2015/2221(INI) | [ParlTrack]

Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 a (new)

– having regard to the Euro Area Summit Statement of 29 June 20121a, envisaging "to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns", __________________ 1a http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/europ ean-council/pdf/20120629-euro-area- summit-statement-en_pdf.

Amendment 10 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 12 a (new)

– having regard to the Council statement on Banking Union and bridge financing arrangements for the Single Resolution Fund of 8 December 2015,

Amendment 100 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Emphasises the need to avoid double reporting requirements and more generally an unnecessary administrative burden on credit institutions, in particular smaller banks; underlines that the ECB should avoid any duplications of data, reporting requirements and reporting channels in relation to the financial institutions; calls for increased effectiveness of data collection, which should abide by the "once only" principle and be examined for its usefulness, applicability and proportionality;

Amendment 101 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Emphasises the need to avoid double reporting requirements and more generally an ~~unnecessar~~y administrative burden ~~on credit institutions, in particular smaller banks;~~ that is demonstrated not to be necessary to ensure the soundness and good conduct of credit institutions, in particular smaller banks; calls on the ECB to revise their plans to set up a granular credit data register ("AnaCredit') to ensure full compliance with personal data protection and the principles of proportionality and good administrative behaviour; calls for the ECB to adopt a more transparent process, including the use of timely public consultation before adopting relevant quasi legislative measures;

Amendment 102 #

Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Believes that it is important to diversify the banking system in Europe in order to cushion the fall of credit during recessions; notes in this sense that rules in order to create small banks should be utterly analysed to see if they are hampering competition, and should be harmonized across Member States;

Amendment 103 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Calls on the European Central Bank to take greater account of the proportionality principle in connection with its future supervisory activities;

Amendment 104 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)

6b. Calls on the European Central Bank carry out a further in-depth review of the proposal for the creation of a comprehensive credit risk database (Analytical Credit Dataset, AnaCredit), paying particular attention to the proportionality principle and the need for appropriate thresholds, in order to keep administrative costs within strict limits, particularly for smaller institutions;

Amendment 105 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Stresses the importance of close interaction between the ECB’s Directorates General (DGs) in charge of direct and indirect micro-prudential supervision and the DG in charge of horizontal supervision and expertise services, and emphasises the role of the latter in improving the comprehension, among supervised entities, of a common supervisory approach underlying the concrete individual micro-prudential measures;deleted

Amendment 106 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Amendment 107 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Deplores the location of the SSM inside the ECB, as this is a source of potential conflicts of interest, and observes that the ECB has not been very efficient to date because of insufficient interaction between the directorates- general of the ECB responsible for microprudential supervision and the directorate-general responsible for horizontal supervision and specialised services;

Amendment 108 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Is concerned, without prejudice to the importance of the internal dialogue at the ECB, about the potential conflict of interests at the ECB between its central bank role, notably its programmes for purchase of securities on the secondary market from major commercial banks which moreover it supervises, and its role as the Single Supervisory Mechanism; asks the Commission to examine any measures likely to ensure greater independence for the SSM;

Amendment 109 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Calls for urgent and systematic reviews of comprehensive assessments of ECB supervised institutions in all cases where an institution is deemed sound under the assessment and subsequently runs into trouble as well as appropriate improvements of the methodology in the light of lessons learned;

Amendment 11 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 12 a (new)

– having regard to its resolution of ...1 a on Stocktaking and challenges of the EU Financial Services Regulation: impact and the way forward towards a more efficient and effective EU framework for Financial Regulation and a Capital Markets (2015/2106(INI)), __________________ 1a Please insert date of plenary adoption of 2015/2106 (INI)

Amendment 110 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)

7b. Welcomes the fact that the ECB is working on enhancements in the macro stress testing framework to integrate more realistic dynamic features in the stress testing model-framework, add a proper liquidity stress test component, integrate contagion effects within the banking system as well as the two-way interaction with the real economy and the shadow banking sector in the broader framework; stresses the need to enhance the powers of the ESRB to ensure such stress testing is kept relevant;

Amendment 111 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Amendment 112 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Considers the comprehensive assessment performed ahead of the launch of the SSM to be a fundamental step towards restoring the confidence lost through the crisis years and enhancing the resilience of the euro area banking system by improving its capitalisation and increasing transparency; considers the fact that the distance to default for European banks remains smaller than the US banks as a sign that a future comprehensive assessment of bank balance sheets could be a useful tool in identifying banks that should strengthen capital positions, deal with non- performing loans and inadequate risk weighting of assets;

Amendment 113 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Considers the comprehensive assessment performed ahead of the launch of the SSM to be a ~~fundamental~~ step towards restoring the confidence lost through the crisis years and enhancing the resilience of the euro area banking system by improving its capitalisation and increasing transparency;

Amendment 114 #

Renato SORU, Isabella DE MONTE, Andrea COZZOLINO, Alessia Maria MOSCA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Considers the comprehensive assessment performed ahead of the launch of the SSM to be a fundamental first step towards restoring the confidence lost through the crisis years and enhancing the resilience of the euro area banking system by improving its capitalisation and increasing transparency;

Amendment 115 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Invites the Single Supervisor to extend the scope of the Asset Quality Review to include all Level 3 financial assets, including derivatives, and to recalibrate the stress test, considering additional factors, such as potential litigation costs, with the aim of better preventing banking crises;

Amendment 116 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Underlines that economic recovery is underway but is still fragile and modest, inflation remains below its target, credit dynamics are still subdued in many jurisdictions and a large stock of non- performing loans weighs on many European banks’ balance sheets, limiting their capacity to finance the economy; regrets that the amount of non- performing loans went only down just 2% in the past 12 months according to a recent study; stresses that the ability to write off or sell-on non-performing loans is vital, as it frees up capital to fund new loans to boost the real economy;

Amendment 117 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Underlines that economic recovery is underway but is still fragile and modest, inflation remains below its target, credit dynamics are still subdued in many jurisdictions and a large stock of non- performing loans weighs on many European banks’ balance sheets, limiting their capacity to finance the economy; in Member States with an overwhelming non-performing loans problem, a mechanism responsible for solving this problem should be established as was the case in Spain and in Ireland, in order to deal with it effectively;

Amendment 118 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Underlines that economic recovery is underway but is still fragile and modest, inflation remains below its target, credit dynamics are still subdued in many jurisdictions and a large stock of non- performing loans weighs on many European banks’ balance sheets, limiting their capacity to finance the economy; warns that weak profitability prospects for banks, low secondary market liquidity, rising debt sustainability concerns in the public and non-financial private sectors as well as a rapidly growing shadow banking sector are together the key sources of risk for the EU's financial stability;

Amendment 119 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. ~~Underlines~~Recalls that the signs indicating that economic recovery is underway ~~but is still fragile and modest,~~are distorted by the performance of the euro, the price of oil and the Chinese economy, and are not due to structural changes in the European economy. deplores the fact that inflation remains below its target, and that credit dynamics are still ~~subdued~~worrying in many jurisdictions and a large stock of non- performing loans weighs on many European banks’ balance sheets, limiting their capacity to finance the economy;

Amendment 12 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 12 a (new)

– having regard to Parliament’s Report on the review of the economic governance framework: stocktaking and challenges (2014/2145(INI)),

Amendment 120 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Underlines that economic recovery is underway but is, in part due to a lack of structural reforms, still fragile and modest, inflation remains below its target, credit dynamics are still subdued in many jurisdictions and a large stock of non- performing loans weighs on many European banks’ balance sheets, limiting their capacity to finance the economy;

Amendment 121 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Underlines that economic recovery is ~~underway but is still~~ fragile and modest, inflation remains below ithe ECB's target, credit dynamics are still subdued in many jurisdictions and a large stock of non- performing loans weighs on many European banks’ balance sheets~~, limiting their capacity to finance the economy~~;

Amendment 122 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Underlines that economic recovery is ~~underway but is~~ still fragile and modest, inflation remains below its target, credit dynamics are still subdued in many jurisdictions and a large stock of non- performing loans weighs on many European banks’ balance sheets, limiting their capacity to finance the economy;

Amendment 123 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

Amendment 124 #

Renato SORU, Andrea COZZOLINO, Isabella DE MONTE, Alessia Maria MOSCA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Underlines that economic recovery is underway but is still fragile and modest, inflation remains below its target, credit dynamics are still subdued in many jurisdictions, while tangible improvements could be observed here in the recent past, and a large stock of non- performing loans weighs on many European banks’ balance sheets, limiting their capacity to finance the economy;

Amendment 125 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Underlines that economic recovery is underway but is still fragile and modest, inflation remains below its target, credit dynamics are still subdued in many jurisdictions, while credit conditions still differ among European countries and a large stock of non- performing loans weighs on many European banks’ balance sheets, limiting their capacity to finance the economy;

Amendment 126 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)

9a. Stresses the need to enhance the capacity of banks to lend, in particular to SMEs, including addressing the issue of non-performing loans at European level, notably by facilitating the setting up of asset management companies in those countries where this is deemed to be necessary;

Amendment 127 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Amendment 128 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Highlights that effective coordination between macro-prudential and micro- prudential policies is crucial, and underlines that the SSM is fully part of the EU macro-prudential framework and has been given relevant macro-prudential responsibilities, together with the NCAs and the ECB Governing Council; recalls that there are limits to coordination due to the organisational separation of monetary policy decisions;

Amendment 129 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Highlights that effective coordination between macro-prudential and micro- prudential policies is crucial, and underlines that the SSM is fully part of the EU macro-prudential framework and has been given relevant macro-prudential responsibilities, together with the NCAs and the ECB Governing Council; stresses that these powers of NCAs and the SSM must be complemented by an EU-wide, cross-sectorial macro-prudential authority, which could be a more independent and enhanced ESRB, to ensure that macro risks are tackled in the overall European interest;

Amendment 13 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 14 a (new)

– having regard to the European Systemic Risk Board "Report on the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures" of March 20151 a, __________________ 1a http://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/e srbreportregulatorytreatmentsovereignexp osures032015.en.pdf?405685f026a3b42a9 f5e8fa1098ef5ed

Amendment 130 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)

10a. Is concerned that capital requirements as well as actual capital levels in the EU continue to fall somewhat short of what has been achieved in other important jurisdictions, thereby hampering the resilience of banks, systemic stability and sustainable economic recovery;

Amendment 131 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)

10a. Agrees with views expressed by senior ECB figures that, macroprudential policy must place greater emphasis on preventing large fluctuations in the financial cycle, rather than simply increasing resilience to shocks when they occur. In addition to the bank-side capital based measures enhancing banks' resilience, borrower-based instruments (such as LTVs or DSTIs), which have proved to be more effective in curtailing excessive credit growth, and are also applicable in a time-varying fashion, should gain more prominence and be properly embedded in European legislation, which is not the case at present; further agrees, that a broader macroprudential toolkit is needed to address risks stemming from the shadow banking sector due to its increasing role in credit intermediation;

Amendment 132 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 b (new)

10b. Welcomes the research by the ECB into the definition of financial stability and urges the development of tools such as the systemic risk index discussed in the Financial Stability Review November 2015 for monitoring systemic risk as part of an effective toolkit for managing it;

Amendment 133 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 c (new)

10c. Welcomes the proposal for a structural reform of banks put forward by the European Commission as a first step in addressing the significant systemic risks that persist in the European banking system, especially those stemming from the interaction of real economy oriented banking and more volatile capital market oriented activities; regrets that the European Parliament has so far failed to agree on a common position and the Council has shown no ambition to tackle this key source of financial instability;

Amendment 134 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 d (new)

10d. Notes that the insurance sector is becoming increasingly more involved in financial services originally provided by banks; warns that an unlevel playing field between insurance and banking sectors may lead to regulatory arbitrage of prudential and consumer protection rules; calls, therefore, on the ESFS for an urgent identification of where the principle of "same risk, same rules" is not fully applied and for swift action to be taken to correct this;

Amendment 135 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Believes that the worldwide drive towards more and better quality bank capital is a necessary condition for a sound banking system capable of supporting the economy and for avoiding any repeat of the enormous bailouts witnessed during the crisis; points out that despite the regulatory actions since the financial crisis capital levels especially of some of the largest banks remained surprisingly low;

Amendment 136 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Believes that ~~the worldwide drive towards~~ more and better quality bank capital is a necessary condition for a sound banking system capable of supporting the economy and for avoiding any repeat of ~~the enormous bailouts witnessed during the crisi~~publically financed bailouts;

Amendment 137 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Believes that the worldwide drive towards more and better quality bank capital and less leveraged banks is a necessary condition for a sound banking system capable of supporting the economy and for avoiding any repeat of the enormous bailouts witnessed during the crisis;

Amendment 138 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Believes that the worldwide drive towards more and better quality bank capital is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a sound banking system capable of supporting the economy and for avoiding any repeat of the enormous bailouts witnessed during the crisis;

Amendment 139 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Believes that the worldwide drive towards more and better quality bank capital is a necessary condition for a sound banking system capable of supporting the economy and for avoiding any repeat of the enormous bailouts witnessed during the crisis; considers therefore the Commission's proposal for a Capital Market Union and its attempt to revitalize securitization to be counterproductive as contributing to greater systemic risk and volatility in financing conditions;

Amendment 14 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

~~A. whereas the Banking Union (BU) is an indispensable component of a monetary union and a fundamental building block of a genuine economic and monetary union (EMU);~~deleted

Amendment 140 #

Renato SORU, Andrea COZZOLINO, Isabella DE MONTE, Alessia Maria MOSCA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Believes that the worldwide drive towards more and better quality bank capital is a necessary condition for a sound banking system capable of supporting the economy and for avoiding any repeat of the ~~enormous~~significant bailouts witnessed during the crisis; underlines however that the development of regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector policies at global level (FSB, BCBS, etc.) must have defined aims, and must not be used as a guise to enable unfair competition, nor to negatively target a particular funding model used in one part of the world;

