2023/2072(INI) The security and defence implications of China influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union
Lead committee dossier:
Progress: Procedure completed
| Role | Committee | Rapporteur | Shadows |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lead | AFET |
GROŠELJ Klemen ( Renew)
|
LEXMANN Miriam ( EPP),
OLEKAS Juozas ( S&D),
GREGOROVÁ Markéta ( Verts/ALE),
MADISON Jaak ( ID),
KANKO Assita ( ECR),
DALY Clare ( GUE/NGL)
|
| Committee Opinion | INTA |
WINKLER Iuliu ( EPP)
|
Reinhard BÜTIKOFER ( Verts/ALE),
Inma RODRÍGUEZ-PIÑERO ( S&D),
Helmut SCHOLZ ( GUE/NGL),
Maximilian KRAH ( ID)
|
| Committee Opinion | IMCO |
Lead committee dossier:
Legal Basis:
RoP 54
Legal Basis:
RoP 54Events
2024/01/17
EP - Text adopted by Parliament, single reading
Documents
2024/01/17
EP - Decision by Parliament
Documents
2023/12/11
EP - Committee report tabled for plenary
Details
The Committee on Foreign Affairs adopted the own-initiative report by Klemen GROŠELJ (Renew, SI) on the security and defence implications of China’s influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union.
China is increasingly gaining access to and exercising influence over European infrastructure and sectors of vital importance for the European Union.
The core of the problem: understanding China’s military-civil fusion strategy
China’s party-driven political system and economy often require private companies to align their commercial interests with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) including its military activities, repression, influence and political interference activities. Consequently, Chinese companies’ international activities support the CCP’s goals of expanding its influence in third countries, undermining geopolitical rivals and increasing China’s influence.
The report stressed the repeated warnings by intelligence agencies against the risks of economic dependence, espionage and sabotage caused by the economic presence of entities from certain non-EU countries, in particular China, in critical infrastructure and strategic sectors across the EU. Members are, in this regard, concerned by the political pressure asserted in the approval of specific Chinese investments into critical infrastructure, as in the case of the German government’s decision to agree to the acquisition of a stake at the port of Hamburg by COSCO, contrary to the advice of the competent institutions.
Consequences of the PRC’s military-civil fusion strategy
Members warned of the risk of Chinese companies having any involvement with EU strategic assets, especially those companies that have direct or indirect links to China’s political-military or intelligence systems. In this regard, they urged EU Member States to increase regulatory oversight and introduce specific background checks over individuals and legal entities with direct ties to the Chinese government.
The Commission and the Member States, in coordination with industry stakeholders are called on to implement the decision to gradually reduce the dependence on China by diversifying the sources of critical raw minerals and rare earth elements, establishing strategic partnerships with reliable third countries with a view to ensuring a secure and reliable supply of critical raw materials.
Developing responses: expanding the toolkit to respond to security and defence concerns
The report argued that a key area of EU critical infrastructure is its network of research institutes and research and development facilities, which play an important role in the EU’s ability to deliver on its green and digital transition commitments, alongside key arenas such as space defence.
Noting that Chinese companies are already leaders in key technologies used in sectors such as 5G wireless infrastructure, drones, batteries, hypersonic missiles, solar and wind energy, as well as cryptocurrency, Members expressed concerns over the uses of these technologies and the dependencies they create. Therefore, they urged the EU and European institutions to carry out a systematic screening of Chinese companies benefiting directly or indirectly from European programmes of strategic importance for the EU and, where necessary, terminate their participation.
Members considered the TikTok app, owned by Chinese conglomerate ByteDance, to be in breach of the European data privacy framework, making it a potential risk and a source of Chinese-backed disinformation. Therefore, they welcomed the decision of EU institutions and those of several EU Member States to suspend the use of the TikTok application on corporate devices , as well as personal devices enrolled in the institutions’ mobile device services.
Still concerned that European critical infrastructure, from telecommunications networks to port facilities, is becoming increasingly vulnerable to external influence, Members commended, in this regard, recent legislative steps to enhance the resilience of critical entities in the EU.
Furthermore, Members called on the Commission to share with Parliament, before the end of this parliamentary term, a detailed analysis of the trade risks linked to technologies such as semiconductors, quantum computing, block chains, space, artificial intelligence and biotechnologies and the possible need for EU action in these fields.
The report also expressed regret at the lack of adequate screening of risks of interference in public procurement related to security equipment, such as the case of the contract signed by Strasbourg airport to install airport security scanners and gates supplied by the European subsidiary of the Chinese company Nuctech, partly owned by the Chinese government and bound by the ‘United Front’ policy.
According to Members, a strategic balance must be found between, on the one hand, the openness of the EU single market and its attractiveness for investments, and, on the other, the defence of the EU’s critical infrastructure and autonomy, considering the EU’s security vulnerabilities, especially as regards economic coercion or threats to the integrity of the EU’s critical infrastructure.
The Commission, in coordination with the Member States, are called on to design a rapid response mechanism for the detection of the dual use, or misuse, of infrastructures in the EU under Chinese ownership, participation or concession, that could be used to terminate the rights of concession and/or suspend the capacity of domain in the cases of ownership and participation.
Members also called for:
- further proposals to secure the production and supply chains of critical infrastructure and materials within the EU;
- a new legislative framework to mitigate the security risks coming from the suppliers of undersea cable systems , including through stricter monitoring and frequent review of the ownership structures of such suppliers, their previous investments in undersea cable systems and the proximity of the undersea cable systems to European and allied military bases.
Internal-external nexus: strengthening the resilience of the EU’s closest partners
The report expressed concern regarding the PRC’s penetration of the EU market and its wider neighbourhood. It called on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to ensure that the measures taken to strengthen the resilience of the EU in the face of Chinese influence, including de-risking, diversification and reduction of critical dependencies, are also extended to the EU’s closest partners, in particular accession countries and those part of the EUs neighbourhood policy.
Members underlined that the risks of espionage are highest when Chinese civilian commercial assets are located in logistical hubs close to EU and NATO naval bases or port operators that have signed agreements to provide logistical support to European companies. Member States are called urgently to address the need to reduce the risks of espionage and sabotage in critical infrastructure, in particular those with a military function, such as ports that are used by NATO. The EU and NATO must work together to develop a long-term plan to counter China’s MCF strategy in Europe.
Documents
2023/11/28
EP - Vote in committee
2023/10/24
EP - Committee opinion
Documents
2023/10/12
EP - Amendments tabled in committee
Documents
2023/09/05
EP - Committee draft report
Documents
2023/06/15
EP - Committee referral announced in Parliament
2023/05/24
EP - WINKLER Iuliu (EPP) appointed as rapporteur in INTA
2023/01/26
EP - GROŠELJ Klemen (Renew) appointed as rapporteur in AFET
Documents
- Text adopted by Parliament, single reading: T9-0028/2024
- Decision by Parliament: T9-0028/2024
- Committee report tabled for plenary: A9-0401/2023
- Committee opinion: PE750.148
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE754.724
- Committee draft report: PE750.176
- Committee draft report: PE750.176
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE754.724
- Committee opinion: PE750.148
- Text adopted by Parliament, single reading: T9-0028/2024
Activities
Votes
A9-0401/2023 – Klemen Grošelj – Motion for a resolution (text as a whole) #
2024/01/17 Outcome: +: 565, 0: 31, -: 26
PPE
NI
The Left| Amendments | Dossier |
| 216 |
2023/2072(INI)
2023/09/11
INTA
65 amendments...
