36 Amendments of Paul TANG related to 2015/2344(INI)
Amendment 91 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas progress has been achieved in addressing the flaws of EMU through legislation such as the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack regulations, as well as through the introduction of the European Semester and the creation of new instruments such ascreation of banking union and the ESM;
Amendment 99 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)
Recital G a (new)
Ga. whereas the attempt to strengthen the stability and growth pact with regards to its credibility and macro-economic coherence by means of the Six Pack, the Two Pack and the Fiscal Compact have added more complexity and less credibility than needed, proving to be a poor substitute for a more fundamental overhaul of euro area governance that will be required in order to achieve a sustainable balance between responsibility and solidarity within our common currency;
Amendment 109 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)
Recital H a (new)
Ha. whereas the Council internally has organised itself to reflect the reality of the existence of a Eurozone, while the European Parliament will eventually also need to reflect the reality that not all EU Member States will adopt the euro in the foreseeable future and are prepared to accept responsibilities that come with such membership;
Amendment 152 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Considers, against this background, that shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception under the Maastricht Treaty with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while budgetary policy remains within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policies, supplemented by a no-bailout clause that is not fully operational in practice for as long as no permanent and democratically legitimate procedure to enforce a good debt equilibrium for Member States confronted with a liquidity problem and no credible procedure for the orderly bankruptcy of an insolvent member are in place that would allow for a fresh start;
Amendment 177 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Points out that the introduction of permanent and democratically legitimate procedure to enforce a good debt equilibrium for Member States confronted with a liquidity problem and a credible bankruptcy procedure for the euro area will need to be preceded by a transition regime in order to avoid a destabilisation of Member States under pressure from the financial markets;
Amendment 180 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalances, triggered by capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States, aggravated by the entanglement of banks, financial markets and governments and led to a sovereign debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstopwithout a proper crisis mechanism such as a European Monetary Fund to deal with illiquidity and without an orderly insolvency procedure for a Member State with unsustainable debt levels, the mere existence of the euro area;
Amendment 198 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy that organises risk sharing and clearly attributes the responsibility between Member States and the euro area as whole so as to address problems of moral hazard cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks;
Amendment 224 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Emphasises that the division of labour between monetary and fiscal policy for the euro area as currently enshrined in the treaties simply did not anticipate that monetary policy would ever reach the zero lower bound, and shortcoming that urgently needs to be corrected;
Amendment 232 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Acknowledges the results achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points in particular to the many measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by strengthening coordination of national fiscal policies, in particular via the adop, and in particular the creation of banking union and the ESM; recalls that the well-intentioned creation of the Six-Pack and, the Two- Pack Regulations; welcomes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor,and the Fiscal Compact have created more complexity, less credibility and less macro-economic cohesion than needed, stresses that further steps are required to create a credible and sustainable architecture of the Eeuropean Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lack democratic oversight and parliamentary control, and hence ownership, including a euro area budgetary capacity, a euro treasury and a democratic decision making body specific to the euro area;
Amendment 259 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Makes it clear that rapid actionnd far reaching action, including changes to the Treaties, is needed to ensure the sustainability of the euro; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to complete the EMU and to restore the trust of citizens and markets;
Amendment 291 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance at or close to the zero lower bound, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; emphasises that a mechanism to achieve an aggregate fiscal stance in the future especially at or close to the zero lower bound as well as incentives for symmetric as opposed to asymmetric adjustment for accelerated macro-economic convergence in response to crises are essential for a proper functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocks;
Amendment 318 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Stresses that a fiscal capacity must be created on top of existing EU funding instruments, within its legal framework, in order to ensure consistent development between euro and non-euro Member States; emphasizes that for any new instrument, payments have to be carried out on the basis of an automatic mechanism to avoid escalating payment backlogs;