Amendment 141 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

11a. Notes that the Banking Structural Reform, which was conceived to reduce systemic risk and address the issue of "too big to fail" institutions, has yet to be implemented;

Amendment 142 #

Renato SORU, Andrea COZZOLINO, Isabella DE MONTE, Alessia Maria MOSCA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 b (new)

11b. Stresses the need to continue the work aimed at cutting the links between the traditional banking system and the traditional one, as proposed by the Liikanen high-level expert Group;

Amendment 143 #

Pablo ZALBA BIDEGAIN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Notes that an increase in capital requirements, beyond a certain threshold, ~~may~~ in the short term ~~induce banks to curtail the supply of cred~~, limits banks’ lending capacity, and therefore looks forward to an overall stabilisation and evaluation of the level of capital;

Amendment 144 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Notes that an increase in capital requirements, beyond a certain threshold, may in the short term induce banks to curtail the supply of credit~~, and therefore looks forward to an overall stabilisation of the level of capital~~;

Amendment 145 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. NTakes notes that an increase in capital requirements, beyond a certain threshold, may in the short term induce banks to curtail the supply of credit, and therefore looks forward to an overall stabilisation of the level of capital; underlines that the interdependence between capital requirements and credit supply is not straightforward; calls on the Commission, together with the European Supervisory Authorities, to conduct a comprehensive assessment in this field;

Amendment 146 #

Jakob von WEIZSÄCKER, Paul TANG

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Amendment 147 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Notes that an increase in capital requirements, ~~beyond a certain threshold, may in the short term induce b~~needs to be achieved by reducing dividend payments and raising fresh equity instead of a shrinking of balance sheets by meanks tof curtail ~~the supply~~ing of credit, and therefore looks forward to a~~n overall stabilisation of the level of capital~~ smooth and steady phasing in of higher capital requirements by means of retained earnings at the minimum;

Amendment 148 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Notes that ~~an increase in capital requirements, beyond a certain threshold,~~further action with regard to capital requirements may in the short term induce banks to curtail the supply of credit, and therefore ~~looks forward to an overall stabilisation of the level of capital~~wishes banking regulation now to concentrate on balance- sheet assets;

Amendment 149 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Notes that an increase in capital requirements, beyond a certain threshold, may in the short term induce banks to curtail the supply of credit, and therefore looks forward to an overall stabilisation of the level of capital significant increase in non-risk based capital requirements will end the sustained implicit subsidy of the banking sectors' risk taking by the taxpayer and lead to an overall stabilisation of the financial sector by mitigating its systemic risks;

Amendment 15 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the Banking Union (BU) is an ~~indispensable component of a monetary union and a fundamental building block of a g~~essential part of a genuine economic and monetary union (EMU), in particular by contributing to financial stability and a risk-based regulation of the banking sector and by strengthenuin~~e economic and monetary union (EMU)~~g the resolvability of banks to prevent the use of taxpayers' money in case of bank failures;

Amendment 150 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Notes that an increase in capital requirements, beyond a certain threshold, may in the short term create unintended consequences and induce banks to curtail the supply of credit, and therefore looks forward to an overall stabilisation of the level of capital;

Amendment 151 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Notes that a~~n increase in capital requirements, beyond a certain threshold, may in the short term induce banks to~~usterity policies which hamper investment and credit demand as well as a lack of capital and non- performing loans weighing on banks’ balance sheets may curtail the supply of credit, and therefore looks forward to an end of austerity policies and the overall stabilisation of the level of capital;

Amendment 152 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Notes that, while an increase in capital requirements, beyond a certain threshold, may in the short term induce banks to ~~curtail the supply of credit, and therefore looks forward to an overall stabilisation of the level of capital~~curtail the supply of credit, higher and better quality capital is nevertheless essential to ensuring the stability of the supply of credit in the long run, and therefore deplores the fact that banks in the Union were not obliged to recognise losses and raise capital to replace those losses as well as meet higher capital standards much earlier, as they were in the US, which would have restored their lending capacity by now;

Amendment 153 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Notes that an increase in capital requirements, beyond a certain threshold, may in the short term induce banks to curtail the supply of credit, and therefore looks forward to an overall stabilisation of the level of capital; underlines the need to conduct thorough impact assessments on capital requirements embedded in current and future legislation, notably with a view to analyse their consequences as regards the financing conditions of the real economy;

Amendment 154 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Stresses the necessity of addressing the sovereign bank loop and suggests commencing a careful and staged phasing in of large exposure rules for sovereign debt in lock-step with the introduction of EDIS;

Amendment 155 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Welcomes the remarks made by the Chair of the SSM calling for a more prudent treatment of sovereign bonds with regard to capital requirements as well as introducing limits for large exposures;

Amendment 156 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Notes the need for research into crucial principles for an effective supervisory framework on which there is not yet a clear position of the SSM: – financial stability – how to define it and how to measure it; – how much capital should banks hold in "normal" conditions; – the diversification and optimal mix of capital; – what role there is for other prudential requirements; – how do liquidity and capital requirements interact; – in which sub-entity of a banking group should capital and liquidity be located;

Amendment 157 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Considers the ~~stabilis~~upward convergence and harmonization of the supervisory and regulatory frameworks an important element to restore investors’' confidence, to avoid uncertainty about regulatory and supervisory action, and to support growth and financial stability;

Amendment 158 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Considers the stabilisation of the supervisory and regulatory framework an important element to restore ~~investo~~savers’ confidence, to avoid uncertainty about regulatory and supervisory action, and to support growth and financial stability, but also considers that the approach adopted – or in other words the SSM – is not the right answer to the problem;

Amendment 159 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Considers the stabilisation of the supervisory and regulatory framework an important element to restore investors’ confidence, to avoid uncertainty about regulatory and supervisory action, and to support growth and financial stability; calls for reducing complexity in existing regulation in the short term and for establishing in the medium term an integrated European rulebook on financial regulation and consumer rights, replacing the current complex and burdensome silo-like legislation; underlines the need for a reform of the SSM to achieve independence of supervision and monetary policy in order to prevent conflict of interests;

Amendment 16 #

Tom VANDENKENDELAERE

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas ~~the Banking Union (BU) is an indispensable component of a m~~a Single Rulebook is crucial for ensuring financial stability, enhancing financial integration and creating a level- playing field in the European financial market; whereas in the Economic and Monetary uUnion ~~and a fundamental building block of a genuine economic and monetary union (EMU)~~with its shared currency it proved necessary to complement this with a genuine Banking Union to address the sovereign-bank loop and more generally mirror the increased interdependence;

Amendment 160 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

13a. Underlines that for banks, in Member States being in financial distress, transforming Emergency Liquidity Assistance debt into other long term forms of debt could be an option in a way that restores confidence and financial stability, especially in such cases where those banks have shown good implementation record;

Amendment 161 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Welcomes the development of a common methodology for the 2015 round of the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP); takes note that, partly as a consequence of the swift start of the SSM, many aspects of this methodology were finalised while the SREP cycle was already underway, and considers that in order to improve robustness of results and consistency between banks’' risk profiles and capital levels, the process leading to the approval of the common risk assessment may benefit from further refinement; points out that stress tests must include potential second round effects in order to be effective and reliable;

Amendment 162 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Welcomes the development of a common methodology for the 2015 round of the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP); takes note that, partly as a consequence of the swift start of the SSM, many aspects of this methodology were finalised while the SREP cycle was already underway, and considers that in order to improve robustness of results and consistency between banks’ risk profiles and capital levels, the process leading to the approval of the common supervisory standards for risk assessment may benefit from further refinement;

Amendment 163 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Welcomes the development of a common methodology for the 2015 round of the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP); takes note that, partly as a consequence of the swift start of the SSM, many aspects of this methodology were finalised while the SREP cycle was already underway, and considers that in order to improve robustness of results and consistency between banks’ risk profiles and capital levels, the process leading to the approval of the common risk assessment may benefit from further refinement; welcomes the SSM's willingness to work on banks' governance and in particular on risk management, risk appetite and cyber risk;

Amendment 164 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Underlines that the legislation’s lack of clarity on the hierarchy between pillar two and capital buffers in relation to the Maximum Distributable Amount threshold and to other sanctioning measures does not prevent the SSM from using a margin of flexibility in order to avoid solutions which are too rigid and might negatively affect the AT1 bond market and the level playing field with other jurisdictions;deleted

Amendment 165 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Amendment 166 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Believes that the homogenisation of supervisory practices and standards within the euro area is a key objective for the SSM in order to ensure a true level playing field; in this respect, welcomes the agreement on a single implementation of national options and discretion for the euro area; considers that such a single implementation ~~requires a gradual approach and~~ should aim to address all existing barriers and segmentations; stands ready to cooperate at the legislative level to ~~further~~ improve regulatory and supervisory harmonisation;

Amendment 167 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Believes that the homogenisation of supervisory practices and standards ~~within the euro area~~ is a key objective for the SSM in order to ensure a true level playing field; ~~in this respect, welcomes the agreement on a single implementation of national options and discretion for the euro area;~~ considers that such a single implementation requires a gradual approach and should aim to address all existing barriers and segmentations; stands ready to cooperate at the legislative level to further improve regulatory and supervisory harmonisation;

Amendment 168 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Believes that the ~~homogenisation~~consistency of supervisory practices and standards within the euro area is a key objective for the SSM in order to ensure a true level playing field; in this respect, welcomes the agreement on a single implementation of national options and discretion for the euro area; calls for an urgent reduction of the number of national options and discretions; considers that such a single implementation requires a gradual approach and should aim to address all existing barriers and segmentations; stands ready to cooperate at the legislative level to further improve regulatory and supervisory harmonisation;

Amendment 169 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Believes that the homogenisation of supervisory practices and standards within the euro area is a key objective for the SSM in order to ensure a true level playing field; in this respect, welcomes the agreement on a single implementation of national options and discretion for the euro area; considers that such a single implementation requires a gradual approach and should aim to address all existing barriers and segmentations; stands ready to cooperate at the legislative level to further improve regulatory and supervisory harmonisation; urges the Commission to use regulations, applicable directly and to all throughout the EU, as the legislative tool to ensure harmonised implementation across the EU and the Banking Union rather than directives;

Amendment 17 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the Banking Union (BU) is a~~n indispensable~~ component of a monetary union and a ~~fundamental~~ building block of a genuine economic and monetary union (EMU);

Amendment 170 #

Tom VANDENKENDELAERE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Believes that the homogenisation of supervisory practices and standards within the euro area is a key objective for the SSM ~~in order to ensure a true level playing field~~yet should go hand in hand with the completion of the other two pillars of the Banking Union; in this respect, welcomes the agreement on a single implementation of national options and discretion for the euro area; considers that such a single implementation requires a gradual approach and should aim to address all existing barriers and segmentations; stands ready to cooperate at the legislative level to further improve regulatory and supervisory harmonisation;

Amendment 171 #

Isabella DE MONTE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16a. Welcomes the ECB initiative to engage into a review of the Option and Discretions (O&Ds) as a step towards harmonising supervisory practices; in this respect, recommends: a) to allow institutions not to include in the own funds unrealised gains or losses on exposures to central governments classified in the AFS category, if such a treatment was applied before 1 January 2014, as provided in Article 467 of Regulation (EU) 575/2013. This treatment shall be applied until the Commission has adopted a regulation on the basis of Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 endorsing the International Financial Reporting Standard replacing IAS 39; b) to review the proposal on Liquidity Cover Ratio (LCR) waivers at cross- border level as provided in Article 8 of Regulation (EU) 575/2013; c) to exercise the option provided by Article 113(6) of Regulation (EU) 575/2013 , which allows the exemption from risk weighting of infra-group exposures for banking group under a single supervisory authority; d) to maintain the permission not to deduct equity holdings in insurance undertakings until December 2022 as provided in Article 471 of Regulation (EU) 575/2013; e) to allow the non-deduction of Deferred Tax Assets (DTA) depending on future profitability for the next three budget years, as provided in Article 478 of Regulation (EU) 575/2013;

Amendment 172 #

Renato SORU, Andrea COZZOLINO, Isabella DE MONTE, Alessia Maria MOSCA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16a. Stresses the fact that Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms Capital Requirements and Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and the of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms (collectively referred to as "CRR/CRDIV") have been adopted by the co-legislators before the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism; encourages the Commission to make a proposal for a technical adaptation of CRR/CRDIV in order to align it with the Banking Union framework;

Amendment 173 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16a. Emphasises the importance of a level playing field within the Single Market and therefore calls for a continued effort aimed at achieving the Single Rule Book, through the removal of national options and discretions; such removal should in the first place ensure the establishment of a common set of rules and supervisory convergence between the EU Member States and the Banking Union and - within the latter - between banks under direct ECB supervision and banks not under direct ECB supervision; in addition, stresses that national options and discretions attributed to Member States prevent the ECB from developing a single coherent supervisory approach within the Banking Union and should therefore be eliminated in the future;

Amendment 174 #

Renato SORU, Andrea COZZOLINO, Isabella DE MONTE, Alessia Maria MOSCA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 b (new)

16b. In order to ensure that the situations and legal relationships governed by EU law remain foreseeable, calls on the ECB to attribute high importance to the principle of protection of the legitimate expectations by respecting and not revoking the transitional arrangements on which banks have relied in good faith when determining their capital planning; in this context, the maintenance of the non-application of fair value measurement for unrealized gains and losses on exposures to central governments classified in the "Available For Sale" category is of high importance; highlights that making such exposures mandatorily subject to fair value measurement (for capital requirement purposes), not only strengthens the link between banks and sovereigns, but may also lead to own funds volatility;

Amendment 175 #

Renato SORU, Andrea COZZOLINO, Isabella DE MONTE, Alessia Maria MOSCA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 c (new)

