[ParlTrack]

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3

(3) Member States should conduct their economic policies ~~and~~in such a way as to ensure economically sustainable economic growth and the efficient use of scarce resources in a market economy committed to providing a sufficient level of social security. Without compromising these objectives, Member States should coordinate themir economic policies in such a way as to attain the objective of strengthening economic, social, and territorial cohesion.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4

(4) The ~~unprecedented~~ financial crisis and economic downturn that hit the world and the euro area has shown that in the euro area available instruments such as the single monetary policy, automatic fiscal stabilisers and discretionary fiscal policy measures at national level are insufficient to absorb large asymmetric shockswas a huge symmetric shock which had a negative impact on all euro area countries and on almost all other countries in the world. Countries recovered from the ensuing economic downturn at very different speeds depending on the structural characteristics of their economies and the economic policies enacted in response to the common shock. The single currency clearly aggravated the recovery for euro area countries whose competitiveness on international markets was low.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4 a (new)

(4a) An asymmetric shock is a shock which harms some countries while other countries benefit from the shock or are not affected at all. As such, the financial crisis was clearly not an asymmetric shock. The Commission is encouraged to invest in capacity building by brushing up basic economic knowledge of its staff.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5

(5) In order to facilitate macroeconomic adjustment and cushion large asymmetric shocks in the current institutional set-up, Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) have to rely more heavily on remaining instruments of economic policy, such as structural reforms, increases in market flexibility, automatic fiscal stabilisers and other discretionary fiscal measures, making the adjustment more difficult overall. The sequence of the crisis in euro area also suggests strong reliance on the single monetary policy to provide for macro-economic stabilisation in severe macro-economic circumstances.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6

(6) TIn response to the financial crisis has resulted in a pro-cyclical pattern for fiscal policies, which has been detrimental to the quality of public finances and in particular for public investment. In turn, that shortcoming has contributed tomany Member States have enacted counter-cyclical fiscal policies, while other countries, in particular those under EFSF or ESM programmes, enacted contractionary fiscal policies in both the recession and the subsequent recovery. Different policies are one, but certainly not the only reason widespread differences in macroeconomic performance between Member States, imperilling cohesion.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7

(7) ~~Additional instruments are therefore necessary to avoid in the future that large asymmetric shocks result into deeper and broader situations of stress and weaken cohesion~~No evidence exists that the Euro area has ever been hit by an asymmetric shock.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8

(8) In particular, in order to support Member States whose currency is the euro to respond better to rapidly changing economic circumstances and stabilise their economy by preserving public investment in the event of large asymmetric shocks,no convincing argument exists for establishing a European Investment Stabilisation Function (EISF) ~~should be established~~.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9

~~(9) EISF should not only benefit Member States whose currency is the euro but also other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II).~~deleted

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10

(10) ~~EISF should be a Union instrument which complements national fiscal policies.~~ It should be recalled that Member States should pursue sound fiscal policies and build up fiscal buffers in favourable economic times. If they do so, they comply with the Treaties and have no need for EU support measures.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11

(11) At Union level, the European Semester of economic policy coordination is the framework to identify national reform priorities and monitor their implementation. Member States develop their own national multiannual investment strategies in support of those reform priorities. Those strategies should be presented alongside the yearly National Reform Programmes as a way to outline and coordinate priority investment projects to be supported by national and/or Union funding. They should also serve to use Union funding in a coherent manner and to maximise the added value of the financial support to be received notably from the programmes supported by the Union under the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion fund, the European Social Fund, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development,~~, the EISF~~ and InvestEU, where relevant.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12

~~(12) The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or its legal successor could provide further support in addition to support under EISF.~~deleted

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13

(13) E~~ISF~~U support ~~should~~may be given in case one or several Member States whose currency is the euro or other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) are confronted with a large asymmetric shock. Changes in unemployment rates are highly correlated with business cycle fluctuations in such Member States. Strong increases in national unemployment rates above their long-term averages are a clear indicator of a large shock in a specific Member State. Asymmetric shocks affect one or several Member States significaThe existence of such shocks can only be established by market data which are exogenous with respect to government policies. Adverse developments in unemployment may clearly have their root in ill-designed government policies. Moreover, adverse developments in unemployment in one countlry moare ~~strongly than the average of Member States~~no proof for the asymmetry of a macroeconomic shock.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14

