BETA

34 Amendments of Beatrix von STORCH related to 2016/2247(INI)

Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 a (new)
- having regard to the Euro Area Summit Statement of 29 June 2012, in which the participants stated their intention ‘to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns’1a , _________________ 1a http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/europ ean-council/pdf/20120629-euro-area- summit-statement-en_pdf
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 4
— having regard to the ECOFIN Council conclusions of 17 June 2016 on a roadmap to complete the Banking Union,deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5
— having regard to the Commission communication of 24 November 2015 entitled ‘Towards the completion of the Banking Union’ (COM(2015)0587),deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 24 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 26
— having regard to the Commission proposal of 24 November 2015 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (COM(2015)0586),deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas the establishment of the Banking Union has been a fundamental step taken towards the completion of a genuine Economic and Monetary Unionsignifies a surrendering of sovereignty not covered by the European treaties;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas the establishment of the SSM within the ECB creates a conflict of interest between the pursuit of an independent monetary policy and prudential supervision;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)
Ab. whereas, under Article 127(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, special tasks should only be conferred upon the Europe Central Bank concerning the supervision of credit institutions;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas the capital and liquidity ratios of EU banks have steadily improvedimproved only slowly and to a very limited extent over the last years; whereas risks to financial stability nevertheless remain; whereas the current situation calls for caution when introducing regulatory changes;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas the new resolution regime that entered into force in January 2016 represented a partial change of paradigm; whereas market participants need to fully understand and adapt to the new system; whereas, by virtue of their size, institutions are still able to circumvent the rules governing resolution;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas a common DGS or EDIS is inadequate as long as risks differ greatly from one national banking system to another;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas no non-euro area country has yet expressed a willingness to join the Banking Union; having regard to the outcome of the referendum in which the British people clearly voted in favour of Brexit; whereas growing criticism of the EU cannot be ignored;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 104 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Notes the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs) in some jurisdictions; considers that this issue is crucial and has yet to be solved; welcom in a market-oriented manner; acknowledges the work of the SSM and its draft guidance on this issue; looks forward tois sceptical about the results of the work on a minimum EU insolvency framework; calls on Member States to improve their insolvency legislation and to stimulate growth in order to tackle NPLs;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 105 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Insists on the full organisational separation of all staff providing services needed to enable the ECB to conduct an independent monetary policy; calls on the ECB to have an annual audit carried out by external experts to verify that it is meeting the legal requirement concerning the organisational separation of supervisory and monetary policy functions and to publish the relevant reports immediately;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 115 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. Calls on the SSM to regularly update the European Parliament about the information exchange which takes place between staff carrying out monetary policy and supervisory functions in accordance with the European Central Bank decision of 17 September 2014 (ECB/2014/39);
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 117 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 c (new)
1c. Notes that the establishment – under Article 127(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – of the SSM is giving rise to legal uncertainty as the unsustainable legal basis of SSM measures makes them vulnerable to legal challenges and the financial institutions which are being supervised are themselves aware of this;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 124 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Considers that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes, however, that modifyingtherefore, that its prudential treatment could have a significant effect on the financial sector, which calls for caution in reform effortsmust urgently be modified by abolishing zero weighting and introducing a cap; awaits with interest the results of the international work on this issue; considers that, in the end, a better regulatory framework, be it European or international, will be needed urgently and quickly;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 207 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Notes that the ‘too-big-to-fail’ issue still needs to be addressed; notes, self- critically, that its own efforts in recent years have been fruitless and that time has been wasted; considers that market- oriented activity is inconceivable if market actors cannot fail; urges, therefore, that the banking system must finally be organised in a market-oriented manner;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 211 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Welcomes the remarks by the Chair of the SSM's Supervisory Board calling for more prudent treatment of sovereign bonds with regard to capital requirements and the introduction of limits for large exposures;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 215 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Points out that easier delegation of decision-making on some routine issues from the Supervisory Board to relevant officials could contribute to making ECB banking supervision more efficient;deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 223 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Recalls the need to find, in the exercise of supervision, a balance between the need for proportionality and the need for a consistent approach;deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 279 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Recalls the need to adhere to State aid rules in the context of bank resolution; takes the view that enougtoo much flexibility is embedded within the current framework to address specific situations and might be better exploited, in particular in the case of preventive measures involving the use of DGS fundsthat this flexibility is exploited to an excessive degree;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 290 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Rejects any arrangement involving a taxpayer-funded backstop;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 321 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Warns that the numerous exceptions to the bail-in under Article 44 BRRD confer special status on the liabilities listed therein, to the detriment of all other creditors;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 323 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 b (new)
13b. Stresses that market-oriented bank resolution does not recognise claims which have special status by virtue of being excluded under the law from the scope of insolvency proceedings;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 324 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Notes the range of legal options available to ensure the subordination of TLAC-eligible debt; points out that none is preferred by the FSB; is of the view that the approach adopted should first and foremost strike a balance between flexibility and legal certainty;deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 332 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Recalls that the substance of the IGA on the SRF is to be incorporated in the future into the Union legal framework; calls on the Commission to reflect on ways of doing so; stresses that the upcoming incorporation of the fiscal compact into EU law could provide a useful template;deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 339 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Points out that swift and effective exchange of information between supervision and resolution authorities is paramount in order to ensure smooth crisis management; welcomes the conclusion of a memorandum of understanding between the ECB and the SRM in respect of cooperation and information exchange; warns of the consequences of this information exchange, which serves to circumvent the separation of monetary policy and supervisory functions;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 348 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Regrets that the Commission did not allow for more time to assess the implementation of the DGSD before proposing the EDIS and did not conduct a proper impact assessment of the proposal; stands ready, however, to seize the opportunity generated by the proposal to discuss the DGSD and address some of the options and discretions it includesregards the impact assessment made available as inadequate;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 360 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Is aware of the potential benefits of an EDIS; is nevertheless of the opinion that risk reduction measures are an indispensable counterparty to its establishment in order to prevent moral hazard, and that such measures should preferably precede risk sharing;deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 381 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Welcomes a European approach to deposit insurance, which must make it possible to address outstanding DGSD implementation issues and phase in the risk reduction measures;deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 391 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Recommends that the Commission, the ECB and the EBA study the possibility and suitability of accompanying the introduction of the EDIS with an assessment of the capital and liquidity situation of banks in order to better quantify the risks to be insurdeleted;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 402 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
22. Highlights thatConsiders it an erroneous interpretation of the law to view Article 114 aseems to be an appropriate legal basis for the establishment of bothe EDIS or the EDISF, and the DIFakes the view that Article 115 applies;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 411 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
23. Stresses that the introduction of the EDIS and discussions on this project should not lead to a weakening of the efforts towards improving the implementation of the DGSD; welcomes the work done recently by the EBA to promote convergence in this field;deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 424 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
24. WelcomDeplores the establishment of loan facility agreements between the SRF and the Banking Union Member States; is of the opinion, nevertheless, that this solution is not sufficient to do away with the bank- sovereign vicious circle cand that the work on a common fiscal backstop for the SRF, which should be fiscally neutral only be broken if the misconception that government bonds are risk free is done away with; rejects categorically, therefore, any mover the medium term, should continue o develop a common fiscal backsteop by stepfor the SRF;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON