90 Amendments of Gerolf ANNEMANS related to 2014/2249(INI)
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the European Union and its Member States are facing major challenges, for which no Member Stateit should be further examined whether these challenges can be tackle on its owd individually by the Member States or rather benefit from a collective response from the Union;
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas the further exploitation of the Lisbon Treaty is an attempt to further undermine Member State sovereignty, e.g., by switching in an increasing number of areas from unanimity to qualified majority voting, by increasing economic dependence through the establishment of a fiscal union, and by the lasting irreconcilability of the EU institutions with subsidiarity and democracy; therefore, and taking into account the results of the European elections of 2014, the potential of the Lisbon Treaty should be blocked rather than expanded;
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the provisions ofsubsidiarity principle within the Lisbon Treaty haves not yet been exploited to theirits full potential; whereas some proposals can only be fully realised by Treaty change, emphasising a two-step approach to EU reform (within and beyond the Treaties);
Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the Community method must be preserved and not be undermined by intergovernmental solutions, not even in areas where not all Member States fulfil the condishould be an added value to the various intergovernmental methods, the former respecting the sovereignty of the European States and the latter preventing alienations for participationrom supranational goals and responsibilities;
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the European Parliament is the parliament of the whole Union anary institution of the European Union and, technically speaking, should plays an essential but additional role in ensuring the legitimacy and accountability of EU decisions by ensuring proper parliamentary scrutiny over the Commission at the Union level;
Amendment 35 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas political dialogue between national parliaments and the European Parliament should be enhanced and practical possibilities for the use of the ‘'yellow’' and ‘'orange card’' improved and should be binding, which implies that national parliaments should be able to withdraw a proposal on the grounds that it infringes subsidiarity, without the EU institutions having the power to ignore it;
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the European Council’'s working methods should be rendered more transparent vis-à-vis Parliament and its interference in legislative decision- making should remain within the limits of the Treaty provisionsspecial legislative procedures should be replaced by the ordinary legislative procedure, analogous to the legislative process in any democratic State;
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas the Commission’s role as the executive should be strengthened in the field of Economic and Monetary Policy by the creation of the positionre is no need for the appointment of a EU Finance Minister, assisted by an EU Fiscal and Treasury administration, and by endowing it with the powers to implement and enforce any future and existing Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) instrumentssince the European Monetary Union is made up of differing economies, which are impossible to be represented by one person at a supranational level; the Ecofin configuration within the Council of the European Union already covers economic matters on a supranational level;
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
Amendment 68 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas the existing economic governance system is not yet strong enough to tackle all potential future crises and shocks as it should, nor is it yet sufficiently good at generating higher competitiveness, structural convergence among its members, sustainable growth and social cohesion; whereas, therefore, progress towards the completion of the EMU should be sustained, as well as efforts to render its institutional structure more legitimate and democratically accountablethe dissolution or, at least, the withdrawal (or non-admittance) of weak economies from the EMU should be sustained;
Amendment 77 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital K
Recital K
K. whereas the Fiscal Compact should be incorporated into the EU legal framework on the basis of an assessment of experience with its implementation, in view of the recent sovereign financial crises, adding a fiscal union to an already failing monetary union would constitute an extra safety net in order to keep high-debt Member States afloat; therefore, the Fiscal Compact should not be incorporated into the EU legal framework;
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas the institutional structure of the EMU should be transformed into an effective and democratic economic government, with Parliament and Council acting as equal co-legislators, the Commission fulfilling the role of the executive, national parliaments scrutinising national governments, monitoring subsidiarity and approving or rejecting Treaty amendments, the European Parliament scrutinising the EU level of decision-making, and the Court of Justice having control over all aspects of EMU enshrined in the Treaties;
Amendment 91 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital M
Recital M
M. whereas the Union needs a new legal act on economic policy, including the adoption of Convergence Guidelines, as well as some crucial structural reforms in the areas of competitiveness, growth and social cohesionafter more than one decade Convergence Guidelines fail to be respected; therefore, and given the fact that the eurozone can impossibly be considered an Optimum Currency Area, a so-called "Convergence Code" will not work;