Amendment 1 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Highlights the fact that in 2022, China was the EU’s second largest trade in goods partner;
Amendment 10 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 b (new) 2b. Points out that the political system in China provides for investors based on a combination of private and state actors or of state-owned enterprises, closely linked to the ruling party, and therefore brings ambiguity regarding the interest behind their investments in third countries’ critical infrastructure;
Amendment 11 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3. Is
Amendment 12 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3. Is nevertheless convinced that
Amendment 13 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3.
Amendment 14 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3. Is nevertheless convinced that the trade and investment relationship between the EU and China is of
Amendment 15 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 3 3.
Amendment 16 #
3. Is nevertheless convinced that the trade and investment relationship between the EU and China is of strategic importance and should be rules-based, with the multilateral trading system and the principle of reciprocity at its core; welcomes a strategy built on the concept of ‘de-risking’, alongside higher degrees of awareness as regard vulnerabilities linked to the possible weaponisation of economic dependencies and the foreign control or influence on critical infrastructure;
Amendment 17 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Emphasises that
Amendment 18 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Emphasises that trade and investment
Amendment 19 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Emphasises that trade and investment are key drivers of sustainable growth, job creation
Amendment 2 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Highlights the fact that in 2022, China was the EU’s second largest trade in goods partner; expresses concern about the increasingly unbalanced trade and investment relationship between the EU and China, which is also highlighted by the EU’s record trade deficit of EUR 396 billion in 2022; notes that through trade with China, in particular electronic consumer goods, and ICT devices have become affordable for EU citizens, and that EU companies are producing on a large scale in China, including for export to the EU;
Amendment 20 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Emphasises that trade and investment are key drivers of sustainable growth, job creation and innovation and that the EU should therefore maintain its economic openness1 ; stresses that increased investment and international cooperation in research and development are needed in order to develop and roll- out innovations that can help mitigate the effects of global warming and other environmental challenges, in accordance with commitments in respective international agreements; _________________ 1 Commission communication of 18
Amendment 21 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Emphasises that trade and investment are key drivers of sustainable growth, job creation and innovation and that the EU should therefore maintain its economic openness1
Amendment 22 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 4. Emphasises that trade and investment are key drivers of sustainable growth, job creation and innovation and that the EU should therefore attempt to maintain its economic openness1 vis-à-vis China when possible, whilst being aware of the possible use of state-owned enterprises for political influence; _________________ 1 Commission communication of 18
Amendment 23 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Points out that the quality of a foreign investment should be measured by its medium and long-term impact on the receiving region or business; reiterates that foreign investors must comply with their obligations as investors and respect EU and Member State legislation regarding workers' rights and including works councils, health at the working place, and environmental legislation and regulations;
Amendment 24 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Calls the European Commission and the Member States to deliver on open strategic autonomy to regain lost ground in all those fields where China's dominant position creates a risk of overdependance to the EU.
Amendment 25 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Calls on the Commission to consider ways of making its FDI screening opinions more impactful, in order to avoid distortions of the internal market and a race to the bottom between Member States;
Amendment 26 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 4 b (new) 4b. Calls on the European Commission and the Member States to conduct a process to increase the harmonization of the regulations on screening and control of foreign investments, and to fully implement the Foreign Direct Investment screening mechanism . Likewise, the Commission and the Member States must pay attention to investments by third countries, which could carry an indirect control position by China, through ownership or relevant participation in companies from those third countries.
Amendment 27 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Acknowledges that
Amendment 28 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Acknowledges that
Amendment 29 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 5. Acknowledges that in certain cases,
Amendment 3 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 1. Highlights the fact that in 2022, China was the EU’s second largest trade in goods partner; expresses concern about the increasingly unbalanced trade and investment relationship between the EU and China, which is also highlighted by the EU’s record trade deficit of EUR 396 billion in 2022; highlights China’s unbalanced international trade policy in the context of its Dual Circulation Strategy; asks the European Commission to raise European concerns with China on its managed trade practices;
Amendment 30 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Is concerned about China’s assertive geopolitical and economic rise that has a considerable impact on the global economic and political developments particularly of the Global South, through its Belt and Road Initiative; calls on the Commission and the Member States to screen with a particular attention China’s acquisitions of critical infrastructures in the Western Balkans and in the EU neighbourhood countries; calls on China to increase transparency on Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) projects, given that many BRI loans that have underperformed and became not financially viable.
Amendment 31 #
5a. Stresses that, as a reliable partner, the EU should engage on equal footing with partner countries, building long term, mutually beneficial partnerships. Calls on the Commission and EEAS to ensure that EU investments, notably via Global Gateway projects, in partner countries support partner countries in their own just and sustainable transition, delivering benefits on the ground in line with international climate agreements, ILO conventions, our Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights;
Amendment 32 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Recommends that a rejection of a Chinese investor shall not result in the failing of the development of the concerned infrastructure, and should therefore be compensated by a public investment, embeded both in EU and Member State economic policies;
Amendment 33 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Is concerned about the impact of large-scale investments by Chinese companies on the usability of European ports by NATO forces;
Amendment 34 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6.
Amendment 35 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6.
Amendment 36 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6. Welcomes the Commission’s proposed European economic security strategy2 , which aims to maximise the benefits of the EU’s economic openness while minimising
Amendment 37 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6. Welcomes the Commission’s proposed European economic security strategy2 and the de-risking paradigm , which aims to maximise the benefits of the EU’s economic openness while minimising the risks resulting from economic
Amendment 38 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6. Welcomes the Commission’s
Amendment 39 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6. Welcomes the Commission’s proposed European economic security strategy2 , which aims to maximise the benefits of the EU’s economic openness while minimising the risks resulting from economic interdependencies; stresses nevertheless the need for enhanced international cooperation in the interest of citizens and for strengthening the EU economies; approves of the fact that the strategy explicitly recognises that risks to the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure are key security vulnerabilities for European economies; is highly concerned by the growing number of EU-based businesses that were targeted for blackmail, industrial espionage, sabotage, or data theft, and that China has become the second most common country of origin of these attacks; calls on the authorities in China and the EU to cooperate in the fight against cybercrime; _________________ 2 Joint communication from the
Amendment 4 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Is mindful that the positive image products originating in the EU enjoy among the growing Chinese middle class, which outnumbers already the entire population of the EU, has been a key to success for EU exports to China, which were exceeding a combined value of 230 billion Euro in 2022;
Amendment 40 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6. Welcomes the Commission’s proposed European economic security strategy2 , which aims to maximise the benefits of the EU’s economic openness while minimising the risks resulting from economic interdependencies; approves of the fact that the strategy explicitly recognises that risks to the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure are key security vulnerabilities for European economies; recommends that proposed outbound investment screening mechanism is built on an impact assessment that includes strong consultation from businesses to minimise any potential negative consequences on European competitiveness; _________________ 2 Joint communication from the
Amendment 41 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 6. Welcomes the Commission’s proposed European economic security strategy2 , which aims to maximise the benefits of the EU’s economic openness while minimising the risks resulting from economic interdependencies; approves of the fact that the strategy explicitly recognises that risks to the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure are key security vulnerabilities for European economies; is convinced that the protection of critical infrastructure should be a key element in the implementation of the strategy; _________________ 2 Joint communication from the
Amendment 42 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Underlines that EU responses must be built around an augmented understanding of the relevant strategic picture centred on cross-policy and cross- national threat assessments and vulnerability studies on critical infrastructure; is of the opinion that a decentralised or lacunar perception, lacking clear visibility and scrutiny over projects with strategic significance for Europe’s defence and security can greatly harm the Union’s geopolitical interests1a; recalls vulnerabilities linked to foreign interference, specifically in the information space, and the interplay between FDI projects and information manipulation operations by malign foreign actors; _________________ 1a Security implications of China-owned critical infrastructure in the European Union - DG EXPO in-depth analysis
Amendment 43 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Urges the Commission and the Member States to secure the main use of EU infrastructures is preserved and protected, to allow the normal development of EU economic activity and trade, notably transport (ports, airports, train, and roads) energy and telecommunication infrastructures. Calls on the Commission to periodically report to the European Parliament on: a) the detection of possible dual use of strategic infrastructures that provide logistical and intelligence support to China; b) the full respect of EU trade legislation, especially due diligence, anti coercion and forced labour of goods entering the EU markets.
