Activities of Bernd LUCKE related to 2016/2063(INI)
Plenary speeches (2)
European Central Bank annual report for 2015 (A8-0302/2016 - Ramon Tremosa i Balcells) DE
European Central Bank annual report for 2015 (debate) DE
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on the European Central Bank Annual Report for 2015 PDF (281 KB) DOC (58 KB)
Amendments (19)
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 a (new)
Citation 2 a (new)
- having regard to Article 123(1) thereof,
Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 3
Citation 3
- having regard to the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, in particular Article 15 and 21 thereof,
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the inflation target is getting harder to reach owing to consolidation of demographic trECB's policy is based on the assumption that the inflation target can be controlled via money supply and interest rate while monetary developmendts and the full impact of trade globalisation on a high-unemployment European socisuggest that this might hold for capital markets but does not seem to have a current effect on goods marketys;
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)
Recital J a (new)
Ja. whereas in a monetary union monetary policy cannot be tailored to developments in particular countries;
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J b (new)
Recital J b (new)
Jb. whereas the ECB's president has continued to stress the urgency of much- needed structural reforms in the Eurozone;
Amendment 59 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J c (new)
Recital J c (new)
Jc. whereas Article 123 TFEU and Article 21 of Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank prohibit the monetary financing of governments;
Amendment 68 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Stresses that the euro area continues to suffer from a high level of unemployment and excessive low inflation and that, in addition, the euro area is facing a very low level of productivity growth, which is the result of the lack of investment since the beginning of the crisis; acknowledges in this regard that some problems of the weaker euro area economies are due to the impossibility of a nominal depreciation in the Eurosystem; notes that the high level of public debt and the huge number of non- performing loans in the banking sector in some Member States are still fragmenting the euro area financial market, thus reducing room for manoeuvre to support the most fragile economies;
Amendment 81 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Acknowledges that, confronted with this very complex environment and the risks of a prolonged period of low inflationIs concerned that, the ECB was not within the terms of its mandate iwhen adopting extraordinary measures to lift inflation back up to the medium-term objective of 2 %; points out that the ECB bond-buying programmes violates at least the intent, if not the letter, of Article 123 TFEU; urges the ECB to refrain from assuming a political role and monetary financing government deficits; notes that, since the launching of the APP in March 2015, and owing to targeted long-term refinancing operation (TLTRO) programmes targeted at the real economy, financialng conditions have improved, which has promoted a recovery in lending to firms and households in the euro area slightly;
Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
Amendment 110 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Agrees with ECB President Mario Draghi that the singleConsiders that monetary policy canis not stimulate aggregate demand unless it is complemented by sound fiscal policies and ambitious structural reform programmes at Member State level; recalls that the main benefit of monetary policy is to safeguard price stability in order to guarantee a stable environment for investment; considers that monetary policy is not the appropriate tool to solve the structural problems of the European economythe appropriate tool to solve the structural problems of the European economy; Believes that non-standard monetary policy must not be used as a pretext for Member states to defer fiscal consolidation and structural reforms;
Amendment 129 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Underlines that structural reforms in the economy and the labour market should also fully take into account the demographic trends in Europe, in order to create incentives for a more balanced demographic structure that would make it easier to maintain an inflation target of around 2 %; urges the ECB to contribute to creating conditions incentivising Member States to implement ambitious structural reforms to enhance flexibility and competition in product and labour markets;
Amendment 136 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Notes, however, that even though the impactsize of unconventional monetary policy measures has been significant, inflation is not expected to converge to the 2 % medium-term objective at the 2017 horizon; notes that the current weak recovery in bank and market lending has not whollyyet produced the expectedany major effect on the existing investment gap in the euro area so far;
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Deplores the existing, albeit gradually decreasing, gaps between the financing rates granted to SMEs and those granted to bigger companies, between lending rates on small and large loans, and between credit conditions for SMEs located in different euro area countries, but recognises the limits of what monetary policy can achieve in this respect; stresses that the lack of trust and transparency in the banking system as well as the persistent need for balance sheet adjustments affect the availability of credit for SMEs in some Member States and dampens economic activity;
Amendment 185 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Recognises the existence of distributional consequences of the ECB policies, which can be perceived astend to increasinge inequalities, but believes that the ECB policies are the right ones to lower the costs of credit for citizens and SMEs and enhance employment in the euro areay;
Amendment 196 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Stresses the prerequisites defined by the Court of Justice that have to be met by any purchase of government bonds of Member States of the Euro zone on the secondary market by the European System of Central Banks ("ESCB"): purchases are not announced, the volume of the purchases is limited from the outset, there is a minimum period between the issue of the government bonds and their purchase by the ESCB that is defined from the outset and prevents the issuing conditions from being distorted, the ESCB purchases only government bonds of Member States that have bond market access enabling the funding of such bonds, purchased bonds are only in exceptional cases held until maturity and purchases are restricted or ceased and purchased bonds are remarketed should continuing the intervention become unnecessary;
Amendment 223 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Recalls that the independence of the ECB for the conduct of monetary policy, as enshrined in the Treaties, is crucial to the objective of safeguarding price stability; asks all governments to avoid statements questioning the role played by the institution within its mandate;
Amendment 236 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. Asks the European Central Bank to specifically identify and measure the effects of the central bank's actions throughout the economy;
Amendment 241 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 b (new)
Paragraph 16 b (new)
16b. Asks the European Central Bank to better explain to the public where and how its actions affect the economies of the member states, particularly in view of recent unorthodox monetary policy measures;
Amendment 246 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 c (new)
Paragraph 16 c (new)
16c. Notes that the ECB's policy to address financial stability risks solely with macro prudential tools is in contradiction with the BIS' view that macro prudential policy is a complement and not a substitute to monetary policy;