38 Amendments of Eleftherios SYNADINOS related to 2014/2248(INI)
Amendment 36 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital Α
Recital Α
Α. whereas the ‘polycrisis’ currently faced by the Union, including its financial, economic, political, social and migratory consequences, as well as terrorism, have all led to the rejection by a growing part of the population of the current European Union;
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
Β. whereas progress towards a Union that can really deliver on and achieve its goals are impaired by a failure of governance owing to a continuous and systematic , while institutional, search for unanimity in the Council (which is still based on the so- called Luxembourg Compromise) and the lack of a credible single executive authority enjoying full democratic legitimacy, through electoral procedure, and competence to take effective action across a wide spectrum of policies; whereas recent examples such as the uncontrolled migration flow, the slow clean-up of our banks after the outbreak of the financial crisis and the lack of an immediate common response to the internal and external threat of terrorism have aptly demonstrated the Union’s incapacity to respond effectively and quickly;
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas this problem, coupled with a lack of a common vision and common goals on the part of our Member States as regards the future of our continent, has given rise to unprecedented levelsa justified increase of ‘euroscepticism’ that risk a returnleads to nationalism and the disintegration of the Union;
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas, instead of fostering the Union, the system whereby Member States make progress at different speeds in accordance with their different capacities and circumstances, further reinforced in the Lisbon Treaty, which introduced new formal methods of enhanced cooperation, has increased the complexity of the Union and accentuated its ‘variable geometry’; whereas more and more Member States are declining to agree on the goals and prefer ‘à la carte’ solutions, some of them even unilaterally, such as imposing strict austerity;
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
Ε. whereas, in the field of the euro and monetary policy, the United Kingdom obtained a permanent derogation from joining (Protocol No 15), Denmark has a constitutional exemption (Protocol No 16), Sweden has ceased to follow the euro convergence criteria and the possibility of Greece leaving the single currency has been openly discussed in the European Council and in the Eurogroup;
Amendment 100 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas, as regards Schengen, the free movement of people and the resulting abolition of internal border controls, all formally integrated into the Treaties, ‘opt- outs’ were given to the UK and Ireland; whereas four other Member States are also not taking part, but have the obligation to do so, while ‘opt-ins’ were accorded to three countries outside the European Union; whereas this fragmentation not only prevents the total abolition of some remaining internal bordersuniformity of the Schengen area, but also hinders the establishment of a true internal market and of a fully integrated area of freedom, security and justice;
Amendment 110 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas, last but not least, this ‘variable geometry’ endangers the uniform application of EU law, leads to excessive complexity in terms of good governance, jeopardises the cohesion of the Union and undermines solidarity among its citizens;
Amendment 133 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas, while Article 16 of the TSCG provides that within five years of the date of entry into force (before 1 January 2018) the necessary steps must have been taken to incorporate the Fiscal Compact into the legal framework of the Union, it is clear that the resilience of the euro area, including the completion of the banking union, cannot be achieved without further fiscal deepening steps together with the establishment of a more reliable, effective and democratic form of governanceadministrative authority; whereas this will complete the current Stability and Growth Pact, which, ever since it came into existence, even after its reform by the so- called six-pack and two-pack, has never been applied for any obvious political reasons;
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas this new system of governanceadministrative authority implies a genuine government equipped to formulate andpropose and, following approval by the Council, implement the common monetary, fiscal and macro- economic policies that the euro area desperately needs and must be endowed with a treasury and budget commensurate with the scale of the tasks at hand; whereas this requires, in addition to measures within the existing primary law, a reform of the Lisbon Treaty;
Amendment 152 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital K
Recital K
K. whereas this is also the case for the necessary reform and modernisation of the financial resources of the whole European Union; whereas the agreement on the current multiannual financial framework (MFF) was only reached after long and strenuous negotiations and was accompanied by the decision to establish a high-level group to review the Union’s revenue system of ‘own resources’, due to report in 2016; whereas the current MFF severely limits the financial autonomself- sufficiency of the Union, as most of the revenue consists of national contributions by the Member States and a large part of the expenditure is already preordained by means of returns to these same Member States;
Amendment 161 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas the European Union is a constitutional system andsystem which is based on the rule of law; whereas the Treaties must be changed to give the European Court of Justice (ECJ) increased jurisdiction over allthe aspects of EU law, in particular common foreign and security policy (Article 24(1) TEU) and monetary and economic policy (Article 126(10) TFEU);
