BETA

29 Amendments of Nicola DANTI related to 2016/2215(INI)

Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Available eEmission control technologies (ECTs) available at the time of adoption of the Euro 5 and 6 NOx emission limits, when properly applied, already allowed diesel cars to meet the Euro 5 NOx emission limit of 180 mg/km and the Euro 6 NOx emission limit of 80 mg/km by the date of their respective entry into force, in real world conditions and not only in laboratory tests.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. The existence of the discrepancies, and their significant negative impact on attaining air quality objectives, in particular with regard to urban areas, had been known to the Commission, to the responsible authorities of the Member States and to many other stakeholders since at least 2004-2005 when the Euro 5/6 Regulation was being prepared. The discrepancies have been confirmed by a large number of studies by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) since 2010-2011 and other researchers since 2010-201104.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Although less so than for NOx emissions, there are also significant differences in the measured values of CO2 emissions and fuel consumption between laboratory tests and tests on the road;
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 24 #
5 a. At the same time, the development of a new, more realistic, laboratory test procedure, the so called Worldwide Harmonized Light vehicles Test Procedure (WLTP), that is due to replace the obsolete NEDC, took an extremely long time, and the test will be mandatory as part of the type approval process of all new vehicle types from 1 September 2017 onwards and for all new vehicles one year later. The WLTP has been chosen by the Commission and Member States as the test procedure for CO2 emissions, other pollutant emissions and fuel consumption measurements for the purpose of type approval.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. The analysis of the minutes of the RDE-LDV working group and of the Technical Committee on Motor Vehicles (TCMV) shows that some Member States, including in particular France, Italy and Spain, acted on several occasions to delay the adoption process of the RDE tests and to favour less stringent testing methods. In addition, several Member States prevented the formation of a qualified majority in the TCMV, resulting in a postponement of the vote on the first RDE package.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9 a. Despite the issue of pollutant emissions from vehicles being not only a highly sensitive and political issue, but also a subject of high concern to the EU citizens, the Commission did not make any attempts to advance the decision- making process by making use of the possibility envisaged in the Regulatory Procedure with Scrutiny to bring forward the proposal to the level of the Council to increase political awareness and to exercise additional pressure on obstructing Member States. The Commission's failure to act in a timely manner on its responsibility to keep the test procedure under review and to revise it to reflect real world conditions constitutes maladministration.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. As the entity responsible for the process and agenda of the RDE-LDV working group, the Commission, and more specifically DG ENTR, should have steered the RDE-LDV working group towards an earlier choice of the option of PEMS testing, as that option was suggested in Recital 15 of the Euro 5/6 Regulation, was widely supported within the RDE- LDV group, and the JRC had already concluded in November 2010 that PEMS testing methods were sufficiently robust. This constitutes maladministration.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Over half of the RDE-LDV working group participants consisted of experts from car manufacturers and other automotive industries. This can inter alia be attributed to the lack of sufficient technical expertise in the Commission departments. While the Commission consulted a wide range of stakeholders and ensured open access to the RDE-LDV group, it should have taken further steps to "as far as possible, ensure a balanced representation of relevant stakeholders, including NGOs, consumers associations and civil society, taking into account the specific tasks of the expert group and the type of expertise required", as required by the horizontal rules for Commission expert groups of 10 November 2010.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Defeat devices were generally not considered among the possible reasons behind the discrepancies between laboratory and on-road NOx emissions and it was not generally suspected that they could be in actual use in any passenger car produced in the EU before the Volkswagen revelations in September 2015, despite the fact that such devices were found in the US in light-duty vehicles in 1995 and in heavy-duty vehicles in 1998.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 88 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 b (new)
16 b. The evidence gathered confirmed that car manufacturers - who are responsible for ensuring that no prohibited defeat device is used in their vehicles - interpret the rules established in Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 in such a way that they are optimising their vehicles in order to simply pass the test cycle and comply with the letter of the law, but not necessarily the spirit. At the same time, the car manufacturers clearly disregarded the provisions set in Article 5(1) of the above- mentioned Regulation, obliging them to equip their vehicles so that the components likely to affect emissions are designed, constructed and assembled so as to enable the vehicle, in normal use, to comply with the Regulation and its implementing measures.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 90 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. No authority searched for defeat devices or proved the illegal use of defeat devices before September 2015. No Member State authority or technical service performed any tests other than the NEDC, that has to be used in the scope of type-approval, which in itself cannot point to the use of a defeat device. While an alternative test in itself may not necessarily identify the use of a defeat device, the use of tests other than the NEDC could indicate suspicious emission behaviour and prompt the need for further investigation. Alternative tests have always been a possibility but have never been used. The vast majority of car manufacturers present on the EU market declared that they use the derogations to the ban on defeat devices foreseen in Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007. The legality of the use of the derogations is subject to ongoing investigations and court cases.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Unlike in the case of heavy-duty vehicles, car manufacturers were not required to disclose or justify their emission strategies. Without such an obligationOnly Article 3(9) of the Commission implementing Regulation (EC) No 692/2008 asks manufacturers, when applying for type-approval, to "provide the approval authority with information on the operating strategy of the exhaust gas recirculation system (EGR), including its functioning at low temperatures". Apparently this information was never used by national type approval authorities to check whether switching off or modulating emission abatement technologies is in line with the provisions on defeat devices. Without an obligation to disclose the complete base and auxiliary emission strategies, which change the base strategies for a specific purpose and in response to a specific set of operating conditions, identifying with certainty a defeat device implemented in software by reverse engineering is a lengthy and burdensome operation with no guarantee of success. Even with RDE tests, the risk that defeat strategies are used cannot be completely excluded in the future.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 96 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18 a. There is no consistent application of EU law in the 28 Member States, thus creating uncertainty in the interpretation of legal provisions and undermining the single market.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 b (new)
