11 Amendments of Ulrike TREBESIUS related to 2015/2344(INI)
Amendment 86 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Stresses that the premise for the creation of the Eurozone was the promise that there would be no fiscal transfers between Member States; reminds that fiscal transfers within Europe would be carried out by EU institutions such as the European Social Fund;
Amendment 90 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 b (new)
Paragraph 6 b (new)
6b. Believes that it is a mistake to increase the interdependence of the EU and the Eurozone; warns that there is increasing risk that a failure of the Euro- system will damage EU institutions or the entire EU; warns that problems economically caused by the Euro-system will be increasingly attributed by citizens on the EU; maintains that increased transfers from northern Europe to the South within the Eurozone system would help parties that want to abolish the EU altogether;
Amendment 91 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 c (new)
Paragraph 6 c (new)
6c. Believes that a budgetary capacity would make the EU still more opaque to the voter and reduce democratic control;
Amendment 92 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 d (new)
Paragraph 6 d (new)
6d. Warns of the difficulty to correctly identify asymmetric economic shocks and their duration; warns that the fiscal capacity would be used to compensate not for temporary shocks but for permanent loss in competitiveness; reminds that countries such as Italy1a or France1b regularly devalued to the German Mark before the Euro-System but rarely and only temporarily revalued; indicating that loss of competitiveness usually must be absorbed by permanent and not temporary measures; notes that fiscal capacities such as the "Länderfinanzausgleich" in Germany rarely reverse and usually are permanent transfer systems; 1a http://fxtop.com/de/zoom-historischen- wechselkursen- graph.php?C1=DEM&C2=CHF&A=1&DD1=01& MM1=01&YYYY1=1953&DD2=06&MM2=05&Y YYY2=2016&LARGE=1〈=de&CJ=0&MM1Y=0. 1b http://fxtop.com/de/zoom-historischen- wechselkursen- graph.php?C1=DEM&C2=CHF&A=1&DD1=01& MM1=01&YYYY1=1953&DD2=06&MM2=05&Y YYY2=2016&LARGE=1〈=de&CJ=0&MM1Y=0.
Amendment 93 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 e (new)
Paragraph 6 e (new)
6e. Believes that quantitative easing policies are damaging capital allocation and are damaging long-term growth and job creation; maintains that current debt levels in some member states are unsustainable;
Amendment 94 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 f (new)
Paragraph 6 f (new)
6f. Acknowledges that ECB policies are reducing pressure to reform in Member States; fears that a EU budgetary capacity will have the same effect; reminds that the OECD has concluded that France and Italy have made little progress since 2013; reminds that Mario Draghi has repeatedly asked the member states to use the time gained by ultra-loose monetary policy to carry out structural reform; maintains that a fiscal capacity will massively build moral hazard and disincentive to reform;
Amendment 95 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 g (new)
Paragraph 6 g (new)
6g. Acknowledges that the introduction of the common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing economic shocks such as exchange rate fluctuation; maintains that a currency union need not have transfer mechanisms as long as labour markets are sufficiently flexible; points out that this was known at the start of the currency union1a and reforms should have been implemented when joining the currency union; 1a http://www.zvab.com/W%C3%A4hrungsunion- Arbeitsmarkt-Auftakt-unabdingbaren-Reformen- Dohse/14988303120/bd.
Amendment 96 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 h (new)
Paragraph 6 h (new)
6h. Deplores that there is no figure of the size of the envisioned budgetary capacity mentioned except for the Community Budget of 5-7% of GDP as mentioned in the 1977 McDougall Report;
Amendment 97 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 i (new)
Paragraph 6 i (new)
6i. Acknowledges that the rules of the Euro and the institutions dealing with it (ECB, ESM) were broken numerous times and there is no indication that the rule of law would be observed in a budgetary capacity; reminds that when Jean Claude Juncker was questioned about the continual failure of France to fulfil its debt criteria he responded "we should not blindly apply the stability pact”;
Amendment 98 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 j (new)
Paragraph 6 j (new)
6j. Warns that the fiscal capacity might issue equities; warns that debt- based Keynesian deficit spending will only have short temporary effect on the labour markets; warns that while they will be backed by the strongest countries the control over debt issuance will currently be in the hands of the deficit countries; warns that debt issuance of the facility will further undermine the deficit criteria of the Maastricht treaty; demands that national parliaments will have a veto over debt issuance as they will be held accountable for backing this debt;
Amendment 99 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 k (new)
Paragraph 6 k (new)
6k. Demands that any country taking money from the fiscal capacity will have to subject the entirety of its labour laws to the Commission; demands that countries can only be eligible for money from the budgetary capacity if their retirement age is set to the highest retirement age of any country currently paying into the system;