(14) The activation of EISF support should therefore be determined by a double activation trigger based on both the level of national unemployment rate compared to its past average and the change in unemployment compared to a certain threshold.deleted

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15

(15) Strict eligibility criteria based on compliance with decisions and recommendations under the Union's fiscal and economic surveillance framework over a period of twoen years before the request for EISF support should be fulfilled by the Member State requesting EISF support in order not to diminish the incentive for that Member State to pursue prudent budgetary policies.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18

(18) EISF support should take the form of loans to the Member States concerned~~. That instrument would provide them with financing to continue executing public investment~~ granted under market conditions and subject to a debt sustainability analysis by a highly-reputed and politically neutral academic institution.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19

(19) In addition to loans, no interest rate subsidies should be granted to the Member States concerned to cover the interest costs incurred on such loans, as a specific type of financial assistance under Article 220 of the Financial Regulation. Such an interest rate subsidy would provide additional support in parallel to the loan for Member States undergoing an asymmetric shock and facing tight financing conditions on the financial markets.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20

(20) With a view to ~~swif~~efficiently provide EISF support, the competence for granting the loans when the eligibility and activation criteria are fulfilled and deciding on granting interest rate subsidies should under no means be entrusted to the Commission. Rather, the Council should be entrusted, provided the Council approves of such loans in a unanimous decision.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21

(21) Member States should invest the support received under EISF in eligible public investment and also maintain the level of public investment in general compared to the average level of public investment over the five last years in order to ensure that the objective pursued by this Regulation is achieved. In that respect, there is the expectation that Member States should give priority to maintaining eligible investment in programmes supported by the Union under the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion fund, the European Social Fund, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development.which has a clearly identified European added value. They should critically review the level of public investment compared to the level of public investment which is deemed sustainable.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23

(23) The maximum level of eligible public investment that could be supported by EISF loan for a Member State should be automatically set on the basis of a formula which captures the ratio of public eligible investment to gross domestic product (GDP) in the Union over a period of five years before the Member State concerned requests a loan and its GDP over the same period. The maximumPublic investment should always be in line with the productivity effects it generates. Mechanical and automatically set level s of ~~eligible~~ public investment should also be scaled by means of scaling factor (α) towards the fixed ceiling in the Union budget. That factor is determined such that with hindsight of the recent crisis, all the EISF support could have been provided to the Member States concerned, had the mechanism been in placeentail a waste of resources and remind attentive observers of the huge misallocation of funds in centrally planned economies.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24

(24) The amount of EISF loan should also be automatically determined on the basis of a formula which firstly takes into account the maximum level of eligible public investment that can be supported under EISF and secondly the severity of the large asymmetric shock. The support determined on the basis of that formula should also be scaled in function of the severity of the shock by means of a factor (β). That factor is determined such that for a shock that increases unemployment by more than 2.5 percentage points, the maximum support is made available to the Member State concerned. An EISF loan could be increased up to the maximum level of eligible public investment in case the asymmetric shock is particularly severe as reflected by other indicators of the Member State's position in the economic cycle (e.g. confidence surveys) and a deeper analysis of the macroeconomic situation (as conducted in particular in the context of the macroeconomic forecast and the European Semester). With a view to ensure that as many Member States as possible could qualify for support under EISF, the loan to a Member State should not exceed 30 percent of the remaining available means under the ceiling set for calibrating the loans under EISF to the available means in the Union budget.deleted

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

~~(25) The amount of EISF interest rate subsidies should be determined as a percentage of the interest rate costs incurred by the Member State on the loan granted under the EISF.~~deleted

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 26

(26) A Stabilisation Support Fund should be established to finance the interest rate subsidy. The Stabilisation Support Fund should be endowed with national contributions from Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II).deleted

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27

(27) Both the determination of the amount of the national contributions to the Stabilisation Support Fund and their transfer should be governed by an intergovernmental agreement to be concluded between Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II). That agreement should provide that the national contributions for all the Member States are calculated based on the share of the national central banks of those Member States whose currency is the euro in the monetary income of the Eurosystem. For Member States which participate in ERM II a specific key should be foreseen to determine the national contributions. The Commission should assist the Member States for the calculation of those contributions. To that end, the European Central Bank (ECB) should communicate to the Commission the amount of monetary income the national central banks of the Eurosystem are entitled to.deleted

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 28

(28) After that intergovernmental agreement has entered into force, payment of the interest rate subsidy to the Member State concerned should be conditional upon the Member State transferring its yearly contribution to the Stabilisation Support Fund. Payment of interest rate subsidies should be conditional upon the availability of sufficient means in the Stabilisation Support Fund. Payment of interest rate subsidies from the Stabilisation Support Fund would be postponed in case the interest rate subsidy to a specific Member State would exceed 30 percent of the available means in the Stabilisation Support Fund at the moment when such payment is due.deleted

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29

(29) TUnder no means should the Commission ~~should~~ be in charge for managing the assets of the Stabilisation Support Fund ~~in a safe and prudent manner~~.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 30

(30) In order to increase the impact of public investment and potential EISF support the quality of Member States' public investment systems and practices should be ensured and where appropriate strengthened. An assessment by the Commission should be carried out regularly and take the form of a report and if warranted contain recommendations to improve the quality of public investment systems and practices in Member States. A Member State couldFor its public investment, a Member State may request technical assistance from Commission. The latter could undertake technical missions.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 31

(31) In order to determine the rules for the involvement of the ESM or its legal successor in providing financial assistance in parallel to the Commission in support of public investment, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of the exchange of relevant information as regards the EISF loan, the impact of the ESM's involvement for calculating the amount of EISF support, and the granting of an interest rate subsidy by the Stabilisation Support Fund to the Member State for costs incurred on ESM financial assistance. The Commission should also be empowered to adopt delegated acts determining the percentage in the formula for calculating the interest rate subsidy, the detailed rules for the administration of the Stabilisation Support Fund and the general principles and criteria for its investment strategy. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 13 April 201614 . In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. _________________ 14deleted OJ L 231, 12.5.2016, p. 1

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 32

(32) Pursuant to paragraph 22 and 23 of the Inter-institutional agreement for Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016, there is a need to evaluate this Regulation in order in particular to assess its effectiveness, its contribution to the conduct of economic policies in Member States and the Union's strategy for jobs and growth, and to determine possible further developments that are needed in order to create an insurance mechanism serving the purpose of macro-economic stabilisation. This will be done on the basis of information collected through specific monitoring requirements, while avoiding overregulation and administrative burdens, in particular on Member States. These requirements, where appropriate, can include measurable indicators, as a basis for evaluating the effects of the Regulation on the ground.deleted

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 33

(33) EISF should be considered as a first step in the development over time of a fully-fledged insurance mechanism to cater for macro-economic stabilisation. Currently, EISF would be based on loans and granting of interest rate subsidies. In parallel, it is not excluded that the ESM or its legal successor would be involved in the future by providing financial assistance to Member States whose currency is the euro facing adverse economic conditions in support of public investment. Moreover, a voluntary insurance mechanism with a borrowing capacity based on voluntary contributions by Member States could be set up in the future to provide for a powerful instrument for the purpose of macro- economic stabilisation against asymmetric shocks.deleted

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 35

(35) Horizontal financial rules adopted by the European Parliament and the Council on the basis of Article 322 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union apply to this Regulation. These rules are laid down in the Financial Regulation and determine in particular the procedure for establishing and implementing the budget through grants, procurement, prizes, indirect implementation, and provide for checks on the responsibility of financial actors. Rules adopted on the basis of Article 322 TFEU also concern the protection of the Union's budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States, as the respect for the rule of law is an essential precondition for sound financial management and effective EU funding.deleted

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36

(36) Since the objective of this Regulation, namely setting up a European Investment Stabilisation Function to absorb large asymmetric shocks which risk imperilling economic and social cohesion cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States due to the architecture of the EMU with a centralised monetary policy but national fiscal policies, but can rather, by reason of the scale of action required be better achieved at the Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives,deleted

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2

2. The EISF shall provide financial assistance in the form of loans ~~and interest rate subsidies~~ for public investment to a Member State which is experiencing a large asymmetric shock, provided the public investment projects have a clearly identified European added value.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 3