16c. Reminds that Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 grants a level playing field between conglomerates institutions and non-conglomerated institutions, which have holdings in insurance undertakings; stresses that the shortening of the transitional period for the exemption for the deduction of equity holdings in insurance companies from common equity Tier 1 items, provided for in Article 471 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, together with the confirmation of the exemption provided for in Article 49, would breach such level playing field, benefiting entities which form part of financial conglomerates to the detriment of other institutions; recalls that the shortening of the transitional period cannot in any case be established by regulations issued by a Supervisory Authority;

Amendment 176 #

Renato SORU, Andrea COZZOLINO, Isabella DE MONTE, Alessia Maria MOSCA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 d (new)

16d. Believes moreover that such change to Article 471 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 would negatively affect the "legitimate expectations" of supervised entities, that have already planned and targeted their capital requirements on the basis of the current regulation;

Amendment 177 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Stresses the importance of the work that has been undertaken on the homogenisation of the calculation of risk- weighted assets, which is pivotal for comparability purposes, and on the review of internal models for the calculation of banks’ capital requirements, and considers swift progress in this area, for all portfolios, crucial in order to preserve the effectiveness and credibility of banking supervision in the euro area;

Amendment 178 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. ~~Stresses the importance of~~Considers inadequate the work that has been undertaken to date on the homogenisation of the calculation of risk- weighted assets, which is pivotal for comparability purposes, and on the review of internal models for the calculation of banks’ capital requirements, and considers progress in this area, for all portfolios, crucial in order to preserve the effectiveness and credibility of banking supervision in the euro area;

Amendment 179 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Stresses the importance of the work that has been undertaken on the homogenisation of the calculation of risk- weighted assets, which is pivotal for comparability purposes, and on the review of internal models for the calculation of banks’ capital requirements, and considers progress in this area, for all portfolios, crucial in order to preserve the effectiveness and credibility of banking supervision in the euro area; calls for regular evaluations of the application of the capital requirements in order to avoid loopholes in the calculation of risk- weighted assets;

Amendment 18 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the Banking Union (BU) is designed to be an indispensable component ~~of a monetary union~~ and a fundamental building block of ~~a genuin~~the eEconomic and mMonetary uUnion (EMU);

Amendment 180 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Stresses the importance of the work that has been undertaken on the hcom~~ogenisation~~parability of the calculation of risk- weighted assets, which is pivotal for ~~comparability purposes, and on the~~the benchmarking and review of internal models for the calculation of banks’' capital requirements, and considers progress in this area, for all portfolios, crucial in order to preserve the effectiveness and credibility of banking supervision in the euro area in order to promote best practice in market and credit risk models and improve the relevance of the standard approaches to such risks; calls for efforts to align bank internal risk and pricing models with regulatory capital requirement models; recalls the neutrality of banking supervision with regard to accounting as laid down in Recital 39 of the Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 ("SSM regulation"); therefore calls on the ECB not to ask institutions to provide data which cannot be derived from their respective accounting frameworks applicable to them pursuant to other acts of Union and national law;

Amendment 181 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

17a. Welcomes the publication by the ECB of a draft regulation aiming at closing around 35 national options and discretions under the EU banking regulatory framework as well as of a draft guide to help JSTs make decisions in a more consistent manner in the areas covered by the other options and discretions identified; considers this to be a significant step towards a genuinely European banking supervision; looks forward to the outcome of the public consultation launched by the ECB on these two draft texts as well as to the outcome of the work to be conducted on the options for which further assessment has been deemed necessary;

Amendment 182 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

17a. Emphasises that government bonds are not a risk-free form of investment and calls for government bonds to be subject to regulatory capital requirements;

Amendment 183 #

Jakob von WEIZSÄCKER, Paul TANG

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Underlines that the SSM should look beyond credit risk to all forms of bank risk, including non-financial risk such as business culture and behaviour of banking employees, and that further steps are necessary to reinforce the supervisory scrutiny of banks’ financial portfolios, especially level 3 assets;

Amendment 184 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Underlines that the SSM should look beyond credit risk to all forms of bank risk, and that further steps are necessary to reinforce the supervisory scrutiny of banks’' financial portfolios, especially level 3 assets; stresses the need for a reduction of the interlinkages between the regulated and the shadow banking sector, not least via limiting the respective credit risk exposure;

Amendment 185 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Underlines that the SSM should look beyond ~~credit risk to all forms of bank risk~~a narrow focus on Pillar 1 credit, market and operational risk to all forms of bank risk including model risk, reputation risk and financial risks related to climate change, specifically the potential threat to financial stability posed by so-called "stranded assets" as highlighted, among others, by the Governor of the Bank of England, and that further steps are necessary to reinforce the supervisory scrutiny of banks’' financial portfolios, especially level 3 assets; welcomes the attempts of the Basel Committee to revise the credit risk standard approach as well as measurement of operational risk; deplores that the large exposure regime still excludes sovereign exposures and allows higher limits for interbank exposures; welcomes the recommendations of the ESRB to revise the treatment of sovereign and interbank exposures;

Amendment 186 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Considers that appropriate attention should be paid to increased exposure in the form of off-balance sheet items, in particular for global systematically important banks (G-SIBs); underlines in this respect the need to be vigilant about the development of the shadow banking sector;

Amendment 187 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Considers that ~~appropriat~~more attention should be paid to increased exposure in the form of off-balance sheet items, in particular for global systematically important banks (G- SIBs);

Amendment 188 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)

19a. Is of the opinion that setting limits to large exposures to sovereign risk and/or assigning a non-zero risk weight to government debt could contribute to breaking the "doom loop" between banks and sovereigns; calls therefore on the EBA, the SSM and the Commission to reflect and conduct research so as to determine whether and how such rules could be introduced without reducing available funding for the more fragile States and/or creating unintended market distortions;

Amendment 189 #

Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)

19a. Underlines that the SSM and SRM is a step in the direction of a common market for banking services, making cross-border consolidation more appealing; believes that the introduction of a financial stability and resolvability assessment in the Qualifying Holdings Directive is necessary to avoid new too- big-to-fail problems that may be produced due to a higher number of mergers and acquisitions;

Amendment 19 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the Banking Union (BU) is an indispensable component of a monetary union and a fundamental building block of a genuine economic and monetary union (EMU) and whereas participation in this is open to Member States that have not yet adopted the euro;

Amendment 190 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO, Emmanuel MAUREL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

Amendment 191 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Underlines the important role played by the SSM during the Greek crisis in monitoring the condition of the country’s banking sector, in conducting a comprehensive assessment of the significant Greek institutions and in contributing to the determination of the recapitalisation needs; condemns the SSM decision to limit Greek banks' exposure to Greek sovereign debt, thus increasing the danger of state bankruptcy, a decision which contributed to the systemic instability and which appeared as a political decision to add pressure to the Greek government in the context of the negotiations, in a breach of the political neutrality principle which should govern this institution;

Amendment 192 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Underlines the important role played by the SSM during the Greek crisis in monitoring the condition of the country’s banking sector, in conducting a comprehensive assessment of the significant Greek institutions and in contributing to the determination of the recapitalisation needs; regrets the fact that the "no creditor worse off" principle may impede swift bail-ins; questions the independence of financial consultancies which played a central role in all the euro area bailouts by giving expertise to the "troika" of international lenders; criticises that these firms were often hired without a public tender although they so far invoiced taxpayers in Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain over EUR 80 million; calls for more transparency and accountability in the hiring process to avoid potential conflicts of interest, which arise from links to investment funds and other financial service providers;

Amendment 193 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)

20a. Emphasises in this regard the conflict of interest between monetary and supervisory policy when it comes to emergency aid to banks such as ELA and the assessment of the respective banks' solvency;

Amendment 194 #

Emmanuel MAUREL, Sergio Gaetano COFFERATI, Fabio DE MASI, Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Guillaume BALAS, Tibor SZANYI, Isabelle THOMAS, Curzio MALTESE, Eva JOLY, Ernest URTASUN, Philippe LAMBERTS, Edouard MARTIN, Dimitrios PAPADIMOULIS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)

20a. Asks the Commission to conduct and make public an evaluation of the decision-making procedure which led the Troika, in the implementation of the last Memorandum of Understanding signed with Greece, to require savings up to 25 billion EUR for the recapitalization of Greek banks, while the SSM, which role is to assess such needs, stated on 31 October 2015, that the recapitalization needs, in a baseline scenario, were up to 4.4 billion EUR, and the most risky scenario, up to 14.4 billion EUR;

Amendment 195 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Believes that the ECB’'s supervisory strategy, while avoiding any differentiation along national lines, should reflect and safeguard pluralism of banking models across the EU without undermining the effectiveness of the SSM;

Amendment 196 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Believes that the ECB’s supervisory strategy, while avoiding any differentiation along national lines, should reflect and safeguard pluralism of banking models across the EU; wonders however whether the significant level of fragmentation in the European banking landscape is always beneficial to the final consumer;

Amendment 197 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Believes that the ECB’s supervisory strategy~~, while avoiding any differentiation along national lines,~~ should reflect and safeguard pluralism of banking models across the EU;

Amendment 198 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Believes that the ECB’s supervisory strategy, while avoiding any differentiation along national lines, should ~~reflect and safeguard plu~~ensure decentralis~~m of~~ed banking models across the EU;

Amendment 199 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Believes that the ECB’'s supervisory strategy, while avoiding any differentiation along national lines, should reflect and safeguard ~~pluralism of banking models across the EU~~, in particular through respecting the principle of proportionality in relation to smaller simpler banking models, a healthy diversity of banking models across the EU which can significantly reduce systemic risks;

Amendment 2 #

Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 a (new)

– having regard to the proposal of the European Commission for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on structural measures improving the resilience of EU credit institutions (COM/2014/043),

Amendment 20 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

Aa. whereas the euro is the European Union’s currency;

Amendment 200 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Believes that the ECB’s supervisory strategy, while avoiding any differentiation along national lines, should reflect and safeguard pluralism of banking models across the EU, and comply with the principle of proportionality;

Amendment 201 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Believes that the ECB’s supervisory strategy, while avoiding any differentiation along national lines, should reflect and safeguard pluralism of banking models across the EU, thereby ensuring that the needs of certain Member States are not taken into account at the expense of other Member States;

Amendment 202 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)

21a. Stresses that the regulatory framework should accommodate the particular operating principles and respect the specific mission of the cooperative and mutual banks as well as that supervisory authorities should keep these in regard and reflect them in their practices and approaches;

Amendment 203 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

22. Considers transparency vis-à-vis market players and the public, including on sensitive topics, to be essential for fair competition in the banking market; underlines that transparency of both supervisors and supervised entities is also a prerequisite for accountability, as it allows Parliament and the public to be informed about key policy issues and to assess consistency with rules and supervisory practices; point out that a lack of transparency is currently making it impossible to lay the foundations for future stability and renewed trust in banks;

Amendment 204 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

22. Considers transparency vis-à-vis market players and the public, including on sensitive topics~~, to be essential for fair competition in the banking market~~ such as capital targets as a result of the SREP cycle, supervisory practices and other requirements to be essential for fair competition in the banking market and for avoiding that regulatory uncertainty influence negatively banks' business strategy; underlines that transparency of both supervisors and supervised entities is also a prerequisite for accountability, as it allows Parliament and the public to be informed about key policy issues and to assess consistency with rules and supervisory practices;

Amendment 205 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

22. Considers transparency vis-à-vis market players and the public, including on sensitive topics, to be essential for fair competition in the banking market; underlines that transparency of both supervisors and supervised entities is also a prerequisite for accountability, as it allows Parliament and the public to be informed about key policy issues and to assess consistency with rules and supervisory practices; calls for more transparency with regard to pillar 2 decisions and justifications; believes that additional capital requirements related to shortcomings in institutions' Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process should be accompanied by a clear plan to address those shortcomings upon which the lifting of extra capital charges is made clearly conditional;

Amendment 206 #

Othmar KARAS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)

22a. Considers transparency and appropriate justification concerning the SREP-decision process by the European Central Bank a precondition for the rule of law and a crucial element for a level playing field between supervised entities;

Amendment 207 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)

23a. Calls on the SSM, which is best placed for this purpose as the supervisor of systemically important banks, to produce a public assessment of a reform of the separation of banking activities; and more specifically, to draw up scenarios, ranging from the most restrictive to the most expansive, of the current structural reform of banks under discussion in the European Parliament;

Amendment 208 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

Amendment 209 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. ~~Welcomes~~Takes note of the efficient ~~and open~~ way in which the ECB has so far fulfilled its accountability obligations towards Parliament and calls upon the ECB to ~~continue to fully engage in this regard~~further improve in this regard, especially with regard to protocols, and to further contribute to improving Parliament’s capacity to assess SSM policies and activities;

Amendment 21 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the BU is ~~instrum~~not sufficiental to ensur~~ing~~e stability and restor~~ing~~e confidence in euro area banks, enhanc~~ing~~e financial integration, and foster~~ing~~ risk sharing within the monetary union ~~and contributing to breaking the link between sovereigns and banks at national level~~, because it acts only on effects and not on causes;

Amendment 210 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. ~~Welcomes the~~Criticises the lack of efficientcy and open ~~way in~~ness with which the ECB has so far fulfilled its accountability obligations towards Parliament and ~~calls upon the ECB to continue to fully engage in this regard and to further contribute to improving Parliament’s capacity to assess SSM policies and activities~~the lack of transparency shown with regard to the publication of minutes of meetings at which key decisions are made;

Amendment 211 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Welcomes the efficient and open way in which the ECB has so far fulfilled its accountability obligations towards Parliament ~~and calls upon the ECB to continue to fully engage in this regard and to further contribute to improving Parliament’s capacity to assess SSM policies and activities~~, but very much regrets that the ECB has, in the context of monetary dialogue, left important questions unanswered; in particular, deplores the failure of the ECB, in its annual report, to mention its activities as part of the Troika in the countries subject to a macroeconomic adjustment programme;

