2020/2133(INI) | [ParlTrack]

Stéphane SÉJOURNÉ, Karen MELCHIOR, Pascal DURAND, Javier NART

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Notes that within the EU institutions different legislative measures aimed at preventing conflicts of interest contain varying definitions of the term ‘conflict of interest’; believes therefore that the term should be understood to mean a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official, in which the public official has private- capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities; notes, however, that a definition of this kind has an evolving nature and that full transparency does not necessarily guarantee the absence of any conflict of interest, nor does it guarantee public trust; highlights that post- public employment and ‘revolving door’ conflict of interest situations are recurring concerns of a systematic nature and a problem common to institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies across the EU; considers that conflict of interest situations could jeopardise the enforcement of high ethical standards in the EU institutions and agencies, thus compromising their integrity and damaging citizens’ trust in them;

Amendment 10 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1 a. Notes that the European Parliament has established the Advisory Committee on the Conduct of Members as the body responsible for giving Members guidance on the interpretation and implementation of the Code of Conduct; it also assesses alleged breaches of the Code of Conduct and advises the President on possible action to be taken;

Amendment 11 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1 a. Reminds that the Committee on Legal Affairs is the committee responsible for the Statute for Members and the Staff Regulations of the European Union, the privileges and immunities and the verification of Members' credentials as stipulated by in Annex VI of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament;

Amendment 12 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1 a. Notes that trust in the European institutions and their democratic legitimacy have been profoundly altered by the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 despite the rejection by referendum in France and in the Netherlands of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2005;

Amendment 13 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1 b. Further notes the low level of trust in the EU institutions, with only half of the EU citizens expressing trust for the EU institutions according to the Eurobarometer survey carried out by the European Commission in 2019;

Amendment 14 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 c (new)

1 c. Underlines that utmost importance of independence, transparency and accountability of public institutions and public officers to foster the trust of citizens that is necessary for the legitimate functioning of democratic institutions;

Amendment 15 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 d (new)

1 d. Recalls that, according to the rules of procedure of the European Parliament, the confirmation by the Committee for Legal Affairs of the absence of any conflict of interests as an essential precondition for the appointment of Commissioner-designates; Underlines that this provision should be read in articulation with the ethical standards set out in Article 17(3) of the Treaty on the European Union, which provides that the Members of the European Commission should be chosen “from persons whose independence is beyond doubt”;

Amendment 16 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 e (new)

1 e. Notes that during the examination of the potential conflict of interests of Commissioner-designates in 2019, Members of the Committee for Legal Affairs have underlined profound flaws of the current procedure; Further notes that these flaws include the access only to a limited range of information, the lack of time for examination, the absence of investigative powers, the absence of support from experts, and the lack of impartiality of Members of the Legal Affairs Committee considering that Commissioner-designates are often chosen from their own political movements, and often by their own national governments;

Amendment 17 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Is of the opinion that the examination of Commissioner-designates’ declarations with a view to inferring a conflict of interest is of fundamental institutional and democratic importance and should be undertaken with the utmost attention, commitment and sense of responsibility, by means of a fully objective and independent interpretation focused on documenting the technical implications;

Amendment 18 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Is of the opinion that the examination of Commissioner-designates’ declarations with a view to inferring a conflict of interest is of fundamental institutional and democratic importance and should be undertaken with the utmost attention, commitment and sense of responsibility; insists that the declaration of the President-elect of the European Commission should also be examined;

Amendment 19 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Is also of the opinion that for this examination to be complete and accurate, and for the possibility of a conflict of interest to be excluded, information and documents beyond the declaration of financial interests of Commissioner- designates are ~~often~~ essential; considers in this regard that the independent ethics body should be able to request from individuals under examination that they provide banking information, tax information, and any other information that may be necessary for the examination; considers that the independent ethics bodies should be given the appropriate investigative powers to be able verify the information provided; stresses that the independent ethics body should be able to impose sanctions for unjustified delays or for the refusal to provide information; further stresses that such information may remain confidential if necessary;

Amendment 2 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Notes that there is no widely accepted European Union definition of conflict of interest and that no guidelines for its applicability have been clearly established; points out that within the EU institutions different legislative measures aimed at preventing conflicts of interest accordingly contain varying definitions of the term ‘conflict of interest’; believes therefore that the term should be understood to mean a conflict between the public duty - implying professional and official accountability - and private interests of a public official, in which the public official has private- capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities; notes, however, that a definition of this kind has an evolving nature with the widest implications and that full transparency does not necessarily guarantee the absence of any conflict of interest, nor does it guarantee that public trust will be won or increased;

Amendment 20 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Is also of the opinion that for this examination to be complete and accurate, and for the possibility of a conflict of interest to be excluded, information and documents beyond the declaration of financial interests of Commissioner- designates are often essential; stresses in this regard that the future independent EU Ethics Body should be given a right to access a wider range of documents, including from national Parliaments and other elected and executive bodies, as well as tax authorities; considers that the future independent EU ethics body should have the power to request Commissioner- designates and all others falling under its scope to provide sufficiently detailed information in order to allow it to carry out well-reasoned and well-documented assessments;

Amendment 21 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

Amendment 22 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Is also of the opinion that for this examination to be complete and accurate, and for the possibility of a conflict of interest to be excluded, ~~information and~~ documents beyond the declaration of financial interests of Commissioner- designates ~~are often essential~~sometimes can be useful as stipulated by Annex VII Article 4 (d) of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament;

Amendment 23 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Believes therefore that the Committee on Legal Affairs should be given sufficient time to evaluate possible conflicts of interest; further believes that it should be provided with sufficient resources, tools and skills to cross-check and locate necessary information as well as ask for complementary information where necessary;

Amendment 24 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Believes therefore that the Committee on Legal Affairs in cooperation with the independent ethics body should be given sufficient time to evaluate possible conflicts of interest; further believes that it should be provided with sufficient resources, tools and skills to cross-check and locate necessary information;

Amendment 25 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Believes therefore that the Committee on Legal Affairs should be given sufficient time to evaluate possible conflicts of interest; further believes that it should be provided with sufficient ~~resources,~~ tools and skills to cross-check and locate necessary information;

Amendment 26 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 (new)

Reminds that the absence of any conflict of interest is a precondition for holding the hearing of a Commissioner-designate by the committee responsible and that the Committee on Legal Affairs possesses clear powers to reject Commissioners- designates in case of a conflict of interest;

Amendment 27 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Stresses the need for full compliance with the rules on confidentiality, privacy and personal data protection in verifying the implications of a conflict of interest;

Amendment 28 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that, given the sophisticated and complex nature of this responsibility, the establishment of a possible conflict of interest should be de- politicised and performed in an independent and systematic way with the assistance of a body with the relevant expertise and experience and with the highest degree of independence in relation to its composition, its budget and its investigatory powers; notes that several similar bodies e.g. in France and Canada dispose of a staff of around 50 persons and several million euro of budget; calls on the Commission and all participating institutions to allocate the future EU ethics body sufficient staff and resources for a professional case-by-case assessment by experts of potential conflicts of interest in particular of Commissioners, Members of Parliament and high-ranking EU officials; considers that most national and EU institutions are not in the position to carry out professional and speedy assessments in each case so far;

Amendment 29 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that, given the sophisticated and complex nature of this responsibility, the e~~stablishment of a possible~~xamination of a potential or actual conflicts of interest should be de- politicised and performed in an independent and systematic way ~~with the assistance of a body with the relevant expertis~~by an independent body with the relevant expertise and experience; Considers that it should be undertaken as on ongoing exercise, with annual updates of the declarations of interests and the possibility for the independent ethics body to issue san~~d experience~~ctions for delays or bad faith in the provision of information and updates of information;

Amendment 3 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Notes that within the EU institutions different legislative measures aimed at preventing conflicts of interest contain varying definitions of the term ‘conflict of interest’; believes therefore that the term should be understood to mean a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official, in which the public official has private- capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities, or in which the performance of official duties is prompted by private-capacity interests; notes, however, that a definition of this kind has an contextual and evolving nature and that full transparency does not necessarily guarantee the absence of any conflict of interest, nor does it guarantee public trust;

Amendment 30 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that, given the sophisticated and complex nature of this responsibility, the establishment of a possible conflict of interest should be ~~de- politicised and~~ performed in an objective, independent and systematic way ~~with the assistance of a body with the relevant expertise and experience~~;

Amendment 31 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that, given the sophisticated and complex nature of this responsibility, the examination of and the establishment of a possible conflict of interest ~~should be de- politicised~~of Commissioner-designates should be technical and performed in an independent and systematic way with the assistance of a body with the relevant expertise and experience;

Amendment 32 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

Amendment 33 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

Amendment 34 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5 a. Considers in particular that the independence of the future ethics body necessarily implies the power to start investigations on its own initiative; believes in this regard that the ethics body should be equipped with mechanisms designed to facilitate reporting from whistle-blowers, in line with Directive 2019/1937, and to facilitate media reports and access to other legally available information;

Amendment 35 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5 a. Underlines the need to review and align relevant EU legislation and codes of conduct, including with a view to laying down strict rules and requiring full transparency on the employment or the projects taken up by high-ranking EU officials after leaving public office and on any side activities held by Members of the European Parliament;

Amendment 36 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 b (new)

5 b. Stresses the need to learn from best practices in Member States; underlines in this light that in some Member States elected representatives are required to refrain from voting on issues in which they have a personal interest, and that these instances can occur in the European Parliament as well, for instance with Members who have farmland voting on direct income support under the CAP; asks MEPs in these cases to refrain from voting;

Amendment 37 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Considers that for proper expertise to be acquired, the future ethics body should have a permanent, independent and collegiate structure, and that its composition could be based either on specific institutional positions, such as that of the President of the Court of Justice, or on the nomination of experts by each EU institution;deleted

Amendment 38 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

Amendment 39 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

Amendment 4 #

Jiří POSPÍŠIL

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Notes that within the EU institutions different legislative ~~measure~~and other provisions aimed at preventing conflicts of interest contain varying definitions of the term ‘conflict of interest’; believes therefore that the term should be uniformly understood to mean a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official, in which the public official has private- capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities; notes, however, that a definition of this kind has an evolving nature and that full transparency does not necessarily guarantee the absence of any which could improperly influence their activities and the decisions falling under their responsibility; notes that maximum transparency can help prevent conflicts of interest~~, nor does it guarantee public trust~~ and increase public trust in the proper performance of public administration;

Amendment 40 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Considers that for proper expertise to be acquired, the ~~future~~independent ethics body should have a permanent, independent and collegiate structure, and that its composition could be based ~~either~~ on specific institutional positions, such as that of the President of the Court of Justice, orand on the nomination of experts by each EU institution and relevant bodies such as the European Ombudsman, the OLAF, the European Court of Auditors, and on the participation of civil society organisations specialised in ethics, transparency and independence in public policy making;

Amendment 41 #

Stéphane SÉJOURNÉ, Karen MELCHIOR, Pascal DURAND, Javier NART

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Considers that for proper expertise to be acquired, the future ethics body should have a permanent, independent and collegiate ~~structure~~body, and that its composition could be based either on specific institutional positions, such as that of the President of the Court of Justice, or on the nomination or election of experts by each EU institution; further considers that the composition of the future ethics body should ensure gender equality and involve representatives of the civil society;

Amendment 42 #

Amendment 43 #

Jiří POSPÍŠIL

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Considers that for proper expertise to be acquired, the future ethics body should have a permanent, independent and collegiate structure, and that ~~its composition could be based either on specific institutional positions, such as that of the President~~the members of this body could include, on the one hand, persons in specific positions providing a guarantee of professionalism and independence, such as the position of judge of the Court of Justice, o~~r on the nomination of experts by each EU institution~~f the European Union, and, on the other hand, persons appointed by the European Parliament in view of their reputation for increasing transparency in public administration and for detecting and combating conflicts of interest;

Amendment 44 #

Gilles LEBRETON, Gunnar BECK, Jean-Paul GARRAUD

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Considers that for proper expertise to be acquired, the future ethics body should be given broad investigative powers and have a permanent, independent and collegiate structure, and that its composition could be based either on specific institutional positions, such as that of the President of the Court of Justice, or on the nomination of experts by each EU institution;

Amendment 45 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

Amendment 46 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6 a. Considers that the nomination by the Parliament of members of the independent ethics body should be done by a vote of the two third the plenary assembly;

Amendment 47 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 b (new)

6 b. Stresses that the composition of the independent ethics body should respect gender parity;

Amendment 48 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

Amendment 49 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. Underlines however that the assessment of the independence of Commissioner-designates remains a political and institutional competence of the European Parliament; Recommends therefore that, while fully keeping its competence on the matter, the Committee on Legal Affairs decide on the existence of a conflict of interest after having received apublic, non-binding, precise and motivated recommendations by such an independent expert advisory body; Considers that the Committee on Legal Affairs should ultimately hold a debate and vote on the recommendations issued by the independent ethics body; Stresses that this decision of the Committee on Legal Affairs should be publicly motivated and taken by roll-call vote;

Amendment 5 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Notes that within the EU institutions different legislative measures aimed at preventing conflicts of interest contain varying definitions of the term ‘conflict of interest’; believes therefore that the term should be understood to mean a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official, in which the public official has private- capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities; ~~notes, howev~~consider,s that a ~~definition of this kind has an evolving nature and that full transparency does not necessarily guarantee the absence of any conflict of interest, nor does it guarantee public trust~~pplying the highest transparency standards is the best way to restore citizens’ trust in EU institutions;

Amendment 50 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. Recommends therefore that, while fully keeping its competence on the matter, the Committee on Legal Affairs decide on the existence of a conflict of interest of Commissioner-designates after having received a non-binding recommendation by such an independent expert advisory body; insists that the body should also have the investigative powers to detect relevant conflicts of interests prior to, during and after public office or employment of all Union institutions, bodies,offices, and agencies; suggests the EU ethics body to be competent on declarations of interest, declarations of assets, conflicts of interest, gifts and lobby transparency rules;

Amendment 51 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. Recommends, therefore, that~~, while fully keeping its competence on the matter, the Committee on Legal Affairs decide on the existence of a conflict of interest after having received~~ the Committee on Legal Affairs should retain in full its exclusive power to decide whether a potential conflict of interests exists, and where there are reasonable and/or reasoned doubts, the Committee on Legal Affairs must be able to request a detailed report from a committee set up at its request at no~~n- binding recommendation by such an independent expert advisory body~~ cost to the budget and comprising EU officials with sufficient, proven knowledge in the area concerned;

Amendment 52 #

Stéphane SÉJOURNÉ, Karen MELCHIOR, Pascal DURAND, Javier NART

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. Recommends therefore that, while fully keeping its competence on the matter, the Committee on Legal Affairs decide on the existence of a conflict of interest after having received a non-binding recommendation by such an independent expert ~~advisory body;~~ body; considers that transparency requires the conclusions of investigations conducted and recommendations formulated by the future ethics body to be public;

Amendment 53 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. Recommends therefore that, while fully keeping its competence on the matter, the Committee on Legal Affairs decide on the existence of a conflict of interest after having received a non-binding recommendation by such an independent expert advisory body, which would have the effect of strengthening its action;

Amendment 54 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. Recommends therefore that, while fully keeping its competence on the matter, the Committee on Legal Affairs decide on the existence of a conflict of interest after having received a non-binding recommendation ~~by such an independent expert advisory body~~s from national ethics authorities;

Amendment 55 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7 a. Upholds that the ethics body should be able to take on concerns by stakeholders, including by whistle- blowers;

Amendment 56 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 b (new)

7 b. Questions the recent approval by the European Commission of former Commissioner Oettinger’s employment by the international consulting firm Kekst CNC, a consultancy firm whose biggest EU-lobbying client is Philip Morris International, the tenth post- Commissioner position of Mr. Oettinger which has been approved for in less than a year;

Amendment 57 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

Amendment 58 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

Amendment 59 #

Gilles LEBRETON, Gunnar BECK, Jean-Paul GARRAUD

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

8. Believes ~~furthermore that~~that, in parallel with its advisory functions in relation to potential conflicts of interests of Commissioner- designates, thise future ~~advisory~~EU ethics body cshould also be entrusted with the broader task of examining conflicts of interest within the EUuropean institutions and agencies in general, playing, in a complementary and balanced way, on the one hand a preventive role via awareness raising and ethical guidance powers, and on the ~~one hand, and a compliance role on the other.~~other hand a compliance role; considers in particular that the future ethics body should be granted autonomous investigatory and sanctioning powers as to potential conflicts of interest among Members and staff of EU institutions, bodies’ and agencies; considers that the future body’s mandate should include declarations of interest, declarations of assets, conflicts of interest, revolving door cases, gifts and entertainment as well as lobby transparency rules; considers that the future EU ethics body should unite all responsibilities of the existing ethics bodies in Parliament, Commission and all other participating EU institutions, bodies and agencies and replace them to avoid conflicts and to further consolidate the implementation of the respective rules striving for the highest ethical standards;

Amendment 6 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

Amendment 60 #

Stéphane SÉJOURNÉ, Karen MELCHIOR, Pascal DURAND, Javier NART

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

8. Believes furthermore that this future advisory body could also be entrusted with ~~the broader~~power to enforce attenuation measures, as well as bans and sanctions while exercising its task of examining conflicts of interest within the EU institutions and agencies in general, playing, in a complementary and balanced way, a preventive role via awareness raising and ethical guidance powers on the one hand, and a compliance and enforcement role on the other. ; suggests the new EU ethics body could replace existing ethics committees within EU institutions, to support a coherent implementation of the respective rules aiming for the strongest ethical standards;

Amendment 61 #

Jiří POSPÍŠIL

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

8. Believes furthermore that the mission of this future advisory body cshould also ~~be entrusted with the broader task of~~include examining conflicts of interest within the EU institutions and agencies in general, as well as among public officials at Member State level who are involved in the implementation of the budget under direct, indirect and shared management within the meaning of Article 61 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and that this body could play~~ing~~, in a complementary and balanced way, a preventive role via awareness raising and ethical guidance powers on the one hand, and a compliance role as regards conflicts of interest on the other.

