41 Amendments of Ernest URTASUN related to 2016/2063(INI)
Amendment 6 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas, according to the Commission’'s latest spring forecast, euro area real growth is expected to be modest and geographically uneven – 1.6 % in 2016 and 1.8 % in 2017, following 1.7 % in 2015;
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the inflation target is getting harder to reach owing toinflation has been below the ECB policy target for the last four years and market based expectations do not forecast a return to target in the foreseeable future; whereas structural patterns generate deflationary pressures such as a lack of investment and aggregate demand and the consolidation of demographic trends ands well as the full impact of trade and financial globalisation on a high-unemploymentthe European society;
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Stresses that the euro area continues to suffer from a high level of unemployment and excessive low inflation as well as still large macroeconomic imbalances such as excessive current account imbalances and that, in addition, the euro area is facing a very low level of productivity growth, which isare in particular the result of the lack of investment and overall aggregate demand since the beginning of the crisis; notes that the high level of publicoverall debt and the huge number of non- performing loans in theand a still undercapitalized banking sector in some Member States are still fragmenting the euro area financial market, thus reducing room for manoeuvre to supporthampering the effectiveness of the monetary transmission mechanism in the most fragile economies;
Amendment 74 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Underlines that a frontloaded fiscal consolidation in the euro area as a whole during a period of large output gap since 2010 has had a severe impact on aggregate demand and has generated long lasting negative hysteresis effects which have undermined the effectiveness of the monetary transmission mechanism despite the unprecedented policy measures implemented by the ECB;
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Acknowledges that, confronted with this very complex environment and the risks of a prolonged period of low inflation, the ECB was within the terms of its mandate in adopting extraordinary measures to lift inflation back up to the medium-term objective of 2 % as recently underlined by the European Court of Justice; notes that, since the launching of the APP in March 2015, and owing toin combination with the effects of the targeted long-term refinancing operation (TLTRO) programmes targeted at the real economy, financial conditions have improved, which has promoted a recovery in lending to firms and households in the euro area;
Amendment 88 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Emphasizes that the ECB started in June 2016 a new series of four targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO II); point out the incentive structure of the programme has changed in comparison with the original TLTRO as several banks will be able to borrow at negative rates even if they do not increase their net lending to the real economy;
Amendment 90 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Is concerned by the fact that by offering liquidity at negative rates, but eliminating the requirements for banks to return the funds when they do not achieve their lending benchmark, the ECB is therefore weakening the link between the provision of central bank liquidity and lending to the real economy that was at the centre of the TLTRO concept;
Amendment 98 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Believes that the APP would have an even higher impact on the European economy if it had a higher share of EIB bond buying, particularly related to the TEN-T and TEN-E ( in projects with proven added European value in social and economic terms), and SME securitised loans, or if the ECB were able to buy Member States’' public debt directly linked to investment and research expenditure on the secondary markets; believes that in order to choose the eligibility of public debt assets for the APP, the Eurosystem should explore in cooperation with the EIB the feasibility of assigning a complementary credit rating in addition to those assigned by private agencies based on specific criteria that would facilitate future oriented and long-term investments and would take explicit account of the need to reduce the overall exposure of the economy to stranded carbon assets;
Amendment 102 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Urges the ECB together with other relevant Union bodies and in the light of the requirement under TFEU 127.1 that the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union to consider the possibility of using its APP strategically, by encouraging in coordination with the EIB the development of safe and simple marketable asset classes, suitable for the Program, that are linked to the achievement of key EU targets particularly the transition to a sustainable and fair economy and to consider drawing up a range of green and social projects for which credit created through quantitative easing could be used as direct financing;
Amendment 105 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)
Paragraph 3 b (new)
3b. Is of the opinion that any asset backed security related purchase by the eurosystem as part of its unconventional policy toolbox should be strictly limited to the most senior tranches of the most simple and transparent products and that purchases of mezzanine tranches should be avoided while originators should retain at least retain 20% of original risks;
Amendment 116 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Agrees withTakes note of ECB President Mario Draghi repeated statements that the single monetary policy cannot stimulate aggregate demand unless it is complemented by sound fiscal policies and ambitious structural reform programmes at Member State level; recalls that the main benefittreaty based mandate of monetary policy is to safeguard price stability in order to guarantee a stable environment for investment; considers that monetary policy is not the appropriate tool to solve the structural problems of the European economy;
Amendment 125 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Underlines that structural reforms in the economy and the labour market should also fully take into account the demographic trends in Europe, in order to create incentives for a more balanced demographic structure that would make it easier to maintain an inflation target of around 2 %cost- competitiveness oriented structural reforms as well as current demographic trends in Europe have accentuated deflationary pressures in a context of a persistent negative output gap; points out that overall economic policy measures need to urgently and fully take into account the demographic trends in Europe in order to tackle deflationary pressures;
Amendment 138 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Notes, however, that even though the impact of unconventional measures has been significant, as regards in particular funding conditions for banks in the periphery inflation is not expected by the ECB to converge to the 2 % medium-term objective at the 2017 horizonbefore at least the 2017 horizon and is not forecasted to converge to the policy target in the foreseeable future by market based expectations; notes that the current recovery in bank and market lending has not wholly produced the expected effect on the existing investment gap in the euro area so far;
Amendment 143 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Points out that, while the effects on the real economy have been very limited, banks have been able to access funding at virtually no or very low cost which has directly subsidised their balance sheets; deplores the fact that the size of this subsidy, despite representing a clear fiscal spill-over effect of monetary, is not monitored and published and that it is free from strict conditionality in terms of whether or how it is invested; insists that any extraordinary measures of this kind should be accompanied by measures to mitigate distortions to markets and the economy;
Amendment 151 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Underlines that a prolonged period of ultra-low (negative) interest rate policys creates potential risks for financial stability and ultimately the whole economy; warns that a decline in the profitability of banks willmight dampen their willingness to develop lending activity; points particularly to the effect of such an interest rate policy on local and regional banks and savings banks with little funding from financial markets, and to risks in the insurance sectorand pension sector, in particular for defined benefits schemes as recently highlighted by an EIOPA stress test;
Amendment 165 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Understands the reason why negative policy rates have been implemented by the ECB, but remains concerned about the potential consequences of negative interest rate policys for individual savers and the financial equilibrium of pension schemes and as regards the development of asset bubbles; believes that owing to demographic trends and cultural preferences for saving, these negative effects on income may lead to an increase in the household saving rate, which could be detrimental to domestic demand in the euro area;
Amendment 167 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Is concerned in particular that, in the absence of Union and Member State actions to stimulate demand, continued application of unconventional monetary policy actions will further exacerbate the problems posed by sustained low interest rates and excess liquidity chasing yield leading to actual and potential distortions and instabilities in financial markets;
Amendment 169 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)
Paragraph 9 b (new)
9b. Remains concerned by the still significant levels of non-marketable assets and asset-backed securities put forward as collateral to the eurosystem in the framework of its refinancing operations; reiterates its request to the ECB to provide information on which central banks have accepted such securities as well as to disclose valuation methods regarding such assets; underlines that such disclosure would be beneficial for the purpose of parliamentary scrutiny of supervisory tasks conferred to the ECB;
Amendment 173 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Asks the ECB to study how the transmission of monetary policy differs in those Member States with centralised and concentrated banking sectors and those with a more diverse network of local and regional banks and bigger reliance on capital markets;
Amendment 175 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Calls on the ECB to carefully assess the risks of a future resurgence of housing bubbles owing to its ultra-low (negative) interest rate policythe expectation of low interest rate policy in the foreseeable future, particularly in big cities, and to put forward proposals for designing specific macroprudential recommendations in this regard;
