62 Amendments of Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS related to 2020/2133(INI)
Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5
Citation 5
— having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 9 and 10, 15(3)3, 14, 15,16 and 17(3) thereof,
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)
Citation 8 a (new)
- having regard to the special report 13/2019 of the European Court of Auditors on the ethical frameworks of the audited EU institutions
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 13
Citation 13
— having regard to the recommendations of Transparency Intthe Organisation for Economic Co-Opernational and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe’´s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)various NGO´s,
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the TEU stipulates that ‘the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies and agencies’; whereas this implies that public decisions are taken in the interest of the common good and notthat conflicts of interests - which occur, according to the definancial power of individual actors; ition of the OECD "when an individual or a corporation (either private or governmental) is in a position to exploit his or their own profession or official capacity in some way for personal or corporate benefit" - should be avoided in the legislative process and whereas any definition of conflict of interest has a contextual and evolving nature and full transparency does not necessarily guarantee the absence of any conflict of interest, nor does it guarantee that public trust will be won or decreased;
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
A a. whereas the Treaties have established a system of division of powers between the institutions of the Union that assigns to each institution its own role within the institutional structure of the Union and in the performance of the tasks entrusted to it;
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
B a. whereas the European Court of Auditors has stated in its special report 13/2019 1a on the ethical framework of the EU that Parliament, Council and Commission "have to a large extent adequate ethical frameworks in place for both staff and Members". _________________ 1a https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADoc uments/SR19_13/SR_ethical_frameworks _EN.pdf
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)
Recital B b (new)
B b. whereas nevertheless the enforcement of the ethical framework could be improved;
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the shortcomings of the current EU ethics framework derive largely from the fact that it relies on a self-regulatory approach and lacks adequate human and financial resources and competences to verify informany further evolution of the EU ethics framework must have a clear legal basis while respecting the separation of powers as laid down in the Treationes;
Amendment 24 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas, as a consequence, multiple cases of unethical conduct and their inadequate handling by the EU institutions have harmed every incidence of unethical behaviour can endanger the trust which European citizens place in the EU institutions;
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas the current ethics standards frameworks appearse to be highly fragmented, with different rules in different institutions, creating a complex system which is difficult for both EU citizens and for those who have to respect the rules to understandailored according to the specificities of each European institutions;
Amendment 35 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Recital E a (new)
E a. whereas the balance of powers assigned to the institutions is a fundamental guarantee afforded by the Treaty to European citizens;
Amendment 36 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the Meroni doctrine developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) allows for the delegation of EU institutions’ competences to external bodies; under strict conditions; whereas according to the court any delegation of competences must be limited and can only relate to clearly defined executive powers, the use of which must be entirely subject to the supervision of the high authority and cannot concern discretionary powers involving any political judgement in order not to jeopardise the balance of powers between the institutions;
Amendment 39 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
F a. whereas, following the preceding considerations, the legal margin for overarching rules applied to individual institutions with a common application is very narrow;
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)
Recital G a (new)
G a. Underlines that all EU institutions have to meet the highest standards of independence and impartiality while stressing each institution´s right of organisational sovereignty;
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G b (new)
Recital G b (new)
G b. Recalls that Members of Parliament´s freedom of the mandate is in the interest of the citizens they represent;
Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G c (new)
Recital G c (new)
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G d (new)
Recital G d (new)
G d. Points out that all staff in the institutions is covered by the EU staff regulations of officials of the European Union (EUSR) and conditions of employment of other servants of the European Union (CEOS);
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G e (new)
Recital G e (new)
G e. Recalls that the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union set out a European governance framework based on the separation of powers, laying down distinct rights and obligations for each institution;
Amendment 48 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G f (new)
Recital G f (new)
G f. Points out that based on the principle of conferral, institutions cannot delegate by means of an interinstitutional agreement, powers which they themselves do not have, for instance where such powers are conferred by the Treaties on the Court of Auditors or have remained with the Member States;
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G g (new)
Recital G g (new)
G g. Recalls furthermore that one of Parliament´s primary functions as laid down in the Treaty on European Union is to exercise political control;
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Principles Considers that any option under discussion for improving transparency and integrity in the EU institutions must be respectful of the following principles: - the principle of sound financial management, ensuring the efficient and effective management of Union ressources - the principles of conferral and separation of powers - the freedom to choose an occupation and the right to engage in work as stipulated by article 15 of the Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union - rule of law and fundamental European principles such as the presumption of innocence, the right to be heard, the principles of legality and proportionality - Freedom of the mandate of Members of European Parliament
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)
Paragraph 1 b (new)
1 b. Further stresses that any option under discussion requires a solid legal base for the constitution and for any competences to be assigned;
Amendment 59 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 c (new)
Paragraph 1 c (new)
1 c. Insists that any option under discussion requires a clear definition of the mandate, composition and competences none of which must duplicate or interfere with the work of OLAF, the European Ombudsman, the European Court of Auditors or the European Court of Justice;
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 1
Subheading 1
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 1 a (new)
Subheading 1 a (new)
Underlines that the principle of separation of powers is the foundation pillar of modern democracy; considers it imperative for the legislative to control the executive, as any reversal of the roles and powers of the legislative and executive would otherwise endanger the independence of the free mandate of elected Members of Parliament;
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 1 b (new)
Subheading 1 b (new)
Stresses that any option under discussion for improving transparency and integrity in the EU institutions can neither, based on primary law, issue any decision on whether a criminal offense has been committed, nor impose any sanctions, nor impose any administrative measures intended to avoid or clean up accidental or negligent non-compliance with the rules;
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 1 c (new)
Subheading 1 c (new)
Highlights that any option under discussion for improving transparency and integrity in the EU institutions which is to regulate the grey area in between can only have an advisory function for the institutions concerned;
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 1 d (new)
Subheading 1 d (new)
Insists that any decisions on measures to be taken or sanctions to be imposed can only be taken by the competent bodies of the institutions themselves;
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 1 e (new)
Subheading 1 e (new)
Recalls that distinction must be made between a conflict of interest arising during or after the exercise of a function and the importance to distinguish between the two and recalls furthermore to distinguish between acts that authorised if declared and acts that are not authorised at all.