Amendment 212 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. ~~Welcom~~Notes the ~~efficient and open way in which the ECB has so far fulfilled its accountability obligations towards Parliament~~scope for improvement in the fulfilment of the ECB's accountability obligations towards Parliament with regard to providing more specific information on prudential supervision of banks and calls upon the ECB to continue to fully engage in this regard and to further contribute to improving Parliament’'s capacity to assess SSM policies and activities;

Amendment 213 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Welcomes the efficient and open way in which the ECB has so far fulfilled its accountability obligations towards Parliament and calls upon the ECB to continue to fully engage in this regard and to further contribute to improving Parliament’s capacity to assess SSM policies and activities; notes, however, the fact that the European Central Bank is able to make rules independently, the legal nature of which affects the Member States and their citizens, without the involvement of the usual European-level legislative bodies in these decisions; therefore encourages the ECB to improve the processes for developing such rules and enhancing the involvement of the European Parliament;

Amendment 214 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Welcomes the efficient and open way in which the ECB has so far fulfilled its accountability obligations towards Parliament and calls upon the ECB to continue to fully engage in this regard and to further contribute to improving Parliament’s capacity to assess SSM policies and activities; views favourably the willingness of the ECB President to further cooperate with the European Parliament regarding the ECB's role in banking matters in the framework of global standards setting bodies, in particular the Financial Stability Board; is aware that this would require a renewed effort from the ECON committee to follow these issues;

Amendment 215 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)

24a. Recalls that public audit is an integral part of the mechanisms to ensure the accountability of institutions to citizens; takes therefore note with some concern of the statement published last June by the Contact Committee of the Heads of the Supreme Audit Institutions of the European Union and the European Court of Auditors (ECA), which warns against the emergence of audit gaps due to the transfer of supervisory tasks from national authorities to the SSM in a context where the audit mandate of the ECA over the ECB acting as a supervisor is less comprehensive than these of national audit institutions over national supervisors; recommends accordingly that consideration be given to strengthening the audit mandate of the ECA;

Amendment 216 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)

24a. Stresses that more attention should be paid to the impact of the new rules introduced with the Banking Union, especially on the changing operating costs of banks and on bank lending propensities, in view of the investment gap that has persisted in the Union over the past years; calls for an in-depth study of the impact of the banking union as it is being implemented on bank credit in general and SMEs in particular with the aim of mitigating any negative consequences in this regard;

Amendment 217 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)

24a. Highlights the necessity to ensure that the ECB and SSM fully comply with the obligation to strictly separate the supervisory tasks from the monetary policy function; recalls that SSM tasks and operations shall neither interfere with, nor be determined by, the ECB tasks relating to monetary policy;

Amendment 218 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

25. Underlines the importance of cooperation with the European Banking Authority (EBA) and with other authorities within the European System of Financial Supervision, while fully respecting the division of roles and competences and the separation between regulation and supervision in order to help ensure compliance with the EU checks-and- balances structure; stresses in particular that the EBA, with its explicit consumer protection mandate, must enforce and enhance the consumer protection framework for banking services, in complement to the SSMs prudential supervision, and in the Union as a whole;

Amendment 219 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

25. Underlines the importance of cooperation with the Single Resolution Board (SRB), the European Banking Authority (EBA) and with other authorities within the European System of Financial Supervision, while fully respecting the division of roles and competences and the separation between regulation and supervision in order to help ensure compliance with the EU checks-and- balances structure;

Amendment 22 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the BU is deemed instrumental to ensuring stability and restoring confidence in euro area banks, enhancing financial integration, fostering risk sharing within the monetary union and contributing to breaking the link between sovereigns and banks ~~at national level~~;

Amendment 220 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

Amendment 221 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 a (new)

25a. Calls on the ECB to annually conduct an external professional audit of its legally required organisational separation of supervisory and monetary policy functions and immediately publish the report;

Amendment 222 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 a (new)

25a. Considers that the ECB Annual Report on supervision should contain actual numbers on 'on-site inspections', 'internal model investigations' and a description of the subject and result of these inspections; and calls for target numbers on inspections and investigations for the coming year to be published as well;

Amendment 223 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 a (new)

25a. Welcomes the credibility of the SSM on the international stage; considers it fundamental that the SSM is properly involved in the design of global regulatory standards, in particular the orientations negotiated within the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision;

Amendment 224 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 a (new)

25a. Points out that since the ECB has become the supervisor of euro area significant banks the issue of how to prevent and settle potential conflicts of interest between its monetary and supervisory missions has become an important policy debate with implications for the future design of the Economic and Monetary Union and its institutional 'checks and balances'; stresses the controversial role played by the ECB in the Troika framework which raises also fundamental questions on the boundaries of the 'technical agency' role devolved to the ECB and hence on whether such role carries unavoidable conflicts of interest; asks the ECB to redefine its role regarding assistance programmes to a role of 'silent observer'; underlines that the broad discretionary powers of the ECB Governing Council when it comes to specific decisions (e.g. Greece, Cyprus and Ireland) confirming or limiting the provision of ELA by National Central Banks (NCBs) inevitably put the ECB in a position where its independence in the exercise of the lender of last resort function from supervisory and political decision making will be questioned; is of the opinion that the ELA regime needs a diligent revision in the light of the 'Europeanisation' of bank supervision as serious doubts remain as to whether current discretion is fully consistent with a balanced doctrine of operational independency; welcomes the remarks made by President Draghi in the ECON committee hinting that such reform should be explored;

Amendment 225 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 b (new)

25b. Calls on the SSM to periodically report to the European Parliament any exchange of information between policy functions under the Decision of the European Central Bank of 17 September 2014 (ECB/2014/39);

Amendment 226 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 b (new)

25b. Believes that the SSM will not be able to conduct effective banking supervision due to the EU's watered down version of Basel III which is already insufficient; calls therefore on the Commission to create more ambitious regulation within the Union, and to allow Member States to adopt more ambitious regulation should they wish to do so;

Amendment 227 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. ~~Welcomes the efficient~~Notes the setting up of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the establishment of the national resolution authorities (NRAs) in the Member States, and criticises the procedure used to select its members;

Amendment 228 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. ~~Welcomes the efficient~~Takes note of the setting up of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the establishment of the national resolution authorities (NRAs) in the Member States;

Amendment 229 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. ~~Welcomes the efficient~~Takes note of the setting up of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the establishment of the national resolution authorities (NRAs) in the Member States;

Amendment 23 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the BU is instrumental to ensuring stability and restoring confidence in euro area banks, enhancing financial integration, fostering risk sharing within the monetary union and contributing to breaking the link between sovereigns and banks at national level; subject to the consideration that 'one-size-fits-all' solutions may not effectively address the different economic and financial realities present in Member States;

Amendment 230 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. ~~Welcomes the efficient~~Notes the setting up of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the establishment of the national resolution authorities (NRAs) in the Member States;

Amendment 231 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 a (new)

26a. Recalls that 4.5 trillion EUR of public money and guarantees were made available to bailed out banks; believes that all measures to avoid bail out of private banks with public money must be taken; deems that any capital injection given in the past should be turned into golden shares and the loans granted by other banks counted in the liability of the balance sheet should turn into preferred stock or shares as well. The purpose is to change the practices of the banking system, increasing the participation of a public banks network under social control, and reinforcing the capitalization rate to recover the viability and solvency of the banking system to put it in favour of social interest;

Amendment 232 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 b (new)

26b. Believes that in principle banks should be allowed to fail and go bankrupt. This requires a complete ban on the existence of banks that are too-big-to-fail;

Amendment 233 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 c (new)

26c. Regrets therefore that banking regulation at national and European level continues to allow for the existence of Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFI) despite their central role in causing the financial crisis and its global contagion;

Amendment 234 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 d (new)

26d. Believes that the existence of SIFIs not only makes it impossible to allow the banks to go bankrupt, it makes them very difficult if not impossible to resolve. Many actors are still 'too-big-to fail' and 'too- interconnected-too-fail' and 'too-complex- to-resolve'. None of these problems have been remotely addressed by the SRM;

Amendment 235 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 e (new)

26e. Believes that the European banking sector is as concentrated as it ever was; believes therefore that the BU has failed to break the link between banks and sovereigns;

Amendment 236 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 f (new)

26f. Believes it is highly necessary to separate banking activities: on one hand retail banking and on the other investment banking. Furthermore, the shadow banking system has to be duly identified and regulated preventing all the irregular banking practices (leveraged buy out, abusing of transfer prices, decapitalisation of viable companies, etc.);

Amendment 237 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 g (new)

26g. Believes the SRM itself encourages a greater concentration of too-big-to-fail actors in the European banking sector. The sale of business tool allows megabanks to grow even bigger by taking over ailing banks at bargain basement prices - rather than the long term value of the asset. The result of consolidation will be even more concentration and even bigger banks;

Amendment 238 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 h (new)

26h. Believes that in those cases where a public intervention is the only option left to ensure macroeconomic stability, the intervention should be in a manner in which public money is not lost but is used to create a new public bank network, under a sound management but not looking for the maximum profit. The starting point should be the bailed out banks and their solvent assets with the financial support of the ECB and under social and democratic control;

Amendment 239 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Highlights the importance of establishing efficient cooperation between the SRB and the NRAs for the smooth functioning of the SRM; ~~considers the organisational model established by the SSM through the JSTs to be a good basis for organising cooperation within the SRM;~~

Amendment 24 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

Amendment 240 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

Amendment 241 #

Renato SORU, Andrea COZZOLINO, Isabella DE MONTE, Alessia Maria MOSCA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Highlights the importance of establishing efficient cooperation between the SRB and the NRAs for the smooth functioning of the SRM; considers ~~the organisational model established by the SSM through the~~Internal Resolution Teams (IRTs) as an equivalent to the SSM's JSTs to be a good basis for organising cooperation within the SRM;

Amendment 242 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 a (new)

27a. Acknowledges the traditional reliance of SMEs on bank funding on account of their specific nature, different risk profiles and variety across Europe; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the ESAs, the ECB and national authorities, to assess the sufficiency of SME funding, to analyse the obstacles to, and benefits of the diversification of funding channels and how to enable banks and non-banks to increase SME funding, widening companies' choice among different methods of funding at different stages of their development; recalls the importance of tools such as the 'SME Supporting Factor'; suggests that the initiatives for improved SME funding should be expanded to start-ups, micro enterprises and mid-cap companies; highlights the potential of innovative and largely untapped venues for financing SMEs, including peer-to-peer lending, crowdfunding and private placement, and stresses the need to streamline the respective regulatory requirements;

Amendment 243 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Encourages the conclusion of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on mutual cooperation and data sharing between the SRB and the ~~ECB as single supervisor~~SSM, in order to increase efficiency and avoid double reporting for banks, while allowing the SRB to have access to the data necessary to fulfil its institutional mandate;

Amendment 244 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Encourages the conclusion of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on mutual cooperation and data sharing between the SRB and the ~~ECB~~SSM as single supervisor, in order to increase efficiency and avoid double reporting for banks, while allowing the SRB to have access to the data necessary to fulfil its institutional mandate;

Amendment 245 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Encourages the conclusion of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on mutual cooperation and data sharing between the SRB and the ECB as single supervisor, in order to increase efficiency and avoid double reporting for banks, while allowing the SRB to have access to the data necessary to fulfil its institutional mandate; underlines the importance of smooth cooperation between the SRM and the NCAs;

Amendment 246 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Encourages the conclusion of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on mutual cooperation and data sharing between the SRB and the ECB as ~~single~~ supervisor, in order to increase efficiency and avoid double reporting for banks, while allowing the SRB to have access to ~~the~~relevant SSM data necessary to fulfil its institutional mandate;

Amendment 247 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29

29. ~~Underlines the~~Criticises the worrying discrepancy between banks directly supervised by the SSM and banks under the direct responsibility of the SRB (including other cross-border groups) and its potential consequences in terms of the SRB’s access to information, which are at the root of the failure of the Banking Union project;

Amendment 248 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

30. Calls for specific arrangements within the Commission and between the SRB and the Commission in order to define ~~efficient~~in advance efficient and clear procedures for decision-making in the event of resolution;

Amendment 249 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

32. Welcomes the preparation by the SRB of manuals on resolution activities, in line with the relevant EBA standards, which aim to promote a consistent ~~and~~, effective and proportionate approach to resolution tasks within the SRM;

Amendment 25 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the BU is instrumental to ensuring stability and restoring confidence in euro area banks, enhancing financial integration~~, fostering risk sharing within the monetary union~~ and a substantial risk reduction in the European banking system and contributing to breaking the link between sovereigns and banks ~~at national level~~;

Amendment 250 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

32. Welcomes the preparation by the SRB of manuals on resolution activities, in line with the relevant EBA standards, which aim to promote a consistent and effective approach to resolution tasks within the SRM; believes those manuals should be made fully public;

Amendment 251 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33

33. Calls for timely progress in drawing up resolution plans and the setting of a minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) for institutions in the scope of the SRM, in order to be able to ensure an orderly resolution of failing banks with a minimum impact on the real economy and public finances; stresses that the MREL and the FSB’s Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) for global systematically important banks should be taken into account when assessing the role and scope of DGSs in the future;

Amendment 252 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33

33. Calls for timely progress in drawing up resolution plans and the setting of a binding and sufficiently high minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) for institutions in the scope of the SRM, in order to be able to ensure an orderly resolution of failing banks with a minimum impact on the real economy and public finances; calls on the Commission to swiftly adopt the regulatory technical standard on MREL with a standard of at least 8% MREL for all SRB banks;

Amendment 253 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33

Amendment 254 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33 a (new)

33a. Calls for further regulation of banking products and their respective interest rates as well as complementing prudential regulation by asset based reserve requirements, limits to those investors being hidden as false creditor in order to avoid shareholder's risk when they behave in fact as them, and specifically the shadow banking sector in order to reduce complexity of financial markets and improve monetary transmission;

