79 Amendments of Notis MARIAS related to 2014/2248(INI)
Amendment 1 #
Draft opinion
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas all EU institutions without exception ought to be transparent and fully accountable to the citizens of the EU as regards the funds entrusted to them as EU institutions;
Amendment 3 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Considers that Parliament’s powers of oversight and monitoring of EU budget implementation are key to ensuring effective accountability of the institutions and should therefore be reinforced and extended immediately;
Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 a (new)
Citation 1 a (new)
Amendment 5 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Believes that for the UnionMember States to meet the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy and to address current and new challenges effectively, it needs to be granted a budget that is commensurate with the mission it isthey are called on to accomplish; considers that the current level of the EU budget, which corresponds to 1 % of the EU-28 GDP, is not sufficient to achieve these goals;
Amendment 5 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Notes the fact that the list of institutions defined in Article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) differs from that stated in Article 2 of the Financial Regulation; considers that having different meanings for the same concept enshrined in EU legislation is misleading; and urges the Commission and Council to correct this anomaly;
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 b (new)
Citation 1 b (new)
– having regard to Protocol (No 2) to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality,
Amendment 7 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Finds that there are a few instances where the letter of the TFEU diverges from the practice and the spirit of the Treaty; is of the opinion that these incoherencies need to be corrected in line with the principles of democracy and transparency;
Amendment 12 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Points out that effective supervision of the institutions’ and bodies’ implementation of the EU budget requires bona fide cooperation with Parliament, as well as an annual follow-up document from all the institutions on the discharge recommendations of Parliament; regrets that the Council hais not adhereding to this procedure;
Amendment 14 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Notes that the procedure of giving discharge separately to the individual EU institutions and bodies is a long-standing practice developed to guarantee transparency and democratic accountability towards EU taxpayers; underlines that this effectively guarantees Parliament’s right and duty to scrutinise the whole of the EU budget; recalls the Commission’s view, expressed in January 2014, that all institutions without exception are fully part of the follow-up process to the observations made by Parliament in the discharge exercise and should unfailingly cooperate to ensure the smooth functioning of the discharge procedure;
Amendment 15 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. In order to enable Parliament to take an informed decision on granting discharge, requires the institutions to provide Parliament with their annual activity reports and to give Parliament sufficient information in answers to to its questions during the discharge process;
Amendment 21 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Requests that the Financial Regulation be updated in order to clarify the objectives of the discharge procedure and to clearly define the sanctions to be imposed for not respecting this procedure; highlightstresses that this should be done in order to hold the EU institutions accountable with the aim of protecting the financial interests of EU citizens; stresses that there should be no exceptions;
Amendment 24 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Acknowledges the crucial role of the Court of Auditors in ensuring better, fairer and smarter spending of the EU budget; recalls the importance of the Court’s role as European public auditing authority;
Amendment 26 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Notes that the Court’s composition and its appointment procedure are laid down in Articles 285 and 286 TFEU; considers that Parliament and the Council should be on an equal footing when appointing Members of the Court of Auditors, in order to ensure democratic legitimacy, transparency and the complete independence of those Members; calls for the Council to respect in full the decisions taken by Parliament subsequent to hearings of candidates nominated as Members of the Court of Auditors;
Amendment 28 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Deplores the factNotes that certain appointment procedures have resulted in conflicts between Parliament and the Council on candidates; stresses that it is, as stipulated in the Treaty, Parliament’s duty to evaluate the nominees; emphasises that these conflicts might harm the good working relations of the Court with the aforementioned institutions and could possibly have serious negative consequences for the credibility, and hence the effectiveness, of the Court; is of the opinion that the Council should, in the spirit of good cooperation among the EU institutions, respect the decisions taken by Parliament subsequent to the hearings.