Amendment 62 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

8. Believes furthermore that this future advisory body could also be entrusted with ~~the~~a broader ~~task of~~support role in order to examin~~ing~~e conflicts of interest within the EU institutions and agencies in general, including for Members of the European Parliament and senior officials, playing, in a complementary and balanced way, a preventive role via awareness raising and ethical guidance powers on the one hand, and a compliance role on the other.

Amendment 63 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

8. Believes furthermore that this future advisory body could also be entrusted with the broader task of examining conflicts of interest within the EU institutions and agencies in general, playing, in a complementary and balanced way, a preventive role via awareness raising and ethical guidance powersthat a better cooperation between the EU institutions trying to align their Code of conducts and ethical frameworks would increase public trust and raise the level onf t~~he one hand, and a compliance role o~~ransparency and integrity in the ~~other~~EU.

Amendment 64 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

8. Believes furthermore that this future advisory body could also be entrusted with the broader task of examining conflicts of interest within the EU institutions, including the European Parliament, and EU agencies in general, playing, in a complementary and balanced way, a preventive role via awareness raising and ethical guidance powers on the one hand, and a compliance role on the other.

Amendment 65 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8 a. Notes that the most acute challenges in the implementation of present rules for Members and staff of EU institutions, bodies and agencies exist as regards the management of disclosure requirements, as regards revolving-door cases and the management of conflicts of interest due to side-activities and memberships; Calls on the Commission to design the future EU ethics body as the competent instance for the substantial harmonisation and the centralised enforcement of the rules on transparency, ethics and conflicts of interest applicable to the staff of EU institutions, bodies and agencies, in order to more efficiently tackle the issue the ‘revolving doors’ and generally increase the level of transparency and integrity among Members and staff of EU institutions;

Amendment 66 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8 a. Notes that the fragmented administrative structure of the European Union has led to the development of different and uneven ethical standards and enforcement mechanisms across European institutions; Stresses that all European institutions and bodies should strive for the highest possible standards of transparency, accountability and integrity; Recommends that the future independent ethics body serves as an overarching supervisory body and works towards the harmonization of ethical standards while taking into account the specific nature and challenges of each institution;

Amendment 67 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Regrets the lack of professionalism on the part of some MEPs who, when the potential conflicts of interest of the current High Representative were being verified, took it upon themselves to provide their journalist friends with a live commentary on matters being discussed and decided upon during the debate in the Committee on Legal Affairs; takes a very dim view of the unscrupulous behaviour of the MEPs concerned, who were motivated solely by partisan interests and showed a glaring lack of decorum and professionalism;

Amendment 68 #

Stéphane SÉJOURNÉ, Karen MELCHIOR, Pascal DURAND, Javier NART

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8 a. Recalls that the Parliament may withdraw confidence from an individual Member of the Commission, after which the President of the Commission shall either require the resignation of that Member or explain his/her refusal to do so before Parliament in the following part-session, in line with point 5 of the Inter-Institutional Agreement of November 20th 2010.

Amendment 69 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Considers that the examination of conflicts of interest should be carried out on taking up a post, during the performance of the duties involved and on leaving a post; is of the opinion that such an examination should include the checking of statements made and compliance with the rules on transparency and lobbying the European institutions;

Amendment 7 #

Gilles LEBRETON, Gunnar BECK, Jean-Paul GARRAUD

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

Amendment 70 #

8a. Stresses, in particular, that this body should examine possible conflicts of interest of Commissioners throughout, and at the end of, their term of office;

Amendment 71 #

Stéphane SÉJOURNÉ, Karen MELCHIOR, Pascal DURAND, Javier NART

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 b (new)

8 b. Considers that the European Parliament should lead by example with regards to rules on ethics and their enforcement; Suggests that the future independent ethics body should we able to investigate breaches of ethics rules by Member of the European Parliament and impose appropriate sanctions, such as fines or the retention of allowances; Considers that the independent ethics body should be able to investigate on serious conflicts of interests arising in relation to a Member’s rapporteurship or shadow rapporteurship for specific files and take appropriate and effective decisions to redress litigious situations;

Amendment 72 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 b (new)

8b. Considers that an institutional culture based on prevention, support and transparency requires close cooperation with the various bodies and institutions subject to oversight; considers that, in due course, internal administrative services responsible for ethical issues could be replaced by contact points responsible for relations with the European ethics body;

Amendment 73 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 b (new)

8 b. Considers that the future ethics body could make use of its future powers to start an independent investigation on the links between the European Commission and among others the ‘Big Four’ audit, consultancy and accountancy companies, in order to avoid potential conflict of interests;

Amendment 74 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 c (new)

8 c. Believes that the ethics body should also be entrusted with the duty of examining conflicts of interests within the European institutions and with expert groups, advisory, facilitator and research bodies, playing a preventive role to avoid any conflicts of interests; considers that the ethics body should act as a guarantor of the general interest, especially regarding the implementation of the Green Deal, and should thus put in place particularly strong requirements when examining conflicts of interest involving fossil fuels companies;

Amendment 75 #

Stéphane SÉJOURNÉ, Karen MELCHIOR, Pascal DURAND, Javier NART

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 c (new)

8 c. Believes that the independent ethics body should control the independence and ethical conduct of EU civil servants both before, during and after they hold a position or an office within the EU institutions; stresses the importance of combating the phenomenon of revolving doors between public and private organisations; recommends the adoption of harmonized and adequate cooling-off periods across all EU institutions and reinforce the currently failing system of enforcement of those rules;

Amendment 76 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 c (new)

8c. Considers that such a body should have investigative powers, as well as the power to request and have access to administrative documents;

Amendment 77 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 d (new)

8 d. Calls for the establishment of a meaningful cooling-off period before joining EU institutions or bodies after a transition from a private company linked to the fossil fuels sector, and for a similar cooling-off period before joining a private company linked to the fossil fuels sector after a transition from the EU institutions or bodies; considers that the participation of fossil fuel companies and their representatives in EU policy-making activities should be strictly limited and subject to demanding monitoring requirements by the ethics body; underlines that the participation of fossil fuel companies or their representatives to advisory, facilitator or research body should not lead to any benefits for those companies, which could be considered as a conflict of interests; calls for full transparency regarding all meetings between fossil fuels companies or their representatives and public institutions and representatives; calls for a ban of events organized by fossil fuels companies or their representatives inside European institutions; recalls that BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell and Total collectively account for 7.4 % of global greenhouse gas emissions between 1988 and 20151a; further recalls that these companies spent 123,3 million euros between 2010 and 2018 to put pressure on the various European institutions, whereas their 13 lobbying companies have estimated their contribution at an additional 128 million euros; _________________ 1a https://corporateeurope.org/en/2019/10/bi g-oil-and-gas-buying-influence-brussels.

Amendment 78 #

Stéphane SÉJOURNÉ, Karen MELCHIOR, Pascal DURAND, Javier NART

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 d (new)

8 d. Considers that competent civil society organisations should be closely associated to the work of the independent ethics body; Recommends that the European Parliament appoints civil society organisations as permanent members of the independent ethics body; Considers that they should also support the work of the independent ethics body in an advisory capacity and be responsible for the publication of an annual report on the functioning of the independent ethics body that should be transmitted to the European Parliament and the European Commission;

Amendment 79 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 d (new)

8d. Considers that the consultation, prevention and support tasks of the future ethics body could be accompanied by the possibility of sanctions in order to ensure that its recommendations are followed up; considers that the publication or forwarding of recommendations and opinions could constitute a form of sanction in itself; stresses that such a body should not replace the CJEU;

Amendment 8 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Notes the multitude of existing legal approaches to the meaning and applicability of the concept of conflict of interest; draws attention to the pressing concern of the EU institutions to optimise the effectiveness of standards and rules governing ethics and transparency, giving less attention to the implications and importance of conflicts of interest; expresses its concern in this connection regarding the uncertainty surrounding the appropriate regulatory mechanism, the unpredictable effectiveness of deterrents and sanctions, the dubious efficacy of existing regulations and the need to introduce other political, behavioural and economic instruments;

Amendment 80 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 e (new)

8 e. Considers that companies convicted for environmental crimes should not be allowed to benefit from any of the measures foreseen for registrants into the transparency register; suggests, to this end, to revise the scope and the code of conduct of the transparency register in order to include provisions on the removal from it of companies convicted for environmental crimes;

Amendment 81 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 e (new)

8 e. Stresses that it is of utmost importance that the independent ethics body is given the possibility to start investigations on its own initiative;

Amendment 82 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 f (new)

8 f. Calls on all EU institutions to make meetings of their staff working on policy drafting or policy implementation with interest representatives conditional upon their inscription in the EU Transparency Register;

Amendment 83 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 f (new)

8 f. Recommends the creation of an internal and confidential complaint mechanism for European public officers to raise concerns about potential breaches of existing rules without fearing retaliation;

Amendment 84 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 g (new)

8 g. Stresses that the independent ethics body should be accessible to legitimate external stakeholders; Recommends the creation of a mechanism to allow for the submission of concerns by external stakeholders including individuals and civil society organizations;

Amendment 85 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 h (new)

8 h. Recommends the adoption of a specific complaint mechanism for designated civil society organizations, as well as the obligation for the independent ethics body to examine these submissions without delay and motivate any decision taken in their regard;

Amendment 86 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 i (new)

8 i. Stresses that the combat against fraud, corruption, maladministration or misuse of public funds are distinct, although sometimes related, to the control of ethical issues in the EU institutions; Consequently underlines that the creation of an independent ethics body must not lead to the undue suppression or restriction of other existing bodies that supervise the good administration of the European Union;

Amendment 87 #

Stéphane SÉJOURNÉ, Karen MELCHIOR, Pascal DURAND, Javier NART

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 j (new)

8 j. Considers that, for the purpose creating an ethics body “common to all EU institutions”, in line with the mission letter of the Vice-President of the European Commission for Values and Transparency, it is necessary to amend the treaties of the European Union;

Amendment 9 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Notes that the European institutions have a fragmented approach to the prevention of conflicts of interest and that each institution applies its own rules; considers that the establishment of a new ethics body could contribute to a harmonised interpretation of existing rules and to strengthening their implementation;

source: 661.820

2021/02/05 CONT 129 amendments...

Amendment 1 #

Ibán GARCÍA DEL BLANCO, Cristina MAESTRE MARTÍN DE ALMAGRO, Marc ANGEL, Sylvie GUILLAUME, Massimiliano SMERIGLIO, Demetris PAPADAKIS, Domènec RUIZ DEVESA

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Stresses that transparency, accountability and integrity are key components in promoting ethics principles within the EU, ~~and~~ are essential to protect the EU budget from fraud and corruption, and to maintain democratic legitimacy; recalls that ~~corruption has serious financial consequences~~unethical behaviours have negative financial consequences, may result in reputational damage to the image of the EU and its institutions, and constitutes a serious threat to democracy, the rule of law and the public in~~vestmen~~terest; re~~call~~marks that ~~conflicts of interest can significantly damage the EU’s financial interests and decision-making process~~the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development defines public integrity as the alignment of, and adherence to, shared ethical values, principles, and ~~should therefore be prevented and condemned~~norms for upholding and prioritising the public interest over private interests in the public sector;

Amendment 1 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph -1 (new)

-1. Welcomes the commitment taken by the European Commission before the European Parliament for the establishment of an independent EU ethics body;

Amendment 10 #

Ramona STRUGARIU, Olivier CHASTEL, Gilles BOYER, Alin MITUȚA, Katalin CSEH

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Emphasises that the high level of fragmentation in the ethics legal framework and the lack of oversight have prevented the proper implementation of codes of conduct in EU institutions; believes that the current self-regulatory approach is not fit for purpose and cannot guarantee integrity; highlights that public officials are not in a position to self-assess ethical situations or conflicts of interest, and that this assessment should fall under the remit of an independent specialised third party; underlines the need to enhance the integrity of the EU institutions and restore public trust;

Amendment 10 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1 a. Highlights that the EU institutions should lead by example regarding transparency, accountability and integrity; notes there are lessons to take from the management of the current COVID-19 crisis and especially the vaccination agreements, which eventually hampered citizens’ trust on the European Institutions; urges the Commission to take specific measures to secure the highest transparency standards adequately, timely and throughout all the stages of the decision procedures in the future, even if emergency procedures are followed; in this context, welcomes the establishment of an independent Ethics Body or the development of any existing body to an independent ethics coordination authority;

Amendment 11 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Emphasises that the high level of fragmentation in the ethics legal framework and regarding sanctions and the lack of oversight have prevented the proper implementation of codes of conduct in EU institutions; believes that the current self-regulatory approach is not fit for purpose and cannot guarantee integrity; underlines the need to enhance the integrity of the EU institutions and restore public trust;

Amendment 11 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1 a. Highlights that over the recent years multiple cases of unethical behaviours and breaches of the rules remained unsanctioned, confirming that the current EU ethics oversight system continues to be affected by severe shortcomings and inconsistencies;

Amendment 12 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Encourages the creation of an Independent Ethics Body (IEB) common to all EU institutions; welcomes the fact that the Commission has made it a priority, and is committed to supporting the IEB’s effort to establish a common ethical framework at EU level; initiatives to create a Commissioner’s statute and to ensure aligned rules across EU agencies and other EU organs; asks the President and the Bureau of the European Parliament to identify in cooperation with the other institutions common areas as well as particular circumstances requiring a differentiated approach with the goal to strengthen their integrity; welcomes the fact that the Commission has made it a priority, and is committed to supporting this idea together through a common ethical framework that is respectful of the particularities of each institution as well as the institutional balance and democratic role of each institution and its members as established by the Treaties; reminds that the principle of separation of power is the foundation pillar of modern democracy; considers it imperative for the legislative to control the executive, as any reversal of the roles and powers of the legislative and executive would otherwise endanger the independence of the free mandate of elected Members of Parliament;

Amendment 12 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1 b. Notes that the proposed Ethics Body or any existing body to be further developed to an independent ethics coordination authority should pay special attention to monitoring institutions and agreements where there is the greatest risk of deviating from transparency, agreements with financial transaction higher than a certain amount or agreements and contracts of the EU institutions relating with public health and safety;

Amendment 13 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. ~~Encourages~~Reflects on the creation of an Independent Ethics Body (IEB) common to all EU institutions; ~~welcom~~acknowledges the fact that the Commission has made it a priority, and is committed to supporting the ~~IEB’s~~ effort to establish a common ethical framework at EU level; remarks that improving and harmonising the existing ethic frameworks and their effective implementation don’t rely exclusively upon the creation of the IEB; considers it to be of utmost importance, prior to the elaboration of a legislative proposal to create an IEB, to perform a thorough cost-benefit analysis and an impact assessment, including different scenarios competence-wise; highlights that the objective is to protect the EU budget from unethical behaviours while maintaining the highest standards of ethics and integrity among a diverse and large number of EU institutions and bodies, and contemplates a range of options to reach this objective;

Amendment 13 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 c (new)

1 c. Calls on the Commission to consider specific measures to ensure that highest standards of transparency, accountability and integrity are horizontally embedded in all the EU procedures and across the EU institutions in a coordinated manner; therefore, welcomes the establishment of an independent Ethics Body with the authority to verify certain transparency standards of agreements and proceed to cancellations where needed as well as to monitor and control procedures, persons and bodies, and impose sanctions where needed; suggests that the role of ethics coordinator with the above mentioned authorities should be assigned to one of the existing bodies of the EU, in case no Ethics Body is established;

Amendment 14 #

Ramona STRUGARIU, Olivier CHASTEL, Gilles BOYER, Alin MITUȚA, Katalin CSEH

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

Amendment 14 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 d (new)

1 d. Calls on the Commission to take further and specific measures in order to strengthen transparency and integrity in all agreements of EU bodies relevant with financing and budgets; suggests to include, under the authority of the Ethics Body or another independent ethics coordination authority, all EU decision- making procedures relevant with EU public spending, funding or getting any provision supplies and financially relevant transactions;

Amendment 15 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Sees high potential for the EU institutions to transfer administrative decision-making competences to the IEB based on a new harmonised ethics framework that it will establish, which should include common rules on the publication of declarations of interests,Encourages a creation of clear rules on the avoidance of conflicts of interest ~~and rev~~s, coolving doors, acceptance of gifts and entertainment, protection of whistle- blowers and victims of harassment, transparency of lobby meetings, public procurement and meeting calendars of senior staff, and use of transparent bank accounts for public fund-off periods, undue interference on political decisions, rules of publication, direct and indirect gifts, protection of whistle-blowers and victims;

Amendment 15 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Underlines the particular interest that citizens have for transparency and integrity in the functioning of the EU institutions as revealed by a number of petitions received by the Committee on Petitions that call for ~~more~~full transparency1 , in ~~particular in~~, inter alia, the decision-making of the Council and its contacts with lobbyists; raises its concerns over the appointment procedures of EU senior officials2 and over ~~alleged~~the handling of conflicts of interests of Commissioners and breaches of MEPs’ code of conduct3 ~~; not~~and over checks on transparency obligations and the verification of compliance with revolving doors rules; underlines also that, as in previous years, the majority of inquiries closed by the European Ombudsman in 2019 concerned transparency and accountability, including public access to information and documents; _________________ 1Petitions Nos 0134/2019, 0939/2018, 0161/2017, 1367/2015, 0696/2015, 0698/2013. 2Petitions Nos 0224/2018 and 0799/2018, 0799/2018. 3Petitions Nos 0742/2017, 1004/2016, 2485/2014, 1984/2014.