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital N
Recital N
N. whereas the European Semester process should be simplified, and rendered more focused and democratic, by enhancing P, democratic and effective, by greater involvement of national stakeholders, by enhancing European and especially national parliament’s' scrutiny role over it and by investing ithem with a more substantial role in the various cycles of negotiations;
Amendment 104 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital O
Recital O
O. whereas the use of the Union budget should be (1) more streamlined, its revenue shouldtransparent, viz. aiming to reduce fraud, irregularities and errors (especially in regional and farm spending, as announced in the report of the European Court of Auditors 2014), (2) more autonomous, viz. with a revenue originateing from genuine own resources and not predominantly from Gross National Income (GNI) contributions, and (3) more democratic, by switching the procedure for adoption of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and the legislation relevant to own resources should be switched to the ordinary legislative procedure;
Amendment 112 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital P
Recital P
P. whereas the Union should be endowed with increased investment capacity by ensuring better use ofa more responsible investment strategy, by better controlling the existing structural funds and by fullycertainly not by further implementing the existing six-pack and two-pack legal framework, which are highly anti-democratic, since the indicators of competitiveness, as well as the thresholds of what is considered a macro-economic imbalance, are set unilaterally by the Commission, and, as such, undermine democratic decision making on the national level;
Amendment 120 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital Q
Recital Q
Amendment 133 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital R
Recital R
R. whereas the growth potential of the Single Market should be further exploitedinvestigated, e.g. in the areas of services, the Digital Single Market, the Energy Union, the Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union;
Amendment 145 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital U
Recital U
U. whereas recent security challenges, some in the immediate vicinity of the EU’'s borders, have revealed the need to move progressively towards the establishment of a common defence policy, and eventually, a common defence; whereas the Treaty already contains clear provisions as to how this could be done, notably in Articles 41, 42, 44 and 46 TEUclose EU's external borders and to re-establish internal borders in order to avoid further economic and social chaos and free traveling of refugees;
Amendment 153 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital V
Recital V
V. whereas the refugee crisis has exposed the need for a common asylum and immigration policy, which should provide as well for a fair distribution of asylum seekers across the European Unioneach Member State should be able to determine how many refugees it will host, without the EU governments imposing mandatory quotas;
Amendment 165 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Notes that the European Union and its Member States are facing unprecedented challenges, such as the refugee crisis, the foreign policy challenges in the immediate neighbourhood and the fight against terrorism, as well as globalisation, climate change, the consequences of the financial and debt crisis, the lack of competitiveness and the social consequences in several Member States, and the need to reinforce the EU internal market, which have so far been inadequately addressed;
Amendment 173 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Underlines that it should be investigated whether these challenges cannot be tackled individually by the Member States, but needor rather benefit from a collective response from the Union;
Amendment 181 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Stresses that the Union needs to restore the lost confidence and trust of its citizens by enhancing the transparency of its institutions and decision-focusing on areas of competence that truly benefit from a supranational approach, viz. the free trade of goods, the fight against international crime and terrorism, and the waterproof protection of the external borders; shared competences in these domaking, and improving its capacity to acts can be established through multi- or bilateral agreements and do not require the intervention, nor the existence, of the European Union;
Amendment 192 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Points out that the provisions ofsubsidiarity principle in the Lisbon Treaty haves not yet been exploited to their full potential even though they contain some necessary tools that could have been applied to prevent some of the crises with which the Union is confronted, or could be used to cope with the current challenges without having to initiate a Treaty revision in the short termits full potential;
Amendment 197 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Stresses that the Community method is superior to the intergovernmental method as it is the only one that allows for transparency,, based on QMV in the Council, as well as ond the equal right of co-legislation by the European Parliament and Council, as well as preventing a fragmentation of institutional responsibilities and the development of competing institutionshould be an added value to the various intergovernmental methods, the former respecting the sovereignty of the European States and the latter preventing alienation from supranational goals and responsibilities;