Amendment 44 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Raises concerns over the fact that Chinese investment in critical infrastructure in third countries may lead to gaining control in or over some sectors, which in turn could facilitate espionage and control of access; believes in this respect that cooperation between EU Member States is key, in ensuring security and public order when it comes to foreign direct investments into the EU but also in order to ensure incentives for Union wide strategic cooperation that makes configurations like the 14+1 less attractive ;
Amendment 45 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Is of the opinion that fair, transparent, sustainable and mutually reinforcing trade relationships between the EU and China are of strategic importance and should be rules-based, with the multilateral trading system, the principle of reciprocity, and international labour and environmental agreements at its core;
Amendment 46 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Calls on the Commission to pursue a pragmatic and holistic approach when implementing the European economic security strategy, by taking into consideration the strategy’s impact on the economic interests and the competitiveness of the European Union.
Amendment 47 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 b (new) 6b. Calls on the European Commission in coordination with the Member States, to design a rapid mechanism of response, in case of detection of dual use, or misuse, of the infrastructures in the EU, which are under property, participation or concession to China, that could lead to the cancellation of the rights of concession, and/or the suspension of the capacity of domain in the cases or property and participation.
Amendment 48 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 c (new) 6c. Calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, to activate procedures for the suspension and revocation of China's capacity of domain, or concessions in case that, in the context of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, China involves in the conflict on the side of the aggressor, to avoid any possible dual or direct use, jeopardising EU and/or Ukrainian security.
Amendment 49 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 d (new) 6d. Calls on the European Commission and China to explore coordinated ways to boost trade and investment, looking to better adaptation of China to EU legislation and to the international and multilateral trade provisions.
Amendment 5 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 2. Notes that Chinese investments in Europe continued to decline in 2022, reaching a 10-year low of EUR 7.9 billion; recalls a shift in Chinese FDI from mergers and acquisitions (M&A) towards greenfield investments, primarily in battery technology, which is a key sector of the Green Transition1a; _________________ 1a https://rhg.com/research/chinese-fdi-in- europe-2022-update/
Amendment 50 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 6 e (new) 6e. Calls on the Commission to fully put in force the recently developed legislation and mechanisms to address the unbalanced trade relationship and mitigate EU vulnerabilities, such as the screening of Foreign Direct Investment, the review of Trade Defence Instruments, the International Procurement Instrument, the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation, the export controls, the anti- coertion instrument the Critical Raw materials proposal, the Net Zero Industries Act, and the European Economic Security Strategy. Calls on China to cooperate to level the playing field limiting the assistance and the intervention in Chinese companies and removing the restrictions of European companies’ access.
Amendment 51 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Recalls that the Regulation on the screening of foreign direct investments3 addresses risks to security and public order resulting from investments from outside the EU; recalls also that according to this regulation, the decision on whether to set up a screening mechanism or to screen a particular foreign direct investment remains the sole responsibility of the Member State concerned; notes that critical infrastructure is among the factors that may be taken into consideration by the Member States or the Commission in determining whether an investment is likely to affect security or public order.
Amendment 52 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Recalls that the Regulation on the screening of foreign direct investments3 partly addresses risks to security and public order resulting from investments from outside the EU;
Amendment 53 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Recalls that the Regulation on the screening of foreign direct investments3 addresses risks to security and public order resulting from investments from outside the EU; notes that critical infrastructure is among the factors that may be taken into consideration by the Member States or the Commission in determining whether an investment is likely to affect security or public order; encourages the Commission to present an ambitious legislative proposal on a revised EU FDI screening Regulation adequately addressing all the loopholes that have emerged during the implementation of the present Regulation, as well as a legislative proposal on a screening mechanism for outbound investments. _________________ 3 Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the
Amendment 54 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Recalls that the Regulation on the screening of foreign direct investments3 addresses risks to security and public order resulting from investments from outside the EU; notes that critical infrastructure is among the factors that may be taken into consideration by the Member States or the Commission in determining whether an investment is likely to affect security or public order
Amendment 55 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 7. Recalls that the Regulation on the screening of foreign direct investments3 addresses risks to security and public order resulting from investments from outside
Amendment 56 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. Highlights the role of the EU as a promotor of quality infrastructure projects abroad, through initiatives such as the Global Gateway or through the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment; underlines the EU’s need to deliver on its value-based and sustainability-driven rhetoric of international infrastructure projects, acknowledging the vital geostrategic role such programs can have at the level of diversification, supply chain resilience, standard setting and regulatory alignment;
Amendment 57 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. Points out that the security of citizens should not be characterised merely under military defence aspects, as safeguarding their well-being includes economic, social and environmental dimensions; calls therefore on the EU institutions and Member States to increase their joint efforts to implement own policies and realise investments to lift up economic abilities in order to deliver high well-being standards for all people in the EU;
Amendment 58 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen the EU strategic autonomy notably by building diversified, secure and resilient supply chains and by increasing its actions in key areas such as research and development, cutting-edged technologies, critical raw materials, reindustrialisation and new infrastructures.
Amendment 59 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. Recalls that the EU must continuously, and actively, work towards the attainment of its strategic autonomy.
Amendment 6 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 2. Notes that Chinese investments in Europe continued to decline in 2022, reaching a 10-year low of EUR 7.9 billion; welcomes Chinese investment if it doesn’t hurt security or the public order; emphasizes that at the same time adequate investment screening must be pursued;
Amendment 60 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 b (new) 7b. Argues that a key area of EU critical infrastructure is also its network of research institutes and R&D facilities, which play a pertinent role in the Union’s ability to deliver on its green and digital transitions, alongside key arenas such as space of defence; reminds of security vulnerabilities linked to forced technology transfers, IP-theft and knowledge leaks, both at home and abroad, and calls for increased vigilance in accounting for such threats to the EU’s ability to innovate and foster growth.
Amendment 61 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 b (new) 7b. Calls on the Commission to design actions to reduce the risks for EU own security and to develop internal resilience, strenghthening the security and integrity of its critical infrastructures, the supply chains and the technology base, notably the 5G and 6G networks, all of them essential for our normal economic activity and trade; calls the Commission and the Member States to review their networks security toolbox.
Amendment 62 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 b (new) 7b. Recommends to reduce risks rather by a focus on trust-building EU- China initiatives such as establishing a formal decarbonisation partnership, also as a further step towards setting multilateral rules and standards on sustainability ;
Amendment 63 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 c (new) 7c. Calls on the Commission, the EU institutions and the Member States to terminate any research funding to Chinese companies active in the areas of critical and strategic importance for the EU, such as ICT, and to channel risks related to contracting operators using Chinese equipment.
Amendment 64 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 d (new) 7d. Calls on China to put in place and implement a responsible digital governance, with respect for privacy rights, freedom of expression and the rule of law in its digital governance policies, in the framework of WTO and multilateral standards; calls on the Commission to assess other areas under risk such as the semiconductors, quantum computing, blockchains, space, AI or biotechnologies, and consider legislation or tools for further protection against malicious software and cyber espionage.
Amendment 65 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 7 e (new) 7e. Requires the Commission to share with the European Parliament, before the end of this parliamentary term, a detailed analysis of the risks for EU trade, regarding the semiconductors, quantum computing, blockchain, space, AI or biotechnologies and the possible need of EU action in these fields.
Amendment 7 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 2. Notes that China was the seventh biggest investor in the EU in 2021 and that Chinese investments in
Amendment 8 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 2. Notes that Chinese investments in Europe remains way below its potential, and even continued to decline in 2022, reaching a 10-year low of EUR 7.9 billion; observes that Chinese greenfield investments in the EU reached a ten-year- high at the same time;
Amendment 9 #
Draft opinion Paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. Highlights that according to an Evaluation from the European Union Court of Auditors, Chinese investments in the EU have been concentrated during 2000-2020 in strategic areas such as transport and infrastructure, information and communication technologies, and energy;
source: 752.864
2023/10/12
AFET
151 amendments...
Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 4 a (new) – having regard to joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank of 1 December 2021 entitled “The Global Gateway” JOIN(2021) 30 final,
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 9 Amendment 100 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Notes that the screening of stakeholders with access to critical infrastructure cannot be limited only to direct investment; calls for the current instruments that address foreign direct investment and foreign subsidies to be expanded to include generalised screening procedures for all stakeholders involved in EU critical infrastructure projects; calls on the Commission, with the support of the Member States, to map, track and assess China’s
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Notes that the screening of stakeholders with access to critical infrastructure cannot be limited to direct investment; calls for the current instruments that address foreign direct investment and foreign subsidies to be expanded to include generalised screening procedures for all stakeholders involved in EU critical infrastructure projects;
Amendment 102 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Notes that the screening of stakeholders with access to critical infrastructure cannot be limited to direct investment; calls for the current instruments that address foreign direct investment and foreign subsidies to be expanded to include generalised screening procedures for all stakeholders involved in
Amendment 103 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Notes that the screening of stakeholders with access to critical infrastructure cannot be limited to direct investment; calls for the current instruments that address foreign direct investment and foreign subsidies to be expanded to include generalised screening procedures for all stakeholders involved in EU critical infrastructure projects encompassing all modes of participation in critical infrastructure endeavors, including collaborative ventures, partnerships, and technology transfers; calls on the Commission, with the support of the Member States, to map, track and assess China’s access to critical infrastructure in the EU; stresses that the Member States are ultimately responsible for infrastructure protection, but have not consistently implemented current guidelines on foreign direct investment or set up national-level investment-screening mechanisms;
Amendment 104 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Notes that the screening of stakeholders with access to critical infrastructure cannot be limited to direct investment; calls for the current instruments that address foreign direct investment and foreign subsidies to be expanded to include generalised screening procedures for all stakeholders involved in EU critical infrastructure projects; calls on the Commission, with the support of the Member States, to map, track and assess China’s access to critical infrastructure in the EU; stresses that the Member States are ultimately responsible for infrastructure protection
Amendment 105 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Notes that the screening of stakeholders with access to critical infrastructure cannot be limited to direct
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9.
Amendment 107 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Regrets in this regard the lack of adequate screening of risks of interference on public procurement related to security equipment, such as the case of the contract signed by the Airport of Strasbourg to instal airport security scanners and gates supplied by the European subsidiary of the Chinese company Nuctech, partially owned by the Chinese government and bound by the United Front policy; warns that any such technologies could incorporate in-built security gaps or be accessed during their maintenance;
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 a (new) 9a. Welcomes the decision of the Romanian government to terminate negotiations with China General Nuclear Power Corporation, GCNPC, on the construction of nuclear reactors 3 and 4 at Cernavoda and further welcomes the ratification of the 2020 intergovernmental agreement with the United States on cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, including construction of reactors 3 and 4 at Cernavoda;
Amendment 109 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 b (new) 9b. Recalls that Huawei has been participating in 11 projects under Horizon Europe until June 2023, thus receiving 3.89 million euros of funding in total, and raising obvious security concerns due to the type of services that threaten the EU's data security and strategic autonomy; therefore, calls on the EU and European institutions to carry out a systematic screening of Chinese companies benefiting directly or indirectly from European programmes of strategic importance for the EU;
Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 9 a (new) – having regard to the Final Assessment Report of the NATO-EU Task Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure of 29 June 2023,
Amendment 110 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Welcomes the potential of the Commission’s proposal for a European economic security strategy to expand the EU toolkit to exports or outward investments in a narrow set of key enabling technologies with military applications, inter alia, in the areas of quantum computing, advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence; calls for the swift adoption of the Commission’s proposals and for the Member States to fully implement the EU’s expanded regulatory framework to exclude entities that could contribute to MCF
Amendment 111 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Welcomes the potential of the Commission’s proposal for a European economic security strategy to expand the EU toolkit to exports or outward investments in a narrow set of key enabling technologies with military applications, inter alia, in the areas of quantum computing, advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence;
Amendment 112 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Welcomes the potential of the Commission’s proposal for a European economic security strategy to expand the EU toolkit to exports or outward investments in a narrow set of key enabling technologies with military applications, inter alia, in the areas of quantum computing, advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence; calls for the swift adoption of the Commission’s proposals and for the Member States to fully implement the EU’s expanded regulatory framework to exclude entities that could contribute to MCF and to find alternatives for Chinese-financed projects in the EU;
Amendment 113 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Welcomes the potential of the Commission’s proposal for a European economic security strategy to expand the EU toolkit to screen exports or outward investments