Amendment 16 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Sees high potential but also important risks for the EU institutions to transfer administrative decision-making competences to the IEB based on a new harmonised ethics framework ~~that it will establish, which~~, which nevertheless should include common rules on the publication of declarations of interests, avoidance of conflicts of interest and revolving doors, acceptance of gifts and entertainment, protection of whistle- blowers and victims of harassment, transparency of lobby meetings, public procurement and meeting calendars of senior staff, and use of transparent bank accounts for public funds, while taking into consideration the different work performed by the institutions as well as the risks inherent to their members’ specific duties;

Amendment 16 #

Gianna GANCIA, Markus BUCHHEIT, Mara BIZZOTTO, Stefania ZAMBELLI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Underlines the particular interest that citizens have for transparency and integrity in the functioning of the EU institutions as revealed by a number of petitions received by the Committee on Petitions that call for more transparency1 , in particular in the decision-making of the Council and its contacts with lobbyists; raises its concerns over the appointment procedures of EU senior officials2 and over alleged conflicts of interests of Commissioners and breaches of MEPs’ code of conduct3 ; nNotes also that, as in previous years, the majority of inquiries closed by the European Ombudsman in 2019 concerned transparency and accountability, including public access to information and documents; _________________ 1Petitions Nos 0134/2019, 0939/2018, 0161/2017, 1367/2015, 0696/2015, 0698/2013. 2Petitions Nos 0224/2018 and 0799/2018, 0799/2018. 3Petitions Nos 0742/2017, 1004/2016, 2485/2014, 1984/2014.highlights that democracy, transparency and integrity presuppose openness and inclusiveness; suggests that all EU websites and documents, with a special focus on transparency-sensitive documents, should be timely available in all official EU languages;

Amendment 17 #

Ramona STRUGARIU, Olivier CHASTEL, Alin MITUȚA, Gilles BOYER, Katalin CSEH

5. Sees high potential for the EU institutions to transfer administrative decision-making competences to the IEB based on a new harmonised ethics framework that it will establish, which should include common rules on the content and publication of declarations of interests, avoidance of conflicts of interest and revolving doors, acceptance of gifts and entertainment, protection of whistle- blowers and victims of harassment, transparency of lobby meetings, public procurement and meeting calendars of senior staff, and use of transparent bank accounts for public funds;

Amendment 17 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Underlines the particular interest that citizens have for transparency and integrity in the functioning of the EU institutions as revealed by a number of petitions received by the Committee on Petitions that call for more transparency1 , in particular in the decision-making of the Council and its contacts with lobbyists; raises its concerns over the appointment procedures of EU senior officials2 and over alleged conflicts of interests of Commissioners and breaches of MEPs’ code of conduct3 ; notes also that, as in previous years, the majority of inquiries closed by the European Ombudsman in 2019 concerned transparency and accountability, including public access to information and documents; stresses also the importance of remaining vigilant about the revolving doors phenomenon; _________________ 1Petitions Nos 0134/2019, 0939/2018, 0161/2017, 1367/2015, 0696/2015, 0698/2013. 2Petitions Nos 0224/2018 and 0799/2018, 0799/2018. 3Petitions Nos 0742/2017, 1004/2016, 2485/2014, 1984/2014.

Amendment 18 #

Gianna GANCIA, Markus BUCHHEIT, Mara BIZZOTTO, Stefania ZAMBELLI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Considers that establishing the new ethics body should result in the individual EU institutions taking a horizontal approach to disadvantaged persons, enabling compliance with the principles of equality of opportunity and treatment to be guaranteed by all the institutions; stresses that the main priorities of the independent ethics body must include ensuring equal rights for persons with disabilities and other disadvantaged persons in the operation of the EU institutions;

Amendment 18 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Underlines the particular interest that citizens have for transparency and integrity in the functioning of the EU institutions as revealed by a number of petitions received by the Committee on Petitions that call for more transparency1 , in particular in the decision-making of the Council and its contacts with lobbyists and stakeholders; raises its concerns over the appointment procedures of EU senior officials2 and over alleged conflicts of interests of Commissioners and breaches of MEPs’ code of conduct3 ; notes also that, as in previous years, the majority of inquiries closed by the European Ombudsman in 2019 concerned transparency and accountability, including public access to information and documents; _________________ 1Petitions Nos 0134/2019, 0939/2018, 0161/2017, 1367/2015, 0696/2015, 0698/2013. 2Petitions Nos 0224/2018 and 0799/2018, 0799/2018. 3Petitions Nos 0742/2017, 1004/2016, 2485/2014, 1984/2014.

Amendment 19 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. ~~Believes that empowering the IEB with the current internal ethics functions of~~Reminds that the Treaties of the European Union are the primary law and reside at the top of the hierarchy of norms; the Treaties establish the EU’s institutions ~~will concentrate expertise, create synergies and hence improve the implementation~~and clearly define their competences and decision-making powers (Article 13 TEU); Parliament together with the Council are the co-legislators (Article 14(1) TEU); reminds that under the Treaties, the Court of Justice of the European Union is the supreme judicial body of eth~~ics rules; is confident~~e EU(Article 19 TEU); there can be no higher judicial decision-making authority above it; under no circumstances can secondary law contradict or amend primary law; reminds that, th~~is transfer of competence will represent considerable savings for the EU budget~~erefore, the establishment of an independent ethics body with the power to make binding decisions on the EU’s institutions and organs counter to the separation of powers laid down in the Treaties, would imperatively require a change of the Treaties;

Amendment 19 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Underlines the particular interest that citizens have for transparency and integrity in the functioning of the EU institutions as revealed by a number of petitions received by the Committee on Petitions that call for more transparency1, in particular in the decision-making of the Council and its contacts with lobbyists; raises its concerns over the appointment procedures of EU senior and top officials2 and over alleged conflicts of interests of Commissioners and breaches of MEPs’ code of conduct3; notes also that, as in previous years, the majority of inquiries closed by the European Ombudsman in 2019 concerned transparency and accountability, including public access to information and documents; ~~_________________ 1 0161/2017, 1367/2015, 0696/2015, 0698/2013. 2~~Petitions Nos 022134/201~~8 and 0799/2018, 0799/2018. 3Petitions Nos 0742/2017, 1004/2016, 2485/2014, 1984/2014.~~9, 0939/2018,

Amendment 2 #

Ramona STRUGARIU, Olivier CHASTEL, Alin MITUȚA, Gilles BOYER, Katalin CSEH

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Stresses that transparency, accountability and integrity are key components in promoting ethics principles within the EU, and are essential to protect the EU budget from fraud and corruption and to maintain democratic legitimacy as well as public trust in the EU; recalls that corruption has serious financial consequences and constitutes a serious threat to democracy, the rule of law and public investment; recalls that conflicts of interest can significantly damage the EU’s financial interests and decision-making processes, and should therefore be prevented and condemned;

Amendment 2 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Emphasises that the highest standards of transparency and integrity in the EU institutions are essential to enabling citizens to fully exercise their democratic right to participate in the EU’s decision- making process and thus to enhancing the democratic legitimacy and credibility of the Union while restoring confidence in the European integration process; recalls that, in her Political Guidelines for the 2019- 2024 Commission, the President of the Commission committed to work for the creation of an independent ethics body common to all EU institutions and stressed that if citizens were to have faith in the EU, its institutions should be open and beyond reproach on ethics, transparency and integrity; recalls that the right to petition must be enhanced providesing citizens with the mobest ~~accessible way~~support in order to enter into and maintain a direct dialogue with representatives from the EU institutions ~~and~~with a view to solving problems affecting them, thus contributesing to improving openness, responsiveness and accountability while bridging the gap between citizens and EU institutions;

Amendment 20 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Believes that empowering the IEB with the current internal ethics functions of the EU institutions will concentrate expertise, create synergies and hence improve the implementation of ethics rules, requiring public officials always to act for the good of society through the sound management of public funds and legal, fair and transparent decision making; is confident that this transfer of competence will represent considerable savings for the EU budget;

Amendment 20 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2 a. Notes that although there has been some relevant improvement, according to the EU survey in EU citizenship, there is still the need to work with a special focus on citizens’ information and awareness on the ways they may use in order to exercise their democratic rights; stresses that already in-place channels for citizens to participate in the EU decision-making, such as the right of petition to the European Parliament, recourse to the European Ombudsman, or public consultations, need to improve in terms of visibility, accessibility, inclusiveness and coordination; suggests that the establishment of an independent Ethics Body or the further development of any other existing independent ethics coordination authority should also serve as a central coordination portal of all channels of citizen’s participation in the EU decision-making; suggests that the inauguration of the Ethics Body or of any other existing independent ethics coordination authority under further development should facilitate relevant awareness raising with specific communication measures; calls on the Commission to prioritize citizens’ access to information on the Union’s activities in its external communication strategy;

Amendment 21 #

Stefania ZAMBELLI, Gianna GANCIA, Mara BIZZOTTO

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Believes that ~~empowering the IEB with the current internal ethics functions of the EU institutions will~~the IEB could concentrate expertise, create synergies and hence improve the implementation of ethics rules~~; is confident that this transfer of competence will represent considerable savings for the EU budget~~ without requiring a transfer of competences;

Amendment 21 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Stresses the need to ensure greater transparency regarding European Union agencies, especially with regard to their remit, activities and funding; regrets the recent scandals involving the European Economic and Social Committee; calls, therefore, for all EU agencies and advisory committees, which often elude democratic control, to meet higher standards of transparency and integrity;

Amendment 22 #

Mario FURORE, Fabio Massimo CASTALDO

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. Underlines that the ~~IEB should be in charge of prevention, monitoring, investigation and enforcement of the ethical framework for the protection of the EU’s financial interests; highlights that the IEB s~~creation of a common ethics framework must respect the boundaries of competence of the EU’s institutions and the separation of power as defined in the Treaties; emphasises the need to respect and uphould ~~be able to take disciplinary measures and impose financial sanctions in order to avoid abuse of the EU budget linked to unethical behaviour~~the rule of law and to ensure that the common ethical framework is soundly based on the fundamental legal basis of the Treaties and the respect for rule of law in its implementation;

Amendment 22 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Considers it essential for documentation relating to agreements with pharmaceutical companies for COVID-19 vaccines to contain a clause that requires their essential provisions to be made public;

Amendment 23 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. Underlines that the IEB shcould ~~be in charge of~~provide knowledge and guidance about prevention, monitoring, investigation and enforcement of the ethical framework for the protection of the EU’s financial interests; ~~highlights~~contemplates the possibility that the IEB shwould be able to ~~take~~recommend disciplinary measures and ~~impose~~ financial sanctions in order to avoid abuse of the EU budget linked to unethical behaviour; calls for the IEB, as the case may be, to assess the implementation and compliance of ethics rules by the EU institutions and publish an annual report on its findings;

Amendment 23 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 b (new)

2 b. Suggests to include on the annual regular function of the proposed Ethics Body or of any other existing independent ethics coordination authority under further development of a scheduled and systematic conduct of evaluation assessments, where citizens may give their input and evaluate the available channels and procedures for their participation in EU dialogues and decision-making;

Amendment 24 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. Underlines that the IEB should be in charge of prevention, monitoring, investigation and enforcement of the ethical framework for the protection of the EU’s financial interests; highlights that the IEB should be able to take disciplinary measures and impose ~~financial~~ sanctions in order to avoid abuse of the EU budget linked to unethical behaviour; stresses that the IEB must heighten staff awareness of the ethical framework provisions and the ethical culture in the EU institutions so as to prevent fraud and corruption;

Amendment 24 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 c (new)

2 c. Stresses that a change in rules and practices such as the establishment of an independent Ethic Body at EU level or the further development of any existing body to an independent ethics coordination authority should have in place open procedures in order to take into account the opinion of citizens and Citizens’ Society;

Amendment 25 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. Underlines that the IEB should be in charge of prevention, monitoring~~, investigation~~ and enforcement of the ethical framework for the protection of the EU’s financial interests; ~~highlights that the IEB should be able to take disciplinary measures and impose financial sanctions in order to avoid abuse of the EU budget linked to unethical behaviour;~~

Amendment 25 #

Ramona STRUGARIU, Katalin CSEH

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 d (new)

2 d. Suggests in the context of the function of the Ethics Body or of any other existing independent ethics coordination authority under further development, the establishment of scheduled and regular public hearings on citizens’ dialogues and citizens’ participation in the EU decision-making, where citizens, stakeholders and Citizens’ Society representatives may take the floor and express their views on measures to improve civic engagement in the EU decision making;

Amendment 26 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. Underlines that the IEB should be in charge of prevention, monitoring, investigation and enforcement of the common ethical framework for the protection of the EU’s financial interests; highlights that the IEB should be able to take disciplinary measures and impose financial sanctions, and not only issue recommendations, in order to avoid abuse of the EU budget linked to unethical behaviour;

Amendment 26 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 e (new)

2 e. Suggests, along with the establishment of the Ethics Body or of any other existing independent ethics coordination authority under further development, to proceed to the design of an EU Civic Participation Strategy, including an action plan and a media plan; suggests the setting of specific aims and measurable goals for such a strategy, including quotas to secure gender balance and overall representation of the diversity of European society; suggests the setting of long-term goals; highlights the importance of an ultimate goal to increase citizens’ participation in the European elections;

Amendment 27 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Highlights that tasks transferred to the IEB can go beyond those currently exercised by the institutions; calls for the IEB to assess the implementation of ethics rules by~~Reminds that currently all institutions and EU bodies have their own set of ethics rules in place, where the final discretion on decisions and interpretation of the rules commonly rests with the respective presidents; emphasises the need of the support of each institution involved for the common framework to be effective; underlines that it would be desirable for the EU institutions ~~and publish an annual~~ to generally align their ethics rules where po~~rt on its findings~~ssible and identify areas for a harmonised approach;

Amendment 27 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 f (new)

2 f. Suggests the conduct of scientific social research in order to explore the parameters suggested by citizens and the Citizen’s Society that the Commission should focus on in order to improve civic participation in the EU decision- making,including the establishment of the independent Ethics Body or the further development of any other existing body to an independent ethics coordination authority;

Amendment 28 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Highlight~~Warns that ~~tasks~~ transfer~~red~~ing tasks to the IEB ~~can go~~ beyond those currently exercised by the institutions; c~~alls for the IEB to assess the implementation of ethics rules by the EU institutions and publish an annual report on its finding~~ould create a serious breach of the Treaties;

Amendment 28 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Stresses that athe highest level of transparency of the legislative process is essential to enabling citizens to hold their elected representatives and governments accountable; reiterates, therefore, its call on the Council to improve its rules and practices on transparency of its legislative process in line with the recommendations of the European Ombudsman, which have been overwhelmingly supported by Parliament in its resolution of 17 January 2019 on the Ombudsman’s strategic inquiry OI/2/2017 on the transparency of legislative discussions in the preparatory bodies of the Council of the EU4 , which was based on the joint report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the Committee on Petitions; ~~_________________ 4~~urges the EU Institutions to provide timely and fully transparent access to the public during all preparatory stages of the legislative and other documents and processes; suggests that legislative discussions should be on live web stream and the relevant minutes made available to the general public as soon as possible and shortly after the proceedings; Texts adopted, P8_TA(2019)0045.

Amendment 29 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Highlights that tasks transferred to the IEB can go beyond those currently exercised by the institutions; c~~Calls for the IEB to assess the implementation of ethics rules by the EU institutions and publish an annual report on its findings;

Amendment 29 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Stresses that ~~a high level of~~full transparency ofin the legislative process is essential to enabling citizens to hold their elected representatives and governments accountable; reiterates, therefore, its call on the Council to improve its rules and practices on transparency of its legislative process in line with the recommendations of the European Ombudsman, which have been overwhelmingly supported by Parliament in its resolution of 17 January 2019 on the Ombudsman’s strategic inquiry OI/2/2017 on the transparency of legislative discussions in the preparatory bodies of the Council of the EU4 , which was based on the joint report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the Committee on Petitions; _________________ 4 Texts adopted, P8_TA(2019)0045.

Amendment 3 #

Stefania ZAMBELLI, Gianna GANCIA, Mara BIZZOTTO

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Stresses that transparency, accountability professionalism and integrity are key components in promoting ethics principles within the EU, and are essential to protect the EU budget from fraud and corruption and to maintain democratic legitimacy; recalls that corruption has serious financial consequences and constitutes a serious threat to democracy, the rule of law and public investment; recalls that conflicts of interest can significantly damage the EU’s financial interests and decision-making processes, and should therefore be prevented, investigated and condemned;

Amendment 3 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Emphasises that high standards of transparency and integrity in the EU institutions are essential to enabling citizens to exercise their democratic right to participate in the EU’s decision-making process and thus to enhancing the democratic legitimacy and credibility of the Union ~~while restoring confidence in the European integration process~~; recalls that, in her Political Guidelines for the 2019-2024 Commission, the President of the Commission stressed that if citizens were to have faith in the EU, its institutions should be open and beyond reproach on ethics, transparency and integrity; recalls that the right to petition provides citizens with the most accessible way to enter into and maintain a direct dialogue with representatives from the EU institutions and thus contributes to improving openness, responsiveness and accountability while bridging the gap between citizens and EU institutions;

Amendment 30 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

8. Highlights that tasks transferred to the IEB can go beyond those currently exercised by the institutions; calls for the IEB to assess the implementation of ethics rules by the EU institutions ~~and~~, publish an annual report on its findings and recommendations and present it to Parliament;

Amendment 30 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Stresses that a high level of transparency of the legislative process is essential to enabling citizens to hold their elected representatives and governments accountable; reiterates, therefore, its call on the Council to improve its rules and practices on transparency of its legislative process in line with the recommendations of the European Ombudsman, which have been overwhelmingly supported by Parliament in its resolution of 17 January 2019 on the Ombudsman’s strategic inquiry OI/2/2017 on the transparency of legislative discussions in the preparatory bodies of the Council of the EU4 , which was based on the joint report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the Committee on Petitions; recalls that transparency and accountability, as well as communication with EU bodies, must also be accessible for people with disabilities; _________________ 4 Texts adopted, P8_TA(2019)0045.

Amendment 31 #

9. Calls for the ~~IEB~~EU bodies to lead by example on transparency by publishing all relevant decisions ~~and spending in a machine- readable open data format available to all citizens; strongly recommends that~~in accordance with the applicable data-protection rules anyd software developed for upholding the ethical standards in EU public administration should be made available under a free and open-source software licence and should be shared with any institution in Europe wishing to use itpending in a machine-readable open data format available to all citizens;

Amendment 31 #

Ioan-Rareş BOGDAN

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Stresses that a high level of transparency of the legislative process is essential to enabling citizens to hold their elected representatives and governments accountable; reiterates, therefore, its call on the Council to align its working methods with the standards of a parliamentary and participatory democracy as required under the Treaties and to improve its rules and practices on transparency of its legislative process in line with the recommendations of the European Ombudsman, which have been overwhelmingly supported by Parliament in its resolution of 17 January 2019 on the Ombudsman’s strategic inquiry OI/2/2017 on the transparency of legislative discussions in the preparatory bodies of the Council of the EU4 , which was based on the joint report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the Committee on Petitions; _________________ 4 Texts adopted, P8_TA(2019)0045.