Amendment 179 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital M
Recital M
M. whereas this review is also needed to rebalance the functioning of the Union, with the aim of less bureaucratic regulation and more effective policymaking; whereas this exercise also concerns the competences conferred on the Union that impair the ability to make progress towards some of its stated objectives such as the energy union, common migration management and security policy;
Amendment 187 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital N
Recital N
N. whereas over the past decade the security situation in Europe has deteriorated markedly, especially in our neighbourhood: no longer can a single Member State guarantee its internal and external security alone, because of the erroneous policies of the Union;
Amendment 197 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital O
Recital O
O. whereas the decline of Europe’s defence capabilities has limited its ability to project stability beyond our immediate borders; whereas this goes hand in hand with the reluctance of our US allies to intervene if Europe is not ready to take its fair share of responsibility; whereas this leads inevitably to the need for more intense cooperation among the Member States and an integration of some of their defence capacities into a European defence community, both in line with a new European security strategy and in accordance with Article 42 of the Treaty;
Amendment 268 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Considers that the time of crisis management by means of ad hoc and incremental decisions has passed, as it only leads to measures that are too little, too late; is convinced that it is now time to address the shortcomings of the governance of the European Union by undertaking a comprehensive, in-depth reform of the Lisbon Treaty, and especially by changing the policies followed;
Amendment 287 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Notes that the direction of the Union’s reform should lead towards its modernisation by establishing new effective European capacities and instruments, rather than its renationalisation by means of greater intergovernmentalismwithout however questioning the national policies of Member States;
Amendment 312 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Observes with great concern the proliferation of subsets of Member States uandermining the unity of the Union by causing a lack of transparency, as well as diminishing the trust of the people citizens of the Union who doubt its unity due to the political impasses;
Amendment 359 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judiciprocedural control;
Amendment 389 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’, by endreconsidering the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;
Amendment 481 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions, as a result of the institutional inability of the EU to adopt realistic solutions;
Amendment 610 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Is of the opinion that, in order to increase financial stability, mitigate cross- border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession, the euro area needs a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility equipped with a capacity to borrow, such as the adoption of the eurobond; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;
Amendment 641 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Calls, therefore, for the executive authority to be concentrated in the Commission in the role of an EU Finance Ministery, by endowing the Commission with the capacity to formulateplan and give effect, following approval by the Eurogroup, to a common EU economic policy combining macro-economic, fiscal and monetary instruments, backed up by a euro-area budget; the Finance Minister should be responsible and accountable before the Council and the Eurogroup for the operation of the ESM and other mutualised funds, and be the single external representative of the euro area in international organisations, especially in the financial sector;
Amendment 661 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Considers it necessary to endowgive the Finance Minister with proportionathe powers to intervene in the setting of nationaldebate within the Eurogroup on economic and fiscal policies in cases where the convergence code is not respected, and the power to upropose the use of fiscal capacity or the common bond instrument for those Member States that are compliant with the convergence code;
Amendment 690 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Calls for the suppressionamendment of Article 126(10) TFEU in order that the European Court of Justice gain fullenlarged jurisdiction over the operation of the EMU, as is appropriate in a democratic system of economic governance based on the rule of law and the principle of equality among Member States;
Amendment 720 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Recognises the geopolitical, economic, energy and environmental need for the creation of a genuine European energy union; notes that this will require the removal of the constraint that EU policy must not affect a state’s right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy sources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply (Article 194(2) TFEU);
Amendment 735 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Notes that the Treaties provide ample means to set up a humane, well- functioning migration management system including a European Border and Coast Guard; believes, however, that the Treaties, particularly Article 79(5) TFEU, are too restrictive regarding other aspects of migration, especially on the establishment of a genuine European legal migration system; insists that democratic scrutiny by Parliament is needed that Article 79(5) TFEU is not an impediment to the common European action, as the choice by a Member State onf the implementation of bordervolume of third- countrol, asylum and migration policies, and that the safeguarding of national security cannot be used as a pretext to circumvent European actiony nationals admitted is an integral part of national sovereignty;