Amendment 255 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33 a (new)

33a. Underlines that, according to the SRM regulation, the Board should take due care, as a matter of priority, to establish the resolution plans of systemically important institutions, assess their resolvability and take all action necessary to address or remove all of the impediments to their resolvability; further emphasises that the Board has the power to require changes to the structure and organisation of institutions or groups to take measures which are necessary and proportionate to reduce or remove material impediments to the application of resolution tools and ensure the resolvability of the entities concerned;

Amendment 256 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33 a (new)

33a. Highlights the importance of a full implementation and enforcement of the bail-in principle; calls on the Commission to present proposals to further reduce the legal risks of claims under the no- creditor-worse-off-principle;

Amendment 257 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33 b (new)

33b. Proposes to attribute more importance to the dividend distribution limit in case of low rate of capitalisation before selling assets at whatever price. A relevant initiative would be to create a European Public Banks net. This would be based on those public contributions (for instance, from ESM) granted, deeming any of this financing, even in a retrospective way, as golden shares and the corresponding participation within the Board of directors of the banks concerned. At the same time, in equivalent cases of intervention, it would be appropriate to determine an orderly exchange process of contracted bonds, subordinated and junior debt, which are property of private banks, turning them into preferred stock or shares to improve the capitalisation rate;

Amendment 258 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33 b (new)

33b. Recalls that the safekeeping of SME deposits is a critical function and its continuity in a crisis very important and, therefore, that the SRM must ensure that the Minimum Requirement for Eligible Liabilities - i.e. equity as well as unsecured debt - should be set sufficiently high to ensure that the chances of eligible but uncovered deposits of SMEs incurring losses is minimised;

Amendment 259 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33 b (new)

33b. Points to the necessity to analyse whether the SRB and the National Resolution Authorities are equipped with sufficient early intervention powers and sufficient early intervention instruments; calls for a thorough assessment to evaluate whether and to which extent the SRB and the National Resolution Authorities need additional tools and additional powers in order to ensure a timely invention and a use of their competences which comes early enough to contain outflows and hence prevent the haemorrhaging of banks;

Amendment 26 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the BU is instrumental to ensuring stability and restoring confidence in euro area banks, enhancing financial integration, fostering risk sharing within the monetary union and contributing to breakducing the limoral hazard banks be~~tween sovereigns and banks at national level~~nefit from vis-à-vis states;

Amendment 260 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34

34. ~~Takes note of~~Criticises the double role of the Board members who are at the same time members of an executive body with decision-making roles and senior managers accountable in that capacity to the Chair, and considers that ~~an evaluation of~~ this structure should be ~~undertaken before the end of the current mandate~~completely dismantled and replaced, because it is anti-democratic;

Amendment 261 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

Amendment 262 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

35. Calls on Member States to fully and swiftly implement the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the intergovernmental agreement (IGA) on transfer and mutualisation of contributions to the Single Resolution Fund; ~~regrets the decision to set up the fund through an IGA rather than through Union law~~welcomes the ratification of the Agreement of a sufficient number of countries by the deadline of 30 November 2015, which will enable the SRM to start operating as planned; regrets nevertheless the decision to set up the fund through an IGA rather than through Union law and calls on the Commission to take the necessary steps, in accordance with Article 16 of the Agreement, to incorporate the substance of this text into the legal framework of the Union, and to act as promptly as possible on that matter;

Amendment 263 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

Amendment 264 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

Amendment 265 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

Amendment 266 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

Amendment 267 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

35. Calls on Member States to fully and swiftly implement the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the intergovernmental agreement (IGA) on transfer and mutualisation of contributions to the Single Resolution Fund; calls on the Commission to enforce the implementation of the BRRD; regrets the decision to set up the fund through an IGA rather than through Union law;

Amendment 268 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

Amendment 269 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

35. Calls on remaining Member States to ~~fully and swiftly implement~~complete the transposition of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the intergovernmental agreement (IGA) on transfer and mutualisation of contributions to the Single Resolution Fund; regrets the decision to set up the fund through an IGA rather than through Union law; regrets the decision to set up the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) through an IGA rather than through Union law; welcomes the establishment of calculation and collection procedures for ex-ante contributions to the SRF through the SRB;

Amendment 27 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the BU is instrumental to ensuring stability and restoring confidence in euro area banks, enhancing financial integration, fostering risk sharing within the monetary union and contributing to breaking the link between sovereigns and banks at national level in order to avoid a socialisation of private debt by financial institutions;

Amendment 270 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

35. Calls on ~~Member States~~Belgium, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Sweden to fully and swiftly implement the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and on Luxembourg to fully and swiftly implement the intergovernmental agreement (IGA) on transfer and mutualisation of contributions to the Single Resolution Fund; regrets the decision to set up the fund through an IGA rather than through Union law and the fact that the Commission did not act swiftly enough to ensure timely implementation of BRRD;

Amendment 271 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

Amendment 272 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 a (new)

35a. Is concerned that, due to the way the BRRD has been implemented in some Member States, some banks appear to have been required to contribute to the resolution financing arrangements of both their home country and the countries where their branches are established; calls on Member States to consider granting some form of financial assistance, possibly in the form of tax relief, to banks in this situation;

Amendment 273 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 a (new)

35a. Considers that the investment strategy of the SRF should help to break the vicious cycle between banks and sovereigns; recommends, therefore, that any obligations of intergovernmental organisations specified in Article 118 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 should not be eligible assets for investments of the SRF;

Amendment 274 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 a (new)

35a. Calls on Member States to collect the BRRD and SRM-related contributions fully, effectively and in a timely manner at the national level in order to transfer them to the SRF in accordance with the IGA;

Amendment 275 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 a (new)

35a. Welcomes the ratification by Member States of the Intergovernmental Agreement on the transfer and mutualisation of contributions to a single resolution fund (SRF), which will allow the Single Resolution Mechanism to become fully operational, including the use of the bail-in instrument, as of 1 January 2016, according to the planned schedule;

Amendment 276 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 b (new)

35b. Recommends, for the successful management of banking crises in the future, to assess carefully the various choices at the disposal of the Board – different resolution tools as alternative to the liquidation of the bank – keeping in mind the importance of safeguarding financial stability and maintaining confidence in the banking system;

Amendment 277 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 c (new)

35c. Underlines the time mismatch between the rules on burden sharing and on the full bail-in, which have affected retroactively the effective riskiness of the debt instruments issued before the latter legal provisions, and the definition and implementation of appropriate investment protection rules; invites the Commission and the SRB to assess carefully the transition period, including the consideration of appropriate provisions to ensure the necessary proportionality, fairness and flexibility in the application of the new rules;

Amendment 278 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 d (new)

35d. Believes that, since the Directive 2014/59/EU foresees a hierarchy of eligible liabilities for the bail-in including also subordinated debt instruments, and considering that retail investors may have greater difficulties assessing the risks implied by certain financial instruments, a tightening of the provisions concerning the distribution of such subordinated debt instruments to retail investors according to articles 16 and 24 of Directive 2014/65/EU should be considered in order to require an appropriate portfolio diversification and to reinforce investor protection rules;

Amendment 279 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

Amendment 28 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the BU is instrumental to ensuring stability and restoring confidence in euro area banks, enhancing financial integration, ~~fostering risk sharing~~minimising the risk of disruptive individual bank failures while sharing residual cross border systemic risks within the monetary union and contributing to breaking the link between sovereigns and banks at national level;

Amendment 280 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. Stresses the need, as a consequence of the existence of the national compartments in the SRF, to rapidly put in place an adequate bridge financing mechanism in order to provide the fund, if necessary, with sufficient resources in the period before its completion; recalls that the Eurogroup and the Ecofin ministers identified, in their statement of 18 December 2013, the possibility of having recourse to both national sources and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and considers the latter the most effective and credible solution, which could be implemented either through a swift revision of the ESM treaty or through appropriate implementation of the provisions of Article 13 thereofTakes note of the Ecofin statement on Banking Union and bridge financing arrangements for the Single Resolution Fund of 8 December 2015;

Amendment 281 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. ~~Stresses the need~~Takes note, as a consequence of the existence of the national compartments in the SRF, to rapidly put in place an adequate bridge financing mechanism in order to provide the fund, if necessary, with sufficient resources in the period before its completion; recalls that the Eurogroup and the Ecofin ministers identifiedof the agreement of Member States participating in the Banking Union, in their statement of 18 December 20135, t~~he possibility of having recourse to both national sources and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and consi~~o establish a bridge financing mechanism in orders the latter the most effective and credible solution, which could be implemented either through a swift revision of the ESM treaty or through appropriate implementation of the provisions of Article 13 thereofo provide the fund, if necessary, with sufficient resources in the period before its completion;

Amendment 282 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. Stresses the need, as a consequence of the existence of the national compartments in the SRF, to rapidly put in place an adequate bridge financing mechanism in order to provide the fund, if necessary, with sufficient resources in the period before its completion; recalls that the Eurogroup and the Ecofin ministers identified, in their statement of 18 December 2013, the possibility of having recourse to both national sources and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and considers the latter the most effective, logical and credible solution~~, which could be implemented~~; calls for further clarification of the conditions under which direct recapitalisation of a bank by the ESM, without going through a loan to the national government, would be possible under the current framework and for reflection on the changes necessary in order to turn the ESM into a genuine fiscal backstop, either through a swift revision of the ESM treaty or through appropriate implementation of the provisions of Article 13 thereof;

Amendment 283 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. Stresses the need, as a consequence of the existence of the national compartments in the SRF, to rapidly put in place an adequate bridge financing mechanism in order to provide the fund, if necessary, with sufficient resources in the period before its completion; recalls that the Eurogroup and the Ecofin ministers identified, in their statement of 18 December 2013, the possibility of having recourse to ~~both~~ national sources ~~and~~or the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and considers the latter ~~the most effective and cred~~a possible solution, which could be implemented either through a swift revision of the ESM treaty or through appropriate implementation of the provisions of Article 13 thereof;

Amendment 284 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. Stresses the need, as a consequence of the existence of the national compartments in the SRF, to rapidly put in place an adequate bridge financing mechanism in order to provide the fund, if necessary, with sufficient resources in the period before its completion and guarantee the effective separation between banks and sovereigns; recalls that the Eurogroup and the Ecofin ministers identified, in their statement of 18 December 2013, the possibility of having recourse to both national sources and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and considers the latter the most effective and credible solution, which could be implemented either through a swift revision of the ESM treaty or through appropriate implementation of the provisions of Article 13 thereof;

Amendment 285 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

Amendment 286 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. ~~Stresses the need, as a consequence of the~~Regrets the continued existence of ~~the~~ national compartments in the SRF, ~~to rapidly put in place an adequate bridge fin~~which are contrary to the spirit and the principles of the joint resolution of bancking ~~mechanism in order to provide the fund, if necessary, with sufficient resources in the period before its completion; recalls that the Eurogroup and the Ecofin m~~crises that is supposed to embody a new European solidarity through contributions from all national banking sectors; insisters identified, in their statement of 18 December 2013, the possibility of having recourse to both national sources and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and considers the latter the most effective and credible solution, which could be implemented either through a swift revision of the ESM treaty or through appropriate implementation of the provisions of Article 13 thereofn this regard on the absolute necessity for the second pillar of the Banking Union (the SRM), just like the future third pillar (the joint deposit guarantee), to be managed at a Community and not an intergovernmental level;

Amendment 287 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. Stresses the need, as a consequence of the existence of the national compartments in the SRF, to rapidly put in place an adequate bridge financing mechanism in order to provide the fund, if necessary, with sufficient resources in the period before its completion; recalls that the Eurogroup and the Ecofin ministers identified, in their statement of 18 December 2013, the possibility of having recourse to both national sources and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and considers the latter the most effective and credible solution, which could be implemented either through a swift revision of the ESM treaty or through appropriate implementation of the provisions of Article 13 thereof; believes however that the ESM - which has been set up with money from taxpayers - should not be used to recapitalise private banks;

Amendment 288 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

Amendment 289 #

Renato SORU, Isabella DE MONTE, Andrea COZZOLINO, Alessia Maria MOSCA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. Stresses the need, as a consequence of the existence of the national compartments in the SRF, to rapidly put in place an adequate bridge financing mechanism ~~in order to provide the fund, if necessary, with sufficient resources in the period before its completion~~as required under Article 74 of the SRM Regulation in order to provide the fund, if necessary, with additional resources in the period before its completion where the amount of ex-ante and ex-post contributions obtainable proves insufficient; underlines that, without recourse to such a mechanism, under the first years of the gradual mutualisation, the requirement for Member States to replenish national compartments with ex- post contributions could prove strongly pro-cyclical; recalls that the Eurogroup and the Ecofin ministers identified, in their statement of 18 December 2013, the possibility of having recourse to both national sources and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and considers the latter the most effective and credible solution, which could be implemented either through a swift revision of the ESM treaty or through appropriate implementation of the provisions of Article 13 thereof;

Amendment 29 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

Ba. whereas the BU plays a key role in funding investment and therefore in fostering growth and job creation throughout the European Union;

Amendment 290 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. Stresses the need, as a consequence of the existence of the national compartments in the SRF, to rapidly put in place an adequate bridge financing mechanism in order to provide the fund, if necessary, with sufficient resources in the period before its completion; recalls that the Eurogroup and the Ecofin ministers identified, in their statement of 18 December 2013, the possibility of having recourse ~~to both~~either to national sources ~~and~~, backed by bank levies, or to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and considers the latter the most effective and credible solution, which could be implemented either through a swift revision of the ESM treaty or through appropriate implementation of the provisions of Article 13 thereof in accordance with the agreed procedures;

Amendment 291 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36 a (new)