Amendment 204 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Is of the opinion that intergovernmental solutions should not exist, not even in areas where not all the Member States fulfil the conditions for participation, and thatnsists that, in view of the recent sovereign financial crises, adding a fiscal union to an already failing monetary union would constitute an extra safety net in order to keep high-debt Member States afloat; therefore, the Fiscal Compact ands well as the European Stability Mechanism, as intended by the Treaties should therefore should not be incorpotegrated into Union law and no new institutions should be introduced;
Amendment 212 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Underlines that the directly elected European Parliament plays, technically speaking, an essential role in ensuring the legitimacy of the Union, as well as in making the Union’'s decision- making system accountable to citizens by ensuring proper parliamentary scrutiny over the executiveCommission at the Union level and, by the legislative co-decision procedure, and by attributing direct legal initiative to the European Parliament, akin to national parliaments;
Amendment 217 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Recalls that the European Parliament is the parliament of the wholeary institution of the European Union; considers that its working methods should be reformed so as to strengthen its control over the Commission in the implementation of the acquis, and to ensure proper democratic accountability even in the areas in which not allose chapters of the acquis with respect to freedom of expression, the fight against corruption, and the independence of the judiciary for (candidate) Member States participate;
Amendment 222 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Considers that political dialogue between national parliaments and the European Parliament should be intensified and made more meaningful and substantial, without overstepping the limits of their respective constitutional competences; points out, in this regard, that national parliaments are best placed to mandate and scrutinise at national levelonitor subsidiarity through the early warning mechanism (Protocol nr 2 in conjunction with Article 5.3 TEU), as well as the action of their respective governments in European affairs, while the European Parliament should ensure the democratic accountability and legitimacy of the European executiveCommission;
Amendment 232 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
Amendment 238 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Considers it necessary for the European Parliament to reform its working methods in order to cope with the challenges ahead, by using its control over the Commission, including in relation to the implementation and application of the acquis in the Member States, by limiting first-reading agreements to exceptional cases of urgencyespecially those chapters of the acquis with respect to freedom of expression, the fight against corruption, protection of religious and minority rights and the independence of the judiciary for (candidate) Member States, by abolishing the possibility of first-reading agreements, and by improving its own electoral procedure through the revision of the 1976 Electoral Act in line with Parliament’'s proposals contained in its resolution of 11 November 2015 on the reform of the electoral law of the European Union5 or as a future step through the adoption of implementing measures in application of Article 14 of the Electoral Act; __________________ 5 Texts adopted, P8_TA(2015)0395. Texts adopted, P8_TA(2015)0395.
Amendment 257 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Encourages meaningful political dialogue with national parliaments on the contents of legislative proposals; insists, however, on a clear delineation of the respective decision-making competences of the national parliaments and the European Parliament, where the former should exercise their European function on the basis of their national constitutions, in particular via the control of their national governments as members of the European Council and the Council, which is the level where they are best placed to directly influence the content of and exercise scrutiny over the European legislative process; is therefore against the creation of joint parliamentary decision- making bodies for reasons of transparency, accountability and ability to actand adoption or rejection of legislative and budgetary proposals; therefore, national parliaments should have a greater say over EU law-making, by using the tools at their disposal, viz. the yellow and orange card (whose result should be binding, without the Commission having the possibility to ignore it), and by introducing the so- called "green card" procedure, in conformity with a recent proposal of the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC), whereby legislative initiatives could be proposed to the EU institutions by national parliaments;
Amendment 289 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Notes that it is possible within the Treaties to mergInsists to keep separate the function of President of the European Council withand that of President of the European Commission; and that the European Council, by means of an Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA), could engage itself politically to appoint as its President the Commission President, who should be elected by the European Parliament on a proposal by the European Council on the basis of the European election results, as was the case in the 2014 European election, since a double-hatted presidency might result in an over-centralisation of powers;