Amendment 114 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Welcomes the
Amendment 115 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Welcomes the potential of the
Amendment 116 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Welcomes the
Amendment 117 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Further welcomes the Commission’s proposal to prevent the leakage of sensitive emerging technologies by establishing a list of dual-use technologies, based on narrowly defined and forward-looking criteria, such as the potential enabling and transformative nature of a technology
Amendment 118 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Further welcomes the High Representative and Commission’s proposal to prevent the leakage of sensitive emerging technologies by establishing a list of dual-use technologies, based on narrowly defined and forward-looking criteria, such as the potential enabling and transformative nature of a technology, the risk of MCF and the risk of the technology being misused to violate human rights; calls on the Commission and the Member States to identify and implement the relevant protection measures for these dual-use technologies as soon as possible;
Amendment 119 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 a (new) 11a. Calls on the Commission to establish a regulatory framework and additional security standards for Chinese suppliers of 5G and 6G networks;
Amendment 12 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 9 b (new) – having regard to the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/102,
Amendment 120 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Welcomes the adoption of the European Chips Act, which will increase the EU’s ability to produce semiconductors and create a strategic map of, inter alia, capability gaps in the semiconductor value chain in the EU, thereby limiting the EU’s dependence on third countries such as China; calls for further proposals to secure the production and supply chains of critical infrastructure and material within the EU; further calls on the Commission and Member States to develop additional initiatives aimed at enabling closer coordination and collaboration with like- minded partners and allies to monitor and develop further, where possible and in line with the EU’s aim to reduce further dependencies, global production capacities and supply chains of critical infrastructure and materials which are crucial to the security and defence of the Union;
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Welcomes the adoption of the European Chips Act, which will increase the EU’s ability to produce semiconductors and create a strategic map of, inter alia, capability gaps in the semiconductor value chain in the EU, thereby limiting the EU’s dependence on third countries such as
Amendment 122 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Welcomes the adoption of the European Chips Act, which will increase the EU’s ability to produce semiconductors and create a strategic map of, inter alia, capability gaps in the semiconductor value chain in the EU, thereby limiting the EU’s dependence on third countries such as China; calls for further proposals to secure the production and supply chains of critical infrastructure and material within the EU; welcomes the launch of the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), which will foster the EU's quest for strategic autonomy and digital sovereignty;
Amendment 123 #
12. Welcomes the adoption of the European Chips Act, which will increase the EU’s ability to produce semiconductors and create a strategic map of, inter alia, capability gaps in the semiconductor value chain in the EU, thereby limiting the EU’s dependence on third countries such as China; calls for further proposals to secure the production and supply chains of critical infrastructure and material within the EU, as well as strengthening strategic partnerships, such as with Taiwan;
Amendment 124 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Welcomes the adoption of the European Chips Act, which will increase the EU’s ability to produce semiconductors and create a strategic map of, inter alia, capability gaps in the semiconductor value chain in the EU, thereby limiting the EU’s dependence on third countries
Amendment 125 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 a (new) 12a. Notes that ports are gateways to the world and as such play a crucial role in the EU's economy; nots with concerning, however, that Chinese-owned or controlled entities have strategically increased their stakes in European ports and port infrastructure, including the Germany's Hamburg and Duisburg, Greek ports of Pireus and Thessaloniki, Belgium's Zeebrugge and Antwerp, the Neterlands' Rotterdam, Spain's Valencia, Bilbao and Barcelona, France's Montoir, Dunkirk, Le Havre and Fos, Sweden's Stockholm, Poland's Gdynia, Italy's Vado Ligure and Malta's Marsaloxlokk;
Amendment 126 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 a (new) 12a. Underlines the importance of the Critical Raw Materials Act and recalls that critical raw materials are essential for the success of the EU’s digital and green transitions, but also for the security and defence sector; emphasises the need to establish strategic partnerships with third countries with a view to ensuring a secure and reliable supply of critical raw materials;
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 b (new) 12b. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to urgently address the need to reduce the risks of espionage and sabotage in critical infrastructure, in particular those with a military function, such as ports that are used by NATO;
Amendment 128 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 c (new) 12c. Calls on the Commission to present an EU strategic policy framework to reduce and limit influence and operational control by China and other regimes that a security threat to the Union in the EU’s ports and in their processes and hinterland operations;
Amendment 129 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 d (new) Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 10 a (new) – having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 on the update of the EU Maritime Security Strategy and its Action Plan entitled ‘An enhanced EU Maritime Security Strategy for evolving maritime threats’ (JOIN(2023)0008),
Amendment 130 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Calls on the Commission to propose a new legislative framework to mitigate the security risks coming from the suppliers of undersea cable systems, including through stricter monitoring and frequent review of the ownership structures of such suppliers, their previous investments in the undersea cable systems and the proximity of the undersea cable systems to European and allied military bases; stresses the need to prevent cable system suppliers, such as Chinese companies, from sharing data with intelligence services other than to protect the infrastructure from outside intrusions or malignant attacks; calls in this regards for initiatives aimed at the further development of European owned or based companies in the field of undersea cable systems;
Amendment 131 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Calls on the Commission to propose a new legislative framework to
Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Calls on the Commission to propose a new legislative framework to mitigate the security risks coming from the suppliers of undersea cable systems; stresses the need to prevent cable system suppliers
Amendment 133 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 a (new) 13a. Recalls the need to perform a thorough evaluation of the EU institutions' information security infrastructure and services, in particular regarding classified communications between the institutions and missions and operations abroad; reminds that the full supply chain should be taken into account to ensure that the companies do not have any direct or indirect links with the PRC; calls for specific provisions in EU institutions procurements procedures to limit the risk of interference, including the acquisition, maintenance, or the vetting of third party;
Amendment 134 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 a (new) 13a. Stresses the importance of tracking and assessing China’s access to critical infrastructure in the EU, as well as strengthening FDI-screening procedures with due-diligence standards to identify China’s leverage on investors in critical infrastructure;
Amendment 135 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 a (new) 13a. Encourages the EU and Member States to deepen cooperation with Taiwan in confronting disinformation from mainland China, including the sharing of best-practices;
Amendment 136 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 b (new) 13b. Underlines the need to coordinate critical-infrastructure protection at EU and national levels; considers that responsibility for protecting critical infrastructure ultimately lies with Member States, which should enact critical-infrastructure protection regulations consistent with those in force at EU level;
Amendment 137 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Is cognisant of the
Amendment 138 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14.
