53 Amendments of Seb DANCE related to 2016/2215(INI)
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Available eEmission control technologies (ECTs) available at the time of adoption of the Euro 5 and 6 NOx emission limits, when properly applied, already allowed diesel cars to meet the Euro 5 NOx emission limit of 180 mg/km and the Euro 6 NOx emission limit of 80 mg/km by the date of their respective entry into force, in real world conditions and not only in laboratory tests.
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. There are large discrepancies between the NOx emissions of most Euro 3-6 diesel cars measured during the type- approval process with the New European Driving Cycle (NEDC) laboratory test, which meet the legal limit, and their NOx emissions measured in real driving conditions, which substantially exceed the limit. Those discrepancies affect most the vast majority of diesel cars and are not limited to the Volkswagen vehicles equipped with prohibited defeat devices. These discrepancies contribute, to a large extent, to infringements by several Member States of Directive 2008/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe.
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. The existence of the discrepancies, and their significant negative impact on attaining air quality objectives, in particular with regard to urban areas, had been known to the Commission, to the responsible authorities of the Member States and to many other stakeholders since at least 2004-2005 when the Euro 5/6 Regulation was being prepared. The discrepancies have been confirmed by a large number of studies by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) since 2010-2011 and other researchers since 2010-201104.
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Although less so than for NOx emissions, there are also significant differences in the measured values of CO2 emissions and fuel consumption between laboratory tests and tests on the road;
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Before September 2015, the discrepancies were generally attributed to the inadequacy of the NEDC laboratory test, which is not representative of real world emissions, and to the optimisation strategies put in place by car manufacturers to pass the laboratory test, not to the use of prohibited defeat devices, although in 2013 a study conducted by the JRC discussed the possible use of defeat devices similar to those later discovered in Volkswagen vehicles. Evidence gathered by the committee suggested that car manufacturers are deliberately calibrating ECTs in their cars so that their effectiveness is reduced outside of the boundary conditions of the NEDC test.
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. The mandate forRather than waiting for a new, more realistic and certified test procedure, the co-legislators decided to continue with the development of the Euro 5/6 legislation in 2007, while at the same time giving a mandate to the Commission to keep the test cycles under review, and revise them if necessary to adequately reflect the emissions generated by real driving on the road, included by the legislators in 2007, . This resulted in the development and introduction of real driving emission (RDE) testing with Portable Emission Measurement Systems (PEMS) into the EU type-approval procedure as of 2017, while introducing at the same time the notion of a conformity factor (CF), which, in practice, weakens the emission standards currently in force.
Amendment 24 #
5 a. At the same time, the development of a new, more realistic, laboratory test procedure, the so called Worldwide Harmonized Light vehicles Test Procedure (WLTP), that is due to replace the obsolete NEDC, took an extremely long time, and the test will be mandatory as part of the type approval process of all new vehicle types from 1 September 2017 onwards and for all new vehicles one year later. The WLTP has been chosen by the Commission and Member States as the test procedure for CO2 emissions, other pollutant emissions and fuel consumption measurements for the purpose of type approval.
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5 b. From the evidence gathered and from internal exchanges of emails in the Commission, it is clear that vehicle manufacturers strongly resisted the introduction of PEMS at any stage of type approval and delayed the work of the RDE-LDV working group, insisting on the application of the random laboratory cycle as an "easier procedure" for emission compliance, leaving the door open for possible cycle-beating.
Amendment 28 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. The excessive length of the process leading to the introduction of regulatory RDE tests cannot be explained only in partsufficiently explained by the complexity of the development of a new test procedure, the time needed for the technological development of PEMS, and the length of the decision-making and administrative processes at the EU level. The delays were also due to choices of political priorities, such asand constant pressure from the industry, that put the focus of the Commission and the Member States on avoiding burdens on industry in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6 a. It is debatable, as confirmed by several experts, whether there is a need to include any conformity factor in the RDE procedure, given that they remain in clear contradiction with the results of several independent tests carried out on Euro 6 cars, which showed NOx conformity factors below the value of 1.5 or even much lower than 1 are already achievable. Moreover, conformity factors are not justifiable from a technical perspective and do not reflect an obvious need to develop new technology, but rather allow the ongoing use of technology with less efficiency, while efficient technology is present on the market but has low penetration levels for economic reasons today.