Amendment 32 #

Ramona STRUGARIU, Marie-Pierre VEDRENNE, Jordi CAÑAS, Ulrike MÜLLER, Maite PAGAZAURTUNDÚA, Vlad GHEORGHE

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9

9. Calls for the IEB to lead by example on transparency by publishing all decisions and spending in a machine- readable open data format available to all citizens; strongly recommends that any software developed for upholding the ethical standards in EU public administration should be made available under a free and open-source software licence and should be shared with any institution in Europe wishing to use it;

Amendment 32 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Stresses that a high level of transparency of the legislative process is essential to enabling citizens to hold their elected representatives and governments accountable; reiterates, therefore, its call on the Council to improve its rules and practices on transparency of its legislative process in line with the recommendations of the European Court of Auditors and the European Ombudsman, which have been overwhelmingly supported by Parliament in its resolution of 17 January 2019 on the Ombudsman’s strategic inquiry OI/2/2017 on the transparency of legislative discussions in the preparatory bodies of the Council of the EU4 , which was based on the joint report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the Committee on Petitions; _________________ 4 Texts adopted, P8_TA(2019)0045. 4

Amendment 33 #

Ramona STRUGARIU, Marie-Pierre VEDRENNE, Jordi CAÑAS, Ulrike MÜLLER, Maite PAGAZAURTUNDÚA, Vlad GHEORGHE

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9

9. Calls for the IEB to lead by example on transparency by publishing all drec~~ision~~ommendations, annual reports and spending in a machine- readable open data format available to all citizens; strongly recommends that any software developed for upholding the ethical standards in EU public administration should be made available under a free and open-source software licence and should be shared with any institution in Europe wishing to use it; calls for a close cooperation with the European Data Protection Supervisor on this regard;

Amendment 33 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3 a. Stresses that the current self- regulatory ethical framework has proven insufficient, has led to a fragmented approach and to different ethical standards within the different EU institutions; highlights that in order to restore and maintain high levels of confidence in the EU institutions, all EU institutions must abide by the highest ethical standards; recalls in this respect the recommendations of the European Court of Auditors concerning the establishment and implementation of a common ethical framework for all EU institutions;

Amendment 34 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 10

10. Welcomes the signing of an interinstitutional agreement (IIA) between EU institutions to set up the IEB; emphasises the importance of the Council, including the Member States’ representatives working in the Council, joining the IIA in view of the ECA’s and European Ombudsman’s repeated requests to enhance the institution’s working ethics and transparency; recalls the obligation of the Council to deal with high-level conflicts of interest, revolving doors and lobby transparency rules; Underlines that with the creation of a new advisory ethics body for the Parliament, duplication of work and overlapping competences should be avoided, its decisions should take the form of non-binding recommendations to the President, who must remain in charge of the final decision-making power; calls for clear provisions giving the Person concerned a right of appeal against any such decision taken by the President in fully respect of the basic principles of rule of law; underlines that respect for the peculiarity of parliamentary work requires that this body be composed of current and former Members of the Parliament being knowledgeable about Parliaments rules of procedures and in accordance with Parliament’s rules of procedure on geographical, political and gender balance, and potentially supplemented with former Members of the Court of Justice of the EU or national Courts of highest instance;

Amendment 34 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3 a. Highlights that MEPs and senior officials of the EU institutions should lead by example regarding transparency, accountability and integrity; suggests the strengthening of the measures to prevent incidents of revolving doors and conflicts of interests; in this regard, suggests for a common framework and definition of conflict of interest and revolving doors to be used in all EU institutions;

Amendment 35 #

Mario FURORE, Fabio Massimo CASTALDO

Draft opinion
Paragraph 10

10. ~~Welcomes~~Considers that the creation of the IEB, as the case may be, should be accompanied by the signing of an interinstitutional agreement (IIA) between EU institutions to set up the IEB; emphasises the importance of the Council, including the Member States’ representatives working in the Council, joining the IIA in view of the ECA’s and European Ombudsman’s repeated requests to enhance the institution’s working ethics and transparency; recalls the obligation of the Council to deal with high-level conflicts of interest, revolving doors and lobby transparency rules;

Amendment 35 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Considers it essential to make the transparency register mandatory for all EU institutions and agencies, in order to facilitate public scrutiny and enable individual citizens and other interest groups to monitor the activities of lobbyists and their impact on decisions and legislation;

Amendment 36 #

Ramona STRUGARIU, Marie-Pierre VEDRENNE, Jordi CAÑAS, Maite PAGAZAURTUNDÚA, Vlad GHEORGHE

Draft opinion
Paragraph 10

10. ~~Welcom~~Encourages the signing of an interinstitutional agreement (IIA) between EU institutions to set up the IEB; emphasises the importance of the Council, ~~including the Member States’ representatives working in the Council,~~ joining the IIA in view of the ECA’s and European Ombudsman’s repeated requests to enhance the institution’s working ethics and transparency; recalls the obligation of the Council to deal with high-level conflicts of interest, revolving doors and lobby transparency rules;

Amendment 36 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 b (new)

3 b. Underlines that public officials are not in a position to self-declare themselves out of conflict of interest or to provide self-assessment with regards to respecting ethical standards; highlights that this task should fall under the competence of an independent specialised third party, in the form of an Independent Ethics Body (IEB) for all the EU institutions, agencies, bodies and offices;

Amendment 37 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 10

Amendment 37 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Considers that the EU institutions should apply the highest ethical standards to prevent any episodes of revolving doors and any conflicts of interests, also with regard to the appointments to senior positions in the EU institutions and agencies; notes that in cases where ethical standards are proven as inadequate, there should be sanctions imposed, varying from soft to severe sanctions, depending on the offense and according to a framework of sanctions with specific rules and procedures; expresses its concern that any such episodes, even if legally admissible, are undermining the overall credibility of the EU institutions and ~~often used by anti- European propaganda as a means of introducing euro-scepticism to the public~~citizen’s trust on the EU institutions;

Amendment 38 #

Gianna GANCIA, Markus BUCHHEIT, Mara BIZZOTTO, Stefania ZAMBELLI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 11

11. Stresses the importance of enhanced mutual cooperation between the ~~IEB and~~ EU bodies such as the European Anti- Fraud Office (OLAF), the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), the European Ombudsman, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) and others within their respective mandates, and of such cooperation generating a steady information exchange.

Amendment 38 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

Amendment 39 #

Ramona STRUGARIU, Marie-Pierre VEDRENNE, Jordi CAÑAS, Maite PAGAZAURTUNDÚA, Vlad GHEORGHE

Draft opinion
Paragraph 11

11. Stresses the importance of ~~enhanced mutual~~having a clear division of tasks and a close cooperation between ~~the IEB and~~ EU bodies such as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), the European Ombudsman, the European Court of Auditors (ECA), the IEB if applicable and others within their respective mandates, and of such cooperation generating a steady information exchange.; warns that the public trust cannot afford adding the IEB to the EU institutions and bodies without giving full reassurance in terms of opportunity and efficacy;

Amendment 39 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Considers that the EU institutions should apply the highest ethical standards to prevent any episodes of revolving doors and any conflicts of interests, also with regard to the appointments to senior positions in the EU institutions and agencies; expresses its concern that any such episodes, even if legally admissible, are undermining the overall credibility of the EU institutions and often used by anti- European propaganda as a means of introducing euro-scepticism to the public; calls for the establishment of an Independent Ethics Body for all EU institutions that would overlook the implementation of a future common ethical framework, and have competence over the common rules on the content and publication of declarations of interests, avoidance of conflicts of interest and revolving doors, acceptance of gifts and entertainment, protection of whistle- blowers and victims of harassment, transparency of lobby meetings, public procurement and meeting calendars of senior staff, and use of transparent bank accounts for public funds;

Amendment 4 #

Ramona STRUGARIU, Alin MITUȚA, Katalin CSEH

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Recalls that the European Court of Auditors (ECA) identified serious weaknesses in this regard in its 2019 audit on the ethical frameworks of the EU institutions, which concludes that improvements need to be made through harmonisation, awareness raising and strengthening of EU ethics rules; shares the ECA’s concerns about the absence of a common EU ethical framework governing the work of Member States’ representatives in the Council, the lack of overall strategies on ethics in the Parliament and the Council, the unreliable procedures for verifying declarations of interest, the limited scrutiny of these declarations and the incomplete policies in other areas concerning the existing ethical frameworks;

Amendment 4 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Emphasises that high standards of transparency and integrity in the EU institutions are essential to enabling citizens to exercise their democratic right to participate in the EU’s decision-making process and thus to enhancing the democratic legitimacy and credibility of the Union while restoring confidence in the European integration process; recalls that, in her Political Guidelines for the 2019- 2024 Commission, the President of the Commission stressed that if citizens were to have faith in the EU, its institutions should be open and beyond reproach on ethics, transparency and integrity; recalls that the right to ~~petition~~make a claim provides citizens with the most accessible way to enter into and maintain a direct dialogue with representatives from the EU institutions and thus contributes to improving openness, responsiveness and accountability while bridging the gap between citizens and EU institutions; notes in this regard that accessibility of the home pages dealing with claims should be fully granted also to persons with disabilities ;

Amendment 40 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

Amendment 41 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

Amendment 42 #

Ibán GARCÍA DEL BLANCO, Cristina MAESTRE MARTÍN DE ALMAGRO, Marc ANGEL, Sylvie GUILLAUME, Massimiliano SMERIGLIO, Demetris PAPADAKIS, Domènec RUIZ DEVESA

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4 a. Notes that the creation of a strict and clear framework of prevention and of sanctions would work as a precaution in order to avoid violations; suggests that prevention measures may include freezing time intervals after occupation in senior EU positions, disclosure of breaches where proven as required may as well act as a deterrent; suggests that the proposed Ethics Body or any existing body to be further developed to an independent ethics coordination authority should be plainly assigned the authority of monitoring procedures, applying controls on its own initiative and enforcing sanctions where required and after relevant procedures to safely prove the truth; suggests to include the creation of a common framework of sanctions, varying from soft to severe, according to specific rules and procedures based on the offence, including the return of financial resources or of any other fortune where proven as legitimately required;

Amendment 43 #

Cristian TERHEŞ

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4 a. Notes that some EU Member States already have a high level of transparency requirements for their elected and appointed officials in the area of conflict of interests, sources of income and family assets; considers that it is imperative for the EU institutions to standardise their procedures and apply the same high level of ethical and integrity standards.

Amendment 44 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4 a. Underlines the need to review and align relevant EU legislation and codes of conduct, requiring full transparency on employment or projects taken up by high- ranking and senior officials of EU institutions and agencies, including after leaving public office;

Amendment 45 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 b (new)

4 b. Considers that the procedures for selecting persons for senior positions should be carried out with fully objective criteria and fully transparent to the general public; highlights that there should be a framework in place for expressing questions and objections, along with open follow-up procedures and the power to cancel decision that may be proven as of inadequate transparency and integrity;

Amendment 46 #

Cristian TERHEŞ

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 b (new)

4 b. Considers discriminatory that in some EU Member States a MEP can also hold another public office in the country or be a board member of a public or private company, while in other Members States this is considered a conflict of interest, an offense that is often even criminalized; underlines the importance of homogenising the integrity and transparency standards at EU level;

Amendment 47 #

Ibán GARCÍA DEL BLANCO, Cristina MAESTRE MARTÍN DE ALMAGRO, Marc ANGEL, Sylvie GUILLAUME, Massimiliano SMERIGLIO, Demetris PAPADAKIS, Domènec RUIZ DEVESA

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Underlines the important role that the European Ombudsman plays in ensuring the highest standards of transparency and integrity in the EU institutions; calls on its Committee on Constitutional Affairs committee to consider and to take fully into account ~~the experience provid~~all shortcomings and gaps of the current EU ethics framework, as also confirmed in the inquiries conducted by the European Ombudsman, when ~~reflecting on the possible establishment of an~~working on strengthening ethical rules and their enforcement by establishing a single independent EU ethics body; suggests the ~~setting up~~conclusion of an EU interinstitutional ~~working group that is tasked with discussing and formulating recommendations on~~agreement to set up an EU Ethics Body for Parliament and the Commission, open to the participation of all EU institutions, agencies and bodies with a view to improving all aspects related to the subject matter;

Amendment 48 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Underlines the important role that the European Ombudsman plays in ensuring high standards of transparency and integrity in the EU institutions; stresses its key role at monitoring the proper functioning of the European public administration, which should continue after the establishment of the EU ethics body; calls on its Committee on Constitutional Affairs committee to consider and to take into account the experience provided by the European Ombudsman when reflecting on the ~~possible~~ establishment of an independent ethics body; suggests the setting up of an EU interinstitutional working group that is tasked with discussing and formulating recommendations on all aspects related to the subject mattersuch body, which should be holding a clear mandate, and operating at a technical level with a permanent, independent, impartial, collegiate and gender-balanced structure;

Amendment 49 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Underlines the important role that the European Ombudsman plays in ensuring high standards of transparency and integrity in the EU institutions; calls on its Committee on Constitutional Affairs committee to ~~consider and to~~ take into account the experience provided by the European Ombudsman when reflecting on the possible establishment of an independent ethics body; ~~suggests the setting up of an EU interinstitutional working group that is tasked with discuss~~calls for an independent advisory ethics body within Parliament, consisting, a~~nd formulating recommendations on all aspects related~~mong others, of highly respectable former Members with a staunch record of responsiveness to the spub~~ject matter~~lic opinion;

Amendment 5 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Recalls that the European Court of Auditors (ECA) ~~identified serious weaknesses in this regard in its 2019 audit on the ethical frameworks of the EU institutions, which concludes that improvements need to be made through~~assessed the ethical frameworks of the Parliament, the Council and the Commission and published its findings in the special report 13/2019; notes that the ECA concluded that the audited institutions had established adequate ethical frameworks; notes with concern that the ECA also identified some weaknesses in this regard and recommends improvements that could be made in terms of harmonisation, awareness raising and strengthening of EU ethics rules; shares the ECA’s concern about the absence of a common EU ethical framework governing the work of Member States’ representatives in the Council;

Amendment 5 #

Stefania ZAMBELLI, Gianna GANCIA, Mara BIZZOTTO

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Emphasises that highest standards of transparency, accountability and integrity in the EU institutions are essential to enabling citizens to exercise their democratic right to participate in the EU’s decision-making process and thus to enhancing the democratic legitimacy and credibility of the Union while restoring confidence in the European integration process; recalls that, in her Political Guidelines for the 2019- 2024 Commission, the President of the Commission stressed that if citizens were to have faith in the EU, its institutions should be open and beyond reproach on ethics, transparency and integrity; recalls that the right to petition provides citizens with the most accessible way to enter into and maintain a direct dialogue with representatives from the EU institutions and thus contributes to improving openness, responsiveness and accountability while bridging the gap between citizens and EU institutions; notes that openness requires relevant adjustments to facilitate citizens’ participation in the EU decision-making by ensuring inclusiveness and by removing any barriers relative to bureaucracy, accessibility and know- how, among others; notes that the procedures for citizens’ participation in the EU decision-making should be as simplified as possible and easy for citizens to understand; highlights that along with the digital communication channels there is a need to empower traditional communication channels, so that citizens of low web literacy or limited web access may still have equal opportunities to the EU participation, dialogues and decision- making; suggests that the proposed independent Ethics Body should be established as serving both roles in a manner of coordination, working for transparency inwards and outwards, that is within EU institutions and in direct dialogue with the citizens and the Citizen’s Society;

Amendment 50 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

Amendment 51 #

Ramona STRUGARIU, Marie-Pierre VEDRENNE, Jordi CAÑAS, Maite PAGAZAURTUNDÚA, Vlad GHEORGHE

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

Amendment 52 #

Mario FURORE, Fabio Massimo CASTALDO

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Underlines the important role that the European Ombudsman plays in ensuring high standards of transparency and integrity in the EU institutions; calls on its Committee on Constitutional Affairs committee to consider and to take into account the experience provided by the European Ombudsman when reflecting on the possible establishment of an independent ethics body; suggests the setting up of an EU interinstitutional working group that is tasked with discussing and formulating recommendations on all aspects related to the subject matter; suggests that the interinstitutional working group focuses on utilizing accumulated experience aiming at the best possible effectiveness and optimization of coordination for the proposed Ethics Body; suggests that if there is evidence that there may be more efficient alternatives in terms of coordination than establishing a new body, then they should be thoroughly examined as well;

Amendment 53 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Underlines the important role that the European Ombudsman plays in ensuring high standards of transparency and integrity in the EU institutions; calls on its Committee on Constitutional Affairs committee to consider and to take into account the experience provided by the European Ombudsman when reflecting on the possible establishment of an independent ethics body; considers it necessary to strengthen the role of the Ombudsman as most immediate means of protection for citizens in the face of the institutions; suggests the setting up of an EU interinstitutional working group that is tasked with discussing and formulating recommendations on all aspects related to the subject matter;

Amendment 54 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5 a. Recalls that there is no common definition of ethics in the EU law; notes in this regard that there is a need to reach an agreement among the institutions on definitions to be accordingly used regarding ethics, transparency, integrity, accountability, morality, trust and conflict of interest, among others; underlines the need for relevant institutional change so that the treaties plainly define ethics with no open interpretations; suggests to include this review into the Future of Europe;

Amendment 55 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5 a. Stresses that ensuring equal rights and opportunities of people with disabilities and other disadvantaged people in the functioning of the EU institutions should be one of the main priorities of an independent advisory ethics body;

Amendment 56 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5 a. Is convinced that the independent EU ethics body must be given monitoring powers over ethics standards as well as advisory, investigative and enforcement powers;

Amendment 57 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 b (new)

5 b. Notes that the Ethics Body or any existing body to be further developed to an independent ethics coordination authority should have full access to all the data needed during audit process and any control procedures over the auditees, including personal data, banking data, tax data and all financial situation data and data of relatives or other approximates where the case is valid, among others;

Amendment 58 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 b (new)

5 b. Believes that the independent EU ethics body must be provided with adequate human and financial resources in order for it to effectively fulfil its tasks and designed to issue legally binding decisions, which may be appealed against before the CJEU and may be subject to complaints to the EU Ombudsman;

Amendment 59 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 c (new)