36a. Calls on the European Commission to carry out with great care the review of the calculation of contributions to the SRF provided for in recital 27 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 and in so doing to review in particular the appropriateness of the risk factor in order to ensure that the risk profile of less complex institutions is reflected appropriately;

Amendment 292 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36 a (new)

36a. Recalls that ESM funds come with harsh austerity which in the end will be passed on to citizens, contradicting any attempt to break the link between banks and sovereigns;

Amendment 293 #

Renato SORU, Andrea COZZOLINO, Isabella DE MONTE, Alessia Maria MOSCA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36 a (new)

36a. Stresses the need, as a consequence of the existence of the national compartments in the SRF, to rapidly put in place an adequate bridge financing mechanism in order to provide the fund, if necessary, with sufficient resources in the period before its completion; recalls that the Eurogroup and the Ecofin ministers identified, in their statement of 18 December 2013, the possibility of having recourse to national sources in the transition period, as well as to develop a common backstop during the same period;

Amendment 294 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37

37. Welcomes, nonetheless, the progress made so far in securing public bridge financing to help ensure the availability of funds for concrete resolution through national resources; underlines, however, that the specificities of the arrangements currently being discussed (uncommitted credit lines, prior national approval, staggered payments) may reduce the usefulness of public bridge financing;deleted

Amendment 295 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37

Amendment 296 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37

37. ~~Welcom~~Notes, nonetheless, the ~~progress made so far in securing public bridge fin~~ECOFIN statement of 8 December 2015 that promises a harmonised Loan facility Agreement between the Single Resolution Board and all Member States participating in the Bancking to help ensure the availability of funds for concrete resolution through national resources; underlines, however, that the specificities of the arrangements currently being discussed (uncommitted credit lines, prior national approval, staggered payments) may reduce the usefulness of public bridge financingUnion, that will provide from the beginning of 2016, a national individual credit line to the SRB to back every national compartment in the SRF in case of funding shortfalls; notes that the maximum aggregate amount of these credit lines is EUR 55bn and that the whole system of credit lines is fiscally neutral; questions however the appropriateness of this arrangement in severing the link between banks and national budgets;

Amendment 297 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37

37. Welcomes, nonetheless, the ~~progress made so far in~~agreement reached to secur~~ing~~e public bridge financing to help ensure the availability of funds for concrete resolution action through national resources~~; underlines, however, that the specificities of the arrangements currently being discussed (uncommitted credit lines,~~ in order to bridge financing the raising of ex-post contributions; underlines, however, that certain options provided for the agreed arrangements (prior national approval, staggered payments) may reduce the ~~useful~~effectiveness of public bridge financing;

Amendment 298 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37

Amendment 299 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37

Amendment 3 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 b (new)

– having regard to the Financial Stability Review 11/2015 of the European Central Bank,

Amendment 30 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas in a BU a Single Rulebook must be complemented by a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and a common deposit guarantee scheme (DGS), and should be provided with an efficient fiscal backstop at EU level;deleted

Amendment 300 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 a (new)

37a. Stresses the necessity to substantially and continuously reduce risks in the banking sector, and reiterates the necessity to enforce the liability principle whereby risk takers remain liable for their risk-taking;

Amendment 301 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 b (new)

37b. Believes that steps towards a risk- based treatment of sovereign exposures should be carefully and thoroughly assessed and welcomes the work of the ESRB and BCBS in this regard;

Amendment 302 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38

Amendment 303 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38

Amendment 304 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38

38. ~~Recall~~Notes that ~~the credibility of the BU, and in particular of bail-in and single resolution provisions, requires a common backstop in order to be able to supp~~common backstop to the SRF may be developed at a later stage during the transitional period to facilitate borrowings by the SRF, if necessary; underlines that the banking sector should remain liable fort the ~~SRF, if necessary, beyond its capacity of EUR 55 billion, and considers that its setting-up should start swiftly and be based on the ESM~~repayment by bank levies in all participating Member States, including ex-post; highlights that any common backstop has to be fiscally neutral over the medium term to protect taxpayers;

Amendment 305 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38

38. Recalls that the credibility of the BU, and in particular of bail-in and single resolution provisions, requires a common backstop in order to be able to support the SRF, if necessary, beyond its capacity of EUR 55 billion, and considers that its setting-up should start swiftly and be based on the ESMinstalling a common backstop in order to be able to support the SRF, if necessary, does not take into account that economic and fiscal policy are a matter of national competences; any backstop can thus only be provided on Member States' level;

Amendment 306 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38

38. Recalls that the credibility of the BU, and in particular of bail-in and single resolution provisions, requires ~~a common backstop in order to be able to support the SRF, if necessary, beyond its capacity of EUR 55 billion, and considers that its setting-up should start swiftly and be based on the ESM~~much greater contributions to the SRF from the banking sector itself. Taking into account the costs of the financial crisis, the current target of EUR 55 billion is grossly insufficient. Banks should also speed up the process and make the full amount available much earlier than 2023;

Amendment 307 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38

38. Recalls that the ~~credibility of the~~ BU, and in particular of bail-in and single resolution provisions, ~~requires a common backstop in order to be able to support the SRF, if necessary, beyond its capacity of EUR 55 billion, and considers that its setting-up should start swiftly and be bas~~lack credibility, when the SRF together with the banks that are failing do not have sufficient capital available for bail-in; rejects any backstop funded onby the ~~ESM~~taxpayer;

Amendment 308 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38

38. Recalls that the credibility of the BU, and in particular of bail-in and single resolution provisions, requires athe establishment of the common backstop in order to be able to support the SRF, if necessary, beyond its capacity of EUR 55 billion, and considers that its setting-up should start ~~swiftly~~as soon as possible and be based on the ESM;

Amendment 309 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38

38. Recalls that the credibility of the BU, and in particular of bail-in and single resolution provisions, requires a common backstop in order to be able to support the SRF, if necessary, beyond its capacity of EUR 55 billion, and considers that its setting-up should start swiftly and be based on the ESM with any loans from the ESM being repaid via contributions from the institutions covered by the SRM;

Amendment 31 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas in athe BU athe Single Rulebook ~~must~~has been complemented by a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and a ~~common~~ deposit guarantee scheme (DGS)~~, and should be provided with an efficient fiscal backstop at EU level~~;

Amendment 310 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38

Amendment 311 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38

38. Recalls that the credibility of the BU, and in particular of bail-in and single resolution provisions, requires at a later stage a common backstop in order to be able to support the SRF, if necessary, beyond its capacity of EUR 55 billion~~, and considers that its setting-up should start swiftly and be based on the ESM~~; stresses, however, that a common fiscal backstop will only be used as a last resort if the entire range of prudential measures to strengthen supervision and crisis management are not able to eliminate risk; reminds that the backstop must be fiscally neutral in the medium term, as any public funds used would be reimbursed, including ex-post, and underlines the importance of avoiding moral hazard;

Amendment 312 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38

38. Recalls that the credibility of the BU, and in particular of bail-in and single resolution provisions, requires a common backstop in order to be able to support the SRF, if necessary, beyond its capacity of EUR 55 billion, and considers that its setting-up should start swiftly and be based on the ESM; welcomes in that context the ECOFIN statement of 8 December 2015 that reiterates its commitment to develop this common backstop urging the Council to ensure its full operation ability as soon as possible;

Amendment 313 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 a (new)

38a. Stresses that emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) is an essential instrument to safeguard the stability of the financial system by preventing liquidity crises from turning into solvency crises; notes that the responsibility for its provision has not yet been fully transferred to the euro area level; considers such transfer as a further means to address the negative bank - sovereign feedback loop; calls accordingly for full responsibility for decisions on ELA provision to be given to the ECB;

Amendment 314 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 a (new)

38a. Stresses that the new institutions of the Banking Union have to be leading examples in terms of transparency, accountability, technical competence and integrity;

Amendment 315 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 a (new)

38a. Emphasises that the added value of the SRM relies on the credibility of the bail-in and calls for rigid rules that put an end to political discretion whether or not to include certain creditors in the process;

Amendment 316 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 a (new)

38a. Points out that the entry into force of the SRF and the allocation of only EUR 55 billion to the fund have also played a part in the SRM’s lack of success and the lack of credibility of the entire Banking Union project; takes the view that temporary measures, such as bridge financing, can have only a palliative effect, doing no more than to conceal these failings; points out, lastly, that the introduction of a common backstop at EU level will not solve the problem of the SRF's inadequate resources;

Amendment 317 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

39. Underlines that, together with the SSM and the SRM, the capacity to afford the same level of protection to deposits, irrespective of their location, is an indispensable component for completing the BU; underlines that to this end the existing Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive must be swiftly and fully implemented;

Amendment 318 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

39. Underlines that, together with the SSM and the SRM, thany premature capacity to afford the same level of protection to deposits, irrespective of their location, ~~is an indispensable component for~~will create moral hazard instead of completing the BU;

Amendment 319 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

39. Underlines that~~, together with the SSM and the SRM,~~ the capacity to afford ~~the same~~a high level of protection to deposits, irrespective of their location and their size, is an indispensable component for completing the BU;

Amendment 32 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas in a BU a Single Rulebook ~~must~~should be complemented by a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and - in so far as all the necessary conditions have been created - a common deposit guarantee scheme (DGS), and should be provided with an efficient fiscal backstop at EU level;

Amendment 320 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

39. Underlines that~~, together with the SSM and the SRM, the capacity to af~~ the call ford the same level of protection to deposits, irrespective of their location~~, is an indispensable component for completing the BU~~ embodied in the EDIS, implies the socialisation of losses and the institutionalisation of a moral hazard problem;

Amendment 321 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

39. Underlines that, together with the SSM and the SRM, the capacity to afford the same level of protection to deposits, irrespective of their location, is ~~an indispensable component for~~important and that this can already be achieved by establishing national deposit guarantee schemes; calls on the Commission therefore consistently to punish the failure by some Member States to transpose the relevant Directive; calls on those non-compliant Member States to develop their national deposit guarantee schemes as swiftly as possible in order to make their contribution to the completingon of the BU;

Amendment 322 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

39. ~~Underline~~Recalls that, together with the SSM and the SRM, the capacity to afford the same level of protection to deposits, irrespective of their location, is an indispensable component for completing the BU;

Amendment 323 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

39. Underlines that, together with the SSM and the SRM, the capacity to afford the same level of protection to deposits, irrespective of their location, is an indispensable component for completing the BU; calls on Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Cyprus, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Sweden to fully and swiftly implement the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive;

Amendment 324 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

39. Underlines that, together with the SSM and the SRM, the capacity to afford ~~the same~~a uniform and high level of protection to deposits, irrespective of their location, is an indispensable component for completing the BU; considers that any system of protection of deposit must always avoid the introduction of any moral hazard;

Amendment 325 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

39. Underlines that, together with the SSM and the SRM, the capacity to afford the same level of protection to deposits, irrespective of their location, is a~~n indispensable~~ key component for the future completingon of the BU if and when conditions are right;

Amendment 326 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

39. Underlines that, together with the SSM and the SRM, ~~the capacity to afford the same~~a high and uniform level of protection to deposits, irrespective of their location, ~~is an indispensable component for completing th~~should be ensured in an effective BU;

Amendment 327 #

Tom VANDENKENDELAERE, Pablo ZALBA BIDEGAIN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

39. URegrets the delay in establishing the Single Deposit Guarantee Scheme and underlines that, together with the SSM and the SRM, the capacity to afford the same level of protection to deposits, irrespective of their location, is an indispensable component for completing the BU;

Amendment 328 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

39. Underlines that, together with the SSM and the SRM, the capacity to afford the same level of protection to deposits, irrespective of their location, is an indispensable component for completing the BU and thus genuinely breaking the sovereign-bank loop, restoring depositor confidence, creating a level-playing field and enhancing financial stability;

Amendment 329 #

Renato SORU, Andrea COZZOLINO, Isabella DE MONTE, Alessia Maria MOSCA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39 a (new)

39a. Recalls that while breaking the link between sovereigns and banks at national level remains an important objective, all the measures directed at achieving this objective, have to take into account both the international context and the short term repercussion on financial stability; stresses in particular that the introduction of a risk weighting on the sovereign debt exposure of banks, by severing the link between debt and saving in any given Member State, may endanger debt sustainability and put financial stability at risk; furthermore considers that this measure should only be taken in conjunction with risk sharing measures;

Amendment 33 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas in a BU ~~a Single Rulebook must be complement~~the development of a Single Rulebook is fostered by a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and a ~~common deposit guarantee scheme (DGS), and should be provided with an efficient fiscal backstop at EU level~~high and uniform level of protection of covered deposits;

Amendment 330 #

Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

Amendment 331 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

40. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement regarding the presentation of a legislative proposal for the first steps towards a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) by establishing a reinsurance mechanism at EU level for the national deposit guarantee schemeslegislative proposal aiming at establishing a Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) in three steps: reinsurance, coinsurance and full insurance; welcomes the gradual approach taken and looks forward to the implementation of the new mechanism;

Amendment 332 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

40. Welcomes the Commission’s ~~announcement regarding the~~ presentation of a legislative proposal for ~~the first steps towards a~~ European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) by establishing a reinsurance mechanism at EU level for the national deposit guarantee schemes immediately but regrets that a truly common DGS will only be in place in 2024;

Amendment 333 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

40. ~~Welcomes~~Takes note of the Commission’s ~~announcement regarding the presentation of a~~ legislative proposal for ~~the first steps towards~~ a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (~~EDIS) by establishing a reinsurance mechanism at EU level for the national deposit guarantee schemes~~COM(2015)0586);

Amendment 334 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

40. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement regarding the presentation of a legislative proposal for the first steps towards a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) by establishing a reinsurance mechanism at EU level for the national deposit guarantee schemes and looks forward to a swift adoption of EDIS to complete this pillar of the Banking Union;