Amendment 179 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Asks the Commission to come forward with proposals to improve macroprudential oversight and the policy tools available for mitigating the risks in shadow banking, in the light of the warning by the ECB that, given the steady expansion over the last decade to 22 trillion euro in assets of non-bank credit intermediation, further initiatives are needed to monitor and assess vulnerabilities in the growing shadow banking sector;
Amendment 180 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 b (new)
Paragraph 11 b (new)
11b. Supports the ECB's assessment that the current CRR/CRD IV package lacks certain measures which could also effectively address specific types of systemic risk - such as (i) various asset- side measures including the application of limits to loan-to-value, loan-to income or debt service-to-income ratios, and (ii) the introduction of various exposure limits falling outside the current definition of large exposures; urges the Commission to examine the need for legislative proposals in this regard; notes that some of these measures could already be integrated in the context of the ongoing legislative work around the EDIS proposal;
Amendment 181 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 c (new)
Paragraph 11 c (new)
11c. Points out, that as indicated by the ECBs role in relation to liquidity provision to Greece in June 2015 and the leaked discussions of the ECB Council of Governors on the solvency of Cypriot banks, the concept of 'insolvency' underpinning the provision of central bank liquidity to institutions in the Euro area lacks a sufficient level of clarity and legal certainty as the ECB has in the previous years alternatively referred to a static concept (whether a bank complies with minimum capital requirements at a certain point in time) or to a dynamic concept of solvency based on forward looking scenarios of stress tests for justifying the continuation or the limitation of ELA provision; underlines that such a lack of clarity needs to be addressed so as to guarantee legal certainty and foster financial stability;
Amendment 182 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 d (new)
Paragraph 11 d (new)
11d. Warns that prolonged non- conventional monetary policy actions can have significant distributional effects between the wealthy and poor, young and old, and also between regions with different financial structures; urges and suggests the ECB to monitor comprehensively in its next annual report the side effects of its monetary policy measures and its impact on inequality;
Amendment 183 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 e (new)
Paragraph 11 e (new)
11e. Underlines the still urgent need for a deep structural reform of the euro area banking system as 'too-big and interconnected to fail' institutions still enjoy unjustifiable public subsidies and represent a fundamental treat to the stability and efficient allocation of capital in the EU and international economies; emphasizes that an institution that is 'too- big to fail' must be considered 'too dangerous to exist' and should therefore be downsized, simplified into manageable entities with defined economic functions and put to the service of the real economy;
Amendment 188 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. RecognisesUnderlines that despite the existence of distributional consequences of the ECB policies, which can be perceived as increasing inequalities, but believes that the ECB policies are the right ones to lower the costs of credit for citizens and SMEs and enhance employment in the euro area, the lowering of costs of credit for citizens and SMEs might partially compensate for these distributional impacts;
Amendment 191 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Points out that under normal circumstances monetary policy is in principle supposed to involve unbiased and unsystematic distributional effects in the short to medium term while fostering price stability in the longer term; notes however that under the current non- conventional policy regime, distributional consequences arise in the short-term while the long-term effects of such unconventional policies are as yet unknown and subject to controversy within the academic and policy making spheres;
Amendment 193 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Notes that the ECB’'s APP has lowered bond yields in most Member States to unprecedented levels; warns against the risk of too-high valuations on the bond markets, which would be difficult to handle if interest rates start to rise again, particularly for the countries involved in the excessive deficit procedure or with high levels of debt in the absence of a sufficiently robust recovery; points out that a sudden reversal of interest rates from currently low levels along the yield curve carry significant market risks for financial institutions with a significant proportion of mark-to-market financial instruments;
Amendment 200 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Deplores the fact that some Member States are usingTakes note of the fact theat ultra-low (negative) interest rate policy has a pretext to defer the necessary consolidation of their primary public deficitsprovided Member States with additional fiscal space, particularly at central government level;
Amendment 225 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Recalls that the independence of the ECB for the conduct of monetary policy, as enshrined in the Treaties, is crucial to the objjustified on grounds on the need to ensure an effective of safeguarding of price stability; asks all governments to avoid statements questioning the role played by the institution within its mandate and in the same spirit asks the ECB to refrain from questioning the role played by or even delivering de facto instructions to governments when it comes to fiscal and general economic policies as it was the case with the letters sent to some euro area governments in the previous years;