5 c. Highlights the need for the Ethics Body or any existing body to be further developed to an independent ethics coordination authority to monitor and conduct systematic controls in order to ensure that the EU institutions and any third parties in collaboration with the EU institutions, including those enlisted in the Transparency Registry, keep covering transparency criteria overtime;

Amendment 6 #

Ramona STRUGARIU, Marie-Pierre VEDRENNE, Jordi CAÑAS, Ulrike MÜLLER, Maite PAGAZAURTUNDÚA, Vlad GHEORGHE

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Recalls that the European Court of Auditors (ECA) identified serious weaknesses in this regard in its 2019 audit on the ethical frameworks of the EU institutions, which concludes that improvements need to be made through harmonisation, awareness raising and strengthening of EU ethics rules; sharn its special report 13/20191a on the ethical frameworks of the EU institutions stated that Parliament, Council and Commission “have, to large extent, adequate ethical frameworks in place for both staff and Members” and identified certain areas where the coverage, specificity, clarify and level of guidance could be improved and harmonised; notes the ECA’s ~~concern~~observations about the absence of a common EU ethical framework governing the work of Member States’ representatives in the Council; _________________ 1a https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADoc uments/SR19_13/SR_ethical_frameworks _EN.pdf

Amendment 6 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Emphasises that high standards of transparency and integrity in ~~the~~all EU institutions are essential to enabling citizens to exercise their democratic right to participate in the EU’s decision-making process and thus to enhancing the democratic legitimacy and credibility of the Union while restoring confidence in the European integration process; ; highlights that all EU institutions should abide by high standards of ethics and transparency and calls on all EU institutions to conclude an agreement on establishing a common ethical framework, to reflect these standards; recalls that, in her Political Guidelines for the 2019- 2024 Commission, the President of the Commission stressed that if citizens were to have faith in the EU, its institutions should be open and beyond reproach on ethics, transparency and integrity; recalls that the right to petition provides citizens with the most accessible way to enter into and maintain a direct dialogue with representatives from the EU institutions and thus contributes to improving openness, responsiveness and accountability while bridging the gap between citizens and EU institutions;

Amendment 60 #

Ibán GARCÍA DEL BLANCO, Cristina MAESTRE MARTÍN DE ALMAGRO, Marc ANGEL, Sylvie GUILLAUME, Massimiliano SMERIGLIO, Demetris PAPADAKIS, Domènec RUIZ DEVESA

6. Stresses the ~~important role played by~~key role the Parliament must play, as representative of the citizens of the EU, in~~cluding in its oversight of the Commission and other institutions on behalf of the public~~ the process of enhancing the current EU ethics oversight system applying across all EU Institutions, agencies and bodies, in order to increase public trust in the EU decision-making processes;

Amendment 61 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Stresses the important role played by Parliament as representative of the citizens of the EU, including in its oversight of the political evaluation of the Commission and other institutions ~~on behalf of the public~~, as well as to ensure suitability of certain senior positions; recalls that the European Parliament should continue holding this role after the establishment of the EU ethics body;

Amendment 62 #

Gianna GANCIA, Markus BUCHHEIT, Mara BIZZOTTO, Stefania ZAMBELLI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Stresses the ~~important~~fundamental role played by Parliament as the only institution representative of the citizens of the EU, including in its oversight of the Commission and other institutions on behalf of the public;

Amendment 63 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Stresses the important role played by Parliament as representative of the citizens of the EU, including in its oversight of the Commission and other institutions on behalf of the public; suggests that nominees by the European Parliament to participate in the independent Ethics Body or in any existing body to be developed to an independent ethics coordination authority should follow democratic procedures and should be voted by the two third of the plenary;

Amendment 64 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6

6. Stresses the important role played by Parliament as the only directly elected representative of the citizens of the EU, including in its oversight of the Commission and other institutions on behalf of the public;

Amendment 65 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6 a. Emphasizes that the independent Ethics Body or any existing body to be developed to an independent ethics coordination authority should follow democratic procedures and should be governed by a scheme including equal representation by all institutions; suggests that the relevant governance scheme should as well respect gender parity;

Amendment 66 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 b (new)

6 b. Suggests that the independent Ethics Body or any existing body to be developed to an independent ethics coordination authority should include in its function certain mechanisms for complaint management internally in the EU institutions, so that concerns about potential breaches may be confidentially risen and discreetly examined;

Amendment 67 #

Ramona STRUGARIU, Jordi CAÑAS, Maite PAGAZAURTUNDÚA, Vlad GHEORGHE

Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 c (new)

6 c. Suggests that the independent Ethics Body or any existing body to be developed to an independent ethics coordination authority should include in its function certain mechanisms for complaint management coming from citizens or the Citizen’s Society under a certain framework, so that concerns about potential breaches may be confidentially risen and appropriately and discreetly examined;

Amendment 68 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. Reiterates, therefore, the need for the highest ethical standards for the Members of the European Parliament and calls for a strong advisory body within Parliament , consisting, among others, of highly respectable former Members with a staunch record of responsiveness to the public opinion;deleted

Amendment 69 #

Gianna GANCIA, Markus BUCHHEIT, Mara BIZZOTTO, Stefania ZAMBELLI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

Amendment 7 #

Gianna GANCIA, Markus BUCHHEIT, Mara BIZZOTTO, Stefania ZAMBELLI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2 a. Highlights that the ECA states that there should be effective institutional frameworks, and clear procedures and channels in place for facilitating the reporting of wrongdoing and corruption, as well as that whistleblowers acting in good faith must be protected from retaliation;

Amendment 7 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Emphasises that high standards of transparency and integrity in the EU institutions are essential to enabling citizens to exercise their democratic right to participate in the EU’s decision-making process and thus to enhancing the democratic legitimacy and credibility of the Union while restoring confidence in the European integration process; recalls that, in her Political Guidelines for the 2019- 2024 Commission, the President of the Commission stressed that if citizens were to have faith in the EU, its institutions should be open and beyond reproach on ethics, transparency and integrity; recalls that the right to petition provides citizens with the most accessible way to enter into and maintain a direct dialogue with representatives from the EU institutions and thus contributes to improving openness, responsiveness and accountability while bridging the gap between citizens and EU institutions; nonetheless underlines the fact that still a large portion of citizens is not aware of the instrument represented by the right to petition;

Amendment 70 #

Ibán GARCÍA DEL BLANCO, Cristina MAESTRE MARTÍN DE ALMAGRO, Marc ANGEL, Sylvie GUILLAUME, Massimiliano SMERIGLIO, Demetris PAPADAKIS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

Amendment 71 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. Reiterates, therefore, the need for the highest ethical standards for ~~the Members of the European Parliament and calls for a strong advisory body within Parliament , consisting,~~all EU Institutions, agencies and bodies and highlights the paramount importance that the provisions of the interinstitutional agreement to set up the single independent EU ethics body cover Members and staff of the participating institutions before, during and after the term of office or service in line with the applicable rules; calls for a strong single independent EU ethics body, consisting of Members selected by the Commission, elected by Parliament and assigned de jure from among othe~~rs, of highly respectable former Members with a staunch record of responsiveness to the public opinion~~ former Presidents of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the Court of Auditors and former EU Ombudsmen, chosen on the basis of their integrity, competence, experience and absence of conflicts of interest; demands for a gender balanced composition of the independent EU ethics body;

Amendment 72 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. Reiterates, therefore, the need for the highest ethical standards for the Members of the European Parliament and calls ~~for a strong advisory body within Parliament , consisting, among others, of highly respectable former Members with a staunch record of responsiveness to the public opin~~on the Commission to establish an independent Ethics Body or to develop any existing body into an independent ethics coordination authority; highlights that this body should be assigned with the resources needed to effectively function monitoring and control as well as the authority to impose sanctions and to cancel decisions if proven as necessary;urges the Commission to ensure that no colleagues are to be placed as judges of other colleagues; namely, suggests not to place MEPs or former MEPs as judges of other MEPs; instead, suggests the procedure of the voting process where necessary, for the European Parliament to have a supervisory and control power, as one of the EU Institutions;

Amendment 73 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. Reiterates, therefore, the need for the highest ethical standards for the Members of the European Parliament and calls for a strong advisory body within Parliament ~~, consisting, among others, of highly respectable former Members with a staunch record of responsiveness to the public opinion~~;

Amendment 74 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7

7. Reiterates, therefore, the need for the highest ethical standards for the Members of the European Parliament and calls for a ~~strong~~n advisory ethics body within Parliament , consisting, among others, of highly respectable former Members with a staunch record of responsiveness to the public opinion;

Amendment 75 #

Ramona STRUGARIU, Marie-Pierre VEDRENNE, Jordi CAÑAS, Maite PAGAZAURTUNDÚA, Vlad GHEORGHE

Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7 a. Notes that in this context it is necessary to adequately clarify any responsibilities and authorities of MEPs and members of any other body that are about to participate in order to ensure transparency and integrity;

Amendment 76 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

Amendment 77 #

Ibán GARCÍA DEL BLANCO, Cristina MAESTRE MARTÍN DE ALMAGRO, Marc ANGEL, Sylvie GUILLAUME, Massimiliano SMERIGLIO, Demetris PAPADAKIS, Domènec RUIZ DEVESA

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

8. Underlines th~~e fact that strengthening the existing procedures on the basis of analysis and evaluation of their effectiveness and public response is generally more effective th~~at the future ethics body should take on the role of the ethics committees operating in the different EU institutions and agencies; and work towards the harmonization of the different interpretations of the norms and terms within the EU institutions, such as “conflict of interest”, to avoid divergences and in pursuit of the clarity that citizens demand t~~he introdu~~o continue growing their trust in the functioning of ~~new~~ the EU institutiones;

Amendment 78 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

8. Underlines the fact that ~~strengthen~~replacing the existing ~~procedures on the basis of analysis and evaluation of their effectiveness and public response is generally more effective than the introduction of new~~ fragmented procedures based on a self-regulatory approach by introducing a more effective EU ethics oversight system with the creation of a new single independent EU ethics body is paramount in order to guarantee a consistent and full implementation of ethics standards across the EU Institutiones;

Amendment 79 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

8. Underlines the fact that strengthening the existing procedures on the basis of analysis and evaluation of their effectiveness and public response is generally more effective than the introduction of new ones; highlights, that the establishment of an advisory ethics body should lead to a horizontal approach to disadvantaged people in each EU institution that can guarantee the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment for all institutions;

Amendment 8 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Emphasises that the ~~high level of fragmentation~~fragmentation shows a lack of common understanding and different standards under comparable circumstances in the ethics legal framework ~~and~~s of the ~~lack of oversight have prevented the proper implementation of codes of conduct in EU in~~different EU institutions, bodies and organs; believes that a more harmonised approach in important areas such as whistle-blower protection is needed and to fill existing legislative gaps such as a non-existing Commissioner’s stiatut~~ions; believes that the current self-regulatory approach is not fit for purpose and cannot guarantee integrity~~e; acknowledges the differences in the nature of the various institutions, explicitly the legally guaranteed independence of Judges of the European Court of Justice, of the Members of ECA, of the Members of the European Parliament, national Parliament or national governments; underlines the need to enhance the integrity of the EU institutions and ~~restore public trust~~to strengthen public trust and to overcome existing weaknesses;

Amendment 8 #

Ioan-Rareş BOGDAN

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Emphasises that high standards of transparency and integrity in the EU institutions are essential to enabling citizens to exercise their democratic right to participate in the EU’s decision-making process and thus to enhancing the democratic legitimacy and credibility of the Union while restoring confidence in the European integration process; points out in this regard that citizens' trust in political institutions is a key founding element of representative democracies; recalls that, in her Political Guidelines for the 2019- 2024 Commission, the President of the Commission stressed that if citizens were to have faith in the EU, its institutions should be open and beyond reproach on ethics, transparency and integrity; recalls that the right to petition provides citizens with the most accessible way to enter into and maintain a direct dialogue with representatives from the EU institutions and thus contributes to improving openness, responsiveness and accountability while bridging the gap between citizens and EU institutions;

Amendment 80 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

8. Underlines the fact that strengthening the existing procedures on the basis of analysis and evaluation of their effectiveness and public response is generally more effective than the introduction of new ones; considers of high importance to identify the weaknesses of the current system and address them; notes that sound feasibility studies should be the basis for the decisive criteria on the creation of a new independent Ethics Body or the further development of an existing body to an independent ethics coordination authority;

Amendment 81 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8

8. Underlines the fact that strengthening the existing procedures on the basis of analysis and evaluation of their effectiveness and public response is generally preferable, as it is more effective than the introduction of new ones;

Amendment 82 #

Ibán GARCÍA DEL BLANCO, Cristina MAESTRE MARTÍN DE ALMAGRO, Marc ANGEL, Sylvie GUILLAUME, Massimiliano SMERIGLIO, Demetris PAPADAKIS, Domènec RUIZ DEVESA

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8 a. Stresses that the procedures used should be evaluated at regular intervals in order to judge their effectiveness and in case they do not bring the desired results should be changed or replaced by other procedures;

Amendment 83 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9

9. Considers~~, as~~ that, from the viewpoint of the committee most directly engaged with the public opinion and public response to the institutions’ transparency and integrity, that the democratic approach and political responsibility remains the strongest control mechanism in any constitutional democracy, as well as in the EU; stresses the need for further strengthening of the democratic accountability mechanisms at EU levele future ethics body should operate in a depoliticised manner and perform in an independent way, to further strengthen and guarantee the highest standards of accountability, transparency and integrity at EU level, to continue growing trust of the citizens in the EU institutions.

Amendment 84 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9

9. Considers, as the committee most directly engaged with the public opinion and public response to the institutions’ transparency and integrity, that the democratic approach and political responsibility through democratic accountability mechanisms remains the strongest control mechanism in any constitutional democracy, as well as in the EU; ~~stresses the need for further strengthening of the democratic accountability mechanisms at EU level.~~

Amendment 85 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9

9. Considers, as the committee most directly engaged with the public opinion and public response to the institutions’ transparency and integrity, that the democratic approach ~~and political responsibility~~, highest ethics, transparency and accountability standards remains the strongest control mechanism in any constitutional democracy, as well as in the EU; stresses the need for further strengthening of the democratic accountability mechanisms at EU level. , either with the establishment of anew independent Ethics Body or by the further development of an existing body to an independent ethics coordination authority;

Amendment 86 #

Ramona STRUGARIU, Marie-Pierre VEDRENNE, Jordi CAÑAS, Maite PAGAZAURTUNDÚA, Ulrike MÜLLER, Vlad GHEORGHE

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9

9. Considers, as the committee most directly engaged with the public opinion and public response to the institutions’ transparency and integrity, that the democratic approach and political responsibility ~~rema~~must be reinforced by adoptinsg the strongest ~~control~~ethics mechanism, necessary in any constitutional democracy, a~~s well as in the EU~~nd therefore also in the EU, in order to ensure that public decisions are taken in the general interest; stresses the need for further strengthening of the democratic accountability mechanisms at EU level.

Amendment 87 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9

9. Considers, as the committee most directly engaged with the public opinion and public response to the institutions’ transparency and integrity, that the democratic approach and political responsibility remains the strongest control mechanism in any constitutional democracy, as well as in the EU; stresses the need for further strengthening of the democratic accountability mechanisms at EU level and in this regard encourages the establishment of a common ethical framework for all EU institutions and of an Independent Ethics Body in charge of its implementation.

Amendment 88 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 a (new)

9 a. Stresses that information should be provided to citizens without discrimination; to this end, suggests for the relevant technical or other adjustments to be made on the websites of the EU institutions so that people with disabilities and people with dyslexia or any other reading difficulties may equally receive complete and understandable information;

Amendment 89 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 b (new)

9 b. Highlights that those who are audited must be accountable to both the European institutions and the citizens; stresses that there should be a sanctions range, including return of financial resources or other items of wealth when proven as legitimately required;

Amendment 9 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Emphasises that the ~~high level of fragmentation in the ethics leg~~ECA identified many areas where is advisable to have harmonised approaches to handling ethical issues; recalls that the ECA stated that the ethical frameworks and the lack of oversight have prevented the proper implementation of codes of conduct in EU institutions; believes that the current self-regulatory approach is not fit for purpose and cannot guarantee integrityre appropriately supported by investigative and sanction mechanisms; believes, however, that the current self-regulatory approach should be reviewed in the interest of a greater effectiveness; recalls that the ECA states that the ethical frameworks cannot be effective without appropriate control systems as well as that the level of control should reflect the level of risks and take into account the administrative burden created by such controls; underlines the need to enhance the integrity of the EU institutions and restore public trust;

Amendment 9 #

Cristian TERHEŞ

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Emphasises that high standards of transparency and integrity in the EU institutions are essential to having a real accountability of the European officials as well as to enabling citizens to exercise their democratic right to participate in the EU’s decision-making process and thus to enhancing the democratic legitimacy and credibility of the Union while restoring confidence in the European integration process; recalls that, in her Political Guidelines for the 2019- 2024 Commission, the President of the Commission stressed that if citizens were to have faith in the EU, its institutions should be open and beyond reproach on ethics, transparency and integrity; recalls that the right to petition provides citizens with the most accessible way to enter into and maintain a direct dialogue with representatives from the EU institutions and thus contributes to improving openness, responsiveness and accountability while bridging the gap between citizens and EU institutions;

Amendment 90 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 c (new)

9 c. Stresses that the procedures used should be regularly evaluated in order to monitor their effectiveness and apply quality improvements where necessary.

source: 663.207

2021/02/16 AFCO 206 amendments...

