30 Amendments of Ernest URTASUN related to 2023/0137(CNS)
Amendment 13 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5
Recital 5
(5) The economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to better take into account the growing heterogeneity of fiscal positions, sustainability risks and other vulnerabilities across Member States. The strong policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic proved effective in mitigating the economic and social damage of the crisis, but resulted in a significant increase in public- and private-sector debt ratios, underscoring the importance of reducing debt ratios to prudent levels in a gradual, sustained, resilience-enhancing and growth-friendly manner and addressing macroeconomic imbalances, while paying due attention to employment and social objectives. At the same time, the economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to help address the medium- and long-term challenges facing the Union, including achieving a fair digital and green transition, including the Climate Law22 , ensuring energy security, open strategic autonomy, addressing demographic change, strengthening social and economic resilience, and implementing the strategic compass for security and defence, all of which requires reforms and sustained high levels of investment in the years to come. __________________ 22 The European Climate Law sets a Union-wide climate neutrality objective by 2050 and requires Union institutions and Member States to progress in enhancing adaptive capacity, requiring significant public investment to reduce the negative socio-economic impacts of climate change on the EU and its Member States, including negative impacts on growth and fiscal sustainability.
Amendment 16 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
Recital 6
(6) The economic governance framework of the Union should put debt sustainability and, sustainable growth and resilience at its core and therefore differentiate between Member States by taking into account their public debt challenges and allowing country-specific fiscal trajectories.
Amendment 30 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
Recital 11
(11) On the basis of Article 126(2) TFEU, the deficit criterion is also fulfilled where the excess over the reference value of 3 % of GDP is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value. Therefore, a temporary breach that remains close to the reference value should not lead to the opening of a deficit-based EDP if it results from exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a majorr cyclical conditions that adversely impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, which includes a severe economic downturn in the Member State concerned.
Amendment 34 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
Recital 13
(13) In accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council, following a recommendation from the Commission, can allow Member States to deviate from the net expenditure path set by the Council under that Regulation in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole, or in the event of exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a majorr cyclical conditions that adversely impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, provided that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. As a consequence, such a deviation should not lead to the opening of a debt-based EDP.
Amendment 39 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
Recital 14
(14) When assessing the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission should take into account, as a key relevant factor, the degree of debt challenge in the Member State concerned. A substantial public debt challenge established according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor shouldmay be considered a key factor leading to the opening of an EDP as a rule. Since, in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission is to take into account all other relevant factors, in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and debt criteria by the Member State concerned, that should include in particular the efforts in addressing climate related fiscal risks and green investment needs, in line with the EU Green Deal and the Union’s climate targets to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 and achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest, developments in the medium-term economic position and the developments in the medium-term budgetary position, and the implementation of structural reforms and investment. In order to increase national ownership, the independent fiscal institutions referred to in Article 8 of Council Directive [on the national budgetary frameworks]24 , should provide an opinion on the relevant factors. __________________ 24 Council Directive […] of […] [amending Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States] (OJ L …, …, p….).
Amendment 45 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
Recital 16
(16) The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP should bring or keep the general government deficit durably below the reference value of 3 % of GDP referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 by the deadline established by the Councilor put the general government deficit on a plausibly downward path towards the 3% of GDP reference value. The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP should also ensure sufficient progress during the period covered by the recommendation regarding putting the projected debt ratio on a plausibly downward path or remaining at a prudenta sustainable level. When setting the corrective net expenditure path under the EDP, the Council should also ensure that there is no back-loading of the required fiscal adjustment effort. The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP would in principle be the one originally set by the Council, while taking into account the need to correct the deviation from that path. In case the original path is no longer feasible, due to objective circumstances, the Council should be able to set a different path under the EDP.
Amendment 55 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20
Recital 20
(20) Clear conditions should be laid down for aAbrogation of excessive deficit procedures. Abrogation should require should in particular take place when the deficit to remains credibly below the reference value of 3 % of GDP referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 and, for a debt-based EDP, thatwhen the Member State demonstrates compliance with the net expenditure path under the EDP.
Amendment 60 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23
Recital 23
(23) This Regulation is part of a package together with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] and Directive (EU) […] amending 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States. Together, they establish a reformed Union economic governance framework that incorporates into Union law the substance of Title III ‘Fiscal Compact’ of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) in the Economic and Monetary Union25 , in accordance with Article 16 thereof. By building on the experience with the implementation of the TSCG by the Member States, the package retains the Fiscal Compact’s medium- term orientation as a tool to achieve budgetary discipline and growth promotion. The package includes a strengthened country-specific dimension aimed at enhancing national ownership, including by means of a stronger role for independent fiscal institutions, which draws on the Fiscal Compact’s common principles proposed by the Commission26 in accordance with Article 3(2) of the TSCG. The analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures for the overall assessment of compliance required by the Fiscal Compact is set out in Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. As in the Fiscal Compact, temporary deviations from the medium-term plan are allowed only in exceptional circumstances in Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. Similarly, in case of significant deviations from the medium-term plan, measures should be implemented to correct the deviations over a defined period of time. The package strengthens fiscal surveillance and enforcement procedures to deliver on the commitment of promoting sound and sustainable public finances and sustainable growth. The economic governance framework reform, thus, retains the fundamental objectives of budgetary discipline and debt sustainability set out in the TSCG. __________________ 25 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union of 2 March 2012. 26 Communication COM(2012) 342 final of 20 June 2012 from the Commission ‘Common principles on national fiscal correction mechanisms’.
Amendment 74 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) ‘net expenditure’ means government expenditure net of interest expenditure, discretionary revenue measures and other budgetary variables outside the control of the government, as defined in Annex II, point (a) of Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council [on the preventive arm]*;
Amendment 79 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point d a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point d a (new)
(da) 'corrective net expenditure path' means the multi-annual trajectory for net expenditure as requested by the Council under Articles 3 and 5 of this Regulation following a decision on the existence of excessive deficit and defined in accordance with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] ;
Amendment 82 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 1
Article 2 – paragraph 1
The excess of a government deficit over the reference value shall be considered exceptional, in accordance with Article 126(2), second indent, point (a), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), where the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] or of exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a majorr cyclical conditions that adversely impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].
Amendment 86 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
In addition, the excess over the reference value shall be considered temporary where budgetary forecasts as provided by the Commission indicate that the deficit will fall below the reference value following the end of the severe economic downturn or the exceptional circumstances or cyclical conditions referred to in the first subparagraph.
Amendment 100 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 2
Article 2 – paragraph 2
2. The Commission and the Council, when assessing and deciding upon the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) to (6) TFEU, may consider an excess over the reference value resulting from a severe economic downturn as exceptional in the sense of Article 126(2), second indent, point (a), TFEU where the Council establishes the existence of exceptional circumstances or cyclical conditions in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].
Amendment 110 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as a key relevant factor the degree of debt challenges in the Member State concerned. In particular, where the Member State faces substantial public debt challenges according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor, it shall be considered a key factor that may leading to the opening of an excessive deficit procedure as a rule.
Amendment 116 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
The Commission shall equally take into account as a key relevant factor progress by the Member State in addressing climate related fiscal risks and green investments needs, in line with the EU Green Deal and the Union’s climate targets.
Amendment 131 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point c
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point c
(c) the evolution of the government debt position andwith a focus on its financing, andnotably interest rate expenditure as a share of GDP, the related risk factors, in particular the maturity structure, the currency denomination of the debt and contingent liabilities, as well as the share of creditors domestic to the euro area;
Amendment 138 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d
(d) the implementation of reforms and investments including, in particular policies to prevent and correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances, and policies to implement the common growth and employment strategy of the Union, the EU Green Deal, including those supported by NextGenerationEU, measures to be taken in case of insufficient progress towards achieving applicable targets in line with Member States reporting on the performance of their budgetary frameworks under Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] and the overall quality of public finances, in particular the effectiveness of national budgetary frameworks.
Amendment 143 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d a (new)
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d a (new)
(da) the quality of investment expenditure in line with the common key policy priorities of the Union in line with Annex VI of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].
Amendment 162 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
When assessing compliance on the basis of the deficit criterion, if the ratio of the government debt to GDP exceeds the reference value, those factors shall be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit provided for in Article 126(4), (5) and (6) TFEU only if the double condition of the overarching principle — that, before these relevant factors are taken into account, the general government deficit remains close to the reference value and its excess over the reference value is temporary — is fully met.
Amendment 168 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 5
Article 2 – paragraph 5
5. Where Member States are allowed to deviate from their net expenditure path in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole pursuant to Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission and the Council, in their assessment, mayshall decide not to conclude on the existence of an excessive deficit.