Amendment 293 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Calls on the European Council to start activating the ‘passerelle clause’ (Article 48 (7) TEU) in order to switch from unanimity to QMV voting in the remaining policy areas where this inot to extend QMV since this would promote the Union's movement toward supra- nationalism and, as such, would threaten the sovereignty of (smaller) Member States that unanimous nvot yet the caseing would protect;
Amendment 312 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
Amendment 326 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Demands that the Council switches completely to QMV voting and that it abandons the practice of transferring contentious legislative fields to the European Council, as this goes against the letter and the spirit of the Treaty, which stipulates that the European Council can only decide unanimously, and should only do so, on broad political goals, notnot to further extend QMV voting in the Council, since the preservation of unanimity in several fields is of crucial importance in order to avoid (1) further erosion of national sovereignty and (2) disproportionate influence onf legislationarger Member States;
Amendment 334 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Is determined to implement fully Treaty provisions on enhanced cooperation by committing not to give its consent to any new enhanced cooperation proposals unless the participating Member States commit to activate the special ‘passerelle clause’ enshrined in Article 333 TFEU to switch from unaniaware that, in the undesirable context of continuous enlargement of the European Union, possibilities for enhanced cooperation should be increased since it can be a valuable alternative for Member States that are not willing to commity to QMV, and from a special to the ordinary legislative procedurefurther supranational integration;
Amendment 346 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
Amendment 358 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Insists on ensuringthat a single representation of the EU/eurozone within the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and other international financial institutions (Article 138 TFEU) by its Finance M, would imply that in these international inister/VP of the Commission and the President of the European Central Bank (ECB)itutions the various Eurozone members would lose control over their respective economic policies;
Amendment 374 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Calls on the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission to organise better co-operation modalities with the Committee of the Regions (CoR) and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) in order to be able to take their opinions into account at an earlier stage in the legislative procedurinvestigating the possibilities for the abolition or merger of the Committee of the Regions (CoR) and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), since currently both institutions are too costly and do not add sufficient value;
Amendment 384 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Stresses the importance of the subsidiarity principle, as laid down in Article 5 TEU, which is binding on all institutions and bodies, notably the CoR and the EESC, and of the instruments contained in Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; supports a flexible interpretatn extension of the deadlines enshrined in the Protocol and callsfrom 8 to 12 weeks, an improvement of the quality onf the Commission to improve the quality of its responses to reasoned opinions's responses to reasoned opinions, and a more effective use of the yellow and orange card procedure, implying that the final legislative decision on subsidiarity rests with the national parliaments instead of with the EU institutions (as is currently the case);
Amendment 397 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
30. Considers that the practical possibilities for national parliaments to ensure the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality should be improved, andrevised, more particularly, by making the yellow card an imperative for the Commission in order to (at least) review the proposal and by making the orange card independent from the voting in the European Council and in the European Parliament; these two measures entail that for national parliaments it will become more meaningful to object to Commission proposals, rather than a waste of time (as it currently is); cooperation between national parliaments should be strengthened, to enable them, in close cooperation among themselves, to reach the necessary quorum under article 7(3) of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;
Amendment 411 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
Amendment 418 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31 a (new)
Paragraph 31 a (new)
31a. The EMU is to be considered a failed supranational project, which is kept alive by large-scale transfers from Northern to Southern Europe;
Amendment 421 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Calls for further institutional reforms in order to provide the EMU with an effective and democratic economic government with improved capacities and integrated within Opposes against further integration of the EMU; argues that further institutional framework of the Union, whereby the Commission acts as the executive and Parliament and Council as co-legislators, as outlined belowreforms should contribute exclusively to the strengthening of the economic and monetary sovereignty of the Member States;
Amendment 435 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
33. Insists on the adoption of CArgues that after more than one decade convergence Gguidelines, fail to be enshrined within a Convergence Code and adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure, with a view to creating a more binding framework for economic policy coordination (with key economic, competitiveness and social targets, such as in the areas of labour markets, competitiveness, business environment and public administrations, aspects of tax policy and social protection) that is open to all 28 Member States and that guarantees them the possibility of participating in a shock-absorption mechanismrespected; therefore, and given the fact that the eurozone can impossibly be considered an Optimum Currency Area, a so-called "Convergence Code" will not work;
Amendment 443 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. BelievConcludes that a limitedthe number of crucial areas for structural reforms that increase competitiveness, the growth potential, real economic convergence and social cohesion over a five-year period to strengthen the European social market economy, as outlined in Article 3 (3) TEU,ous European Structural and Investment Funds failed to resolve the social and economic contradictions within the EMU; therefore, the development of a Social Market Economy is only possible at the national level, where political institutions can be sensitive to the needs and the desires of the citizens; this presumes that the Union's fetishism for complete uniformity and unlimited market access should be laid downovercome;
Amendment 453 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
Amendment 472 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
Paragraph 40
40. Calls for the establishment of an enhancedintergovernmental dialogue between Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Eurogroup by agreeing on dedicated meeting time-slots during the main steps of the European Semester cyclethe Members of the EMU in the Council as well as within the Eurogroup;
Amendment 484 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
Paragraph 42
42. Calls for the integration ofDemands that the Fiscal Compact is not integrated into the EU legal framework on the basis of an assessment of the experience with its implement, not only because of the economic ineffectiveness of its budgetary provisions (i.e. the requirement of debt levels far below those considered sensible), but also because these budgetary rules do not result from national democratic deliberation;
Amendment 492 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43
Paragraph 43
43. Points out the need to switch from unanimity tonot to extend QMV forto the adoption of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) Regulation, by using the provisions of Article 48 (7) TEU and Article 312 (2) TFEUsince QMV threatens the sovereignty of (smaller) Member States that unanimous voting would protect; highlights the importance of establishing a link between the duration of Parliament’'s legislative term and the duration of the MFF, which can be reduced to five years under the provisions of Article 312 (1) TFEU;
Amendment 509 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45
Paragraph 45
45. Calls for better use and surveillance of the existing structural funds in the direction of fostering competitiveness and cohesion, and for the creation of anaiming at reducing fraud, irregularities and errors (especially inc reased EU investment capacity through the exploitation of innovative approaches such as the European Fund for Strategic Investments, or through the creation of a specific facility to finance and guarantee infrastructure projects gional and farm spending, as announced in the report of the European Court of Auditors 2014); concludes that the European Fund for Strategic Investment is a risky investment vehicle leading the interest of the Uniono even higher debts;
Amendment 519 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 46
Paragraph 46
46. Insists onthat the full implementation of the existing six-pack and two-pack framework and the European Semester to address, in particular, macroeconomic imbalancwould further undermine the economic autonomy of the Member States, and secure long-term control overthat the control over economic imbalances, deficits and still extremely high levels of debt by improving spending efficiency, prioritising productive investments, providing incentive to structural reform and taking into account business cycle conditionsdebts should be exercised on the level of the nation-state;
Amendment 526 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 47
Paragraph 47
47. Recalls that the euro is the currency of the Union and that the EU budget is designed to help less developed Member States catch up and become able to join the eurozoneEU budget should not be used in order to drag less developed Member States into the Eurozone, since such practices are highly unproductive and self-destructive, being one of the fundamental roots of the eurocrisis; calls for the dissolution of the eurozone, implying at least a split into a Northern and Southern euro, consistent with the internal European differences for what concerns organization, productivity and social needs;
Amendment 535 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 48
Paragraph 48
Amendment 550 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 49
Paragraph 49
49. Pledges to increase the resilience of the EMU when facing economic shocks while preventing any form of permanent fiscal transferConcludes that the EMU is currently acting as a large-scale transfer union, whereby the no-bailout clause has already been violated multiple times;
Amendment 561 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 50
Paragraph 50
50. Reiterates its support for the suggestion to transform the position of Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs intoStates that the creation of a EMU Treasury and, consequently, the appointment of a Treasury Minister, ais made in its resolution of 12 December 2013 on constitutional problems of a multitier governance in the European Union6 undesirable, since this implies further infringement on national economic autonomy; __________________ 6 Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0598.