Amendment 1 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 5

— having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 9 and 10, 1~~5(3)~~3, 14, 15,16 and 17~~(3)~~ thereof,

Amendment 10 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

A a. whereas the Treaties have established a system of division of powers between the institutions of the Union that assigns to each institution its own role within the institutional structure of the Union and in the performance of the tasks entrusted to it;

Amendment 100 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

~~5. Considers that the participating institutions should entrust the EU Ethics Body with monitoring powers over ethics standards, as well as advisory, investigative and enforcement powers;~~deleted

Amendment 101 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that ~~the participating institutions should entrust the EU Ethics Body with monitoring powers over ethics standards, as well as advisory, investigative and enforcement powers~~any options under discussion for improving transparency and integrity in the EU institutions has to be respectful of the balance between the institutions as established by the treaties, underlines that it must not replace, substitute or interfere with the responsibilities and prerogatives of each institution and points out that given these considerations, the decision-making powers must remain within the respective institutions, hence only a body with advisory function able to issue non- binding recommendations is conceivable;

Amendment 102 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that the participating institutions should entrust the EU Ethics Body with monitoring powers over ethics standards, as well as advisory, investigative and enforcement powers; stresses that to monitor integrity a framework should be set up, that clearly defines integrity with a set of well-defined objectives and performance indicators;

Amendment 103 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that the participating institutions should entrust, within the framework of their respective procedural autonomy, the EU Ethics Body with autonomous monitoring powers over ethics standards applicable to them, as well as advisory, investigative and enforcement powers;

Amendment 104 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that the participating institutions should entrust the EU Ethics Body with ~~monitoring powers over ethics standards, as well as advisory, investigative and enforcement~~advisory powers;

Amendment 105 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that all the participating institutions should entrust the EU Ethics Body with monitoring powers over ethics standards, as well as advisory~~, investig~~ powers, the power to investigate on its own initiative and enforcement powers;

Amendment 106 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Considers that the participating institutions should entrust the EU Ethics Body with monitoring powers over ethics standards, as well as advisory, investigative and ~~enforcement powers~~the capacity to propose sanctions, if appropriate;

Amendment 107 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

5a. Considers that all administrations should require senior officials, MEPs and Commissioners leaving the service to provide sufficiently detailed information and documentation to enable the ethics body to carry out a comprehensive analysis and prevent conflicts of interest;

Amendment 108 #

Alin MITUȚA, Ramona STRUGARIU, Pascal DURAND, Gilles BOYER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5 a. Highlights that public officials are not in a position to conduct self- assessments concerning matters of conflict of interest or the respect of ethical standards; underlines that this task should fall under the competence of the EU Ethics body, as an independent specialised third party;

Amendment 109 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Amendment 11 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

A a. whereas transparent and liable institutions represent the bedrock of political systems that serve citizens; whereas corruption and fraud represent a constant danger to the integrity of public decision making;

Amendment 110 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Considers that this autonomous monitoring capacity should include, among others, the verification of the veracity of the declaration of financial interests, , through inter alia a centralised collection of data, the handling of conflicts of interest, checks on transparency obligations and the verification of compliance with revolving doors rules and generally verification of compliance with all provisions of codes of conduct and applicable transparency, ethics and integrity rules;

Amendment 111 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Considers that this monitoring capacity should include the verification of the veracity of the declaration of financial interests, the handling of conflicts of interest, checks on transparency obligations and the verification of compliance with revolving doors rules, as well as the possibility for the independent ethics body to impose penalties in the event of delay or bad faith in the provision of information and updates of information in declarations;

Amendment 112 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Considers that this monitoring capacity should include the verification of the veracity of the declaration of financial interests, the handling of conflicts of interest, checks on transparency obligations ~~and the~~, verification of compliance with revolving doors rules, and the verification and improvement of transparency in the EU’s Ordinary Legislative Procedure and EU lobbying;

Amendment 113 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Considers that this monitoring capacity should include the verification of the veracity of the declaration of financial interests, the declarations of assets, the handling of conflicts of interest, checks on transparency obligations, including gifts and lobby transparency rules, and the verification of compliance with revolving doors rules;

Amendment 114 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Considers that this monitoring capacity should include the verification of the veracity of the declaration of financial interests, the handling of conflicts of interest, checks on transparency obligations and the verification of compliance with revolving doors rules, entailing own- initiative inquiries and the assessment of any individual cases arising;

Amendment 115 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. ~~Considers that this monitoring capacity should include the verification~~Recommends empowering the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) ofr the ~~veracity of the declaration of financial interests, the handling~~European Ombudsman with the responsibility to carry out oversight ofn conflicts of interests, ~~checks on transparency obligations and the verification of compliance with revolving doors rul~~revolving doors and lobby transparency for EU institutions and agencies;

Amendment 116 #

6a. Suggests that the independent ethics body should work on establishing a common definition of conflict of interest for the European institutions on the basis of the highest standards; stresses that many Member States have demanding rules; notes the OECD Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service, which lay down a set of basic principles and standards for the design and implementation of conflict of interest policies1 a; _________________ 1a https://www.oecd.org/governance/ethics/c onflict-of-interest/

Amendment 117 #

Alin MITUȚA, Ramona STRUGARIU, Pascal DURAND

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6 a. Believes that the examination of conflicts of interest should be carried out prior to, during and after public office or employment of all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies;

Amendment 118 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6 a. Believes that the EU ethics body should conduct studies, compile annual statistics on financial interest declarations, revolving door cases and other relevant information;

Amendment 119 #

Alin MITUȚA, Ramona STRUGARIU, Pascal DURAND, Gilles BOYER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)

6 b. Considers that the new EU Ethics Body should have competence to contribute by way of proposals to the development and periodic update of a common ethical framework for the EU institutions, including common rules and a common model for declarations of financial interests in a machine-readable format;

Amendment 12 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the ethical standards applicable to the European institutions are in many respects ahead of those applicable in their national equivalents but have not been enforced in a satisfactory manner, particularly in Parliament where, in spite of there having been at least 27 breaches of the code of conduct, no procedure has ever led to any sanction; whereas an independent body with investigative, seizure and sanctioning powers is necessary in order for the EU’s ambition of being ethical and transparent to be truly effective;

Amendment 120 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

~~7. Takes the view that the EU Ethics Body could also be given authority over the obligations imposed by the Transparency Register;~~deleted

Amendment 121 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

~~7. Takes the view that the EU Ethics Body could also be given authority over the obligations imposed by the Transparency Register;~~deleted

Amendment 122 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Takes the view that the EU Ethics Body could also be given authority over the obligations imposed by the Transparency Register; considers, therefore, that the independent ethics body should have the power to carry out checks on the basis of records or on the spot in order to monitor compliance with the reporting obligations of lobbyists; considers that the ethics body should have the power to impose penalties on interest representatives involved in a breach of ethical rules; stresses that the transparency bodies or authorities of the Member States have the capacity to impose financial penalties on lobbyists who fail to comply with their transparency obligations, and do so very effectively, without bureaucracy undermining that effectiveness;

Amendment 123 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Takes the view that the EU Ethics Body could also be given authority over the obligations imposed by the Transparency Register, and should envisage a better protection of whistle-blowers, better management of conflict of interests for corruption and fraud cases;

Amendment 124 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Takes the view that the EU Ethics Body could also be given authority over the obligations imposed by the Transparency Register including additional formal obligation that might be imposed on EU institutions’ members and staff;

Amendment 125 #

Alin MITUȚA, Ramona STRUGARIU, Pascal DURAND, Gilles BOYER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7 a. Considers that the EU Ethics Body should be given the task to develop an EU public portal with relevant information on ethics rules, reports on best practices, studies, statistics, as well as a database containing the declarations of financial interests of all the participating institutions;

Amendment 126 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

~~8. Considers that the EU Ethics Body should have the power to initiate procedures and to conduct investigations based on the information it has collected or that it has received from third parties;~~deleted

Amendment 127 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Amendment 128 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Considers that the EU Ethics Body should have the power to initiate procedures by itself and to conduct on-the- spot and records-based investigations based on the information it has collected or that it has received from third parties, such as journalists, NGOs, whistleblowers, stakeholders, civil society or the European Ombudsman; insists that any third party referring a matter to the independent ethics body must be protected and their identity kept anonymous;

Amendment 129 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Stresses the need for the body to protect whistleblowers, in particular European public officials, so that they can express their concerns about possible violations of rules without fear of reprisals; suggests, in this connection, that the body should supervise the internal and confidential complaint mechanisms under the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and Conditions of Employment of Other Servants; stresses that only a safe and protective working environment will enable public officials to express their concerns and thereby help to make the work of the independent ethics body effective;

Amendment 13 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

Amendment 130 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8 a. Stresses that requesting tax documents and bank records are interventions in private law, for which there must be serious allegations that enter in competence of OLAF;

Amendment 131 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)

8b. Believes that the body should also monitor the independence and ethical behaviour of EU officials before, during and after they hold a post or function within the EU institutions; stresses the importance of combating the phenomenon of revolving doors between public and private organisations; suggests that the body be tasked with issuing recommendations for harmonised and adequate cooling-off periods in all EU institutions, including for Members of the European Parliament;

Amendment 132 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Believes that in relation to its enforcement powers, the body could take over from the Appointing Authority in dealing with staff ethics obligations, and that in relation to Members of Parliament or Commissioners, the body could be granted enforcement powers within the limits of the provisions contained in the Treaties, and without prejudice to any additional mechanisms provided for in Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, in particular concerning termination of office;deleted

Amendment 133 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

Amendment 134 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Believes that in relation to ~~its enforcement powers, the body could take over from the Appointing Authority in dealing with staff ethics obligations, and that in relation to~~ Members of Parliament or Commissioners, the body c~~ould~~annot be granted enforcement powers ~~within the limits of the provisions~~since this transferral of powers would count~~ained in the Treaties, and without prejudice to any additional mechanisms provided for in Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, in particular concern~~er the separation of powers laid down ing t~~ermination of office~~he Treaties;

Amendment 135 #

Gabriele BISCHOFF, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Believes that in relation to its enforcement powers, the body cshould take over from the Appointing Authority in dealing with staff ethics obligations, and that in relation to Members of Parliament or Commissioners, the body could be granted enforcement powers within the limits of the provisions contained in the Treaties, and without prejudice to any additional mechanisms provided for in Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, in particular concerning termination of officeissue recommandations to the responsible authorities of the respective participative Institutions and without prejudice to any additional mechanisms;

Amendment 136 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. ~~Believes that in relation to its enforcement pow~~Considers, th~~e body could take over from the Appointing Authority in dealing with staff ethics obligations, and that in relation to Members of Parliament or Commissioners, the b~~at in case the EU Ethics Body cshould be g~~ranted~~iven enforcement powers within the limits of the provisions contained in the Treaties, ~~and without prejudice to any additional mechanisms provided for in Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, in particular concerning termin~~bilateral agreements for good cooperation should be set up with each EU institution on the procedure envisaged to deal with the ethical obligations of ~~office~~Commissioners, MEPs and staff;

Amendment 137 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Believes that in ~~relation to its enforcement powers,~~order to be fully efficient, the body should merge the roles of existing organs responsible for ethics; Considers that the body cshould take over from the Appointing Authority in dealing with staff ethics obligations, and that in relation to Members of Parliament or Commissioners, the body cshould be ~~grante~~merge monitoring, investigatory and enforcement powers within the limits of the provisions contained in the Treaties, and without prejudice to any additional mechanisms provided for in Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, in particular concerning termination of office;

Amendment 138 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Believes that in relation to its enforcement powers, the body could take over from the Appointing Authority in dealing with staff ethics obligations, and that in relation to Members of Parliament or Commissioners or Commissioner- desginates, the body could be granted enforcement powers within the limits of the provisions contained in the Treaties, and without prejudice to any additional mechanisms provided for in Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, in particular concerning termination of office;

Amendment 139 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Believes that in relation to its enforcement powers, the body could take over from the Appointing Authority in dealing with staff ethics obligations, and that in relation to Members of Parliament or Commissioners, the body could be granted enforcement powers ~~within the limits of the provisions contained in the Treaties~~, and without prejudice to any additional mechanisms provided for in Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, in particular concerning termination of office;

Amendment 14 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

Ba. whereas the main challenges in implementing conflict-of-interest policies relate to the management of compulsory disclosure, revolving doors and conflicts of interest arising from collateral activities and membership of specific groups;

Amendment 140 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Considers that the EU Ethics Body should be entrusted with advisory tasks in order to provide advice to any individual or entity covered by its scope who wishes to request interpretation of an ethical standard in relation to appropriate conduct in a specific case; calls on the institutions to take advantage of the body’s expertise in the implementation of their ethical standards; considers that, in the long term, the body should harmonise the ethical standards of all the institutions, agencies and bodies;

Amendment 141 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Considers that the EU Ethics Body should be entrusted with advisory tasks in order to provide advice to any individual covered by its scope who wishes to request interpretation of an ethical standard in relation to appropriate conduct in a specific case; Considers that, in order to ensure consistent application of the ethical standards and predictability, advice should be binding for the Independent EU Ethics Body in its judgement on the same matter;

Amendment 142 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Considers that ~~the~~such an EU Ethics Body should be entrusted with advisory tasks ~~in order to provide~~to improve the enforcement of existing provisions in the EU institutions in order to provide reliable and trustworthy advice to any individual possibly covered by its scope who wishes to request interpretation of an ethical standard in relation to appropriate conduct in a specific case;

Amendment 143 #

Domènec RUIZ DEVESA, Włodzimierz CIMOSZEWICZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Considers that the EU Ethics Body should promote integrity, and should be entrusted with advisory tasks in order to provide advice to any individual covered by its scope who wishes to request interpretation of an ethical standard in relation to appropriate conduct in a specific case;

Amendment 144 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Considers that the EU Ethics Body should be entrusted with advisory tasks in order to provide advice to any individual and/or institution covered by its scope who wishes to request interpretation of an ethical standard in relation to appropriate conduct in a specific case;

Amendment 145 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)

10 a. Brings attention to the point that if this advisory body is established, its functioning should not overlap or conflict with internal ethics committees in the EU institutions, the Transparency Register secretariat, the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Ombudsman;

Amendment 146 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Believes that the decision on-making process regarding the absence of conflicts of interest of the Commissioners-designate should ~~remain a competence~~be significantly improved to facilitate a thorough examination by Members responsible of any conflicts of interest of future Commissioners, using objective criteria, while leaving the procedural and decision-making aspects in the hands of Parliament’'s Committee on Legal Affairs~~, while the EU Ethics Body should support the process with the publication of~~; considers that the Committee on Legal Affairs should be given more time and the possibility of assistance from the EU ethics body, which should publish its analysis of each individual case and make its investigative capacities available; points out that the findings of this committee should be made public;

Amendment 147 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Believes that the decision on the absence of conflicts of interest of Commissioners-designate should remain a competence of Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs~~, while the EU Ethics Body should support the process with the publication of its analysis of each individual case and make its investigative capacities available;~~

Amendment 148 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

Amendment 149 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Believes that the decision on the absence of conflicts of interest of Commissioners-designate prior to hearings should remain a competence of Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs, while the EU Ethics Body should support the process with the publication of its analysis of each individual case and make its investigative capacities available to the European Parliament;

Amendment 15 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

B a. whereas the European Court of Auditors has stated in its special report 13/2019 1a on the ethical framework of the EU that Parliament, Council and Commission "have to a large extent adequate ethical frameworks in place for both staff and Members". _________________ 1a https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADoc uments/SR19_13/SR_ethical_frameworks _EN.pdf

Amendment 150 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. ~~Believ~~Underlines that the decision on ~~the absence of~~ conflicts of interest of designated Commissioners~~-designate should remain a competence of Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affair~~ remains a political and institutional competence of the European Parliament and its bodies, while ~~the~~such an EU Ethics Body shcould support the process with ~~the publication of its~~its non-binding analysis of each individual case ~~and make its investigative capacities available~~;

Amendment 151 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

11 a. Considers that a complete definition of integrity related tools such as code of conduct, policies relating to conflict of interests, lobbyist participation and pre and post-employment measures should be envisaged;

Amendment 152 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3

~~Composition~~deleted

Amendment 153 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3

CReflections on composition

Amendment 154 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3 a (new)

Recalls that the competent bodies in the institutions are regulated by law and that the composition of the competent body in the European Parliament could be made up of MEPs and former MEPs, such an EU Ethics Body may be composed of Members or former Members of the institutions;

Amendment 155 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3 b (new)

Underlines that with the creation of a new advisory ethics body duplication of work and overlapping competences must be avoided, its decisions should take the form of non-binding recommendations to the President, who must remain in charge of the final decision-making power; calls for clear provisions giving the person concerned a right of appeal against any such decision taken by the President in full respect of the basic principles of rule of law;

Amendment 156 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

~~12. Believes that the Ethics Body should be composed of nine Members, three s~~delected by the Commission, three elected by Parliament, and three assigned de jure from among the former Presidents of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the Court of Auditors and former EU Ombudsmen;

Amendment 157 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Amendment 158 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that the Ethics Body should be composed of nine Mmembers, three selected by the Commission, three elected by Parliament, and three assigned ~~de jure~~by the Council, as follows: - three members selected by the Commission, including one from among former members of the Commission's staff and two from among the former Presidents of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the Court of Auditors, OLAF and former EU Ombudsmen; - three members elected by the European Parliament:one member elected from among former members of Parliament’s staff and two NGOs;suggests that Parliament's Rules of Procedure be revised to include the election of these three representatives;recommends the creation of a new article based on Article 231 on the method of appointing the European Ombudsman; - three members appointed by the Council from among the staff of the national ethics committees or the national ombudsman, if the institution is willing to participate in the IIA; Stresses that each institution must propose gender-balanced nominations;

Amendment 159 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that the Ethics Body should be composed of nine Members, three selected by the Commission, three ~~elec~~appointed by Parliament, and three asdesignated ~~de jure~~ from among the former Presidents of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the Court of Auditors and former EU Ombudsmen;

Amendment 16 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

B a. Whereas citizens’ trust in public institutions and decision-making processes is a pillar of any democratic government and requires exemplarity, integrity, transparency, accountability as well as the highest standards of ethical behaviour;

Amendment 160 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that the Ethics Body should be composed of nine Members, three selected by the Commission, three elected by Parliament, and three assigned de jure from among the former ~~President~~judges of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the Court of Auditors and former EU Ombudsmen;

Amendment 161 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Calls for an example to be drawn from Member States' best practices on transparency in public life; suggests, in this connection, the creation of a position of ethics officer able to provide advice to members of the ethics body on compliance with their obligations and recommendations in potential conflict of interest situations, and also to be responsible for their training; stresses the importance of such a position in order to ensure the exemplary behaviour and independence of members whose work requires them to be above any suspicion;

Amendment 162 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

Amendment 163 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Considers that its members must be independent, chosen on the basis of their competence, experience and professional qualities, as well as their personal integrity, have an impeccable record of ethical behaviour and provide a declaration of the absence of conflicts of interest~~; is of the opinion that the composition of the body should be~~, whose accuracy and compatibility with the post will be verified by the ethics officer; calls on the ethics officer to take charge of the verification of candidates’ declarations; considers that the members should work in a spirit of collaboration and consistency in their decisions and recommendations; calls for a guarantee of gender- balanced in the composition of the body;

Amendment 164 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

Amendment 165 #

Amendment 166 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

Amendment 167 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Suggests that each institution choose these members in particular from among former judges of the CJEU, former or current members of highest courts of Member States, former Members of the European Parliament, former staff of the participating institutions and bodies, former EU Ombudsmen, and members of the ethics authorities in Member States; suggests further that the body elect a President and two Vice- Presidents from among its members;deleted

Amendment 168 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

Amendment 169 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Suggests that each institution choose these members in particular from among former judges of the CJEU, former presidents of OLAF and the Court of Auditors, former or current members of highest courts of Member States, ~~former Members of the European Parliament,~~ former staff of the participating institutions and bodies, former EU Ombudsmen, and members of the ethics authorities in Member States; suggests further that the body elect a President and two Vice- Presidents from among its members; stresses the need to ensure the diversity of members’ backgrounds and independent expertise; suggests limiting the participation of former MEPs and Commissioners to a third of the composition of the body; considers that the appointment of members should be validated by a two-thirds majority vote in Parliament’s plenary;

Amendment 17 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)

B b. Whereas the absence of undue influence of interest representatives, including through providing paid activities for Members of Parliament, gifts or travel invitations, creating expectations for future employment following Members’ termination of mandate and official’s termination of service, undue use of information or contacts is key to ensure democratic processes are not captured and citizens rights are fully respected;

Amendment 170 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

Amendment 171 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Suggests that each institution choose these members in particular from among former judges of the CJEU, former or current members of highest courts of Member States, ~~former Members of the European Parliament, former staff of the participating institutions and bodies,~~ former EU Ombudsmen, and members of the ethics authorities in Member States; suggests further that the body elect a President and two Vice- Presidents from among its members;

Amendment 172 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

Amendment 173 #

Domènec RUIZ DEVESA, Włodzimierz CIMOSZEWICZ, Gabriele BISCHOFF

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)

14a. Calls for inspiration to be drawn from the Member States' best practices with a view to combating the practice of self-regulation; calls for a guarantee that the members of the body do not participate in the debate, decision or vote on any issue in which they have a private or direct interest; stresses more specifically that revolving door cases and the lack of ambition in the institutions' current ethical standards are mainly due to the lack of an independent authority;

Amendment 174 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)

14 a. 14. Considers that the composition of the Ethics Body should be accompanied by a framework for the exercise of the mandate as well as a procedure to end the mandate.

