6 Amendments of Fabio Massimo CASTALDO related to 2023/2072(INI)
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the coercive policies and the growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including its aggressive stance towards Taiwan and the increasingly moscular posture assumed in the South China Sea, as well as the social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine have exposed the EU’s vulnerabilities and reaffirmed the need to ‘de-risk’ its relations vis-à-vis the PRC and other non- democratic third countries;
Amendment 39 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the Sino-Russian strategic partnership formalised with the Joint Statement "on the international relations entering a new era and the global sustainable development" of 4 February 2022 continues to grow, including in the areas of technology and military capability transfers;
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Emphasises that China produces 70 % of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60 % of global aluminium production and 75 % of silicon production, as well as 94% the global production of gallium and around 60% of germanium production, and is the leading refiner of 60 % of lithium and 70 % of copper processing and produces 84 % of the world’s nickel and 85 % of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly on the production and processing of these critical commodities presents not only an acute geopolitical challenge for the EU, but also a huge risk for Europe’s defence and other industrial sectors;
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Warns that the deterioration in the security environment in Europe, in its neighbourhood, and around the globe requires urgent reflection on how to strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy and reduce its dependencies on countries like the PRC that are systemic rivals, not strategic partners; stresses the need to prevent sensitive emerging technologies and key dual-use items from being leaked to destinations of concern that pursue or collaborate in MCF strategies;
Amendment 102 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Notes that the screening of stakeholders with access to critical infrastructure cannot be limited to direct investment; calls for the current instruments that address foreign direct investment and foreign subsidies to be expanded to include generalised screening procedures for all stakeholders involved in EU critical infrastructure projects; calls on the Commission, with the support of the Member States, to map, track and assess China’s access to critical infrastructure in the EU; stresses that the Member States are ultimately responsible for infrastructure protection, but have not consistently implemented current guidelines on foreign direct investment or set up national-level investment-screening mechanisms; strongly encourages the Member States to refrain from concludings deals that involve the ownership of critical and strategically elevant infrastructures with the PRC;
Amendment 122 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Welcomes the adoption of the European Chips Act, which will increase the EU’s ability to produce semiconductors and create a strategic map of, inter alia, capability gaps in the semiconductor value chain in the EU, thereby limiting the EU’s dependence on third countries such as China; calls for further proposals to secure the production and supply chains of critical infrastructure and material within the EU; welcomes the launch of the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), which will foster the EU's quest for strategic autonomy and digital sovereignty;