Amendment 335 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

40. ~~Welcom~~Criticises the Commission’s ~~announcement~~proposal regarding the presentation of a legislative proposal for the first steps towards a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) by establishing a reinsurance mechanism at EU level for the national deposit guarantee schemes;

Amendment 336 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

40. ~~Welcomes the~~Criticises the European Commission’'s ~~announcement regarding the presentation of a legislative proposal for the first steps towards a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) by~~legislative proposal for establishing a reinsurance mechanism ~~at EU level~~ for the national deposit guarantee schemes as a first step towards their communitarisation;

Amendment 337 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

40. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement regarding the presentation of a legislative proposal for the first steps towards a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) by establishing a reinsurance mechanism at EU level forIs astonished about the Commission’s proposal for the first steps towards a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), in the view of recently adopted legislation which, as determined by the co-legislators, sets the ndat~~ional deposit guarantee schemes~~e for review of the present instruments to 2019;

Amendment 338 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

40. ~~Welcomes~~Takes note of the Commission’s announcement regarding the presentation of a legislative proposal for the first steps towards a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) by establishing a reinsurance mechanism at EU level for the national deposit guarantee schemes; stresses that there are economic and legal preconditions to any risk sharing mechanisms with regard to deposits, e.g. harmonisation of insolvency laws and full economic policy coordination;

Amendment 339 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

40. ~~Welcomes~~Takes note of the Commission’s announcement regarding the presentation of a legislative proposal for the first steps towards a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) by establishing a reinsurance mechanism at EU level for the national deposit guarantee schemes, whereby the European Parliament will act as a co-legislator;

Amendment 34 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas in a BU a Single Rulebook must be complemented by a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and if and when conditions are right, a common deposit guarantee scheme (DGS)~~, and should be provided with an efficient fiscal backstop at EU level~~;

Amendment 340 #

Tom VANDENKENDELAERE, Pablo ZALBA BIDEGAIN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

Amendment 341 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

40. Welcomes the Commission’'s announcement regarding the presentation of a legislative proposal for the first steps towards a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) by establishing a reinsurance mechanism at EU level for the national deposit guarantee schemelegislative proposal regarding the establishment of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) which would gradually evolve from a re-insurance of national Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) to a co- insurance scheme and finally a genuine European Deposit Insurance Scheme; deems it essential that in parallel to the gradual introduction of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme concrete steps are taken towards a further reduction of risks in the banking sector and a weakening of the link between banks and sovereigns;

Amendment 342 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

40. ~~Welcomes~~Is concerned at the Commission’'s announcement ~~regarding the presentation~~ of a legislative proposal for the first steps towards a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) by initially establishing a welcome reinsurance mechanism at EU level for the national deposit guarantee schemes but that will gradually be transformed into a full EU- wide deposit insurance scheme; that could do harm to established subsidiary schemes of mutual support of small banks;

Amendment 343 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

40. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement regarding the presentation of a legislative proposal for the first steps towards a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) by establishing a reinsurance mechanism at EU level for the national deposit guarantee schemes; considers however that the transition towards a fully mutualised EDIS should be achieved as soon as possible, in any case well before 2024;

Amendment 344 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

40. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement regarding the presentation of a legislative proposal for the first steps towards a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) by establishing a reinsurance mechanism at EU level for the national deposit guarantee schemes, considers it vital to agree on a scheme that would not create any distortion between the different banking models; in parallel it is essential to work to reduce risks, including those linked to sovereign debt and banks' governance;

Amendment 345 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

40. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement regarding the presentation of a legislative proposal for the first steps towards a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) by establishing a reinsurance mechanism at EU level for the national deposit guarantee schemConsiders therefore the Commission's legislative proposal seeking to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) to be premature as national deposit guarantee schemes and funds have not yet been set up in all the Member States;

Amendment 346 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

40. ~~Welcom~~Notes the Commission’s announcement regarding the presentation of a legislative proposal for the first steps towards a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) by establishing a reinsurance mechanism at EU level for the national deposit guarantee schemes; but requests the Commission to desist as far as possible from a 'phased' approach and aim instead to put in place as swiftly as possible a joint deposit guarantee fund, as the cost of the lack of such a mechanism has been estimated by Parliament's research department to amount to EUR 64 billion or 0.5% of EU GDP in the event of a financial crisis;

Amendment 347 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40

40. Welcomes the Commission’s's draft proposal announcement regarding the presentation of a legislative proposal for the first steps towards on a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) ~~by establishing a reinsurance mechanism at EU level for the national deposit guarantee scheme~~, which contemplates the gradual introduction of a common deposit guarantee scheme; considers appropriate the legal basis which correctly requires the ordinary legislative procedure and considers that the proposal addresses the need to avoid financial stability problems related to the potential vulnerability of national guarantee schemes to local and relevant shocks, by establishing a reinsurance mechanism at EU level for the national deposit guarantee schemes as well as the need to treat depositors in the same way independently of the location of the bank, thus weakening the link between sovereigns and banks;

Amendment 348 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 a (new)

40a. Notes that the creation of EDIS requires the transposition of the BRRD and the DGSD and the ratification of the Inter-Governmental Agreement determining contributions to the Single Resolution Fund by all Member States part of the Banking Union;

Amendment 349 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 a (new)

40a. Stresses the importance of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) to further break the link between member states and their financial sector, and that a European scheme will assure and safeguard the protection of consumer deposits even in severe national financial crisis due to the risk sharing that takes place;

Amendment 35 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the SSM is the first pillar of the BU and ~~aims to~~has not, to date, ensured a uniform and homogeneous supervision of euro area banks, ~~create~~ a level playing field in the banking market, ~~and contribute to the~~greater safety and soundness of credit institutions ~~and the~~or greater stability of the financial system;

Amendment 350 #

Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 a (new)

40a. Welcomes the fact that the European Commission's legislative proposal provides for a risk-based approach to the calculation of contributions, so that low risk banks pay smaller contributions and higher risk banks pay greater contributions to a common deposit guarantee scheme; calls for the criteria for the calculation of these risk-based contributions to the European Reinsurance Fund not to be laid down in delegated legal acts but to be incorporated into the text of the Regulation itself;

Amendment 351 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 a (new)

40a. Recalls the recent changes made to the Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes, which should be fully implemented and funded first to see their effects before further changes are made; requests the Commission to review effective implementation, especially taking into account the level of funds already collected and comparing the findings to similar measures that are able to protect deposits, e.g. ring fencing, institutional protection schemes, and other safeguards;

Amendment 352 #

Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 a (new)

40a. Notes the Commission's proposal for a European Deposit Insurance Scheme; stresses, however, that risk reduction in the banking sector should precede risk sharing and that European banking legislation, in particular the DGSD and the BRRD, should be fully implemented by all Member States prior to the possible establishment of a Deposit Insurance Scheme at European level;

Amendment 353 #

Renato SORU, Andrea COZZOLINO, Isabella DE MONTE, Alessia Maria MOSCA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 a (new)

40a. Welcomes the intention to realize a progressive degree of risk sharing in parallel with the reduction of risks in the banking system; underlines in this regard the importance of implementation of the single rulebook as well as of the first and the second pillar of the Banking Union in order to achieve a substantial reduction of risks in the European banking system; in particular, stresses that the application of the bail-in tool will introduce a systematic mechanism of risk avoidance, thus reducing the fears of moral hazard which could be induced by the progressive mutualisation of guarantee schemes;

Amendment 354 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 a (new)

40a. Recalls that the reduction of systemic risk, attained through regulatory changes and efforts made at national level, should proceed in parallel with the creation of risk sharing mechanism at European level1 a; __________________ 1a Among the others, Commissioner Jonathan Hill, Responsible for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union recently stated that: "Step by step, we need to make sure that risk reduction goes hand in hand with risk sharing.”

Amendment 355 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 a (new)

40a. Recalls that the role of the Commission is to guarantee a level playing field across the European Union and that it should avoid any fragmentation within the internal market;

Amendment 356 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 a (new)

40a. Points to the Commission Communication of 24 November 2015 "Towards the completion of the Banking Union", in particular on the emphasis on further reducing risks in the banking sector and breaking the link between banks and sovereigns;

Amendment 357 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 a (new)

40a. Believes that it should be the job of national central banks to guarantee all foreign-currency deposits held by financial institutions based in their countries;

Amendment 358 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 b (new)

40b. Takes note of the fact that the EDIS aims to reduce the links between banks and sovereigns at the national level through risk sharing among all states in the Banking Union; stresses, however, that risk sharing instruments must be preceded by measures to reduce risk, since the mutualisation of bank failures and insolvencies requires high levels of trust and prior risk reduction; welcomes the Commission's commitment to reducing the risks in the BU, yet underlines that further efforts are needed prior to moving ahead with the third pillar of the Union;

Amendment 359 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 b (new)

40b. Notes that a well-functioning deposit guarantee scheme funded through contributions of the financial sector is one of the proven ways to prevent bail-outs of banks with tax-payers money;

Amendment 36 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the SSM is the first pillar of the BU and should aims to ensure a uniform and homogeneous supervision of euro area banks, ~~create~~taking into account the uneven framework of the European construction derived from the international division of labour between core and peripheral regions, creating a level playing field in the banking market, and contributeing to the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system;

Amendment 360 #

Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 b (new)

40b. Stresses that a possible Deposit Insurance Scheme at European level should focus on preventing moral hazard and reducing systemic risk;

Amendment 361 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 b (new)

40b. Calls on the Commission to present comprehensive proposals in 2016 on measures aiming at a further risk reduction in the banking sector; points to the announcement of the Commission in the Communication "Towards the Completion of the Banking Union" that the adequacy of the prudential treatment of banks' exposures to sovereign risk should be reconsidered;

Amendment 362 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 c (new)

40c. Recalls that the establishment of EDIS should be underpinned by an evaluation of the DGSD results and calls on the Commission to conduct an in- depth impact assessment after the DGSD transposition, taking into account the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity;

Amendment 37 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the SSM is the first pillar of the BU and aims to ensure a uniform and homogeneous supervision of ~~euro area bank~~large banks of participating Member States, create a level playing field in the banking market, ~~and~~ contribute to the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system and respect the diversity of credit institutions and their business models in the European banking sector;

Amendment 38 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)

Da. whereas the European Central Bank has to date failed to take sufficient account of the proportionality principle in connection with its supervisory activities;

Amendment 39 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)

Da. whereas the establishment of the SSM within the ECB creates a conflict of interest between pursuing an independent monetary policy and prudential supervision;

Amendment 4 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 c (new)

– having regard to the Decision of the European Central Bank of 24 February 2014 on the organisation of preparatory measures for the collection of granular credit data by the European System of Central Banks (ECB/2014/6),

Amendment 40 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D b (new)

Db. whereas Article 127(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union only allows to confer specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision, so that the SSM, which serves as a general supervisor, has created legal uncertainty to the detriment of the supervised entities;

Amendment 41 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas the SRM is the second pillar of the BU and ~~aims~~might not be sufficient to ensure uniform rules and procedures and a common decision- making process for orderly resolution of failing banks with minimum impact on the real economy and public finance;

Amendment 42 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas the SRM is the second pillar of the BU and aims to ensure uniform rules and procedures and a common decision- making process for orderly resolution of failing banks with minimum impact on the real economy ~~and public finance~~in order to fully safeguard public finances from the cost of bailing out banks;

Amendment 43 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas the SRM is the second pillar of the BU and aims to ensure uniform rules and procedures and a common decision- making process for orderly resolution of fail~~ing~~ed banks with minimum impact on the rest of the financial system, ordinary citizens, the real economy and public finance;

Amendment 44 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas the SRM is the second pillar of the BU and should aims to ensure uniform rules and procedures and a common decision- making process for orderly resolution of failing banks with minimum impact on the real economy and public finance throughout Europe;

Amendment 45 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas a common DGS, originally intended as the third pillar of the BU, so far consists only in an approximation of national DGSs, while a common DGS that is able to ensure the same level of protection for deposits, irrespective of their location, is a necessary component of a true BUwell structured DGS is a necessary component to ensure stability of the financial system and protect savers;

Amendment 46 #

Othmar KARAS

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas a common DGS, originally intended as the third pillar of the BU, so far consists only in an approximation of national DGSs~~, while a common DGS that is~~; the next steps towards a common DGS should not be taken before the completion of the current harmonisation efforts. Otherwise we will not be able to ensure the same level of protection for deposits, irrespective of their location~~, is a necessary component of a true BU;~~.