Amendment 175 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Insists that the college be supported by a secretariat with the human, material and financial resources commensurate with its mandate and tasks; including an ethics officer, responsible for ethical training and offering advice within the Independent EU Ethics Body; Considers that the pooling of budget and personnel currently allocated to the various EU ethics bodies when merging them would allow to improve the efficiency of the use of resources and might reduce costs;

Amendment 176 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. ~~Insists~~Recommend that the college be supported by a secretariat with the human, material and financial resources commensurate with its mandate and tasks in accordance with the principles of sound financial budget management;

Amendment 177 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. ~~Insists that the college be supported by a secretariat with the human, material and financial resources commensurate with its mandate and task~~Doubts the necessity of establishing a new interinstitutional body, as it might lead to additional financial expenditure on top of the existing bodies at the EU level which are already dealing with similar issues;

Amendment 178 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Insists that the college be supported by a secretariat ~~with th~~using available human, and material ~~and financial resources commensurate with its mandate and task~~resources, without necessitating any increase in the administrative budget of the European institutions;

Amendment 179 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)

15 a. Considers that the procedure followed by the Independent EU Ethics Body should ensure the appropriate level of transparency while protecting legitimate confidentiality of certain aspects of individual cases; Believes that the Inter-institutional agreement should foresee procedural rules, referring to the existing acquis of principles of the existing EU ethics bodies, as well as to the EU’s common values (Art. 2 TEU), the rights of the concerned individual to be heard and to appeal, the obligation to collaborate and the publicity requirements;

Amendment 18 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)

B b. whereas nevertheless the enforcement of the ethical framework could be improved;

Amendment 180 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 b (new)

15 b. Insists that the Independent EU Ethics Body should have the power to start an investigation on its own initiative, based on information collected by itself or received from third parties, in particular from individuals, civil society organizations, the media and whistleblowers;

Amendment 181 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 4

Reflections on Procedures

Amendment 182 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Proposes a ~~two-step~~n approach whereby, in the event that ~~the~~such an EU Ethics Body ~~becomes aware of a breach~~deals with a breach of conduct or possible breach of ethics rules, it first recommends actions to put an end to the breach; considers that it~~his~~ first ~~preventive step~~ should ensure confidentiality and the right of the person to be heard; suggests that in the event that the individual concerned refuses to take the appropriate actions, the EU Ethics Body should make relevant information about the case publicly available and decide, if appropriate, on sanctions; considers that this two-step approach should apply provided that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the individual acted in bad faith and recommends that intentional breach, gross negligence, the concealment of evidence and non- compliance with the obligation to cooperate should be, as such, subject to sanctions, even when the breach itself has ceaseto be heard;

Amendment 183 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Proposes a ~~two-step~~n approach whereby, in the event that the EU Ethics Body becomes aware of a breach or possible breach of ethics rules, it ~~first~~ recommends actions to put an end to the breach; considers that this ~~first~~ preventive step should ensure confidentiality and the right of the person to be heard; suggests that in the event that the individual concerned refuses to take the appropriate actions, the EU Ethics Body should make relevant information about the case publicly available and decide, if appropriate, on sanctions; considers that this two-step approach should apply provided that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the individual acted in bad faith and recommends that intentional breach, gross negligence, the concealment of evidence and non- compliance with the obligation to cooperate should be, as such, subject to sanctions, even when the breach itself has ceased;

Amendment 184 #

Domènec RUIZ DEVESA, Włodzimierz CIMOSZEWICZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Proposes a two-step approach whereby, in the event that the EU Ethics Body becomes aware of a breach or possible breach of ethics rules, it first recommends actions to put an end to the breach; considers that this first preventive step should ensure confidentiality and the right of the person to be heard; suggests that in the event that the individual concerned refuses to take the appropriate actions, the EU Ethics Body should make relevant information about the case publicly available and decide, if appropriate, on sanctions; considers that this two-step approach should apply provided that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the individual acted in bad faith and recommends that intentional breach, gross negligence, the concealment of evidence and non- compliance with the obligation to cooperate should be, as such, subject to sanctions, even when the breach itself has ceased; stresses that it is essential for the body to be able to investigate breaches of ethical rules by Members of the European Parliament and impose appropriate penalties, such as fines or the withholding of allowances; considers that the body should be able to investigate serious conflicts of interest arising in connection with a Member’s position as rapporteur or shadow rapporteur for specific files and take appropriate and effective decisions to remedy any contentious situations;

Amendment 185 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Amendment 186 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Proposes a two-step approach whereby, in the event that the EU Ethics Body becomes aware of a breach or possible breach of ethics rules, it first recommends, within a deadline, actions to put an end to the breach; considers that this first preventive step should ensure confidentiality and the right of the person to be heard; suggests that in the event that the individual concerned refuses to take the appropriate actions and the breach persists, the EU Ethics Body should make relevant information about the case publicly available and decide, if appropriate, on sanctions; considers that this two-step approach should apply provided that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the individual acted in bad faith and recommends that intentional breach, gross negligence, the concealment of evidence and non- compliance with the obligation to cooperate should be, as such, subject to sanctions, even when the breach itself has ceased;

Amendment 187 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Amendment 188 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Proposes a two-step approach whereby, in the event that the EU Ethics Body ~~becomes aware~~is informed of a breach or possible breach of ethics rules, it first recommends actions to put an end to the breach; considers that this first preventive step should ensure confidentiality and the right of the person to be heard; suggests that in the event that the individual concerned refuses to take the appropriate actions, the EU Ethics Body should make relevant information about the case publicly available and decide, if appropriate, on sanctions; considers that this two-step approach should apply provided that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the individual acted in bad faith and recommends that intentional breach, gross negligence, the concealment of evidence and non- compliance with the obligation to cooperate should be, as such, subject to sanctions, even when the breach itself has ceased;

Amendment 189 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16a. Calls for an example to be drawn from Member States' best practices on transparency in public life; stresses, in particular, the provisions of national law on gifts and invitations from lobbyists, including paid travel; points out that in some cases gifts worth more than EUR 15 are prohibited, which is one-tenth of the figure in Parliament and the Commission;

Amendment 19 #

Domènec RUIZ DEVESA, Włodzimierz CIMOSZEWICZ, Gabriele BISCHOFF

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

Amendment 190 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16 a. Considers that the Ethics Body procedures should be accompanied by a complementary proposal to ensure procedural guarantees to the people and institutions subject to these procedures, as well as the adequate data protection protocol.

Amendment 191 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16 a. Believes that as a general rule, the Body should decide by simple majority of its members;

Amendment 192 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 5

GReflections on general and final provisions

Amendment 193 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 5 a (new)

Underlines that any interinstitutional body should have an advisory function only in ethical matters and that in cases of corruption, OLAF is the competent authority;

Amendment 194 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 5 b (new)

Insists that the procedures laid down in the Treaties must be applied, such as the transfer of investigations by the European Court of Auditors to OLAF and to the European Court of Justice;

Amendment 195 #

Włodzimierz CIMOSZEWICZ, Daniel FREUND, Domènec RUIZ DEVESA, Gabriele BISCHOFF

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Is of the opinion that one year after its establishment, the EU Eethics Bbody sh~~ould publish an annual report containing both information about the fulfilment of its tasks and, where~~all adopt a general assessment of its activities, including analysis of the functioning of the rules and procedures and the experience acquired in applying them (review clause). In particular, the EU ethics body should focus on the assessment of: - the effectiveness on the implementation of its mandate and delegated powers, - the monitoring competences over ethics standards, - the application and efficiency of procedures. The EU ethics body shall submit appropriate, recommendations for ~~improving ethics standards;~~ amendments, including, if necessary, proposal to amend its competences and to present it before the EP.

Amendment 196 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Is of the opinion that the EU Ethics Body should publish an annual report containing both information about the fulfilment of its tasks and, where appropriate, recommendations for improving ethics standards; ; Recommends that the annual report describes the number of cases that were investigated, the institutions the individuals were coming from, the type of breaches concerned, the time the procedures took, the timeframe in which the breach was ended, the proportion of sanctions decided and recommendations;

Amendment 197 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Is of the opinion that the EU Ethics Body should publish an annual report containing ~~both~~ information about the fulfilment of its tasks ~~and, where appropriate, recommendations for improving ethics standards~~to be presented to the European Parliament;

Amendment 198 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

17 a. Calls for full transparency regarding all meetings organised by and involving the Body with private actors and their representatives, bot for-profit and non-profit organisations;

Amendment 199 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

~~18. Insists that the decisions of the EU Ethics Body should be legally binding, reviewable before the CJEU and subject to possible complaints to the EU Ombudsman;~~deleted

Amendment 2 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)

- having regard to the special report 13/2019 of the European Court of Auditors on the ethical frameworks of the audited EU institutions

Amendment 20 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas the shortcomings of the current EU ethics framework derive largely from the fact that it relies on a self- regulatory approach and lacks adequate human and financial resources and competences to verify information; whereas this independent ethics body is essential for restoring trust in the European institutions and their democratic legitimacy; whereas the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, despite the rejection by referendum in France and the Netherlands of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2005, has significantly undermined citizens’ trust in the European institutions;

Amendment 200 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

~~18. Insists that the decisions of the EU Ethics Body should be legally binding, reviewable before the CJEU and subject to possible complaints to the EU Ombudsman;~~deleted

Amendment 201 #

Pedro SILVA PEREIRA, Domènec RUIZ DEVESA, Włodzimierz CIMOSZEWICZ, Gabriele BISCHOFF

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Insists that the decisions of the EU Ethics Body should be legally binding~~, reviewable before the CJEU and~~ for the recipient member, staff and institution and reviewable before the CJEU; Believes that the participating institutions should bind themselves to an obligation to fully cooperate in all procedures falling under the scope of the agreed IIA, in particular to communicate to the Independent EU Ethics Body all information and documents necessary to the proper scrutiny of ethics rules; Reminds that the body’s activities would be subject to possible complaints to the EU Ombudsman;

Amendment 202 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Insists that the decisions of the EU Ethics Body should be legally binding, without prejudice of the Parliament's competences refer to in paragraph 11, reviewable before the CJEU and subject to possible complaints to the EU Ombudsman;

Amendment 203 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Insists that the decisions of the EU Ethics Body should be properly justified, well documented and legally binding, reviewable before the CJEU and subject to possible complaints to the EU Ombudsman;

Amendment 204 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Insists that ~~the decisions of the~~an EU Ethics Body ~~should b~~cannot issue legally binding~~, reviewable before the CJEU and subject to possible complaints to the EU Ombudsma~~ decisions, since no institution can delegate decision- making authority to another institution;

Amendment 205 #

Domènec RUIZ DEVESA, Włodzimierz CIMOSZEWICZ, Gabriele BISCHOFF

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)

18 a. The powers and activities of the Ethics Body are to be exercised without prejudice of European Parliament’s right of inquiry in accordance to article 226TFEU, and the necessary improving of the legal framework for the operation of the said right, which represents a cornerstone of the parliamentary democracy

Amendment 206 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)

18 a. Believes that the improvement of integrity, transparency, accountability as well as the highest standards of ethical behaviour of the EU institutions and EU decision-making processes should be part of the topics discussed in the framework of the Conference on the Future of Europe;

Amendment 21 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas the shortcomings of the current EU ethics framework derive largely from the fact that it relies on a self- regulatory approach which has proven to lack the independence indispensable to a satisfactory implementation of the rules and lacks adequate human and financial resources and competences to verify information;

Amendment 22 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas the shortcomings of the current EU ethics framework derive largely from the fact that it relies on a self-regulatory approach and lacks adequate human and financial resources and competences to verify informany further evolution of the EU ethics framework must have a clear legal basis while respecting the separation of powers as laid down in the Treationes;

Amendment 23 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas the shortcomings of the current EU ethics framework derive largely from the fact that it relies on a self- regulatory approach ~~and lacks adequate human~~, due to the absence of EU Criminal law, and fin~~ancial~~sufficient resources and competences to verify information;

Amendment 24 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

~~D. whereas, as a consequence, multiple cases of unethical conduct and their inadequate handling by the EU institutions have harmed the trust which European citizens place in the EU institutions;~~deleted

Amendment 25 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas, as a consequence, multiple cases of unethical conduct and their inadequate handling by the EU institutions have harmed the trust which European citizens place in the EU institutions; whereas the European Ombudsman recommended in 2018, in the wake of Mr Barroso joining Goldman Sachs, that the Commission grant its Ethics Committee the power to act on its own initiative whenever it considers it appropriate1 a; whereas the Commission has not taken the necessary measures to follow up the Ombudsman’s recommendations on the obligation to deal properly with the revolving door issue; whereas half of the former European Commissioners have left to join the private sector, often without respecting the cooling-off period and other ethical criteria; _________________ 1a https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/rec ommendation/en/90956

Amendment 26 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

Amendment 27 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas~~, as a consequence, multiple cases of unethical conduct and their inadequate handling by the EU institutions have harmed~~ every incidence of unethical behaviour can endanger the trust which European citizens place in ~~the~~ EU institutions;

Amendment 28 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas, as a consequence, multiple alleged cases of unethical conduct and their inadequate handling by the EU institutions have potentially harmed the trust which European citizens place in the EU institutions;

Amendment 29 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)

Da. whereas the 'revolving doors' phenomenon in particular is very much on the rise; whereas many Commissioners and a third of those who were MEPs from 2014 to 2019 have been recruited by organisations entered in the European Transparency Register; whereas this entails risks of conflict of interest with the legitimate areas of competence of the Member States and the EU institutions and of confidential information being disclosed or misused, as well as risks that former staff members may use their close personal contacts and friendships with ex-colleagues for lobbying purposes;

Amendment 3 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 12 a (new)

- having regard to the recommendations of the European Ombudsman in the joint inquiry into complaints 194/2017/EA, 334/2017/EA and 543/2017/EA on the European Commission's handling of the post- mandate employment of former Commissioners, a former Commission President and the role of its ‘Ethics Committee’1 a, _________________ 1a https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/rec ommendation/en/90956

Amendment 30 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)

D a. Whereas, according to the reports published by Transparency International more than 50% of ex-Commissioners and 30% of ex-Members work for organisations falling under the scope of the EU lobby register, 60% of the Members have declared outside activities, 31% of MEPs declared paid side jobs; Whereas, when not properly regulated, these situations can lead to conflict of interest, undue influence and regulatory capture;

Amendment 31 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas the current ethics standards framework appears to be highly fragmented, with different rules in different institutions, different processes and levels of enforcement even for the same EU staff regulations in different EU institutions, agencies and bodies, thus creating a complex system which is difficult for both EU citizens and for those who have to respect the rules to understand;

Amendment 32 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas the current ethics standards frameworks ~~appe~~arse t~~o be highly fragmented, with different rules in different institutions, creating a complex system which is difficult for both EU citizens and for those who have to respect the rules to understand~~ailored according to the specificities of each European institutions;

Amendment 33 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)

E a. Whereas the example of the “Haute Autorité pour la Transparence de la Vie Publique” in France demonstrates that a single and independent body responsible for the monitoring, enforcement and sanctioning of ethics rules applicable to public bodies is an effective powerful tool able to achieve a long-lasting reduction of unethical behaviour;

Amendment 34 #

Alin MITUȚA, Ramona STRUGARIU, Pascal DURAND, Gilles BOYER

Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)

E a. whereas the European Court of Auditors recommended, in its Special Report 13/2019, the use of a harmonised approach to handling ethical issues within the EU institutions;

Amendment 35 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)

E a. whereas the balance of powers assigned to the institutions is a fundamental guarantee afforded by the Treaty to European citizens;

Amendment 36 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas the Meroni doctrine developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) allows for the delegation of EU institutions’ competences to external bodies; under strict conditions; whereas according to the court any delegation of competences must be limited and can only relate to clearly defined executive powers, the use of which must be entirely subject to the supervision of the high authority and cannot concern discretionary powers involving any political judgement in order not to jeopardise the balance of powers between the institutions;