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)
Paragraph 6 b (new)
6 b. The introduction and application of conformity factors at the agreed levels could be considered a de facto blanket derogation from the applicable emissions limits for a considerable amount of time and thus run counter to the aims and objectives of the basic Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 given that the established conformity factors did not only reflect the measurement uncertainty of PEMS, but have been adapted further to the demands for more leniency by Member States and car manufacturers, without technical justification.
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. The analysis of the minutes of the RDE-LDV working group and of the Technical Committee on Motor Vehicles (TCMV) shows that some Member States, including in particular France, Italy and Spain, acted on several occasions to delay the adoption process of the RDE tests and to favour less stringent testing methods. In addition, several Member States (Italy, Spain, France, Slovak Republic, Romania, and Hungary), prevented the formation of a qualified majority in the TCMV, resulting in a postponement of the vote on the first RDE package, and therefore a delay of the whole RDE process, that is still not completed today, but was initially foreseen to be applicable for compliance purposes as of the date of introduction of the Euro 6 emission limits (2014 for new type-approvals and 2015 for all new vehicles). As a result of lobbying from certain Member States for a higher value of conformity factor, new car models will have to respect the NTE Euro 6 emission standards, already agreed by the co-legislators in 2007, not before 2020. This is six years later than originally planned and three years later than the already once delayed timing the European Commission proposed in its CARS 2020 Communication of 8/11/2012 (COM(2012) 636).
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8 a. The analysis of minutes of the TCMV meetings shows that many Member States (Italy, Spain, France, Slovak Republic, Romania, Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Poland, United Kingdom and Austria), strongly opposed the more ambitious Commission proposal for conformity factors for NOx limits, and instead settled for higher conformity factor values corresponding to weaker environmental objectives. Some Member States presented a different position to the public and to the participants of the TCMV.
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9 a. Despite the issue of pollutant emissions from vehicles being not only a highly sensitive and political issue, but also a subject of high concern to the EU citizens, the Commission did not make any attempts to advance the decision- making process by making use of the possibility envisaged in the Regulatory Procedure with Scrutiny to bring forward the proposal to the level of the Council to increase political awareness and to exercise additional pressure on obstructing Member States. The Commission's failure to act in a timely manner on its responsibility to keep the test procedure under review and to revise it to reflect real world conditions constitutes maladministration.
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. As the entity responsible for the process and agenda of the RDE-LDV working group, the Commission, and more specifically DG ENTR, should have steered the RDE-LDV working group towards an earlier choice of the option of PEMS testing, as that option was suggested in Recital 15 of the Euro 5/6 Regulation, was widely supported within the RDE- LDV group, and the JRC had already concluded in November 2010 that PEMS testing methods were sufficiently robust. This constitutes maladministration.
Amendment 55 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10 a. The Commission (DG ENTR) delayed the RDE introduction date for compliance purposes on several occasions. It can be estimated that the total delay for introduction of the RDE test for compliance purposes in the framework of legally established emission limits while taking into account the inaccuracy of the measurement equipment equals 6 years (2020 for new vehicles instead of planned 2014 and 2021 for all vehicles instead of 2015).
Amendment 56 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 b (new)
Paragraph 10 b (new)
10 b. The CARS 2020 proposal, explicitly delayed necessary emissions regulations in order to protect the car industry from 'regulatory burden' in the aftermath of the economic and financial crisis. Ensuring compliance with existing EU emissions standards was superseded by the economic concerns of an industrial sector.
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11 a. The issue of pollution and its effects on public health and the environment was not given sufficient attention by the Commission's competent Industry DG (DG ENTR, subsequently DG GROW) despite calls for more action by the Commission's Environment DG (DG ENV) and it's likely that the relevant emissions legislation and its enforcement in the Union would be have been more robust if DG ENV was responsible. In a reply to a DG ENTR Interservice Consultation dated 16 November 2005 on the proposal for a Euro 5 emission limit, DG ENV gave a suspended opinion arguing that that it was justified to push for a lower NOx limit for diesel cars because standards elsewhere in the world were much more demanding than the proposed 200mg/km and that EU car makers were demonstrating their technical and economic capacity to comply with the much stricter NOx standard in the United States of 44mg/km.
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 b (new)
Paragraph 11 b (new)
11 b. More pro-active involvement of DG ENV in the development of emissions legislation by bringing it forward to the level of the College of Commissioners could have contributed to more robust emissions legislation.