Amendment 66 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 1 f (new)
Subheading 1 f (new)
Suggests that each institution concludes agreements on exchange of information with the Member States respecting the framework of the separation of powers;
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – introductory part
Paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. Considers that the new EU Ethics Body should be delegated a list of competences to implement ethics rules for Members and staff; takes the view that this list should include by way of a minimum the competences provided for in:any options under discussion for improving transparency and integrity in the EU institutions should only have advisory competences for the members of the institutions;
Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – indent 1
Paragraph 2 – indent 1
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – indent 2
Paragraph 2 – indent 2
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – indent 3
Paragraph 2 – indent 3
Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – indent 4
Paragraph 2 – indent 4
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – indent 5
Paragraph 2 – indent 5
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
Amendment 94 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Insists that the IIAany cooperation agreement between the institutions should be open to the participation of allother EU institutions and bodies; believes that the IIA should allow the Ethics Body to conclude agreements with national authorities with a view to ensuring the exchange of information necessary for the performance of its task in order to agree on common measures which can be implemented in respect of the division of powers;
Amendment 100 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Considers that the participating institutions should entrust the EU Ethics Body with monitoring powers over ethics standards, as well as advisory, investigative and enforcement powersany options under discussion for improving transparency and integrity in the EU institutions has to be respectful of the balance between the institutions as established by the treaties, underlines that it must not replace, substitute or interfere with the responsibilities and prerogatives of each institution and points out that given these considerations, the decision-making powers must remain within the respective institutions, hence only a body with advisory function able to issue non- binding recommendations is conceivable;
Amendment 109 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
Amendment 120 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
Amendment 126 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
Amendment 130 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8 a. Stresses that requesting tax documents and bank records are interventions in private law, for which there must be serious allegations that enter in competence of OLAF;
Amendment 134 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Believes that in relation to its enforcement powers, the body could take over from the Appointing Authority in dealing with staff ethics obligations, and that in relation to Members of Parliament or Commissioners, the body couldannot be granted enforcement powers within the limits of the provisionssince this transferral of powers would countained in the Treaties, and without prejudice to any additional mechanisms provided for in Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, in particular concerner the separation of powers laid down ing termination of officehe Treaties;
Amendment 142 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Considers that thesuch an EU Ethics Body should be entrusted with advisory tasks in order to provideto improve the enforcement of existing provisions in the EU institutions in order to provide reliable and trustworthy advice to any individual possibly covered by its scope who wishes to request interpretation of an ethical standard in relation to appropriate conduct in a specific case;
Amendment 150 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. BelievUnderlines that the decision on the absence of conflicts of interest of designated Commissioners-designate should remain a competence of Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affair remains a political and institutional competence of the European Parliament and its bodies, while thesuch an EU Ethics Body shcould support the process with the publication of itsits non-binding analysis of each individual case and make its investigative capacities available;
Amendment 153 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3
Subheading 3
Amendment 154 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3 a (new)
Subheading 3 a (new)
Recalls that the competent bodies in the institutions are regulated by law and that the composition of the competent body in the European Parliament could be made up of MEPs and former MEPs, such an EU Ethics Body may be composed of Members or former Members of the institutions;
Amendment 155 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3 b (new)
Subheading 3 b (new)
Amendment 164 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Considers that its members must be independent, chosen on the basis of their competence, experience and professional qualities, as well as their personal integrity, have an impeccable record of ethical behaviour and provide a declaration of the absence of conflicts of interest; is of the opinion that the composition of the body should be gender-balanced; underlines that all member shall be independent in the performance of their duties;
Amendment 176 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. InsistsRecommend that the college be supported by a secretariat with the human, material and financial resources commensurate with its mandate and tasks in accordance with the principles of sound financial budget management;
Amendment 181 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 4
Subheading 4
Reflections on Procedures
Amendment 182 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Proposes a two-stepn approach whereby, in the event that thesuch an EU Ethics Body becomes aware of a breachdeals with a breach of conduct or possible breach of ethics rules, it first recommends actions to put an end to the breach; considers that ithis first preventive step should ensure confidentiality and the right of the person to be heard; suggests that in the event that the individual concerned refuses to take the appropriate actions, the EU Ethics Body should make relevant information about the case publicly available and decide, if appropriate, on sanctions; considers that this two-step approach should apply provided that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the individual acted in bad faith and recommends that intentional breach, gross negligence, the concealment of evidence and non- compliance with the obligation to cooperate should be, as such, subject to sanctions, even when the breach itself has ceaseto be heard;
Amendment 192 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 5
Subheading 5
Amendment 193 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 5 a (new)
Subheading 5 a (new)
Amendment 194 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 5 b (new)
Subheading 5 b (new)
Insists that the procedures laid down in the Treaties must be applied, such as the transfer of investigations by the European Court of Auditors to OLAF and to the European Court of Justice;
Amendment 197 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Is of the opinion that the EU Ethics Body should publish an annual report containing both information about the fulfilment of its tasks and, where appropriate, recommendations for improving ethics standardsto be presented to the European Parliament;
Amendment 204 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Insists that the decisions of thean EU Ethics Body should bcannot issue legally binding, reviewable before the CJEU and subject to possible complaints to the EU Ombudsma decisions, since no institution can delegate decision- making authority to another institution;