3. EISF support shall be available for all Member States ~~whose currency is the euro and for other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism referred to in Article 140(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union~~.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3

(3) 'eligible public investment' means: ~~(a)~~ the public investment in support of policy objectives as defined in Regulation (EU) No [XX] of [XX] [insert reference to new Common Provisions Regulation]16 and ~~(b) any expenditure in areas of education and training as de~~shown to have a clearly identifined ~~in Annex A to Regulation (EU) No 549/2013 and not covered in point (a);~~European added value. _________________ 16 [Insert correct reference to new version of Common Provisions Regulation]

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 4

(4) 'EISF support' means Union financial assistance within the meaning of Article [220] of the Financial Regulation in the form of loans ~~and interest rate subsidies~~ under the EISF in support of eligible public investment;

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6 a (new)

(6a) 'asymmetric shock' means a macroeconomic event, beyond the control of a certain Group of Member States (‘Member States concerned’), having large negative impact on the Member States concerned while having no significant negative impact on other Member States.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6 b (new)

(6b) 'large negative impact of a shock' means a difference of more than three percentage points between two IMF forecasts for the real GDP of the calendar year which follows the year in which the shock took place, the difference being calculated between the last IMF forecast preceding the shock and the first IMF forecast after the shock.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6 c (new)

(6c) 'no significant negative impact of a shock' means a difference of less than half a percentage point between two IMF forecasts for the real GDP of the calendar year which follows the year in which the shock took place, the difference being calculated between the last IMF forecast preceding the shock and the first IMF forecast after the shock.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) a decision of the Council establishing that no effective action has been taken to correct its excessive deficit under Article 126(8) or Article 126(11) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in the twoen years prior to requesting support from the EISF;

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) a decision of the Council in accordance with Article 6(2) or Article 10 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1466/9719 establishing that no effective action has been taken to address the observed significant deviation in the twoen years prior to requesting support from the EISF; _________________ 19 Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point c

(c) two successive recommendations of the Council in the same imbalance procedure in accordance with Article 8(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council20 on grounds that the Member State concerned has submitted an insufficient corrective action plan in the twoen years prior to requesting support from the EISF; _________________ 20 Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 25

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point d

(d) two successive decisions of the Council in the same imbalance procedure in accordance with Article 10(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council having established non-compliance by the Member State concerned on grounds that it has not taken the recommended corrective action in the twoen years prior to requesting support from the EISF;

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2

~~2. When the agreement has entered into force, a Member State shall only be eligible for receiving an interest rate subsidy if it complies with its obligations under the agreement.~~deleted

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. A Member State shall be considered to experience a large asymmetric shock if the Commission and the Council concur that a clearly identified macroeconomic event (‘the shock’) was beyond the control of the Member State and the following activation criteria are simultaneously fulfilled:

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) ~~the quarterly national unemployment rate exceed~~For the Member State concerned, the ~~average unemployment rate in the Member State concerned over a period of 60 quarters p~~re is a difference of more than three percentage points between two IMF forecasts for the real GDP of the calendar year which follows the year in which the shock took place, the differenced being ~~the quarter during which the request is made;~~calculated between the last IMF forecast preceding the shock and the first IMF forecast after the shock.

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) ~~the quarterly national unemployment rate increased above one percentage point in comparison to the unemployment rate observed in same quarter of the previous year~~For at least three Member States, there is a difference of less than half a percentage point between two IMF forecasts for the real GDP of the calendar year which follows the year in which the shock took place, the difference being calculated between the last IMF forecast preceding the shock and the first IMF forecast after the shock.

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2

2. The unemployment rate for the purposes of paragraph 1 shall be determined by reference to Regulation (EC) No 577/9822 In particular, it refers to the unemployment rate for the total population, all age categories, in percentage of active population. _________________ 22Council Regulation (EC) No 577/98 of 9 March 1998 on the organisation of a labour force sample survey in the Community OJ L 77, 14.3.1998, p. 3deleted

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 3

~~3. The quarterly national unemployment rate used for the purposes of paragraph 1 of this Article and point (c) of Article 8(1) shall be adjusted for seasonality.~~deleted

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b

~~(b) maintain the same level of its public investment compared to the average level of its public investment in the five previous years.~~deleted

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

The year following the disbursement of the EISF loan, the Commission shall examine whether the Member State concerned has respected the criteria referred to in paragraph 1. In particular, the Commission shall also verify the extent to which the Member State concerned has maintained eligible public investment in programmes supported by the Union under the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion fund, the European Social Fund, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development.