Amendment 47 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas a common DGS, originally intended as the third pillar of the BU, so far consists only in an approximation of national DGSs, while a common DGS that is able to ensure the same level of protection for deposits, irrespective of their location, is a necessary component of a true BU is inadequate as long as risks differ greatly between national banking systems;

Amendment 48 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas a common DGS, originally intended as the third pillar of the BU, so far consists only in an approximation of national DGSs, while a common DGS that is able to ensure the same level of protection for deposits, irrespective ofnsiderable number of Member States have so far failed to implement fully the EU directives necessary for a common DGS, originally intended as the their ~~location, is a necessary component of a tru~~d pillar of the BU;

Amendment 49 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas a common DGS, originally intended as the third pillar of the BU, so far consists only in an approximation of national DGSs, while, ultimately a common ~~DGS~~scheme that is able to ensure the same level of protection for deposits, irrespective of their location, is a necessary component of a true BU;

Amendment 5 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 d (new)

– having regard to the Decision of the European Commission to refer the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Sweden to the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court) for failing to implement the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (2014/59/EU),

Amendment 50 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas a common DGS~~, originally intended a~~ is the third pillar of the BU~~, so far~~ and consists o~~nly in an approximation of national DGSs, while a common DGS that is able to ensure the same level of protection for deposits, irrespective of their location, is a necessary component of a true BU~~f national DGSs that, when fully funded, are able to ensure protection for deposits;

Amendment 51 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas a common DGS, originally ~~intend~~considered as the third pillar of the BU, so far consists only in an approximation of national DGSs, while a common ~~DGS that is able to ensure the same level of protection for deposits, irrespective of their location, is a necessary component of a true BU~~rules will ensure a unified level of protection for deposits as a necessary component of a true BU and while further legislative steps will be subject to the co-legislators´ decision;

Amendment 52 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas ~~a common~~the system of DGSs, ~~originally intend~~considered as the third pillar of the BU, so far consists ~~only~~ in an approximation of national DGSs, while ait is important to fully enforce the existing common ~~DGS~~rules that ~~is able to ensure the same level of protection for deposits, irrespective of their location, is a necessary component of a true BU~~will ensure a high and uniform level of protection for covered deposits; whereas any future legislative steps will be subject to the co-legislators' decision;

Amendment 53 #

Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas a common DGS, originally intended as the third pillar of the BU, so far consists only in an approximation of national DGSs~~, while a common DGS that is able to ensure the same level of protection for deposits, irrespective of their location, is a necessary component of a true BU~~ and a proposal for a future European Deposit Insurance Scheme has only recently been presented by the European Commission;

Amendment 54 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)

Fa. whereas to function properly the banking union needs risk-free financial assets, such as for example government bonds from the EU or the euro area;

Amendment 55 #

Jakob von WEIZSÄCKER, Paul TANG

Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)

Fa. whereas Banking Structural Reform (BSR) in the spirit of the Liikanen Report as an additional fourth pillar of Banking Union is necessary effectively to address the too-big-to-fail problem and to safeguard taxpayers and depositors;

Amendment 56 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI

Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)

Fa. whereas risks cannot be assessed with enough certainty to achieve a fair burden sharing in a common DGS by risk- weighted contributions;

Amendment 57 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)

Fa. whereas the current economic crisis was largely caused by the financial industry where many actors have become too-big and too-interconnected-to fail and had to be bailed-out with public funds; in contrast to any market-economy logic, losses were socialised and profits privatised; not only did this send national economies spiralling downwards and set off a public debt crisis, it also led to a regime of harsh austerity policies, imposed by EU institutions and the IMF as conditions for loans;

Amendment 58 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO

Motion for a resolution
Recital F b (new)

Fb. whereas the key role of financial institutions is to channel savings into productive investments and to guarantee the socioeconomic function of credit, the invention of various toxic financial instruments and dubious business practices - which for example set exorbitantly high profit targets - has increased volatility and short-term orientation on the financial markets with negative effects on societies and economies; it is therefore imperative to shrink the financial sector to its core functions; hence, institutions that have reached a size and level of interconnectedness which is likely to pose a systemic threat to the functioning of the economies of single Member States or the Union as a whole should be downsized and separated;

Amendment 59 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO

Motion for a resolution
Recital F c (new)

Fc. whereas a proper Structural Reform of Banks which separates trading activities from retail banking and downsizes banks is key to the resolvability of banks and hence the credibility and efficiency of the BU;

Amendment 6 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI, Paloma LÓPEZ BERMEJO

Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 e (new)

– having regard to the recent work of the Basel Committee, especially to the Revisions to the Standardised Approach for credit risk and the Revision to the measurement of operational risk,

Amendment 60 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Welcomes the establishment of the SSM, which has been successful both from an operational point of view and in terms of supervisory quality, and considers it a remarkable achievement, taking into account the complexity of the project and the very short time frame available;deleted

Amendment 61 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

Amendment 62 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Welcomes the establishment of the SSM, which has been successful both from an operational point of view and in terms of supervisory quality~~, and considers it a remarkable achievement, taking into account the complexity of the project and the very short time frame available~~;

Amendment 63 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. ~~Welcomes~~Takes note of the establishment of the SSM, which has yet to prove to been successful both from an operational point of view and in terms of supervisory quality, ~~and considers it a remarkable achievement,~~especially taking into account the complexity of the project and the very short time frame available;

Amendment 64 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. ~~Welcom~~Notes the establishment of the SSM, which has ~~been successful~~yielded questionable results both from an operational point of view and in terms of supervisory quality, and considers ~~it a remarkable achievement, taking into account the complexity of the project and the very short time frame available~~that far more could be done in the field of single supervision;

Amendment 65 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Welcomes the establishment of the SSM, which has been successful since its creation both from an operational point of view and in terms of supervisory quality, and considers it a remarkable achievement, taking into account the complexity of the project and the very short time frame available; calls for this high-quality work to continue;

Amendment 66 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Encourages broad representation in the BU through the future involvement and participation of NCAs of non- participating Member States in accordance with established legal rules and procedures as well as through enhanced cooperation with third countries outside the EU; reaffirms that closer coordination between NCAs across the EU and internationally is essential for ensuring effective regulation and supervision of systemically important banks;

Amendment 67 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Welcomes the attempt to put in place a European banking supervisory mechanism while being concerned about the conflict of interest entailed in the ECB being a supervisor and a lender of last resort;

Amendment 68 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. more specifically with regard to the operational arrangements by means of which the ECB and the EBA have performed the first comprehensive assessment of 130 banks consisting of an Asset Quality Review (AQR) and a Stress Test;

Amendment 69 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Recalls that the ESRB should address the interconnectedness of financial markets and any other systemic risk affecting the stability of financial markets;

Amendment 7 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI

Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 f (new)

– having regard to the European Systemic Risk Board report on the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures of March 2015,

Amendment 70 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Points out that the establishment of the SSM is much too recent and does not allow for a full evaluation both from an operational point of view and in terms of supervisory quality;

Amendment 71 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Welcomes in particular, in relation to the operational set-up: a) the recruitment process, which resulted in a good blend of competences, cultures and gender, thus contributing to the supranational nature of the SSM, and the thorough training activity programme for national competent authorities (NCAs) and ECB staff; b) the drafting, building on national best practices, of the Supervisory Manual laying down common processes, procedures and methods for conducting a euro-wide supervisory review process; c) the set-up of the IT infrastructure and of the supporting analytical tools; d) the setting up of Joint Supervisory Teams (JSTs) and the dialogue they have established with the supervised credit institutions; e) the processes devised to work off the common procedures (authorisation of qualifying holdings, licensing, passporting, fit and proper assessments);deleted

Amendment 72 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – introductory part

2. ~~Welcomes~~Takes note in particular, in relation to the operational set-up:

Amendment 73 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point a

(a) ~~the recruitment process, which resulted in a good blend of competences, cultures and gender, thus contributing to the supranational nature of the SSM, and~~ the thorough training activity programme for national competent authorities (NCAs) and ECB staff;

Amendment 74 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point a

(a) the recruitment process, which resulted in a good blend of competences, cultures and gender, thus contributing to the supranational nature of the SSM, and the thorough training activity programme for national competent authorities (NCAs) and ECB staff; regrets, however, that the professional background of the recruited staff gives rise to conflict of interest in terms of prior service to financial industry;

Amendment 75 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point a

(a) the recruitment process, which resulted in a good blend of competences, cultures and gender, thus contributing to the supranational nature of the SSM, and the thorough training activity programme for national competent authorities (NCAs) and ECB staff; points out, however, that ECB staff working conditions leave room for improvement;

Amendment 76 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point a

(a) the recruitment process, which resulted in a ~~good~~ blend of competences, cultures and ~~gender~~nationalities, thus contributing to the supranational nature of the SSM, and the ~~thorough~~ training activity programme for national competent authorities (NCAs) and ECB staff;

Amendment 77 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point a a (new)

(aa) points out that, however, the ECB sets its employment law unilaterally and without consultation or involvement of the European Parliament or the EU Commission; deplores that the ECB issues term contracts only for the conversion of which into indefinite term contracts there is no involvement of staff representation; deplores that involvement of staff representatives is also totally absent in hiring and promotion decisions and is, therefore, concerned that this approach weakens the legitimation of staffing decisions while in an international organisation as the ECB every effort should be made to avoid the slightest perception of clientelism and favouritism; notes, furthermore, that the ECB does not keep track of the hours worked by ECB staff and cannot prove how it effectively complies with EU labour law, and that, as a result, there are signals in the SSM of risks of burnout, exhaustion and lack of prioritisation as well as room for improvement of coordination of work; notes that the Governing Council, after having received an open letter by the union IPSO at the ECB, decided to increase the headcount in the SSM – albeit not in line with the union's request and that all this may pose risks to the operations of the SSM in the longer run; deplores that the ECB does not enter into negotiations with unions and staff representatives on working conditions and that, overall, social dialogue and staff working conditions in terms of work life balance and social dialogue overall still leave ample room for improvement; welcomes therefore the steps by the ECB to address this situation;

Amendment 78 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point b

(b) the drafting, building on national best practices, of the Supervisory Manual, which should be made public, laying down common processes, procedures and methods for conducting a euro-wide supervisory review process;

Amendment 79 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point b

(b) the drafting, building on national best practices, of the Supervisory Manual laying down common processes, procedures and methods for conducting a euro-wide supervisory review process, which should be made fully public;

Amendment 8 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 11 a (new)

– having regard to the European Systemic Risk Board report on the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures of March 2015,

Amendment 80 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point c

(c) the set-up of the IT infrastructure and of the supporting analytical tools; stresses the importance of strong and well- functioning IT systems corresponding to the needs of the supervisory functions of the SSM; underlines that data collection must never exceed the capabilities of supervisors to analyse it effectively and timely; encourages coordination between the SSM and national supervisory authorities in order to meet the needs of data through a single application;

Amendment 81 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point e

(e) the processes devised to ~~work off~~operationalise the common procedures (authorisation of qualifying holdings, licensing, passporting, fit and proper assessments);

Amendment 82 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point e

(e) the processes devised to work off the common procedures (authorisation of qualifying holdings, licensing, passporting~~, fit and proper assessments~~);

Amendment 83 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point e a (new)

(ea) the contribution to improving the balance sheets of SSM banks through the AQR and accompanying stress tests;

Amendment 84 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Notes that the authority of the SSM only extends to banks subject to supervision and should not pose an obstacle to market access;

Amendment 85 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Warns of the fact that too many tasks falling under the remit of the SSM are handled directly at the highest level of the organisation; calls therefore to resort, whenever possible, to internal delegation processes so as to prevent bottlenecks and thus improve the overall efficiency of the system;

Amendment 86 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Notes that the various operational arrangements adopted for the AQR have undermined the level playing field among banking groups and among Member States because of the different methods of assessment of assets;

Amendment 87 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)

2b. Notes that the non-performance of the Stress Tests for 2016 – which moreover has not been fully justified by the ECB’s decision-making bodies – creates a procedural void and a lack of transparency which undermine the very credibility of the Single Supervisory Mechanism;

Amendment 88 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Notes that a very significant share of work is routinely devoted to administrative procedures, required by the SSM Regulation, which may not always be proportionate, and stands ready to consider proposals aimed at reducing the operational burden on structures at all levels and improving the effectiveness of the SSM supervision, namely by delegating certain decisions on specific administrative issues within clear limits and guidelines;deleted

Amendment 89 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Notes that a very significant share of work is routinely devoted to administrative procedures, required by the SSM Regulation, which may not always be proportionate, and stands ready to consider proposals aimed at reducing the operational burden on structures at all levels and improving the effectiveness of the SSM supervision, namely by ~~delegating certain decisions~~exploiting the potential onf s~~pecific~~treamlining administrative ~~issues within clear limits and guideline~~procedures, including standardised reporting templates and systems;

Amendment 9 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 12

~~– having regard to the Report on Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (‘Five Presidents’ Report’),~~deleted

Amendment 90 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Notes that a very significant share of work is routinely devoted to administrative procedures, required by the SSM Regulation, which may not always be proportionate, and stands ready to consider proposals aimed at reducing the operational burden on structures at all levels and improving the effectiveness of ~~the SSM~~ supervision~~, namely by delegating certain decisions on specific administrative issues within clear limits and guidelines~~;

Amendment 91 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Notes with satisfaction that the ethics rules of the ECB have been reviewed but underlines the need for further development in the light of the expanded mandate of the ECB which requires stronger rules on conflict of interests and safeguards against undue influence of financial industry on staff as well as members of the governing bodies;

Amendment 92 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)

3b. Demands that the President of the European Central Bank immediately steps down from his seat in the Group of Thirty (G30); believes that the ECB President, Mario Draghi, is guilty of conflict of interest as his role as supervisor of all large banks in the Eurozone is incompatible with his association with private market players;

Amendment 93 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. ~~Believes that while the degree of effectiveness achieved by JSTs in less than a year is remarkable,~~Takes note of the effectiveness of JSTs; believes further improvements can be pursued, including by involving NCAs in a more effective way and ensuring that their staff are motivated and involved in the decision- making process;

Amendment 94 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Believes that ~~while the degree of effectiveness achieved by JSTs in less than a year is remarkable, further improvements can be pursued~~many improvements could still be made to the operational aspect of the SSM, including by involving NCAs in a more effective way and ensuring that their staff are ~~motivated and~~ involved in the decision- making process;

Amendment 95 #

Miguel URBÁN CRESPO, Rina Ronja KARI, Matt CARTHY, Fabio DE MASI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Believes that while the degree of effectiveness achieved by JSTs in less than a year is remarkable, further improvements can be pursued, including by involving NCAs in a more effective way ~~and ensuring that their staff are motivated and involved~~ in the decision-making process;

Amendment 96 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Emphasises the need to avoid double reporting requirements ~~and more generally an unnecessary administrative burden~~ on credit institutions, in particular smaller banks;

Amendment 97 #

Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Emphasises the need to avoid double reporting requirements and more generally an unnecessary administrative burden on credit institutions, in particular smaller banks, and ensure that the proportionality principle is upheld;

Amendment 98 #

Tibor SZANYI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Emphasises the need to avoid double reporting requirements and more generally an unnecessary administrative burden on credit institutions, in particular smaller banks, provided that this does not jeopardise the effective attainment of the objectives of supervision;

Amendment 99 #