Amendment 31 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Is convinced that the EU budget needs to be endowed with a system of genuine own resources, with simplicity, fairness and transparency as guiding principles; considers that such a system should reduce the share of GNI contributions to the EU budget with a view to abandoning the ‘juste retour’ approach of Member States; insists, in this context, on the phasing-out of all forms of rebates;
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital Α
Recital Α
Α. whereas the ‘polycrisis’ currently faced by the Union, including its financial, economic, social and migratory consequences, as well as the choices made by its institutions to deals with these consequences have all led reasonably to the rejection by a growing part of the population of the current European Union;
Amendment 41 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Considers that the multiannual financial framework should allow for maximum flexibility in order to respond to crises and evolving political priorities; stresses, in this context, the need to make available in the budget all extraordinary revenue resulting from decommitments under the EU budget or competition fines;
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
Β. whereas progress towards a Union that can really deliver on and achieve itsthe goals are impaired by a failure of governance owing to a continuous and systematic search for unanimity in the Council (which is still basof prosperity of the citizens of its Member States, is hampered onby the so- called Luxembourg Compromise) and the lack of a credible single executive authority enjoying full democratic legitimacy and competence to take effective action across a wide spectrum of policielf-serving interests served by its institutions, as well as the economic interests of wealthier Member States; whereas recent examples such as the uncontrolled migration flow, the slow clean-upuncontrolled activities of our banks after the outbreak of the financial crisis and the lack of an immediate common response to the internal and external threat of terrorism have aptly demonstrated the Union’s incapacity to respond effectively and quickly;
Amendment 49 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Underlines the need to safeguard the principle of unity of the budget, and is concerned aboutNotes the recent shift from the Community method to intergovernmental decision-making as observed in the setting- up of ad hoc satellite instruments outside the EU budget such as the Trust Funds; stresses the need to ensure parliamentary oversight over all EU expenditure.
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas this problem, coupled with a lack of a common vision on the part of our Member States as regards the future of oEur continent,ope has given rise to unprecedented levels of ‘euroscepticism’ that risk a return to nationalism and the disintegration of the Uniona search by various political forces for solutions outside of the ‘European one-way integration’;
Amendment 68 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas, instead of fostering the Union, the system whereby Member States make progress at different speeds in accordance with their different capacities and circumstances, further reinforced in the Lisbon Treaty, which introduced new formal methods of enhanced cooperation, has increased the complexity of the Union and accentuated its ‘variable geometry’; whereas more and more Member States are declining to agree on the goals and prefer ‘à la carte’ solutions, some of them even unilaterally and accentuated its ‘variable geometry’;
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
Ε. whereas, in the field of the euro and monetary policy, the United Kingdom obtained a permanent derogation from joining (Protocol No 15), Denmark has a constitutional exemption (Protocol No 16), Sweden has ceased to follow the euro convergence criteria and the possibility of Greece leaving the single currency has been openly discussed in the European Council;
Amendment 95 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas, as regards Schengen, the free movement of people and the resulting abolition of internal border controls, all formally integrated into the Treaties, ‘opt- outs’ were given to the UK and Ireland; whereas four other Member States are also not taking part, but have the obligation to do so, while ‘opt-ins’ were accorded to three countries outside the European Union; whereas this fragmentation not only prevents the total abolition of some remaining internal borders, but also hinders the establishment of a true internal market and of a fully integrated area of freedom, security and justiceBelgium, France, Austria and Germany have ceased to comply with the Schengen rules;
Amendment 102 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
Amendment 117 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas, since the Treaty of Lisbon, further accelerated by the financial and migration crises, the European Council has widened its role to include day-to-day management through the adoption of intergovernmental instruments outside the framework of the EU such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG or the ‘Fiscal Compact’) and the deal with Turkey on migration; whereas the above mechanisms have not achieved their goals;
Amendment 123 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas, while Article 16 of the TSCG provides that within five years of the date of entry into force (before 1 January 2018) the necessary steps must have been taken to incorporate the Fiscal Compact into the legal framework of the Union, it is clear that the resilience of the euro area, including the completion of the banking union, cannot be achieved without further fiscal deepening steps together with the establishment of a more reliable, effective and democratic form of governance; whereas this will complete the current St the current Stability and Growth Pact is counterproductive and should be abiolity and Growth Pact, which, ever since it came into existence, even after its reform by the so-called six- pack and two-pack, has never been applied for any obvious political reasonsshed as soon as possible;