Amendment 174 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 6
Article 2 – paragraph 6
If the Council, acting under Article 126(6) TFEU, decides that an excessive deficit exists in a Member State, the Council and the Commission shall, in the subsequent procedural steps of that Article of the TFEU, take into account the relevant factors referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, as they affect the situation of the Member State concerned, including as specified in Article 5(2) of this Regulation, in particular in establishing a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit and eventually extending that deadline. However, those relevant factors shall not be taken into account for the decision of the Council under Article 126(12) TFEU on the abrogation of some or all of its decisions under Article 126(6) to (9) and (11) TFEU.’;
Amendment 177 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 a (new)
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2a
Article 2a
(1a) Article 2a is replaced by the following: Article 2a 1. In order to enhance the dialogue between the institutions of the Union, in particular the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and to ensure greater transparency and accountability, the competent committee of the European Parliament may invite the President of the Council, the Commission and, where appropriate, the President of the European Council or the President of the Eurogroup, to appear before the committee to discuss Council decisions under Article 126(6) TFEU, Council recommendations under Article 126(7) TFEU, notices under Article 126(9) TFEU, or Council decisions under Article 126(11) TFEU. The Council is1a. Where the Council considers to take action under Article 126(6) TFEU, Council recommendations under Article 126(7) TFEU, notices under Article 126(9) TFEU, or Council considers taking decisions under Article 126(11) TFEU, it shall not do so without first obtaining a vote of consent by the competent committee of the European Parliament. The Council and European Parliament are, as a rule, expected to follow the recommendations and proposals of the Commission or explain itstheir position in a publicly hearing. The competent committee of the European Parliament may offer the opportunity to the Member State concerned by such decisions, recommendations or notices to participate in an exchange of views. 2. The Council and the Commission shall regularly inform the European Parliament of the application of this Regulation.
Amendment 184 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU shall establish a maximum deadline of six months for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. When warranted by the seriousness of the situation, the deadline for effective action may be three months. The Council recommendation shall also establish a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit. In its recommendation, the Council shall also request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path, which ensures that the general government deficit remains or is brought and maintained below the reference value within the deadline set in the recommendation. For the years when the general government deficit is expected to exceed the reference value, the corrective net expenditure path shall be consistent with a minimum annual adjustment of at least 0,5% of GDP as a benchmarkbrought below the reference value or is put on a plausibly downward path towards the reference value at the end of the adjustment period.
Amendment 196 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
The corrective net expenditure path shall also put the debt ratio on a plausibly downward path or keep it at a prudenta sustainable level having regard to the criteria established in Annex I of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. The corrective net expenditure path shall ensure that the average annual fiscal adjustment effort in the first three years is at least as high as the average annual fiscal effortdjustment effort is not postponed towards the final years of the total adjustment period.
Amendment 206 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 6
Article 3 – paragraph 6
6. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU or where exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a majorr cyclical conditions that adversely impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path recommended by the Council pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, occur after the adoption of that recommendation, the Council mayshall decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU. The revised recommendation, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a ruleat least one year. In case the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council may also decideshall, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU provided that this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The revised recommendation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule.at least one year;
Amendment 213 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Any Council decision to give notice to the participating Member State concerned to take measures for the deficit reduction in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU shall be taken within two months of the Council decision under Article 126(8) TFEU establishing that no effective action has been taken. In the notice, the Council shall request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path which ensures that the general government deficit remains or is brought and maintained below the reference value within the deadline set in the notice. For the years where the general government deficit is expected to exceed the reference value, the corrective net expenditure path shall be consistent with a minimum annual adjustment of at least 0,5% of GDP as a benchmarkis brought below the reference value or is put on a plausibly downward path towards the reference value at the end of the adjustment period.
Amendment 233 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 5 – paragraph 2
Article 5 – paragraph 2
2. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU or where exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with majorr cyclical conditions adversely impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, occur after the adoption of that notice, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, toshall adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU. The revised notice, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a ruleat least one year. In case the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, on condition that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The revised notice may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule.;
Amendment 240 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 8 – paragraph 3
Article 8 – paragraph 3
3. A Council decision shall only be taken pursuant to Article 126(12) TFEU in particular where budgetary forecasts as provided by the Commission indicate that the deficit has been brought durably below the reference value and, where the excessive deficit procedure was opened on the basis of the debt criterion, the Member State concerned respected the corrective net expenditure path set by the Council in accordance with Article 3(4) or Article 5(1) of this Regulation over the previous 2 years and is projected to continue to do so in the current year on the basis of the Commission forecast.;
Amendment 256 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b a (new)
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 10a – paragraph 3
Article 10a – paragraph 3
Amendment 259 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 a (new)
(9a) Article 11 is replaced by the following: "Article 11 1. Whenever the Council decides under Article 126(11) TFEU to impose sanctions on a participating Member State, a fine shall, as a rule, be requiredmay be taken where necessary and proportionate. The Council may decide to supplement such a fine by the other measures provided for in Article 126(11) TFEU.Article 12 2. The Council may not take decisions under Article 126(11) TFEU without first obtaining a vote of consent by the competent committee of the European Parliament. 3. Fines or other measures provided for in Article 126(11) TFEU shall not be taken or otherwise shall be suspended as long as the Commission establishes the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] or exceptional circumstances or cyclical conditions adversely impacting the public finances of the Member State concerned, in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. "