Amendment 139 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 a (new) 14a. Notes that despite European FDI screening mechanisms, Chinese companies have been granted contracts in European critical infrastructure, leading to security risks; calls therefore on the Council and the Commission to exclude the use of equipment and software from manufacturers based in the PRC, particularly ByteDance, Huawei, ZTE and Nuctech; calls on critical sectors to exclude the use of hardware and software from the PRC in order to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data and services; considers the TikTok app, owned by Chinese conglomerate ByteDance, to be in breach of the European data privacy framework, making it a potential risk and a source of Chinese-backed disinformation; welcomes the decision of the EU institutions to restrict the use of TikTok on corporate devices; recommends the banning of TikTok at all levels of national government and in the EU institutions;
Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 11 a (new) – having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN/2021/0030),
Amendment 140 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 a (new) 14a. Recalls that in order to ensure climate and economic resiliance of all countries, the UN states that all countries and all sectors of society need to act now; empasises that increasing great power competition in the military and economic spheres is directly contrary to the interests of humanity at the present conjuncture, and that in the interests of stability and the sustainable survial of the human species we need increased international cooperation across all sectors; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that all measures are taken to advance international cooperation on climate action;
Amendment 141 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 a (new) 14a. Encourages dialogue and cooperation with like-minded partners, such as Taiwan, in all industrial sectors and supply chains, in particular emerging industries and industries of strategic importance such as electronic vehicles, robotics and smart manufacturing, as well as semiconductor technologies, in order to divert the EU's and Member States' dependence on China;
Amendment 142 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Recalls that the PRC’s naval forces have means and legal tools to ensure that China’s civilian ships and infrastructure can be used for military and security purposes; considers that China can use its civilian commercial infrastructure to support the PLA’s presence in third countries; warns that such MCF provides the PLA with access to foreign ports, enabling it to pre-
Amendment 143 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Notes that one third of all African infrastructure built since 2010 has been financed and constructed by Chinese state- owned enterprises; underlines that, over the past 20 years, China has increased its trade, investment and loan commitments with few or opaque contractual obligations; expresses concern that this Chinese model is clearly attractive to many countries that cannot satisfy EU requirements for accessing equivalent levels of finance, thereby expanding Chinese influence to the detriment of EU partnerships; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that the EU’s high standards for investment with partners do not compromise it security relationships and engagement as a reliable and strategic partner; calls on the Commission to effectively use the Global Gateway as an instrument to increase the EU’s presence and visibility worldwide by means of infrastructure investment that creates national value in partner countries, in line with the Sustainable Development Goals; calls on the Commission to strengthen its cooperation with international financial institutions and the private sector to mobilise the necessary funding;
Amendment 144 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Notes that one third of all African infrastructure built since 2010 has been financed and constructed by Chinese state- owned enterprises; underlines that, over the past 20 years, China has increased its trade,
Amendment 145 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Notes that one third of all African infrastructure built since 2010 has been financed and constructed by Chinese state- owned enterprises; underlines that, over the past 20 years, China has increased its trade, investment and loan commitments worth $ 160 billion with few or opaque contractual obligations with African Governments and their state-owned enterprises predominately in transportation, power generation, mining and telecommunications; expresses concern that this Chinese model is clearly attractive to many countries that cannot satisfy EU requirements for accessing equivalent levels of finance, thereby expanding Chinese influence to the detriment of EU partnerships; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that the EU’s high standards for investment with partners do not compromise it security relationships and engagement as a reliable and strategic partner;
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Notes that one third of all African infrastructure built since 2010 has been financed and constructed by Chinese state- owned enterprises; underlines that, over the past 20 years, China has increased its trade, investment and loan commitments with few or opaque contractual obligations; expresses concern that this Chinese model is clearly attractive to many countries that cannot satisfy EU requirements for accessing equivalent levels of finance, thereby expanding Chinese influence to the detriment of EU partnerships; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that the EU’s high standards for investment with partners do not compromise its security relationships and engagement as a reliable and strategic partner;
Amendment 147 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Notes that one third of all African infrastructure, including around 50 % of Africa’s 3G networks and 70 % of its 4G networks, built since 2010 has been
Amendment 148 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 a (new) 16a. Recognises that the increase of China’s strategic investments in Sub- Saharan Africa is a matter for concern; highlights in particular the fact that a single Chinese telecommunication company has constructed up to 70% of Africa’s information technology infrastructure, as well as the role played by Chinese companies in the financing, building, expansion and renovation of at least 14 sensitive intra-governmental African telecommunication networks; consequently warns of the certain possibility of access by Chinese State- owned enterprises to the telecommunications of African citizens and institutions;
Amendment 149 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 a (new) 16a. Emphasises the need for a geopolitical approach to global cooperation on critical infrastructure in order for the EU to successfully face up to the new security challenges; in this context welcomes the European Union’s Global Gateway Initiative that seeks to provide connectivity solutions, including in the area of critical infrastructure, to third countries that are sustainable and trusted; urges Council and Commission to swiftly implement projects, especially lighthouse projects, under the initiative;
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 11 a (new) – having regard to the Parliament's resolutions of 9 March 2022 and of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,
Amendment 150 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Underlines with concern that the P
Amendment 151 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 a (new) 17a. Calls on the Commission to periodically report to the European Parliament on the detection of possible dual use of strategic infrastructures that provide logistical and intelligence support to China which poses a security concern to the Union;
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 11 a (new) – having regard to the Critical Raw Materials Act proposed by the Commission on 16 March 2023 (COM(2023) 160),
Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas the recent joint communication on a European economic security strategy focuses on minimising the risks arising from certain economic flows and the Union's dependency on authoritarian and totalitarian regimes such as the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the context of increased geopolitical tensions and accelerated technological shifts, while protecting free market principles from distortion by such regimes and, thereby, preserving maximum economic openness and dynamism;
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas the recent joint communication on a European economic security strategy focuses on managing and minimising the risks arising from certain economic flows in the context of increased geopolitical tensions and accelerated technological shifts, while preserving maximum economic openness and dynamism;
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A a (new) Aa. whereas disruptions to critical infrastructure can have significant negative consequences for vital government functions, essential services to the population, economic activity as well as security and defence of the Union;
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 4 b (new) – having regard to the Commission recommendation of 3.10.2023 on critical technology areas for the EU's economic security for further risk assessment with Member States (C(2023) 6689),
Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A a (new) Aa. whereas the European Union remains committed to the 'One-China' policy and recognises the government of the PRC as the sole legal government of China;
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B a (new) Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C a (new) Ca. whereas pursuant to the international commitments undertaken in the WTO, in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and in the trade and investment agreements concluded with third countries, it is possible for the EU and the Member States to adopt restrictive measures relating to foreign direct investment on the grounds of security or public order, subject to certain requirements;
Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution Recital C b (new) Cb. whereas the three largest Chinese shareholders in European ports have assets in almost half the ports (14 out of 29) that are located either close to naval bases or provide logistical support to NATO forces, highly increasing the risk of espionage;
Amendment 24 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas in direct response to the coercive policies
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas the coercive policies and the growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including its aggressive stance towards Taiwan and the increasingly moscular posture assumed in the South China Sea, as well as the social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine have exposed the EU’s vulnerabilities and
Amendment 26 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas the coercive policies and the growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including its increasingly aggressive stance towards Taiwan, as well as the social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine have exposed the EU’s vulnerabilities and reaffirmed the need to ‘de-risk’ its relations vis-à-vis the PRC and other non-
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas the coercive policies and the growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including its aggressive stance towards Taiwan, as well as the social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine have exposed the EU’s vulnerabilities and
Amendment 28 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D a (new) Da. whereas in 2021-22, China engaged in economic blockade against Lithuania in response to Lithuania's decision to withdraw from Belt and Road Initiative and to open Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania, resulting in the European Commission's request to establish a panel at the World Trade Organization to examine the legality of China's trade restrictions against Lithuanian and EU exports containing Lithuanian content; this demonstrates China's assertiveness in targeting specific EU countries, not only through direct economic coercion, but also through the threat of secondary sanctions;
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E E. whereas China’s acquisition of critical infrastructure, especially within the EU
Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 5 a (new) – having regard to the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries (2021/0406(COD)),
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E E. whereas China’s
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E E. whereas China’s acquisition of critical infrastructure, especially in the EU’s neighbourhood, including the Western Balkans, and in Africa, poses an increasing risk to the trade-security nexus;
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E a (new) Ea. whereas China’s national security related legislation, such as the 2015 National Security Law of People's Republic of China, requires citizens and organisations to provide support and assistance to the PRC’s public security, state security or military organs;
Amendment 33 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E a (new) Ea. whereas a large number of Chinese students study in Member States universities, especially in the field of dual use technologies potentially leading for some to a high risk of espionage;
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E a (new) Ea. whereas China is involved in constructing EU-funded infrastructure in different EU Member States;
Amendment 35 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E b (new) Eb. whereas China is restricting non- Chinese companies from participating in infrastructure projects due to security risks and is putting forward legislation with regard to critical infrastructure, such as Critical Information Infrastructure Security Protection Regulations;
Amendment 36 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E b (new) Eb. whereas former European fighter pilots have been employed by the Chinese army; whereas such recruitments create a heavy riskof transfer of critical information putting the military-strategic interests of the concerned countries at risk;
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E b (new) Amendment 38 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E c (new) Ec. whereas the Chinese government has demonstrated that it is willing to weaponize its overwhelming control of global rare earth supplies to obtain political concessions;