18 b. Between 2005 and 2015, the EIB granted loans to the Volkswagen Group in the order of EUR 4.3 billion. Of these about EUR 3.1billion concerned loans for RDI investments for emissions reduction of (passenger and commercial vehicle) engines. It is still unclear, pending ongoing investigations by OLAF and EIB, whether there is a link between the loans received by Volkswagen and the illegal software installed.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 99 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Member States contravened theirDespite the fact that there was a specific legal obligation to monitor and enforce the ban on defeat devices set out in Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007. None of them found, the Member States whose type- approval authorities have, in recent years, issued type-approval to vehicles manufactured by Volkswagen which used illegal software did not identify the defeat devices installed in the Volkswagenose vehicles. Moreover, according to our investigations, most Member States, and at least Germany, France, Italy and Luxembourg, had evidence that irrational emission control strategies, based on conditions similar to the NEDC test cycle (temperature, duration, speed), were used in order to pass the type-approval test cycle. Ongoing investigations and court cases at national level will decide if emission control strategies used by car manufacturers constitute an illegal use of defeat devices or a lawful application of the derogations.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 119 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23 a. The Commission had to be aware of the likely use of defeat devices in practice, since its own Impact Assessment for the 2013 Clean Air Package clearly states that: "In addition to the intrinsic weakness of the NEDC, some vehicles seem to be designed to respect the limits only when tested on this cycle. Moreover, there is increasing evidence of illegal practices by some end users that defeat the anti-pollution systems to improve driving performance or save on the replacement of costly components" (footnote 39 of the Impact Assessment).
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 120 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23 a. Moreover, research findings of the Commission's own science body, the Joint Research Centre, were pointing at the possible use of defeat devices and were seen by DG ENTR officials as "a clear case of hard cycle beating". The data of the Euro 5a diesel vehicle concerned was also part of a JRC report on eco- innovation, published in 2013, and in principle available to all Commission's officials.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 b (new)
23 b. Despite the clear indications of the possible illegal use of defeat devices, the Commission never made use of the provision under Regulation (EC) No 692/2008, which entitles it to request Member States' type approval authorities to provide information on the functioning of emission technology at low temperatures.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 124 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
24. The Commission should have ensured that the JRC's research findings and concerns discussed among the Commission services with regard to possible illegal practices by manufacturers reached the higher levels of the hierarchy. This constitutes maladministration.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 126 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)
24 a. The Commission should have shown more initiative and diligence as regards the possible use of illegal defeat devices by car manufacturers given the general suspicion and numerous indications thereof. The JRC should have received the mandate from the Commission to investigate whether the reported suspicious behaviours of certain vehicles have any illegal connotations.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
26. No specific EU oversight of vehicle type-approval is provided for in the current framework, and the rules are subject to a variety of interpretations across the Member States, partly on account of the absence of an effective system for exchanging information among type- approval authorities and technical services. To correct this shortcoming, several witnesses expressed views in favour of a new European agency dedicated to surveillance of motor vehicles, increased Commission oversight or extending the mandate of an existing agency.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 133 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
29. There is an evident lack of control after type-approval, which is partly due to the current rules and partly due to uncertainty as to which authority is in charge of market surveillance. Effective conformity of production, in-service and end-of-lifecycle conformity checks to uncover cases where production vehicles and vehicles in use do not conform to the type-approved vehicle are often not in place or verified only through documents instead of physical tests carried out in the presence of the authorities. despite the fact that technology allowing vehicles to be measured in real world conditions on a large scale, and without being damaged, already exists
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 149 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
34. The Member States’ failure to organise an efficient market surveillance system constitutes a contravention of EU law. The verification of the conformity of production and in-service conformity of light-duty vehicles is often based only on laboratory tests performed on the car manufacturers’ premises, even if current legislation does not prevent the use of different or additional tests.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 162 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 a (new)
38 a. One of the structural weaknesses of the current type-approval framework in Europe is that it is only the type-approval authority that granted a type-approval to a given vehicle that can effectively withdraw the certificate of conformity that was given to the vehicle concerned.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 166 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39 a (new)
39 a. The European legal framework does not foresee the possibility to compensate consumers if corrective measures such as mandatory recalls imposed by type approval authorities have an adverse impact on the original vehicles' performance (such as its durability, fuel economy or engine performance).
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 185 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 47 a (new)
47 a. The Commission did not take the initiative to push for a coordinated and mandatory recall program at EU level for cars of the Volkswagen group equipped with illegal defeat software.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 191 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52 a (new)
52 a. Whilst the collection of written evidence via submission of written questions and questionnaires to both institutional and non-institutional parties was generally an effective means of evidence gathering, the written replies - essential for the committee to prepare each hearing - were often sent very late with little time left before the hearing to read and analyse the replies.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 197 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 55
55. The procedure followed to grant access to the minutes of the regulatory committee (based on explicit consent by the 28 Member States) was unnecessarily cumbersome, lengthy and based on a very narrow interpretation of the law. The access to those documents was too limited, which led to possible mistakes or important information not being taken into account. It should not be followed again in the future.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS
Amendment 205 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61 a (new)
61 a. In order to facilitate the work of the European Parliament's committees of inquiry, given they work under considerable time pressure to scrutinise a huge amount of documents, it is essential that the rules governing the treatment of confidential information by the European Parliament, and in particular the access rights of members' accredited parliamentary assistants (APAs) to "other confidential information" (OCI), are reviewed.
2017/01/24
Committee: EMIS