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Over half of the RDE-LDV working group participants consisted of experts from car manufacturers and other automotive industries. This can inter alia be attributed to the lack of sufficient technical expertise in the Commission departments. While the Commission consulted a wide range of stakeholders and ensured open access to the RDE-LDV group, it should have taken further steps to “"as far as possible, ensure a balanced representation of relevant stakeholders, including NGOs, consumers associations and civil society, taking into account the specific tasks of the expert group and the type of expertise required”", as required by the horizontal rules for Commission expert groups of 10 November 2010.
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12 a. The Commission should have acted to mitigate the central role played by the overrepresented industry representatives in the work of the RDE- LDV working group, who constantly delayed its work by re-opening topics that were considered clarified or even decided upon.
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Defeat devices were generally not considered among the possible reasons behind the discrepancies between laboratory and on-road NOx emissions and it was not generally suspected that they could be in actual use in any passenger car produced in the EU before the Volkswagen revelations in September 2015, despite the fact that such devices were found in the US in light-duty vehicles in 1995 and in heavy-duty vehicles in 1998.
Amendment 78 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. The scope and provisions of the ban on defeat devices has never been disputed by anyone. No Member State or car manufacturer ever questioned or asked for clarification on the provisions on defeat devices, including the implementation of the ban, until the Volkswagen case.
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Some emission control strategies applied by car manufacturers point towards the possible use of prohibited defeat devices. For instance, some manufacturers decrease the effectiveness of ECTs outside specific “"thermal windows”" close to the temperature range prescribed by the NEDC test, but which are not justifiable byaccording to the technical limitations of the ECTs. Others modulate ECTs to decrease their efficiency after a certain time from the start of the engine, close to the duration of the test, has elapsed. Moreover, in many cases, emissions measured on a test cycle after a certain period following engine start are unjustifiably higher, given the technical functionality of ECTs, than on the same cycle with measurements done immediately after engine start.
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16 a. Following the Volkswagen scandal, some car manufacturers have adjusted their thermal windows to allow their existing emissions control technologies to operate within a much broader temperature range.
Amendment 88 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 b (new)
Paragraph 16 b (new)
16 b. The evidence gathered confirmed that car manufacturers - who are responsible for ensuring that no prohibited defeat device is used in their vehicles - interpret the rules established in Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 in such a way that they are optimising their vehicles in order to simply pass the test cycle and comply with the letter of the law, but not necessarily the spirit. At the same time, the car manufacturers clearly disregarded the provisions set in Article 5(1) of the above- mentioned Regulation, obliging them to equip their vehicles so that the components likely to affect emissions are designed, constructed and assembled so as to enable the vehicle, in normal use, to comply with the Regulation and its implementing measures.
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 b (new)
Paragraph 16 b (new)
16 b. Optimisation strategies that reduce the effectiveness of ECTs can be attributed to commercial choices made by the car manufacturer to achieve different objectives, such as reducing fuel consumption, increasing user convenience, reducing costs by using cheaper parts or addressing design constraints. These objectives are not covered by the exemptions on the prohibition on the use of defeat devices.
Amendment 90 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. No authority searched for defeat devices or proved the illegal use of defeat devices before September 2015. No Member State authority or technical service performed any tests other than the NEDC, that has to be used in the scope of type-approval, which in itself cannot point to the use of a defeat device. While an alternative test in itself may not necessarily identify the use of a defeat device, the use of tests other than the NEDC could indicate suspicious emission behaviour and prompt the need for further investigation. Alternative tests have always been a possibility but have never been used. The vast majority of car manufacturers present on the EU market declared that they use the derogations to the ban on defeat devices foreseen in Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007. The legality of the use of the derogations is subject to ongoing investigations and court cases.
Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Unlike in the case of heavy-duty vehicles, car manufacturers were not required to disclose or justify their emission strategies. Without such an obligationOnly Article 3(9) of the Commission implementing Regulation (EC) No 692/2008 asks manufacturers, when applying for type-approval, to "provide the approval authority with information on the operating strategy of the exhaust gas recirculation system (EGR), including its functioning at low temperatures". Apparently this information was never used by national type approval authorities to check whether switching off or modulating emission abatement technologies is in line with the provisions on defeat devices. Without an obligation to disclose the complete base and auxiliary emission strategies, which change the base strategies for a specific purpose and in response to a specific set of operating conditions, identifying with certainty a defeat device implemented in software by reverse engineering is a lengthy and burdensome operation with no guarantee of success. Even with RDE tests, the risk that defeat strategies are used cannot be completely excluded in the future.