Amendment 566 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 51
Paragraph 51
51. Considers it necessary to incorporatethat the European Stability Mechanism into the Union legal framework and, as a next step, to transform it into a European Monetary Funds a highly undemocratic bailout fund, since (1) the ESM deals with millions of taxpayers' euros, which are given away to over-indebted Member States; and (2) the social consequences of the austerity programs attached to the loans have proved to be destructive for the beneficiaries (by sky-high unemployment, reduced access to health care, increasing poverty and homelessness and general demolition of the welfare state);
Amendment 573 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52
Paragraph 52
Amendment 583 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 53
Paragraph 53
53. Calls for duonsiders that a European Redemption Fund would be, on the consideration to be given to the main findingse hand, undemocratic and unfair with respect to sound Member States that are capable of managing their public debt rations, and, ofn the Expert Group created by the Commission, with a view to constituting a Redemption Fund; other hand, is unlikely to work for those Member States that would make use of the Redemption Fund, since the conditions required to avail of the ERF are unrealistic, requiring tax increases and/or savings so severe that it would not only undermine growth but would be completely self-defeating;
Amendment 588 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 54
Paragraph 54
54. Believes that the Single Market contains growth potential that has not yet been fully exploited, particularly with reference to the Digital Single Market; calls, therefore, for better control of the correct application, and better enforcement, of the existing acquis in this domaindomain of services;
Amendment 597 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 55
Paragraph 55
55. Calls for the rapidBelieves that the completion of a Banking Union based on a single supervision mechanism (SSM) and a single resolution mechanism (SRM), and sustained by an adequate backstop; calls, to thi will lead to ever-increasing administrative costs of compliance, both for the banks eand, for a swift agreement on an adequate bridge financing mechanism until the Single Resolution Fund becomes operational and a European Insolvency Scheme is created their customers, and means assuming collective liability and shared responsibility for the debts of all banks in the euro-system; consequently, the Banking Union is a significant encroachment on national sovereignty on several levels;
Amendment 602 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 56
Paragraph 56
Amendment 608 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 57
Paragraph 57
57. Calls for the establishonsiders that the further development of a true capital markets union, with a single European capital markets supervisorshould be on intergovernmental level;
Amendment 614 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 58
Paragraph 58
Amendment 622 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59
Paragraph 59
59. Considers it necessary to improve the automaticthat the initiative of information exchange between national tax authorities in order to avoid tax planning, base erosion and profit shifting, as well as to promote coordinated actions to fight tax havens; calls for the adoption of a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base directive establishing a minimum rate and spelling out common objectives for progressive harmonisation; deems it necessary to embark on a comprehensive review of the existing VAT legislshould reside with the Member States, rather than being imposed by the Union; argues that the adoption of a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base fails to meet with the subsidiarity requirements and will paralyze national economic governance: each Member State should remain in control over taxation, addressing i.a. the issue of reduced rates and the introduction of the country of origin principle, and to establish a partially automatic stabilising mechanism to foster convergence and counter differences in the economic cycles of the Member Statesnd should have the ability to define the taxation level in line with the country-specific economic needs and situation;
Amendment 631 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60
Paragraph 60
60. Recalls the need for proper democratic legitimacy and accountability to be ensured at the levels of decision-making with national parliaments scrutinising national governments, with an enhanced scrutiny role for Concludes that the EMU has become an undemocratic currency area, since (a) illegitimate purchase programs are used to buy debt, (b) tax money is transferred from Northern to Southern European Parliament at EU level, including a central role, toge; and (c) several countries fail to fulfil their with the Council, in the adoption of the Convergence Codeobligations while they are not sufficiently being held to account;
Amendment 635 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 62
Paragraph 62
