Activities of Beatrix von STORCH related to 2015/2221(INI)
Plenary speeches (2)
Banking Union - Annual report 2015 (debate) DE
Banking Union - Annual report 2015 (A8-0033/2016 - Roberto Gualtieri) DE
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on the Banking Union – Annual Report 2015 PDF (403 KB) DOC (130 KB)
Amendments (48)
Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 a (new)
Citation 1 a (new)
– having regard to the Euro Area Summit Statement of 29 June 20121a, envisaging "to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns", __________________ 1a http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/europ ean-council/pdf/20120629-euro-area- summit-statement-en_pdf.
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 12
Citation 12
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the Banking Union (BU) is designed to be an indispensable component of a monetary union and a fundamental building block of a genuinthe eEconomic and mMonetary uUnion (EMU);
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the BU is deemed instrumental to ensuring stability and restoring confidence in euro area banks, enhancing financial integration, fostering risk sharing within the monetary union and contributing to breaking the link between sovereigns and banks at national level;
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas in athe BU athe Single Rulebook musthas been complemented by a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and a common deposit guarantee scheme (DGS), and should be provided with an efficient fiscal backstop at EU level;
Amendment 39 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas the establishment of the SSM within the ECB creates a conflict of interest between pursuing an independent monetary policy and prudential supervision;
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D b (new)
Recital D b (new)
Db. whereas Article 127(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union only allows to confer specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision, so that the SSM, which serves as a general supervisor, has created legal uncertainty to the detriment of the supervised entities;
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas the SRM is the second pillar of the BU and aims to ensure uniform rules and procedures and a common decision- making process for orderly resolution of failing banks with minimum impact on the real economy and public financein order to fully safeguard public finances from the cost of bailing out banks;
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas a common DGS, originally intended as the third pillar of the BU, so far consists only in an approximation of national DGSs, while a common DGS that is able to ensure the same level of protection for deposits, irrespective of their location, is a necessary component of a true BU is inadequate as long as risks differ greatly between national banking systems;
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas a common DGS, originally intended a is the third pillar of the BU, so far and consists only in an approximation of national DGSs, while a common DGS that is able to ensure the same level of protection for deposits, irrespective of their location, is a necessary component of a true BUf national DGSs that, when fully funded, are able to ensure protection for deposits;
Amendment 56 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
Fa. whereas risks cannot be assessed with enough certainty to achieve a fair burden sharing in a common DGS by risk- weighted contributions;
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Welcomes the establishment of the SSM, which has been successful both from an operational point of view and in terms of supervisory quality, and considers it a remarkable achievement, taking into account the complexity of the project and the very short time frame availableTakes note of the establishment of the SSM;
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. WelcomesTakes note of the establishment of the SSM, which has yet to prove to been successful both from an operational point of view and in terms of supervisory quality, and considers it a remarkable achievement,especially taking into account the complexity of the project and the very short time frame available;
Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – introductory part
Paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. WelcomesTakes note in particular, in relation to the operational set-up:
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point a
Paragraph 2 – point a
(a) the recruitment process, which resulted in a good blend of competences, cultures and gender, thus contributing to the supranational nature of the SSM, and the thorough training activity programme for national competent authorities (NCAs) and ECB staff;
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point a
Paragraph 2 – point a
(a) the recruitment process, which resulted in a good blend of competences, cultures and gendernationalities, thus contributing to the supranational nature of the SSM, and the thorough training activity programme for national competent authorities (NCAs) and ECB staff;
Amendment 84 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Notes that the authority of the SSM only extends to banks subject to supervision and should not pose an obstacle to market access;
Amendment 90 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Notes that a very significant share of work is routinely devoted to administrative procedures, required by the SSM Regulation, which may not always be proportionate, and stands ready to consider proposals aimed at reducing the operational burden on structures at all levels and improving the effectiveness of the SSM supervision, namely by delegating certain decisions on specific administrative issues within clear limits and guidelines;
Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Believes that while the degree of effectiveness achieved by JSTs in less than a year is remarkable,Takes note of the effectiveness of JSTs; believes further improvements can be pursued, including by involving NCAs in a more effective way and ensuring that their staff are motivated and involved in the decision- making process;
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Stresses the importance of close interaction between the ECB’s Directorates General (DGs) in charge of direct and indirect micro-prudential supervision and the DG in charge of horizontal supervision and expertise services, and emphasises the role of the latter in improving the comprehension, among supervised entities, of a common supervisory approach underlying the concrete individual micro- prudential measures; insists on the full organisational separation of all staff providing services needed for independent monetary policy purposes;
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Underlines that economic recovery is underway but is still fragile and modest, inflation remains below ithe ECB's target, credit dynamics are still subdued in many jurisdictions and a large stock of non- performing loans weighs on many European banks’ balance sheets, limiting their capacity to finance the economy;
Amendment 128 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Highlights that effective coordination between macro-prudential and micro- prudential policies is crucial, and underlines that the SSM is fully part of the EU macro-prudential framework and has been given relevant macro-prudential responsibilities, together with the NCAs and the ECB Governing Council; recalls that there are limits to coordination due to the organisational separation of monetary policy decisions;
Amendment 136 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Believes that the worldwide drive towards more and better quality bank capital is a necessary condition for a sound banking system capable of supporting the economy and for avoiding any repeat of the enormous bailouts witnessed during the crisipublically financed bailouts;
Amendment 144 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Notes that an increase in capital requirements, beyond a certain threshold, may in the short term induce banks to curtail the supply of credit, and therefore looks forward to an overall stabilisation of the level of capital;
Amendment 149 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Notes that an increase in capital requirements, beyond a certain threshold, may in the short term induce banks to curtail the supply of credit, and therefore looks forward to an overall stabilisation of the level of capital significant increase in non-risk based capital requirements will end the sustained implicit subsidy of the banking sectors' risk taking by the taxpayer and lead to an overall stabilisation of the financial sector by mitigating its systemic risks;
Amendment 155 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Welcomes the remarks made by the Chair of the SSM calling for a more prudent treatment of sovereign bonds with regard to capital requirements as well as introducing limits for large exposures;
Amendment 166 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Believes that the homogenisation of supervisory practices and standards within the euro area is a key objective for the SSM in order to ensure a true level playing field; in this respect, welcomes the agreement on a single implementation of national options and discretion for the euro area; considers that such a single implementation requires a gradual approach and should aim to address all existing barriers and segmentations; stands ready to cooperate at the legislative level to further improve regulatory and supervisory harmonisation;
Amendment 193 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20a. Emphasises in this regard the conflict of interest between monetary and supervisory policy when it comes to emergency aid to banks such as ELA and the assessment of the respective banks' solvency;
Amendment 197 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Believes that the ECB’s supervisory strategy, while avoiding any differentiation along national lines, should reflect and safeguard pluralism of banking models across the EU;
Amendment 208 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
Amendment 209 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. WelcomesTakes note of the efficient and open way in which the ECB has so far fulfilled its accountability obligations towards Parliament and calls upon the ECB to continue to fully engage in this regardfurther improve in this regard, especially with regard to protocols, and to further contribute to improving Parliament’s capacity to assess SSM policies and activities;
Amendment 221 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 a (new)
Paragraph 25 a (new)
25a. Calls on the ECB to annually conduct an external professional audit of its legally required organisational separation of supervisory and monetary policy functions and immediately publish the report;
Amendment 225 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 b (new)
Paragraph 25 b (new)
25b. Calls on the SSM to periodically report to the European Parliament any exchange of information between policy functions under the Decision of the European Central Bank of 17 September 2014 (ECB/2014/39);
Amendment 228 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Welcomes the efficientTakes note of the setting up of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the establishment of the national resolution authorities (NRAs) in the Member States;
Amendment 229 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Welcomes the efficientTakes note of the setting up of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the establishment of the national resolution authorities (NRAs) in the Member States;
Amendment 243 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Encourages the conclusion of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on mutual cooperation and data sharing between the SRB and the ECB as single supervisorSSM, in order to increase efficiency and avoid double reporting for banks, while allowing the SRB to have access to the data necessary to fulfil its institutional mandate;