Amendment 39 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F F. whereas the Sino-Russian strategic partnership formalised with the Joint Statement "on the international relations entering a new era and the global sustainable development" of 4 February 2022 continues to grow, including in the areas of technology and military capability transfers;
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 5 b (new) – having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China strategy (2021/2037(INI)), inter alia aimed at strengthening the EU’s `trade toolbox` to help mitigate the current disproportioned bilateral economic and trade relations between China and the EU,
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F F. whereas the Sino-Russian strategic partnership continues to grow, including in the areas of technology and military capability transfers, posing an increasing threat to European security;
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F F. whereas the Sino-Russian strategic partnership continues to grow, including in the areas of technology and military know- how and capability transfers;
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F a (new) Fa. whereas the spread of China’s digital authoritarianism and mass surveillance continues to intensify both within China and beyond, targeting democratic institutions and societies;
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F b (new) Fb. whereas totalitarian China’s rapidly rising technological, economic and military power risks establishing a new international order that would endanger freedom and democracy around the world;
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F c (new) Fc. whereas Chinese ambitions are growing in strategic areas such as AI, cloud computing, semiconductors, or hardware; whereas these instruments, particularly AI, could be developed for military purposes, driving the next revolution in military affairs;
Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Underlines that China’s military- civil fusion (MCF) strategy is a state-led, state-directed programme and plan to
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Underlines that China’s military- civil fusion (MCF) strategy is a state-led, state-directed programme and plan to
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 1 1. Underlines that China’s military- civil fusion (MCF) strategy is a state-led, state-directed programme and plan to instrumentalise all levers of state and commercial power to strengthen and support the
Amendment 48 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Considers that China’s
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Considers that China’s party-driven political system and economy often require private companies to align their commercial interests with the CCP’s military, repression and political interference activities; highlights that, consequentially, Chinese companies’ international activities
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 6 a (new) – having regard to the Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union,
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Considers that China’s party-driven political system and economy often require private companies to align their commercial interests with the CCP
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Considers that in China’s
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Believes that MCF must be understood in a larger political and strategic context, taking into account its interconnections with other initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (including the Digital Silk Road), subversion activities and China's increasing assertiveness and aggressive posturing abroad; believes that the ultimate aim of MCF is to advance
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Believes that MCF must be understood in a larger geopolitical, economic and strategic context, taking into account its interconnections with other initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (including the Digital Silk Road) and the Global Security Initiative; believes that the ultimate aim of MCF is to advance China’s long-term strategic goal to become the world’s leading power
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Believes that MCF must be understood in a larger political and strategic context, taking into account its interconnections with other initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (including the Digital Silk Road)
Amendment 55 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Believes that MCF must be understood in a larger political and strategic context, taking into account its interconnections with other initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (including the Digital Silk Road); believes that the ultimate aim of MCF is to advance China’s long-term strategic goal to become the world’s leading power and to undermine the rules-based international order;
Amendment 56 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Believes that MCF must be understood in a larger political and strategic context, taking into account
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Recalls that achieving primacy in science and technology has been one of the CCP’s top priorities in recent years and that the CCP’s MCF strategy incentivises the sharing of research and development results between market- oriented and Chinese defence industries;
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution Subheading 2 Consequences of the PRC’s
Amendment 59 #
Motion for a resolution Subheading 2 a (new) Notes that while China can already compete with the United States military across a range of military fields, a hegemonic military presence is dependant on the ability to project power across the world through military bases and military equipment, the United States, with its hundreds of bases and military equipment encircling the globe poses a far greater threat than any other military power on earth;
Amendment 6 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 6 b (new) – having regard to the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries COM/2021/775 final,
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Warns of the risk of Chinese companies having any involvement with EU strategic assets, especially those companies that have direct or indirect links to China’s military system; underlines, in this regard, its concern that technology and technological expertise will be transferred to China’s military, increasing the PLA’s ability to develop the next generation of military technology, which may be used to coerce partners in Asia and around the world; urges EU member states to increase regulatory oversight and introduce specific background checks over individuals and legal entities with direct ties to the Chinese government;
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Warns of the risk of Chinese
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Warns of the risk of Chinese companies having any involvement with EU strategic assets, especially those companies that have direct or indirect links to China’s military or inteligence systems; underlines, in this regard, its concern that technology and technological expertise will be transferred to China’s military, increasing the PLA’s ability to develop the next generation of military technology, which may be used to coerce partners in Asia and around the world;
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Warns of the risk of Chinese companies having any involvement with EU strategic assets, especially those companies that have direct or indirect links to China’s military system; underlines, in this regard, its concern that technology and technological expertise
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Underlines that PRC projects power overseas by using a network of commercial ports and dual-use facilities that provide logistics and intelligence support to the Chinese navy; notes that in 2022, Chinese companies owned or operated terminals in 96 ports across 53 countries; further notes that in at least 9 ports, two of which in Europe, PLAN warships have undergone significant repairs or maintenance for vessels and equipment; points out that naval visits reveal areas of influence, prioritised operational zones, intelligence collection objectives and cooperation priorities;
Amendment 66 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. Stresses the repeated warnings by intelligence agencies against the risks of economic dependence, espionage and sabotage caused by the economic presence of entities from non-EU countries, in particular China, in critical infrastructure and strategic sectors across the EU;
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Emphasises that China produces 70 % of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60 % of global aluminium production and 75 % of silicon production, is the leading refiner of 60 % of lithium and 70 % of copper processing and produces 84 % of the world’s nickel and 85 % of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly on the production and processing of these critical commodities
Amendment 68 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Emphasises that China produces 70 % of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60 % of global aluminium production and 75 % of silicon production, is the leading refiner of 60 % of lithium and 70 % of copper processing and produces 84 % of the world’s nickel and 85 % of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly on the production and processing of these critical commodities presents not only an acute geopolitical challenge for the EU, but also a huge risk for Europe’s defence and other industrial sectors; welcomes, in this regard the Commission proposal for the Critical Raw Materials Act and calls for the speedy implementation of its goals in order strengthen the Union’s supply chain resilience;
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Emphasises that China produces 70 % of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60 % of global aluminium production and 75 % of silicon production, as well as 94% the global production of gallium and around 60% of germanium production, and is the leading refiner of 60 % of lithium and 70 % of copper processing and produces 84 % of the world’s nickel and 85 % of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly on the production and processing of these critical commodities presents not only an acute geopolitical challenge for the EU, but also a huge risk for Europe’s defence and other industrial sectors;
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 6 c (new) – having regard to the Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market,
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Emphasises that China produces 70 % of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60 % of global aluminium production and 75 % of silicon production, is the leading refiner of 60 % of lithium and 70 % of copper processing and produces 84 % of the world’s nickel and 85 % of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly on the production and processing of these
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Emphasises that China produces 70 % of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60 % of global aluminium production and 75 % of silicon production, is the leading refiner of 60 % of lithium and 70 % of copper processing and produces 84 % of the world’s nickel and 85 % of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly on the production and processing of these critical commodities, creates crucial dependencies and therefore presents not only an acute geopolitical challenge for the EU, but also a huge risk for Europe’s defence and other industrial sectors;
Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Emphasises that China produces 70 % of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60 % of global aluminium production and 75 % of silicon production, is the leading refiner of 60 % of lithium and 70 % of copper processing and produces 84 % of the world’s nickel and 85 % of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in Serbia (copper and gold), the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly on the production and processing of these critical commodities presents not only an acute geopolitical challenge for the EU, but also a huge risk for Europe’s defence and other industrial sectors;
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Emphasises that China produces 70 % of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60 % of global aluminium production and 75 % of silicon production, is the leading refiner of 60 % of lithium and 70 % of copper processing and produces 84 % of the world’s nickel and 85 % of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly on the production and processing of these critical commodities presents not only an acute geopolitical challenge for the EU, but
Amendment 74 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Emphasises that 98% of EU’s demand for rare earths is being met by the PRC, and that the EU is also reliant on China for solar panels, clean technology, cars, and pharmaceutical technology; underlines the importance of reshoring, using various ways to encourage it, such as financial incentives, innovation policies, industrial policies, trade policies, environmental policies or monetary policies;
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Further calls on the EU and member states to gradually reduce the dependence on China by diversifying the sources of critical raw minerals and rare earth elements to domestic production and urging the EU to assist member states in developing projects, such as lithium mining, that will aim for greater independence from Chinese production;
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Recalls that both diplomatic and military communication travels through privately owned undersea cables provided by Chinese companies, such as HMN Technologies, a PLA cyber intelligence– affiliated entity; expresses its grave concern over the undersea data cable systems operated by Chinese company HMN Technologies, which connect EU Member States’ territories and the Indo- Pacific region, including Member State and NATO military bases in the region, creating security vulnerabilities as regards to cyber security, underwater surveillance and the collection of intelligence;
Amendment 77 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Recalls that both diplomatic and military communication travels through privately owned undersea cables provided by Chinese companies, such as HMN Technologies, a PLA cyber intelligence– affiliated entity; expresses its grave concern over the undersea data cable systems operated by Chinese company HMN Technologies, which connect EU Member States’ territories and the Indo- Pacific region, including Member State and NATO military bases in the region,
Amendment 78 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6.
Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6. Recalls that
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 8 a (new) – having regard to the embargo imposed by China on Lithuania in December 2021, following the approval of the establishment of a representative office of Taiwan in Vilnius,
Amendment 80 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Notes that Chinese companies are already leaders in key technologies used in sectors such as 5G wireless infrastructure, drones, batteries, hypersonic, solar and wind energy, as well as cryptocurrency; expresses its concerns over the uses of these technologies and the dependencies they create which could be used to apply economic leverage and enhance the CCP’s influence over European assets and critical infrastructure;
Amendment 81 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. In this regard, is concern with the sale of a Dutch company, the backbone of Estonia’s internet infrastructure, to a Chinese company linked to the PLA; highlights the need for a joint effort among the Member States to prevent similar cases;
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Warns that the deterioration in the security environment in Europe and around the globe requires urgent reflection on how to strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy and reduce its dependencies on countries that pose a security threat to the Union like the PRC
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Warns that the deterioration in the
Amendment 84 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Warns that the deterioration in the security environment in Europe and around the globe requires urgent reflection on how to strengthen the EU’s
Amendment 85 #
7. Warns that the deterioration in the security environment in Europe and around the globe requires urgent reflection on how to strengthen the EU’s open strategic autonomy and reduce its dependencies on non-democratic countries like the PRC
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Warns that the deterioration in the security environment in Europe, in its neighbourhood, and around the globe requires urgent reflection on how to strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy and reduce its dependencies on countries like the PRC that are systemic rivals, not strategic partners; stresses the need to prevent sensitive emerging technologies and key dual-use items from being leaked to destinations of concern that pursue or collaborate in MCF strategies;
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Warns that the deterioration in the security environment in Europe and around the globe requires urgent reflection on how to strengthen the EU’s strategic
Amendment 88 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. Considers it necessary to strengthen FDI-screening procedures with due-diligence standards to identify China’s leverage over investors in EU critical infrastructure, such as European ports and undersea cables in the Baltic, Mediterranean and Arctic seas; underlines that this approach should apply equally to candidate and potential candidate countries;
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. Strongly advocates for the diversification of suppliers and partners in critical infrastructure initiatives to reduce the vulnerability to external influences, ensuring that reliance on any single source is minimized;
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 8 a (new) – having regard to the G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué of 20 May 2023,
Amendment 90 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. Stresses that the EU and NATO must work together to develop a long-term plan to counter China’s military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy in Europe;
Amendment 91 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. Welcomes the publication of the Final Assessment Report of the EU- NATO Task Force and calls for the full implementation of its recommendations;
Amendment 92 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 b (new) 7b. Warns that large investments in seaports, railways and airports give Beijing the opportunity to monitor and control activities in key logistical nodes with a fundamental strategic dimension;
Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Remains concerned that European critical infrastructure is becoming increasingly vulnerable to external influence; commends, in this respect, recent legislative steps to enhance the resilience of critical entities in the EU; notes with concern, however, that such initiatives are largely limited to screening procedures for foreign direct investment, leaving other channels open for the CCP to gain access and influence over critical assets; is further concerned by the political pressure asserted in the approval of specific Chinese investments into critical infrastructure, as in the case of the German government's decision to agree to the acquisition of a stake at the port of Hamburg by COSCO, contrary to the assessment of the intelligence services;
Amendment 94 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Remains concerned that European critical infrastructure, from telecommunications networks to port facilities, is becoming increasingly vulnerable to external influence; commends, in this respect, recent legislative steps to enhance the resilience of critical entities in the EU; notes with concern, however, that such initiatives are largely limited to screening procedures for foreign direct investment, leaving other channels open for the CCP to gain access and influence over critical assets; notes that a framework introducing rules for cooperation and sharing of information on FDI between EU member states and the European Commission is a good first step, more must be done in this direction to ensure the protection of critical European infrastructure from Chinese interferences;
Amendment 95 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Remains concerned that European critical infrastructure is becoming increasingly vulnerable to external influence; commends, in this respect, recent legislative steps to enhance the resilience of critical entities in the EU; notes with concern, however, that such initiatives are largely limited to screening procedures for foreign direct investment, leaving other channels open for the CCP to
Amendment 96 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 a (new) 8a. welcomes the decision of EU institutions and those of several EU Member States to suspend the TikTok application on corporate devices, as well as personal devices enrolled in the institutions’ mobile device services; calls for implemention of the suspension across all EU and Member State institutions, as well as a thorough risk assessment of other such vendors with connections to authoritarian and totalitarian regimes;
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 a (new) 8a. Notes that the establishment of a thorough risk assessment and mapping framework is imperative to identify critical infrastructure assets and their susceptibilities; calls on the Commission, with the support of the Member States, to compile an exhaustive inventory of critical assets and systematically evaluate their vulnerability to external influences;
Amendment 98 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 b (new) 8b. Notes with concern that Huawei today controls just under 50% of the EU's 4G network and, in the case of 5G, 100% of the 5G RAN in Cyprus is composed of Chinese equipment, and 59% in the case of Germany; stresses that this runs counter to the EU's “5G security toolbox” guidelines to mitigate security risks in networks and calls on the Member States to remove equipment and services from Huawei, ZTE and other vendors in core network functions;
Amendment 99 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 b (new) 8b. Underlines that routine evaluations of critical infrastructure projects that involve non-EU stakeholders are essential; this process should encompass scrutiny of ownership structures, dependencies within supply chains, and the transfer of technology associated with these projects;
source: 754.724
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