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – point b

~~(b) deciding that upon repayment of EISF loan the Member State concerned shall not be entitled to receive the interest rate subsidy.~~deleted

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2

2. The Commission shall decide the terms of the EISF support. The decision shall contain the amount, the average maturity, the pricing formula, and the availability period of EISF loan ~~and the amount of the interest rate subsidy~~, and the other detailed rules needed for the implementation of the support. When deciding on the terms of the EISF support, the Commission shall take into account the amount deemed to be sustainable within the meaning of Article [210(3)] of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No XX (the ‘Financial Regulation’) under the own resources ceiling for payment appropriations.

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. ~~Without prejudice to paragraph 3, t~~The amount of an EISF loan (S) shall ~~be determined in accordance with the following formula:~~not exceed thirty percent of the total costs of the eligible investment project. Overhead costs shall not count towards the total costs of the investment project.

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

~~S=β×IS×(Increase in unemploymentMS- threshold level)~~deleted

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

deleted

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3

For the purpose of this formula, the following definitions apply: (a) «β» is 0.66; (b) «Is» means the maximum level of eligible public investment that the EISF may support in the Member State concerned referred to in paragraph 2; (c) the increase in the quarterly national unemployment rate referred to in point (b) of Article 4(1) expressed in percentage points; (d) ‘threshold level’ means the threshold defined in point (b) of Article 4(1) expressed in percentage points.deleted means

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4

~~The Commission may nevertheless increase the amount of an EISF loan up to the amount of IS in case of particular severity of the large asymmetric shock experienced by the Member State concerned.~~deleted

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9

Amount of EISF interest rate subsidies 1. An interest rate subsidy (IRS) shall contribute to the interest costs of the EISF loan incurred by the Member State. The amount of an EISF interest rate subsidy shall be determined in accordance with the following formula: For the purpose of this provision, ‘interest rate cost’ means the amount of interest based on the pricing formula determined in the decision of the Commission referred to in Article 6(2) taking into account any refinancing in accordance with Article 12(4); 2. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 21, to amend this Regulation by determining the percentage referred to in paragraph 1 if this appears necessary in view of the implementation of the agreement or the eventual deferral of payments under Article 18(2).rticle 9 deleted

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. In case the ESM or its legal successor provides financial assistance to Member States in support of eligible public investment under modalities and conditions consistent with this Regulation, ~~the Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 21 in order to:~~no further assistance shall be granted.

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point a

~~(a) supplement this Regulation by specifying the exchange of information between the Commission and the ESM or its legal successor as regards the elements referred to in Article 6(2);~~deleted

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) supplement this Regulation by determining rules of complementarity between the financial assistance from the ESM or its legal successor and amounts of EISF support calculated in accordance with Articles 8 and 9;deleted

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point c

(c) amend or supplement Articles 9 and 18 to allow for granting an interest rate subsidy by the Stabilisation Support Fund to Member States for interest costs incurred on financial assistance granted by the ESM or its legal successor to Member States in support of eligible public investment.deleted

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Part 5 – title 2

Interest rate subsidy 15 Disbursement of the interest rate subsidy Without prejudice to Article 5(2) and Article 16, the interest rate subsidy shall be paid to the Member State concerned at the moment when the Member State repays the EISF loan or interest due.deleted

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Part 6

~~[...]~~deleted

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

Bernd LUCKE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 20 – paragraph 2

2. By [DATE two years after the entry into force of this Regulation] at the latest, and every five years after, ~~the Commission~~an independent scientific institute selected by the Member State which has the lowest ratio of Investment Stabilisation Function loans over nominal GDP, shall examine the quality of the public investment management systems and practices in Member States. The ~~Commission~~independent scientific institute shall prepare a report containing a qualitative assessment and a score based on a set of indicators and, if necessary, recommendations to improve the quality of the public investment management systems and practices. The report shall be made public.

2018/11/08
Committee: BUDG ECON

65 Amendments of Bernd LUCKE related to 2018/0212(COD)

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