Amendment 264 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Calls on Member States to fully and swiftly implement the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the intergovernmental agreement (IGA) on transfer and mutualisation of contributions to the Single Resolution Fund; regrets the decision to set up the fund through an IGA rather than through Union law;
Amendment 266 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Calls on Member States to fully and swiftly implement the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the intergovernmental agreement (IGA) on transfer and mutualisation of contributions to the Single Resolution Fund; regretstakes note of the decision to set up the fund through an IGA rather than through Union law;
Amendment 273 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 a (new)
Paragraph 35 a (new)
35a. Considers that the investment strategy of the SRF should help to break the vicious cycle between banks and sovereigns; recommends, therefore, that any obligations of intergovernmental organisations specified in Article 118 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 should not be eligible assets for investments of the SRF;
Amendment 281 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
36. Stresses the needTakes note, as a consequence of the existence of the national compartments in the SRF, to rapidly put in place an adequate bridge financing mechanism in order to provide the fund, if necessary, with sufficient resources in the period before its completion; recalls that the Eurogroup and the Ecofin ministers identifiedof the agreement of Member States participating in the Banking Union, in their statement of 18 December 20135, the possibility of having recourse to both national sources and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and consio establish a bridge financing mechanism in orders the latter the most effective and credible solution, which could be implemented either through a swift revision of the ESM treaty or through appropriate implementation of the provisions of Article 13 thereofo provide the fund, if necessary, with sufficient resources in the period before its completion;
Amendment 305 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
Paragraph 38
38. Recalls that the credibility of the BU, and in particular of bail-in and single resolution provisions, requires a common backstop in order to be able to support the SRF, if necessary, beyond its capacity of EUR 55 billion, and considers that its setting-up should start swiftly and be based on the ESMinstalling a common backstop in order to be able to support the SRF, if necessary, does not take into account that economic and fiscal policy are a matter of national competences; any backstop can thus only be provided on Member States' level;
Amendment 307 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
Paragraph 38
38. Recalls that the credibility of the BU, and in particular of bail-in and single resolution provisions, requires a common backstop in order to be able to support the SRF, if necessary, beyond its capacity of EUR 55 billion, and considers that its setting-up should start swiftly and be baslack credibility, when the SRF together with the banks that are failing do not have sufficient capital available for bail-in; rejects any backstop funded onby the ESMtaxpayer;
Amendment 315 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 a (new)
Paragraph 38 a (new)
38a. Emphasises that the added value of the SRM relies on the credibility of the bail-in and calls for rigid rules that put an end to political discretion whether or not to include certain creditors in the process;
Amendment 318 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
Paragraph 39
39. Underlines that, together with the SSM and the SRM, thany premature capacity to afford the same level of protection to deposits, irrespective of their location, is an indispensable component forwill create moral hazard instead of completing the BU;
Amendment 320 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
Paragraph 39
39. Underlines that, together with the SSM and the SRM, the capacity to af the call ford the same level of protection to deposits, irrespective of their location, is an indispensable component for completing the BU embodied in the EDIS, implies the socialisation of losses and the institutionalisation of a moral hazard problem;
Amendment 338 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
Paragraph 40
40. WelcomesTakes note of the Commission’s announcement regarding the presentation of a legislative proposal for the first steps towards a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) by establishing a reinsurance mechanism at EU level for the national deposit guarantee schemes; stresses that there are economic and legal preconditions to any risk sharing mechanisms with regard to deposits, e.g. harmonisation of insolvency laws and full economic policy coordination;
Amendment 340 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
Paragraph 40
40. WelcomesTakes note of the Commission’s announcement regarding the presentation of a legislative proposal for the first steps towards a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) by establishing a reinsurance mechanism at EU level for the national deposit guarantee schemes;
Amendment 351 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 a (new)
Paragraph 40 a (new)
40a. Recalls the recent changes made to the Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes, which should be fully implemented and funded first to see their effects before further changes are made; requests the Commission to review effective implementation, especially taking into account the level of funds already collected and comparing the findings to similar measures that are able to protect deposits, e.g. ring fencing, institutional protection schemes, and other safeguards;