BETA

Activities of Clare MOODY related to 2018/2004(INI)

Plenary speeches (1)

Cyber defence (debate)
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2018/2004(INI)

Shadow reports (1)

REPORT on cyber defence PDF (408 KB) DOC (77 KB)
2016/11/22
Committee: AFET
Dossiers: 2018/2004(INI)
Documents: PDF(408 KB) DOC(77 KB)

Amendments (17)

Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
L. whereas cyber defence is an important consideration at all stages of the planning process as well as requiring constant monitoring, and whereas adequate capabilities need to be available to mainstream it fully into mission planning and provide continuous critical support;
2018/04/11
Committee: AFET
Amendment 92 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital O
O. whereas different state actors – Russia, China and North Korea, among others – have been involved in malicious cyber activities in pursuit of political, economic or security objectives that include attacks on critical infrastructure, cyber-espionage, aiding disinformation campaigns and limiting access to the internet (such as Wannacry, NonPetyafor which North Korea is culpable and NotPetya, for which Russia is culpable); whereas such activities could constitute wrongful acts under international law and could lead to a joint EU response, such as using the EU cyber diplomacy toolbox;
2018/04/11
Committee: AFET
Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Recognises that many Member States consider possession of their own cyber defence capabilities to be at the core of their national security strategy and to constitute an essential part of their national sovereignty; stresses, however, that – as with other military branches, and also owing to the borderless nature of cyberspace – the scale required for truly comprehensive and effective forces is beyond the reach of any single Member State and that due to EU initiatives such as the digital single market, the EU is well placed to take a leading role in developing European cyber defence strategies;
2018/04/11
Committee: AFET
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Strongly emphasises, therefore, that, in the framework of the emerging European Defence Union, cyber defence capabilities of Member States should be closely integrated from the start to ensure maximum efficiency; urges, therefore, the Member States to cooperate closely in the development of their respective cyber commands and that therefore cyber defence should be at the forefront of the European Defence Union;
2018/04/11
Committee: AFET
Amendment 166 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Emphasises that cyber defence should be considered an operational task for CSDP missions and operations, and that it should be included in all CSDP planning processes; ensuring cyber security is constantly considered throughout the planning process thereby reducing cyber vulnerability gaps;
2018/04/11
Committee: AFET
Amendment 171 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Recognises that planning a successful CSDP mission or operation requires substantial cyber defence expertise, both at operational headquarters and within the mission itself, to conduct a thorough threat assessment and provide adequate protection in the field; calls on the EEAS, and on the Member States providing headquarters for CSDP operations, to strengthen their cyber defence expertise to ensure the safety of the EU’s missions; notes that there is a limit to how well any CSDP mission can be prepared to protect itself from cyber attacks and that CSDP missions should anticipate operating in a contested cyberspace environment and may find themselves with limited access to information;
2018/04/11
Committee: AFET
Amendment 181 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Strongly supports the Military Erasmus initiative aimed at enhancing the interoperability of the armed forces of the Member States through an increased exchange of young officerspersonnel, of whatever level; stresses that there is a need for more experts in the cyber defence domain and; calls on the military academies to pay more attention to, and create more possibilities in, the field of cyber defence education as well as appropriate funding;
2018/04/11
Committee: AFET
Amendment 200 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Believes that such initiatives contribute to improving the quality of education in the cyber defence field at EU level, in particular through the creation of wide-ranging technical platforms and the establishment of a community of EU experts; believes that European armed forces can broaden their appeal by providing comprehensive cyber defence training to attract and retain cyber talent;
2018/04/11
Committee: AFET
Amendment 233 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Welcomes the arrangement between the EU’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) and the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability aimed at facilitating the exchange of information, logistical support and the sharing of best practices; stresses that it is important to encourage information exchanges between CERTs and to work towards increasing the level of trust; believes that there is an assumption that information held by CERT could be of use to cyber defence research and NATO and that this information should be shared providing full conformity with EU data protection legislation is applied;
2018/04/11
Committee: AFET
Amendment 247 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Regrets that, after several months of negotiations, the UN Group of Governmental Experts failed to adopt a consensus report; recalls, however, that international law applies toin cyberspace and that the 2013 and 2015 UNGGE reports still provide relevant guidelines, in particular as regards the prohibition for states to conduct or knowingly support cyber activities contrary to their obligations under international rules;
2018/04/11
Committee: AFET
Amendment 253 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
22. Notes the relevance of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 in this context as an excellent basis for a debate on how international law applies toin cyberspace; notes that it is now time for the Member States to start analysing and consider applying what the experts have stated in the Tallinn Manual in order to build international consensus on how to apply international law in cyberspace and to agree further voluntary norms of international behaviour;
2018/04/11
Committee: AFET
Amendment 258 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
23. Confirms its full commitment to an open, free, stable and secure cyberspace, which respects the core values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and where international disputes are settled by peaceful means; calls on the Member States to promote further implementation of the common and comprehensive EU approach to cyber diplomacy and draw up, together with NATO, EU-level criteria and definitions of what constitutes a cyber attack so as to improve the EU's ability to quickly come to a common position following an internationally wrongful act in the form of a cyber attack; strongly supports the development of voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace;
2018/04/11
Committee: AFET
Amendment 277 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 a (new)
25a. Considers that cyber attacks such as NotPetya and WannaCry are either state directed or take place with the knowledge of the state and its approval; notes that these cyber attacks which cause serious and lasting economic damage as well as being a threat to life, are clear breaches of international law and legal norms; believes therefore that the case of NotPetya and WannaCry represent breaches of international law for which the Russian Federation and North Korea respectively are culpable and should face commensurate and appropriate responses from the EU and NATO;
2018/04/11
Committee: AFET
Amendment 287 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
26. Calls on all stakeholders to reinforce knowledge transfer partnerships, implement appropriate business models and develop trust between companies and defence and civilian end-users, as well as to improve the transfer of academic knowledge into practical solutions, in order to create synergies and port solutions between the civilian and military markets – in essence a single market for cybersecurity; notes the pivotal role that private cybersecurity firms play in early warning and attribution of cyber attacks;
2018/04/11
Committee: AFET
Amendment 304 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
28. Notes that the protection of civilian critical infrastructure assets is becoming a vital defence task that should form part of the remit of national cyber commands; stresses that this will require a level of trust, and the closest possible cooperation, between military actors and the affected industries, and urges all stakeholders to take this into account in their planning processes; urges more cross-border cooperation, whilst fully respecting EU data protection legislation, on law enforcement related to taking down malicious cyber activity;
2018/04/11
Committee: AFET
Amendment 315 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 a (new)
30a. Notes that cyber attacks such as NotPetya spread quickly, thereby causing indiscriminate damage, unless there is widespread resilience globally; believes that cyber defence training and education should form part of the EU’s external action and that building cyber resilience in third countries contributes to international peace and security ultimately making European citizens safer;
2018/04/11
Committee: AFET
Amendment 338 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
32. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the VP/HR, the NATO Secretary-General, the EU agencies in the fields of defence and cyber security, and national parliaments of EU Member States and the NATO Secretary-General.
2018/04/11
Committee: AFET