Amendment 230 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. Stresses that the ECB's supervisory role (SSM), its responsibility for systemic stability (ESRB) and its monetary policy function should not be confused and should not generate any conflict of interest in its execution of its principal functions; further stresses the importance of exploring future institutional independence of these three functions with a democratically accountable mechanism for resolving conflicts between them;
Amendment 240 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 b (new)
Paragraph 16 b (new)
16b. Point out that one source of such potential conflicts of interest arises with the fact that recent stress tests to which design the SSM as the supervisory arm of the ECB participates fail to integrate adverse scenarios of persistently low interest and inflation rates, scenarios which in practice challenges the future effectiveness of monetary policy measures;
Amendment 245 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 c (new)
Paragraph 16 c (new)
16c. Insists that, fiscal and prudential policy need to be clearly under the responsibility of independent and democratically accountable bodies and that conflicts between them must be resolved in the framework of a democratically accountable mechanism;
Amendment 251 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 d (new)
Paragraph 16 d (new)
16d. Points out that, ultimately, a democratically accountable system of checks and balances and coordination between monetary, fiscal and prudential objectives with clear and independent mandates should be achieved through a Treaty change;
Amendment 252 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 e (new)
Paragraph 16 e (new)
16e. Calls in that respect for a revision of the ECB treaty mandate with a view to strengthening its democratic accountability and its strict separation with the EMU Single Supervisory Mechanism; underlines that the fundamental principle of 'no taxation or provision of public subsidies without representation' should be enshrined in such mandate and therefore a permanent scrutiny mechanism will be established so as to ensure a strict separation between fiscal and monetary policy and hence for preventing and correcting the provision of implicit subsidies by the monetary authority and for ensuring that in the medium term the monetary policy does not entail distributive effects;
Amendment 255 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 f (new)
Paragraph 16 f (new)
16f. Underlines that the current ELA legal framework has often been justified on grounds that the provision of emergency liquidity assistance needed to remain within the remit of National Central Banks as the supervision of these banks used to be circumscribed within the Member States' competent authorities perimeter; is of the opinion that as banking supervision of at least significant institutions has been Europeanised such development points towards the need to reform and update the ELA legal framework to adapt it to the new institutional setting; welcomes in that respect recent remarks from President Draghi hinting that such reforms would be required and are to be discussed; suggests the ECB develop further policy options for such reform in its next annual report;
Amendment 257 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 g (new)
Paragraph 16 g (new)
16g. Notes with concern that TARGET 2 imbalances are raising again in the euro area despite a narrowing in trade imbalances pointing out to continued capital outflows from the euro area periphery;
Amendment 259 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 h (new)
Paragraph 16 h (new)
16h. Asks the ECB to prepare in the framework of its next annual report a research on the pro and the cons and the legal feasibility of different options as regards of channelling newly created money towards sustainable investment, including options related to the concept of helicopter money, while respecting the provisions of the Treaty;
Amendment 262 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 i (new)
Paragraph 16 i (new)
16i. Recalls its request to improve the gender balance within the institution; welcomes the gender-quota system that has been recently introduced with that purpose;
Amendment 263 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 j (new)
Paragraph 16 j (new)
16j. Believes that the on-going crisis has highlighted the need diversify the theoretical background underlying the policy framework within central banks; requests the ECB to develop in its next annual report on what has been the impact of the crisis as regards the evolution of its theoretical framework;
Amendment 265 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 k (new)
Paragraph 16 k (new)
16k. Notes with concern the participation of ECB Board and Council of governors Members in instances and informal fora involving secretive discussions with the participation of prominent senior representatives of the private sector such as the 'group of thirty' where discussions are not in the public domain; is of the opinion that rules related to such involvement as well as regarding revolving door practices for all public institutions including the ECB should be significantly strengthen as potential conflicts of interest undermine the necessary trust, transparency and accountability of these institutions;