Amendment 142 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas thisprogress to a new system of governance implies a genuine governmentwith a government that will bypass national authorities, equipped to formulate and implement the common monetary, fiscal and macro- economic policies that the euro area desperately needs and must be endowed with a treasury and budget commensuattempted by some political forces desperately with the scale of the tasks at hll intensify the contradictions and; whereas this requires, in addition to measures within the existing primary law, a reform of the Lisbon Treatyill cause a chaotic disintegration of the European Union;
Amendment 149 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital K
Recital K
K. whereas this is also the case for the necessary reform and modernisation of the financial resources of the whole European Union; whereas the agreement on the current multiannual financial framework (MFF) was only reached after long and strenuous negotiations and was accompanied by the decision to establish a high-level group to review the Union’s revenue system of ‘own resources’, due to report in 2016; whereas the current MFF severely limits the financial autonomy of the Union, as most of the revenue consists of national contributions by the Member States and a large part of the expenditure is already preordained by means of returns to these same Member States;
Amendment 159 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas the European Union is a constitutional system which must be based on the rule of law; whereas the Treaties must be changed to give the European Court of Justice (ECJ) jurisdiction over all aspects of EU law, in particular common foreign and security policy (Article 24(1) TEU) and monetary and economic policy (Article 126(10) TFEU);
Amendment 174 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital M
Recital M
Amendment 188 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital N
Recital N
N. whereas over the past decade the security situation in Europe has deteriorated markedly, especially in our neighbourhood: no longer can a single Member State guarantee its internal and external security alareas where neoliberal economic policies took place and where there was a lack of integration of populations originating from uncontrolled migratione;
Amendment 193 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital O
Recital O
O. whereas the decline of Europe’s defence capabilities has limited its ability to project stability beyond our immediate borders; whereas this goes hand in hand with the reluctance of our US allies to intervene if Europe is not ready to take its fair share of responsibility; whereas this leads inevitably to the need for more intense cooperation among the Member States and an integration of some of their defence capacities into a European defence community, both in line with a new European security strategyfence sector is the sole responsibility of the Member States;
Amendment 204 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital P
Recital P
Amendment 212 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital Q
Recital Q
Q. whereas clarifications are still needed as regards the European elections and on the matter of who leads the Union; whereas, despite the fact that the outcome of the 2014 European parliamentary elections having for the first time led directly to the nomination of the candidate for President of the Commission, a clear direct democratic link is still lacking, although the European Council has agreed to review the ‘Spitzenkandidat’ process in time for 201918; whereas, moreover, there is still confusion – not least among third parties – about the interrelationship of the Presidents of the Commission and the European Council; __________________ 18 EUCO conclusions of 27 June 2014. EUCO conclusions of 27 June 2014.
Amendment 226 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital R
Recital R
R. whereas, finally, the urgency for reform of the Union has been dramatically increased by the United Kingdom’s decision, through a referendum, to leave the European Union; whereas it is crystal clear that the negotiations to set out the arrangements for the UK’s withdrawal also need to take account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union; whereas this agreement must be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) TFEU and be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament;
Amendment 245 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital S
Recital S
S. whereas the UK’s decision creates an opportunity to reduce and drastically simplify the ‘variable geometry’ and complexity of the Union; whereas it offers at least the opportunity to clarify what membership of the Union really means and what could be a clear structure in the future for the EU’s relationship with non- members in our periphery (the United Kingdom, Norway, Turkey, Ukraine, etc.); whereas the founding fathers of the Union had already envisaged a type of ‘associate status’;
Amendment 264 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Considers that the time of crisis management by means of ad hoc and incremental decisions has passed, as it only leads to measures that are too little, too late; is convinced that it is now time to address the shortcomings of the governance of the European Union by undertaking a comprehensive, in-depth reform of the Lisbon Treaty;
Amendment 280 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Notes that the direction of the Union’s reform should lead towards its modernisation by estabrealishing new effective European capacities and instruments, rather than its renationalisationthe mistakes of the past that led to the Brexit and to the perpetuation of the financial crisis, while respective the need for renationalisation of the decisions taken in certain areas and by means of greater intergovernmentalism;
Amendment 299 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Underlines that recent Eurobarometer polling demonstrates that, contrary to popular belief, EU citizens are still fully aware of the importance of, and in support of, genuine European solutions in some areas19; __________________ 19 Standard Eurobarometer 84 - Autumn 2015 & Special Eurobarometer EP - June 2016.