Amendment 96 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18 a. There is no consistent application of EU law in the 28 Member States, thus creating uncertainty in the interpretation of legal provisions and undermining the single market.
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 b (new)
Paragraph 18 b (new)
18 b. Between 2005 and 2015, the EIB granted loans to the Volkswagen Group in the order of EUR 4.3 billion. Of these about EUR 3.1billion concerned loans for RDI investments for emissions reduction of (passenger and commercial vehicle) engines. It is still unclear, pending ongoing investigations by OLAF and EIB, whether there is a link between the loans received by Volkswagen and the illegal software installed.
Amendment 103 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Member States contravened their legal obligation to monitor and enforce the ban on defeat devices set out in Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007. None of them, and in particular Member States whose national type approval authority type-approved the Volkswagen vehicles equipped with illegal software, found the defeat devices installed in the Volkswagen vehicles. Moreover, according to our investigations, most Member States, and at least Germany, France, Italy and Luxembourg, had evidence that irrational emission control strategies, based on conditions similar to the NEDC test cycle (temperature, duration, speed), were used in order to pass the type-approval test cycle. Ongoing investigations and court cases at national level will decide if emission control strategies used by car manufacturers constitute an illegal use of defeat devices or a lawful application of the derogations.
Amendment 114 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. The Commission had no legal basis to search for defeat devices itself, but had the legal obligation to oversee the Member States’' enforcement of the ban on defeat devices. However, in spite of the awareness of, and communication between the relevant Commission services on, possible illegal practices by manufacturers, the Commission neither undertook any further technical or legal research or investigation on its own nor requested any information or further action from the Member States to verify whether the law may have been infringed, although it had the legal right to do so. This is despite an internal request from the Director General of DG ENV to the Director General of the responsible DG ENTR in 2014 to investigate the possibility of emission abatement techniques that "go beyond what is allowed by the Euro 5/6 legislation", which was subsequently ignored by DG ENTR.
Amendment 119 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23 a. The Commission had to be aware of the likely use of defeat devices in practice, since its own Impact Assessment for the 2013 Clean Air Package clearly states that: "In addition to the intrinsic weakness of the NEDC, some vehicles seem to be designed to respect the limits only when tested on this cycle. Moreover, there is increasing evidence of illegal practices by some end users that defeat the anti-pollution systems to improve driving performance or save on the replacement of costly components" (footnote 39 of the Impact Assessment).
Amendment 120 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23 a. Moreover, research findings of the Commission's own science body, the Joint Research Centre, were pointing at the possible use of defeat devices and were seen by DG ENTR officials as "a clear case of hard cycle beating". The data of the Euro 5a diesel vehicle concerned was also part of a JRC report on eco- innovation, published in 2013, and in principle available to all Commission's officials.
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 b (new)
Paragraph 23 b (new)
23 b. Despite the clear indications of the possible illegal use of defeat devices, the Commission never made use of the provision under Regulation (EC) No 692/2008, which entitles it to request Member States' type approval authorities to provide information on the functioning of emission technology at low temperatures.
Amendment 122 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 c (new)
Paragraph 23 c (new)
23 c. The Commission should have followed up on correspondence between the JRC and DG ENTR, DG ENV and DG CLIMA, discussing possible "strange" emission behaviour in 2008 and 2010. The justification for why no action was taken, due to a lack of any indication or clear evidence of the possible use of defeat devices by car manufacturers, is wrong, as indications were given in the correspondence, and constitute maladministration, as evidence cannot be found unless it is sought.
Amendment 124 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. The Commission should have ensured that the JRC’'s research findings and concerns discussed among the Commission services with regard to possible illegal practices by manufacturers reached the higher levels of the hierarchy. This constitutes maladministration.
Amendment 126 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)
Paragraph 24 a (new)
24 a. The Commission should have shown more initiative and diligence as regards the possible use of illegal defeat devices by car manufacturers given the general suspicion and numerous indications thereof. The JRC should have received the mandate from the Commission to investigate whether the reported suspicious behaviours of certain vehicles have any illegal connotations.
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. No specific EU oversight of vehicle type-approval is provided for in the current framework, and the rules are subject to a variety of interpretations across the Member States, partly on account of the absence of an effective system for exchanging information among type- approval authorities and technical services. To correct this shortcoming, several witnesses expressed views in favour of a new European agency dedicated to surveillance of motor vehicles, increased Commission oversight or extending the mandate of an existing agency.