Amendment 37 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas the Meroni doctrine developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) allows for the delegation of EU institutions’ competences to external bodies, including competences that are not yet exercised;

Amendment 38 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)

Fa. whereas in their examination of potential conflicts of interest of Commissioner-designates in 2019, the Members of the Committee on Legal Affairs highlighted fundamental shortcomings in the current procedure; whereas these shortcomings include limited access to certain information, a lack of time for examination, a lack of investigative power and a lack of support from independent experts; whereas Article 17(3) of the Treaty on European Union provides that the Members of the European Commission are to be chosen ‘from persons whose independence is beyond doubt’;

Amendment 39 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)

F a. whereas, following the preceding considerations, the legal margin for overarching rules applied to individual institutions with a common application is very narrow;

Amendment 4 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Citation 13

— having regard to the recommendations of ~~Transparency International,~~ the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),

Amendment 40 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

Amendment 41 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas all lead candidates in the 2019 European elections committed to the creation of an independent ethics body common to all EU institutions; whereas the President of the Commission committed to it in her political guidelines and whereas Parliament has already supported this view; whereas the mission letter of the Vice- President of the European Commission responsible for values and transparency stressed the need for such an ethics body which is ‘common to all EU institutions’; whereas the European Parliament should set an example with regard to rules on ethics and their enforcement;

Amendment 42 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas ~~all~~some lead candidates in the 2019 European elections ~~committed to~~supported the creation of an independent ethics body common to all EU institutions; whereas the President of the Commission ~~committed to~~supports it in her political guidelines and whereas Parliament has already supported this view;

Amendment 43 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)

G a. Underlines that all EU institutions have to meet the highest standards of independence and impartiality while stressing each institution´s right of organisational sovereignty;

Amendment 44 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Recital G b (new)

G b. Recalls that Members of Parliament´s freedom of the mandate is in the interest of the citizens they represent;

Amendment 45 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Recital G c (new)

G c. Further highlights that the existing strict ethics framework for commissioners needs to be further developed in order to fill in existing legislative gaps such as the non-existence of a commissioner´s statue, underlines that this process is closely linked with parliamentary scrutiny and oversight and is of the opinion that a commissioner's statute needs to be elaborated in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure;

Amendment 46 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Recital G d (new)

G d. Points out that all staff in the institutions is covered by the EU staff regulations of officials of the European Union (EUSR) and conditions of employment of other servants of the European Union (CEOS);

Amendment 47 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Recital G e (new)

G e. Recalls that the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union set out a European governance framework based on the separation of powers, laying down distinct rights and obligations for each institution;

Amendment 48 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Recital G f (new)

G f. Points out that based on the principle of conferral, institutions cannot delegate by means of an interinstitutional agreement, powers which they themselves do not have, for instance where such powers are conferred by the Treaties on the Court of Auditors or have remained with the Member States;

Amendment 49 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Recital G g (new)

G g. Recalls furthermore that one of Parliament´s primary functions as laid down in the Treaty on European Union is to exercise political control;

Amendment 5 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Citation 13

— having regard to the recommendations of ~~Transparency Int~~the Organisation for Economic Co-Opernational and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe’´s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), and ~~the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)~~various NGO´s,

Amendment 50 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Believes that a single independent EU ethics body is necessary to ensure the consistent and full implementation of ethics standards across the EU institutions; proposes the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement (IIA) to set up an EU Ethics Body for Parliament and the Commission open to the participation of all EU institutions, agencies and bodies; recommends that the IIA contain the following provisions:deleted

Amendment 51 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 (new)

-1. Welcomes the agreement reached between the three institutions to introduce a European transparency register; urges them to conclude negotiations on this matter as soon as possible;

Amendment 52 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. BConsiders that the best way to strengthen, or restore, citizens’ trust in the European institutions is to apply high standards of transparency and accountability; believes that a single independent EU ethics body is necessary to ensure the consistent and full implementation of ethics standards across the EU institutions; ~~proposes~~considers that the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement ~~(IIA)~~ to set up an EU Ethics Body ~~for Parliament and the Commission open to the participation of~~ would risk limiting its scope to Parliament and the Commission; is concerned that other less virtuous institutions, agencies and bodies may not, on a voluntary basis, participate in an independent ethics body; considers it appropriate to revise the Treaties in order for participation in such an independent ethics body to be binding on all EU institutions, agencies and bodies; ~~recommend~~stresses that the ~~IIA contain the following provisions:~~Convention on the Future of Europe is an opportunity for European citizens to debate a possible treaty change which would include a binding requirement for all EU institutions to establish such an independent ethics body;

Amendment 53 #

Jacek SARYUSZ-WOLSKI, Angel DZHAMBAZKI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Believes that a single independent EU ethics body is necessary to ensure the consistent and full implementation of ethics standards across the EU institutions to guarantee that public decisions are not captured by private interests but driven solely by democratic processes, taken in light of the common good and to regain and maintain citizens’ trust in the European institutions; ; proposes the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement (IIA) based on Article 195 (TFEU) to set up an EU Ethics Body for Parliament and the Commission open to the participation of all EU institutions, agencies and bodies; recommends that the IIA contain the following provisions:

Amendment 54 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. ~~Believes that a single independent EU ethics body is necessary to ensure the consistent and full implementation of ethics standards across the EU institutions; p~~Proposes the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement (IIA) to set up an EU Ethics Body for Parliament and the Commission open to the participation of all EU institutions, agencies and bodies; recommends that the IIA contain the following provisions:

Amendment 55 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Believes that a single independent EU ethics body is necessary to ensure the consistent and full implementation of ethics standards across the EU institutions; proposes the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement (IIA) to set up an EU Ethics Body for Parliament and the Commission open to the participation of all EU institutions, agencies and bodies, and also provide them training and active guidance; recommends that the IIA contain the following provisions:

Amendment 56 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Believes that a single independent EU ethics body is necessary to ensure the consistent and full implementation of ethics standards across the EU institutions; proposes the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement (IIA) to set up anthe Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament should fully maintain its exclusive competence to decide on possible conflicts of interest; calls on the Commission and the Council to examine, without budgetary implications, whether a single independent EU Eethics Bbody ~~for Parliament and the Commission open to the participation of all EU institutions, agencies and bodies; recommends that the IIA contain the following provis~~is necessary and of added value for the purpose of ensuring the consistent and full implementation of ethics standards across the EU institutions:;

Amendment 57 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1 a. Principles Considers that any option under discussion for improving transparency and integrity in the EU institutions must be respectful of the following principles: - the principle of sound financial management, ensuring the efficient and effective management of Union ressources - the principles of conferral and separation of powers - the freedom to choose an occupation and the right to engage in work as stipulated by article 15 of the Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union - rule of law and fundamental European principles such as the presumption of innocence, the right to be heard, the principles of legality and proportionality - Freedom of the mandate of Members of European Parliament

Amendment 58 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1 b. Further stresses that any option under discussion requires a solid legal base for the constitution and for any competences to be assigned;

Amendment 59 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 c (new)

1 c. Insists that any option under discussion requires a clear definition of the mandate, composition and competences none of which must duplicate or interfere with the work of OLAF, the European Ombudsman, the European Court of Auditors or the European Court of Justice;

Amendment 6 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Citation 18 a (new)

- having regard to the powers and responsibilities of the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament, as set out in Annex VI to its Rules of Procedure;

Amendment 60 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 1

~~Scope and mandat~~Reflections on mandate and scope

Amendment 61 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 1 a (new)

Underlines that the principle of separation of powers is the foundation pillar of modern democracy; considers it imperative for the legislative to control the executive, as any reversal of the roles and powers of the legislative and executive would otherwise endanger the independence of the free mandate of elected Members of Parliament;

Amendment 62 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 1 b (new)

Stresses that any option under discussion for improving transparency and integrity in the EU institutions can neither, based on primary law, issue any decision on whether a criminal offense has been committed, nor impose any sanctions, nor impose any administrative measures intended to avoid or clean up accidental or negligent non-compliance with the rules;

Amendment 63 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 1 c (new)

Highlights that any option under discussion for improving transparency and integrity in the EU institutions which is to regulate the grey area in between can only have an advisory function for the institutions concerned;

Amendment 64 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 1 d (new)

Insists that any decisions on measures to be taken or sanctions to be imposed can only be taken by the competent bodies of the institutions themselves;

Amendment 65 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 1 e (new)

Recalls that distinction must be made between a conflict of interest arising during or after the exercise of a function and the importance to distinguish between the two and recalls furthermore to distinguish between acts that authorised if declared and acts that are not authorised at all.

Amendment 66 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 1 f (new)

Suggests that each institution concludes agreements on exchange of information with the Member States respecting the framework of the separation of powers;

Amendment 67 #

Pedro SILVA PEREIRA, Domènec RUIZ DEVESA, Włodzimierz CIMOSZEWICZ, Gabriele BISCHOFF

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – introductory part

2. Considers that the new EU Ethics Body should ~~be delegated a~~have an agreed list of competences to implement ethics rules for Members and staff which should be foreseen in the necessary changes to the existing legislation; takes the view that this list should include by way of a minimum the competences provided for in:

Amendment 68 #

Domènec RUIZ DEVESA, Włodzimierz CIMOSZEWICZ, Gabriele BISCHOFF

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – introductory part

2. Considers that the new EU Ethics Body should be delegated a list of competences to implement ethics rules for Commissioners, Members and staff; takes the view that this list should include by way of a minimum the competences provided for in:

Amendment 69 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – introductory part

2. Considers that the new EU Ethics Body should be delegated a list of competences to ~~implement~~propose and advise on ethics rules for Members and staff; takes the view that this list should include by way of a minimum the competences provided for in:

Amendment 7 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the TEU stipulates that ‘the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies and agencies’; whereas this implies that public decisions are taken in the interest of the common good and ~~not~~that conflicts of interests - which occur, according to the defin~~ancial power of individual actors;~~ ition of the OECD "when an individual or a corporation (either private or governmental) is in a position to exploit his or their own profession or official capacity in some way for personal or corporate benefit" - should be avoided in the legislative process and whereas any definition of conflict of interest has a contextual and evolving nature and full transparency does not necessarily guarantee the absence of any conflict of interest, nor does it guarantee that public trust will be won or decreased;

Amendment 70 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – introductory part

2. Considers that the new EU Ethics Body should be delegated a list of competences to implement ethics rules for Members and staff; takes the view that this list should include by way of a minimum the competences provided for in:any options under discussion for improving transparency and integrity in the EU institutions should only have advisory competences for the members of the institutions;

Amendment 71 #

Jacek SARYUSZ-WOLSKI, Angel DZHAMBAZKI

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – introductory part

2. Considers that the new advisory EU Ethics Body should be delegated a list of competences to implement ethics rules for Members and staff; takes the view that this list should include by way of a minimum the competences provided for in:

Amendment 72 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – indent 1

~~- the Statute for Members of the European Parliament: Articles 2 and 3,~~deleted

Amendment 73 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – indent 2

~~- Parliament’s Rules of Procedure: Rules 2, 10 and 11, 176(1), Annex I, Articles 1 to 3, 4(6), 5 and 6 and Annex II,~~deleted

Amendment 74 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – indent 2

- Parliament’s Rules of Procedure: Rules 2, 10(5, 6 and 7) and 11, 176(1), Annex I, Articles 1 to 3, 4(6), 5 and 6 and Annex II,

Amendment 75 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – indent 2

- Parliament’'s Rules of Procedure: Rules 2, 10 (5 and 6), 11, 176~~(1)~~, Annex I, (Articles 1 to ~~3, 4(6), 5 and 6 and~~8), Annex II,

Amendment 76 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – indent 3

- the Commission’s Rules of Procedure: Article 9, its Code of Conduct, Article 2 and Articles 5-11, and Annex II, and its Decision of 25 November 2014 on the publication of information on meetings held between Members of the Commission and organisations or self- employed individuals, and the same decision for Directors-General,deleted

Amendment 77 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – indent 3

- the Commission’s Rules of Procedure: Article 9, its Code of Conduct, Article 2 and Articles 5-11, and Annex II, and its Decision of 25 November 2014 on the publication of information on meetings held between Members of the Commission and organisations or self-employed individuals, ~~and the same decision for Directors-General,~~

Amendment 78 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – indent 3

- the Commission’s Rules of Procedure: Article 9, its Code of Conduct, Article 2 ~~and Articles 5-11~~to 13, and Annex II, and its Decision of 25 November 2014 on the publication of information on meetings held between Members of the Commission and organisations or self-employed individuals, and the same decision for Directors-General,

Amendment 79 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – indent 4

~~- the Staff Regulation’s Articles 11, 11(a), 12, 12(a), 12(b), 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21(a), 22(a), 22(c), 24, 27 and 40,~~deleted

Amendment 8 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

Amendment 80 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – indent 4

- the Staff Regulation’s Articles 11, 11(a), 12, 12(a), 12(b), 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21(a), 22(a), 22(c), 24, 27 and 40, applying mutatis mutandis to all personnel employed by the agencies if signatories of the IIA

Amendment 81 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – indent 4

- the Staff Regulation’s Articles 11, 11~~(a)~~a, 12, 12~~(a)~~a, 12~~(b)~~b, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21~~(a)~~a, 22, 22~~(a)~~a, 22~~(c)~~c, 24, 26, 27 and 40, 43, 86, 90- 91a and Annex IX

Amendment 82 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – indent 5

~~- The IIA on a mandatory Transparency Register;~~deleted

Amendment 83 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2 a. Recalls the difference between Members of Parliament who are elected and receive allowances, and civil servants who are appointed and receive a salary; stresses that for the former, control should take place after the election, and for the latter before the appointment

Amendment 84 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)

2 b. Recalls that the notion of conflict of interest during the term of office or functions should be distinguished from the situation before and after

Amendment 85 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 c (new)

2 c. Recalls the necessity to distinguish what must be declared and what must be prohibited;

Amendment 86 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 d (new)

2 d. Points out, however, that the final decision making concerning the adoption of ethics rules as well as decisions on sanctions remain the prerogative of the participating Institutions

Amendment 87 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Believes that the Members and staff of the participating institutions should be covered by the agreement before, during and after the term of office or service in line with the applicable rules; considers that this should apply to Members of Parliament, Commissioners and all EU staff falling under the scope of the Staff Regulation;deleted

Amendment 88 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Believes that the Members and staff of the participating institutions should be covered by the agreement before, during and after the term of office or service in line with the applicable rules; considers that this should apply to Members of Parliament, Commissioners, Commissioner-designates, and all EU staff falling under the scope of the Staff Regulation;

Amendment 89 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Believes that the Members and staff of ~~the participating~~all the institutions should be covered by the ~~agreement~~independent ethics body before, during and after the term of office or service in line with the applicable rules; considers that this should apply to Members of Parliament, Commissioners and all EU staff falling under the scope of the Staff Regulation;

Amendment 9 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

Aa. whereas the independence, transparency and accountability of public institutions and their elected representatives, Commissioners and officials are of the utmost importance for promoting the trust of citizens that is necessary for the legitimate functioning of democratic institutions;

Amendment 90 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Believes that the Members and staff of the participating institutions should be covered by the agreement before, during and in some cases after the term of office or service in line with the applicable rules; considers that this should apply to Members of Parliament, Commissioners and all EU staff falling under the scope of the Staff Regulation;

Amendment 91 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3 a. Reminds that when it comes to individuals covered by the staff regulation, the competence can be delegated to the Independent EU Ethics Body by making use of the enabling clauses in article 2(2) and or 9(1) and would concern the monitoring and enforcement of the ethical obligations while other professional obligations will continue to be enforced by the appointing authorities;

Amendment 92 #

Domènec RUIZ DEVESA, Włodzimierz CIMOSZEWICZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Insists that the IIA should be open to the participation of all EU institutions and bodies and reminds that co-legislators may decide to bind agencies through their founding regulation; believes that the IIA should allow the Ethics Body to conclude agreements with national authorities with a view to ensuring the exchange of information necessary for the performance of its tasks, for example tax information, land registers, data held by national ethics bodies;

Amendment 93 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Insists that the IIA should be open to the participation of all EU institutions and bodies; believes that the IIA should allow the Ethics Body to conclude agreements with national authorities with a view to ensuring the exchange of information necessary for the performance of its tasks as well as to explore best practices and peer to peer reviews;

Amendment 94 #

Rainer WIELAND, Vladimír BILČÍK, Loránt VINCZE, Brice HORTEFEUX, László TRÓCSÁNYI, Paulo RANGEL, Sven SIMON, Ernő SCHALLER-BAROSS, Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Insists that ~~the IIA~~any cooperation agreement between the institutions should be open to ~~the~~ participation of ~~all~~other EU institutions and bodies~~; believes that the IIA should allow the Ethics Body to conclude agreements with national authorities with a view to ensuring the exchange of information necessary for the performance of its task~~ in order to agree on common measures which can be implemented in respect of the division of powers;

Amendment 95 #

Alin MITUȚA, Ramona STRUGARIU, Pascal DURAND, Gilles BOYER

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Insists that the IIA should be open to the participation of all EU institutions and bodies; believes that the IIA should allow the Ethics Body to conclude agreements with national authorities with a view to ensuring the exchange of information and best practices necessary for the performance of its tasks;

Amendment 96 #

Gabriele BISCHOFF, Domènec RUIZ DEVESA, Włodzimierz CIMOSZEWICZ, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Insists that the IIA should be open to the participation of all EU institutions and bodies; believes that the IIA should allow the Ethics Body to ~~conclude agreements~~exchange information with national authorities ~~with a view to ensuring the exchange of information~~that are necessary for the performance of its tasks;

Amendment 97 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Insists that th~~e IIA should be open to the participation of~~is independent ethics body should be mandatory for all EU institutions and bodies; believes that the ~~IIA should allow the Ethics Body~~Ethics Body should be able to conclude agreements with national authorities with a view to ensuring the exchange of information necessary for the performance of its tasks;

Amendment 98 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4 a. Reminds that competences of the Independent EU Ethics Body over Members are without prejudice of sanctions and procedures foreseen in the Treaties, the Members’ statute, the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, and the protocol on the privileges and Immunities of the European Union;

Amendment 99 #