62. Reiterates that interparliamentary cooperation should not be seen as establmore incentives (i.e. the effective use of the exishting a new joint parliamentary body or any other institution, because the euro is the currency of the EU and the European Pyellow and orange card and the creation of a green card) should be given to national parliaments is the parliament of the EUn order to get involved in EMU matters; recalls that the EMU is established bywithin the Union, whose citizens are directly represented at Union level by Parliament, which canhas to find ways to guarantee the parliamentary democratic accountability of eurozone- specific decisions;
Amendment 640 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 63
Paragraph 63
Amendment 655 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 67
Paragraph 67
67. Is convinced that the deepening of the EMU should go hand in hand with the completion of the internal market by removing all remaining internal barriers, especially as concerns the Energy Union, the common digital market and the market in serviceEMU in its current state should be abandoned or, at least, dismantled into smaller economic confederations, in a EEC-like framework, which is more compatible with internal European differences with regard to economic organization, productivity and social needs;
Amendment 659 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 68
Paragraph 68
68. Calls for full enforcement of existing internal energy market legislation according to Article 194 TFEU in order to establish an Energy Union; Sustains that the establishment of an Energy Union is unrealistic, given the massive investment and infrastructure costs, and given the idea of replacing the dependence on Russia for the gas supply with dependence on other authoritarian regimes (such as Azerbaijan, Algeria, Libya, Turkmenistan, Qatar, Iraq and Iran, all named in the Commission's communication on the Energy Union) with questionable human rights;
Amendment 663 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 69
Paragraph 69
Amendment 691 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 72
Paragraph 72
72. Points out the importance of promoting the idea of a minimal wage determined by each Member State, and suggests that, under current Treaty provisions, an ‘Employees Mobility Directive’ could be adopted to reduce still-existing barriers for employeethat each Member State should have the freedom to impose or not impose minimal wages, in line with the national employment markets;
Amendment 717 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 75
Paragraph 75
75. Calls for the establishment of a new social pact aimed at preserving Europe’s social market economy, respecting the right to collective bargaining; points out that such a pact could enhance the coordination of the social policies of the Member StatesArgues that the extent to which the implementation of the social market is pursued should best be left to the policy space of the national state, since they are best placed to make the trade-off between the welfare state on the one hand and budgetary restraints, earnings equality and employment growth on the other hand; as such, the establishment of a new social pact aimed at preserving Europe's social market economy is not needed at this point in time;
Amendment 737 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 78
Paragraph 78
78. Calls for European and national parliamentary oversight of EU external action to be strengthened, including by continuing the regular consultations with the Vice-President/High Representative (VP/HR), the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission, and for negotiations on replacing the 2002 Interinstitutional Agreement on access to sensitive information of the Council in the field of CFSP to be concluded;
Amendment 754 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 83
Paragraph 83
83. Calls for progressive steps to be taken towards a common defence policy (Article 42(2) TEU) and, eventually, a common defence, which can be set up by unanimous decision of the European CouncilArgues that defence is a national and not a EU responsibility; common interests in defence matters can be pursued within the framework of multi-lateral or bilateral agreements;
Amendment 758 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 83 a (new)
Paragraph 83 a (new)
83a. Underlines that Europe is in the first place a civilian power; EU military power should be seriously questioned;
Amendment 760 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 84
Paragraph 84
Amendment 766 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 85
Paragraph 85
Amendment 771 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 86
Paragraph 86
86. Underlines the need to define common European capabilities and armaments policy (Article 42(3) TEU), which would encompass the joint planning, development and procurement of military capat Europe is in the first place a civilian power; EU military power should be seriously questioned, since (1) it is impossible to reach consensus between the Member States on the use of military force; (2) the estabilities and which should also include proposals to react to cyber, hybrid and asymmshment of a EU army will raise distrust and suspicion with other powers such as Russia and the United States; (3) it would be highly unetrhical threats; encourages the Commission to work on an ambitious European Defence Action Plan, as announced in the 2016 Work Programmeo send soldiers possibly to their deaths on the basis of the vague political declarations the EU is able to generate at present;