Amendment 133 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. There is an evident lack of control after type-approval, which is partly due to the current rules and partly due to uncertainty as to which authority is in charge of market surveillance. Effective conformity of production, in-service and end-of-lifecycle conformity checks to uncover cases where production vehicles and vehicles in use do not conform to the type-approved vehicle are often not in place or verified only through documents instead of physical tests carried out in the presence of the authorities. despite the fact that technology allowing vehicles to be measured in real world conditions on a large scale, and without being damaged, already exists
Amendment 136 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
30. In-service testing for emissions is mostly conducted in the laboratories of car manufacturers and is currently limited to the NEDC laboratory tests required for type-approval, without considering alternatives like remote sensing technology for monitoring emissions in real driving conditions.
Amendment 149 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. The Member States’ failure to organise an efficient market surveillance system constitutes a contravention of EU law. The verification of the conformity of production and in-service conformity of light-duty vehicles is often based only on laboratory tests performed on the car manufacturers’ premises, even if current legislation does not prevent the use of different or additional tests.
Amendment 162 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 a (new)
Paragraph 38 a (new)
38 a. One of the structural weaknesses of the current type-approval framework in Europe is that it is only the type-approval authority that granted a type-approval to a given vehicle that can effectively withdraw the certificate of conformity that was given to the vehicle concerned.
Amendment 166 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39 a (new)
Paragraph 39 a (new)
39 a. The European legal framework does not foresee the possibility to compensate consumers if corrective measures such as mandatory recalls imposed by type approval authorities have an adverse impact on the original vehicles' performance (such as its durability, fuel economy or engine performance).
Amendment 168 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
Paragraph 40
40. TheVery few Member States were very reluctantwilling to share the results of their investigations and the technical test data with the Commission and this committee of inquiry.
Amendment 178 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43
Paragraph 43
43. Member States did not monitor and enforce appropriately the application of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007, notably in contravention of Article 5(1) on the obligation for manufacturers to design cars which comply with the regulation in , construct and assemble cars so as to enable them to comply with the regulation in normal use. Yet, a former rapporteur on emissions and type approval legislation made very clear that the Parliament never intended to restrict "normal use" to the narrow conditions under which cars are tested in the laboratory for type approval. He indicated that driving conditions as can be commonly found when driving on European roads (including differences in temperature, altitude, engine load, vehicle speed, etc.) were meant to be considered as "normal use".
Amendment 185 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 47 a (new)
Paragraph 47 a (new)
47 a. The Commission did not take the initiative to push for a coordinated and mandatory recall program at EU level for cars of the Volkswagen group equipped with illegal defeat software.
Amendment 186 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 48
Paragraph 48
48. The Commission did notwaited several years to launch infringement procedures against those Member States that have not put in place effective market surveillance on pollutant emissions from vehicles and national system of penalties for infringements of EU law as required by the existing legislation.
Amendment 191 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52 a (new)
Paragraph 52 a (new)
52 a. Whilst the collection of written evidence via submission of written questions and questionnaires to both institutional and non-institutional parties was generally an effective means of evidence gathering, the written replies - essential for the committee to prepare each hearing - were often sent very late with little time left before the hearing to read and analyse the replies.
Amendment 194 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 54
Paragraph 54
54. Delays in the delivery of requested documentation represented a major obstacle in the work of the committee. The documents were of varying quality, some of them were very hard to read and, therefore, to use. The lengthy internal procedure in the Commission, which requires the College’'s approval to react to requests from the committee, together with gaps in its archiving system, delayed the collection of evidence during the time available. Furthermore, the transmission of the information requested was not structured in a user-friendly way, which made it more complicated to retrieve the information.
Amendment 197 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 55
Paragraph 55
55. The procedure followed to grant access to the minutes of the regulatory committee (based on explicit consent by the 28 Member States) was unnecessarily cumbersome, lengthy and based on a very narrow interpretation of the law. The access to those documents was too limited, which led to possible mistakes or important information not being taken into account. It should not be followed again in the future.
Amendment 205 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61 a (new)
Paragraph 61 a (new)
61 a. In order to facilitate the work of the European Parliament's committees of inquiry, given they work under considerable time pressure to scrutinise a huge amount of documents, it is essential that the rules governing the treatment of confidential information by the European Parliament, and in particular the access rights of members' accredited parliamentary assistants (APAs) to "other confidential information" (OCI), are reviewed.