Amendment 324 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Upholds that this instrument should be used to invest in public goods, with an Eurozone added value and taking into account national contexts; underlines that the access to a fiscal capacity involves an agreement that incentivizes the investment in these domains; asks the Commission to explore the potential fields where a fiscal capacity can have such an Eurozone added value and how synergy with the Eurozone budget can be brought about; underlines that the access to a fiscal capacity involves an agreement that incentivizes the investment in these domains;
Amendment 326 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 b (new)
Paragraph 15 b (new)
15b. Points to out that some crisis management mechanisms, such as European Stability Mechanism (ESM), are not covered by the EU budget, whereas other lending and guarantee instruments are indeed protected by the EU budget either directly or by the Guarantee Fund; insist that any lending operation of which the risk is covered by the EU budget, should not lead to cuts in EU budget lines that are not linked to national envelopes, particularly in heading 1a;
Amendment 335 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires sufficient resources; stresses that the stabilization function of the fiscal capacity should not be undermined by fiscal rules;
Amendment 341 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. Notes the complexity and lack of credibility of the EU economic governance; urges the Commission to work towards EU fiscal framework with a better economic and social rationale;
Amendment 355 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Considers that three different functions have to be fulfilled; argues, first, that in order to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’' structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic timeswhen resorting to a fiscal capacity and public goods should be commonly financed and provided; argues, secondly, that differences in the business cycles of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a whole;
Amendment 370 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Argues in consequence that three pillars of a fiscal capacity – each clearly identifying and attributing European and national responsibilities – should be distinguished, wherein action should be undertaken in the framework of a common toolbox to address the different functions, i.e. incentivising convergence and sustainable structural reforms, absorbing asymmetric shocks, and absorbing symmetric shocks; takes note of the various proposals regarding designs put forward on this matter by politicians and academia;
Amendment 405 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity and its responsibility for ensuring that, after the necessary transition period all necessary conditions are in place for – if and when needed - an orderly restructuring of national sovereign debt to restore fiscal sustainability and allow an overly indebted member state a fresh start; stresses that an EMF should be managed by the Commission and held democratically accountable by the European Parliament; emphasises that national parliaments would be involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources could be affected; underscores the own responsibility Member States have in managing their national budgets;
Amendment 425 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Insists that once it is integrated into Community law, the fiscal capacity for, including the eEuro area should be integrated into the EUpean Monetary Fund, should be part of the union budget, but over and above the ceilings of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF); FF, and should be financed by euro area and participating members via a new specific additional resource to be agreed between participating Member States and to be considered as new assigned revenue; considers that eventually in a steady state a revision to upward the current own resources ceiling should be agreed in order to be adapted to a multitier budget;
Amendment 430 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Insists that once it is integrated into Community law, the fiscal capacity for the euro area should be integrated into the EU budget in the form of a fund, but over and above the ceilings of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF);
Amendment 440 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)
Paragraph 21 b (new)
21b. Stresses that current expenditures from the euro area capacity should routinely be met by current revenues but also highlights the need for a euro area borrowing capacity in order to deal with large symmetric shocks not least as a fiscal backstop to the banking union and in order to facilitate the transition to sustainable public finances in crisis countries in the context of operations of the European Monetary Fund;
Amendment 442 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)
Paragraph 21 b (new)
21b. Considers that the ECB profits should feed into the Eurozone fiscal capacity, once discounted the current percentage set for reserves; points out that to this effect, OLP applies to the reform of Article 33.1.a) of the ECB Statute; believes that this is particularly relevant in a period of quantitative easing;
Amendment 456 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Believes that compliance with a convergence code should be the condition for access to funding from the ESM/EMF; believes that conditions for access to funding from the ESM/EMF should have a link to the EU budget via the existing SRSP mechanism; reiterates its call on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal to this end;
Amendment 465 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 4
Subheading 4
Pillar 1: A convergence code to promote convergence and, incentivise the implementation of structural reforms and facilitate the provision of euro area public goods