Amendment 776 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 87
Paragraph 87
87. Considers it necessary to strengthenhat the strategy followed by the European Defence Agency (EDA) by providing itshould first be the object of public consultation and public debate, before it is provided with needed resources and political backing, ; othereby allowing it to play a leadwise, the lack of public involvement ing and coordinating role in capability development, research ntroversial domain will undermine its legitimacy and risks further erosion of public support for the wider Europeand procuremenject;
Amendment 784 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 89
Paragraph 89
89. Suggests that Article 41 (3) TEU be used toDisagrees with the establishment of a start-up fund comprised of Member States’' contributions to finance preparatory activities pertaining to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) activities not charged to the Union budget;
Amendment 789 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 91
Paragraph 91
91. Calls forIs opposed to the creation of a permanent military operational headquarters that would cooperate closely with the existing Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC); calls for the institutionalisation of the various European military structures (among others the different ‘Battle Groups’, Euroforces, France- United Kingdom defence cooperation, Benelux air defence cooperation) into the EU framework, and for an increase in the usability of EU battlegroups, inter alia by extending common financing and by considering, by default, their deployment as an initial entry force in future crisis management scenariobecause (1) it duplicates NATO structures and permanently disassociates EU planning from NATO planning; (2) it will undoubtedly be a far more costly solution than (improving) the existing structures;
Amendment 792 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 92
Paragraph 92
Amendment 823 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 96
Paragraph 96
96. Highlights the need to set up an EU common asylum and immigration policy, which should provide as well for fair distribution of asylum seekers in the European Union; takes the view that such a policy should involve all Member States, but that, if this proves impossible, the potential of enhanced cooperation could be exploitedfor the Member States to determine themselves how many refugees they will host, without the EU governments imposing mandatory quotas;
Amendment 837 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 97
Paragraph 97
97. Considers it necessary to strengthen Frontex and transform it into a European System of Border Guards, to be supported, when necessary, by military instruments such as a European Maritime Force (Euromarfor) and an upgraded European Corps (Eurocorps), together with the resources pooled through Permanent Structured Cooperation; suggests that automatic adjustment should also be envisaged of the databasesimmediately suspend Schengen until further notice, in order to take control over the refugee crisis and illegal immigration; consequently, internal border controls among the Member States should be reinstated; the main task of Frontex (or of the European System of bBorder agencies such as Eurodac, and, in future, Smart Borders, such that they incorporate the ‘European list of dangerous persons’ and the ‘European Database for wanted persons’Guards) should consist in supervising a correct and thorough border management of the Member States;
Amendment 846 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 98
Paragraph 98
98. Stresses the importance of distinguishing between the concepts of ‘'unsafe third countries’' (war zones) and ‘'safe third countries’' (mostly Western Balkans countries), and the corresponding distinction of procedures for processing applicants coming from these two categories of countries; calls for the immediate inadmission of applications for asylum coming from safe third countries and for the signature of agreements with safe third countries in order to control and reduce migration flows before migrants arrive at the EU border; insists, at the same time, on strict procedures for returning applicants with unfounded claims and on their detention in closed asylum centres in the period before their expulsion;
Amendment 855 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 99
Paragraph 99
Amendment 864 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 101
Paragraph 101
101. Underscores the importance of improved coordination between EASO, Frontex and the Office of the European Ombudsman in order to allow for smoother adoption of Early Alert Reports in the event of particular migratory pressure, which is likely to put at risk respect for the fundamental freedoms of asylum seekers and of the European citizens; considers it possible for the Commission to use these Early Alert Reports as basis to trigger the contingency measures provided for in Article 78(3) TFEU;