Amendment 785 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Is of the opinion, while reiterating that more progress could and should be made under the terms of the Lisbon Treaty, including as regards use of the provisions to act by qualified majority voting, that the Vice-President / High Representative shcould be named EU Foreign Minister and be supported in her efforts to, under conditions, become the main external representative of the European Union in international fora, not least at the level of the UN; considers it essential that, owing to the broad and heavy workload, the Foreign MinisterVice-President / High Representative should be able to appoint political deputies, subject to the final approval of the Parliament; proposes a review of the functionality of the current European External Action Service;
Amendment 801 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
33. Stresses that for the Union to strengthen the defence of the EU territory, as a pillar within NATO, which remains the cornerstone of the European security architecture, and to enable the Union to act autonomously in peacekeeping operations abroad, mainly with a view to stabilising and developing its neighbourhood, the Treaties should provide for the possibility of establishing a European defence union;
Amendment 817 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Believes, finally, that it is essential that the restrictions in Article 24(1) TEU on the authority of the European Court of Justice in the field of CFSP be removvisited; calls, in the same spirit, for Parliament to gain greater powers of scrutiny and accountability over CFSP, including full co-decision powers over the budget;
Amendment 847 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Proposes transforming the Commission into the principle executive authority or government of the Union, accountable to the Council and the Parliament, with the aim of strengthening the ‘Union method’, increasing transparency and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of action taken at the level of the European Union;
Amendment 860 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
36. Rreiterates its call for the size of the renewed Commission to be reduced substantially and for its vice- presidents to be reduced to two: the Finance Minister and the Foreign Ministin number; suggests that the same reduction be applied to the Court of Auditors;
Amendment 889 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
Paragraph 38
38. Recalls that Parliament, following the European Council Decision of 28 June 2013, will need to present before the end of 2016 a proposal to establish a system which will make it possible, before each election to the European Parliament, to reallocate the seats among Member States in an objective, fair, durable and transparent way, respecting the principle of degressive proportionality, while taking account of any change in the number of Member States and demographic trendsdata;
Amendment 923 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
41. Considers that this Council and its specialised configurations, as the second chamber of the EU legislature, should, in the interest of specialism, professionalism and continuity, replace the practice of the rotating six-month presidency with a system of permanent chairschairs, with a time bound term of office chosen from their midst; suggests that the idea of creating a special Law Council should be favourably reconsidered;
Amendment 939 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43
Paragraph 43
43. Sstresses that, following the creation of the role of EU Finance Minister, the Eurogroup should be considered as a specialised configuration of the Council with legislative and control functions but no executive tasks;
Amendment 998 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 49
Paragraph 49
49. Recalls its conviction that the financing of the EU budget should respect the letter and the spirit of the Treaty and return to a system of genuine, clear, simple and fair own resources; stresses that the reintroduction of such resources, such as the EU bonds, would put an end to the share of GNI-based contributions and thus lessen the burden on national treasuries; awaits with interest the proposals from the high-level group on own resources in this respect;
Amendment 1003 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 50
Paragraph 50
50. Proposes in this regard that the decision-making procedures for both own resources and the MFF should be shifted from unanimity to qualified majority voting, thereby inducing real co-decision between the Council and Parliament on all budgetary matterscontinue to be carried out on the basis of unanimity; repeats its call, furthermore, to make the MFF coterminous with the mandates of Parliament and the European executive, and insists that the finances of all Union agencies should become an integral part of the EU budget;
Amendment 1024 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52
Paragraph 52
52. Believes, finally, that the current Treaty ratification procedure is too rigid to befit such a supranational polity as the European Union;he most democratic, but proposes allowing amendments to the Treaties to come into force if not by an EU-wide referendum then after being ratified by a qualified majority of four-fifths of the Member States, having obtained the consent of Parliament; correspondingly, once this threshold has been met, Member States which still decline to ratify the amended Treaty should decide, in accordance with their own constitutional requirements, whether to start the process of secession or to opt for an associate status;
Amendment 1030 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 53
Paragraph 53
53. Commits itself to playing a leadingconstitutional part in these important constitutional developments, and is determined to make its own proposals for Treaty amendment in a timely fashion;