Amendment 311 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Observes with great concernNotes the proliferation of subsets of Member States undermining the unity of the Union by causing a lack of transparency, as well as, which have been established as a result of the German- centred political direction that diominishingates in the EU so as to restore the trust of the peoplecitizens thereof;
Amendment 324 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Stresses that a comprehensive democratic reflection on the reform of the Treaties can and must only be achieved through a Convention, which guarantees inclusiveness through its composition of representatives of national parliaments, governments of all the Member States, entities of the society, the Commission and the European Parliament, and also provides the proper platform for such reflection and engagement with European citizestrictly the citizens of Member States of the EU, to ensure the absence of exclusions;
Amendment 336 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 1
Subheading 1
Ending ‘Europe à la carte’German Europe
Amendment 341 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Notes that the fracturing process of ‘variable geometry’ has found its way into the European decision-making process every time the European Council decides to apply intergovernmental methods and to bypass the ‘Union method’ as defined in the Treaties; this not only leads to less effective policy-making but also contributes to a growing lack of transparency, democratic accountability and control;
Amendment 355 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Considers that the ‘current Union method’ is the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into accountoutmoded and deeply undemocratic; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;
Amendment 371 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Considers it essential in these circumstances to reaffirm the mission of an ‘ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Article 1 TEU) iIn order to mitigate any tendency towards disintegration and to clarify once morewith a view to redefining the moral, political and historical purpose of the European Union, as well as theits constitutional nature, of the European Unionconsiders that the method of decision- making within the European Union must change radically;
Amendment 383 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise across the board the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’, by ending the disruptive practice ofand opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;
Amendment 419 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Notes that this new type of ‘associate status’ could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that this wish must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties, with the interests of citizens and democracy as the watchwords;
Amendment 438 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate, in so far as it wishes to, in all decision- making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that intermediate arrangements will need to be made concerning the UK’s participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;
Amendment 460 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Is greatly concerned by the lack of economic reform and convergence in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as well as the loss of competitivenessrapid collapse of the economies of many of its Member States;
Amendment 485 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States, including Germany, without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;
Amendment 505 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Acknowledges the improvementBelieves that the changes brought by the European Semester, the six- pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they have not solved the problems; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system overly complex, are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations and do not cover spill- over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole and are not solving any problems;
Amendment 518 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Is acutely aware of the need to review the efficacy of the many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, and to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy does not function and needs to be elevated into binding legal acts;
Amendment 532 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Proposes therefore merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standards, where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member StatThe coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU should not remove the sovereign rights of EU Member States to independently determine their economic policies;
Amendment 560 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Believes that, in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, such a common debt instrument needs to be established, inspired by the proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts of 9 November 2011, whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund, with strong individual commitments on structural reforms to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to the required maximum of 60 %; insists that euro-area members would only be able to participate when they are in compliance with the convergence codat the same time, calls on all the relevant national authorities in accordance with Article 7(9) of Regulation No 472/2013 to carry out a debt audit; believes that this audit should define the amounts of odious debt for each Member State, asnd this will prevent moral hazardat these should be immediately cancelled from the obligations of those States;
Amendment 562 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18a. Considers it necessary to open the debate at EU level concerning the subject of German war reparations where these are being demanded by Greece and the other EU Member States and considers that the satisfaction of these is not only an economic obligation incumbent on Germany but also an opportunity to stabilise the European economy and at the same time to restore justice;
Amendment 566 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
Amendment 616 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
Amendment 631 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