Amendment 477 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Stresses that significant progress in convergence and, sustainable structural reforms is needed in orderand the provision of euro area public goods can contribute to reconcile fiscal consolidation, growth, jobs, productivity, competitiveness and the European social model so as to effectively prevent asymmetric shock; considers that financial support from the European level for the implementation of agreed structural reforms in the Member States, while keeping the responsibility for implementation at the national level, is therefore indispensable; stresses this support is conditional to the agreement and must be linked to technical support to national authorities aimed at reforming institutions, governance, administration, economic and social sectors;
Amendment 511 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – introductory part
Paragraph 26 – introductory part
26. Suggests that the convergence and responsibility code define criteria to be reached within five years, building on the merits of the Maastricht criteria and focusing for the first period on convergence and responsibility requirements regarding:
Amendment 532 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2
Paragraph 26 – indent 2
Amendment 558 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1 a (new)
– public goods with European relevance
Amendment 598 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Notes that shocks in the Eurozone do differ in intensity rather than in occurrence; Is convinced that increased convergence within the euro area will significantly increase the capacity of its Member States to absorb asymmetric shocks; believes, however, that no matter how great the efforts regarding convergence and sustainable structural reforms, asymmetric shocks with an impact on the stability of the euro area as a whole cannot be ruled out completely, given the strong integration of the euro area Member States; stresses, therefore, the need to have an instrument available for this emergency which provides an immediate stabilisation effect;
Amendment 613 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Notes that the twomultiple models for the shock absorption function are featured most prominently in the academic literature: a Rainy Day Fund and, a European Unemployment Benefit SchemeInsurance or Reinsurance Scheme, a full-fledged capital market union and national budgets; stresses however that Member States remain responsible for the sustainability of their national budget;
Amendment 655 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
31. Acknowledges that the model of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme wouldInsurance or Reinsurance Scheme might be used to foster convergence of labour markets in the medium term;
Amendment 719 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
36. Considers that a renewed instability inand fragmentation of the financial sector could alsogain pose severe challenges for the euro area as a whole; urges completion of the Banking Union, including a meaningful BSR, in order to lessen these challenges; calls for the and recalls that the shock absorption capacity of financial institutions remains low and fragile; calls, thus, for accelerated balance sheet repair and significantly higher levels of capital and bailinable instruments as well as a sufficient fiscal capacity to operate as a fiscal backstop for the Banking Union, as agreed in the SRM;
Amendment 770 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
Paragraph 39
39. Calls urgently for the European Parliament and national parliaments to be given a strengthened role in the renewed economic governance framework in order to reinforce democratic accountability; calls for increased national ownership inUrges that a democratic decision making body in the form of a Eurozone Parliament (EZP) specific to the euro area is created on which the democratic accountability for the new institutional architecture of the Eeuropean Semester in order to improve compliance with the CSRs would be based; the decision making should involve Parliamentarians at the European and national level;
Amendment 774 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
Paragraph 40
40. Argues that national ownership could be improved by including national parliaments in the procedures; insists, however, that the competences of the EP and the national parliaments conferred upon these institutions by the Treaties should be respected and that mixing of these competences be avoided; takes the view that a Eurozone Parliament (EZP) is needed to restore democratic oversight over the Eurozone economic governance; underlines that a Eurozone Parliament, composed of members of the European and National Parliaments, can reinvigorate the public debate on economic policy making and budgetary strategies of the Eurozone 1a ; __________________ 1aSee: Piketty, Thomas (2012) Le Capital au XXIe siècle, pp. 690
Amendment 793 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
41. Considers that in order to provide for a genuine EMU, a euro area treasury should be created for collective decision- making, supervision and management of the budgetary capacity for the euro area; calls for the inclusion of this treasury within the European Commission with full macroeconomic, fiscal and financial competences; callBelieves that further steps in the institutional set-up of economic governance, such as the strengthening of the role of the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs for a vice-presidentthe creation of thea European Commission to head the treasury and simultaneously to act as president of the Eurogroup; urges full accountability of this treasury toTreasury Office must be linked to adequate means for democratic accountability and legitimacy, involving the Europeanzone Parliament;