Amendment 645 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
Amendment 695 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
Amendment 726 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Recognises the geopolitical, economic and environmental need for the creation of a genuine Europeaneed for greater convergence at regional level and cooperation between energy union; notes that this will require thighbouring states in some aremovalas of the constraint that EU policyproduction chain; notes that this must not affect a state’s right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy sources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply (Article 194(2) TFEU);
Amendment 738 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Notes that the Treaties provide ample means to set up a humane, well- functioningfair migration management system including a European Border and Coast Guard; believes, however, that the Treaties, particularly Article 79(5) TFEU, are too restrictive regarding other aspects; considers it necessary to set up a pan-European system of distribution of immigration, especially on the establishment of a genuine European legal migration system; insists that democratic scrutiny by Parliament is needed on the implementation of border control, asylum and migration policies, and that the safeguarding of national security cannot be used as a pretext to circumvent European actionnts similar to the one applying to refugees; believes that the distribution of immigrants under this system should take account of the population, per capita GDP, the unemployment rate as well as the territorial extent and the growth of the economy of each Member State;
Amendment 765 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 5
Subheading 5
Amendment 767 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
31. Regrets, as stated in its resolution of XXXXX on the improvement of the functioning of the European Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty, that the EU has not made more progress in developing its capacity to agree and to implement a common foreign and security policy (CFSP); nNotes that its efforts in initiating a common security and defence policy have not been particularly successful;
Amendment 780 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Is of the opinion, while reiterating that more progress could and should be made under the terms of the Lisbon Treaty, including as regards use of the provisions to act by qualified majority voting, that the Vice-President / High Representative should be named EU Foreign Minister and be supported in her efforts to become the main external representative of the European Union in international fora, not least at the level of the UN; considers it essential that, owing to the broad and heavy workload, the Foreign Minister should be able to appoint political deputies; proposes a review of the functionality of the current European External Action Servicethat external policy is exercised by the national authorities;
Amendment 814 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Believes, finally, that it is essential that the restrictions in Article 24(1) TEU on the authority of the European Court of Justice in the field of CFSP be removed; calls, in the same spirit, for Parliament to gain greater powers of scrutiny and accountability over CFSP, including full co-decision powers over the budgetNotes that the new CFSP must be built around the solution of international controversies by peaceful means and respect strictly the strategic and diplomatic interests of all Member States;
Amendment 841 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
Amendment 856 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
Amendment 869 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
Amendment 887 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
Paragraph 38
Amendment 900 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
Paragraph 39
39. Reiterates its call for a single seat for the European Parliament; proposes that Parliament and the Council each decide the location of their own seat after having obtained the consent of the other; further proposes that the seats of all the other EU institutions, agencies and bodies be determined by Parliament and the Council on a proposal by the European executive, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure;
Amendment 912 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
Paragraph 40
40. Notes that, despite the prohibition in Article 15(1) TEU, the European Council has undertaken various legislative initiatives; proposes abolishing Article 15(1) and integrating the European Council into a Council of States that could engage legitimately in the law- making process and provide direction and coherence to the other specialised Council configurations;
Amendment 919 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
Amendment 928 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
Paragraph 42
Amendment 934 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43
Paragraph 43
Amendment 946 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44
Paragraph 44
Amendment 969 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 46
Paragraph 46
Amendment 980 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 47
Paragraph 47
47. Proposes moreover that, in line with the common practice in a number of Member States, both chambers of the EU legislature, Parliament and the Council, should be given the right of legislative initiative, without prejudice to the basic legislative prerogative of the European executive or government;
Amendment 1016 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52
Paragraph 52
52. Believes, finally, that the current Treaty ratification procedure is too rigid to befit such a supranational polity as the European Union; proposes allowing amendments to the Treaties to come into force if not by an EU-wide referendum then after being ratified by a qualified majority of four-fifths of the Member States, having obtained the consent of Parliament; correspondingly, once this threshold has been met,Proposes allowing amendments to the Treaties to come into force by referendum at each state; notes that Member States which still decline to ratify the amended Treaty should decide, in accordance with their own constitutional requirements, whether to start the process of secession or to opt for an associate status;