Activities of Jiří POSPÍŠIL related to 2022/2143(INI)
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on the implementation of the principle of primacy of EU law
Amendments (11)
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas the case-law establishing the principle of primacy has been implicitly accepted by the Member States, which have never used a Treaty revision to lay down exceptions to the precedence of EU law;
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas several national constitutional courts have nevertheless defended the existence of certain limits to the principle of primacy; whereas these reservations mostly concern respect for EU competences and, the national constitutional identity and protection of fundamental rights;
Amendment 143 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Recalls that it is up to the CJEU, given its exclusive competence to provide the definitive interpretation of EU law, to definbe the scopeguardian of the principle of primacy; notes that such a definition cannot, therefore, be left to national courts, therefore, national courts cannot apply the principle of primacy on the basis of theira differing interpretation of EU law or provisions of national law;
Amendment 153 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Emphasises that the vast majority of the courts of the Member States comply with the principle of the primacy of EU law; notes that, since the Costa v E.N.E.L. judgment of 15 July 1964, there has only been a very small number of cases in which a national court has refused to draw the consequences of a preliminary ruling, compared to the large overall number of preliminary references; highlights that even in one of the most prominent such cases, namely the judgment of 5 May 2020 concerning the European Central Bank’s public sector purchase programme, the German Federal Constitutional Court nevertheless stressed its respect for the principle of primacy;
Amendment 166 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Points, however, to the negative consequences of any decision of a national constitutional court that challenges the principle of primacy; stresses that, if every national constitutional court could decide on the limits of the primacy of EU law, the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law would be seriously jeopardised; underlines that challenging CJEU judgments on the basis of national constitutional reservations concerning respect for EU competences or the national constitutional identity genuinelymight undermines the CJEU’s authority of EU law;
Amendment 174 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Believes that the case-law of any national constitutional court challenging the principle of primacy has an importcan have ant influence on the doctrines of the constitutional courts of the other Member States with regard to the scope of the primacy of EU law; points, therefore, to the risk that this could pose to the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law;
Amendment 180 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Is of the opinion that the preliminary reference procedure constitutes a way to engage in a constructive judicial dialogue; emphasises that, since it ensures the uniform interpretation of EU law, it is a prerequisite for the consistency and autonomy of the EU’s legal order; recalls that, in certain cases, the CJEU has already shown a willingness to change its reasoning in a second preliminary ruling requested by the same national constitutional court that had initiated the first preliminary reference, which demonstrates that this procedure provides for an effective dialogue between courts;
Amendment 192 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Reiterates its callthe duty onf the Commission as the guardian of the Treaties to closely monitor the rulings of national courts with regard to the primacy of EU law over national legislation and to provide full information to Parliament on any possible conflict and any action taken in response;
Amendment 212 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Encourages the Commission to initiate infringement procedures under Article 258 TFEU in response to judgments of national constitutional courts that challenge the principle of primacy as the measure of the last resort when other forms of dialogue fail; underlines that such procedures might provide the opportunity for supremenational highest courts to engage in a judicial dialogue; stresses also the need to make clear to other national constitutional courts that there are consequences for failing to respect the principle of primacy;
Amendment 223 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Acknowledges that infringement procedures against judicial decisions are often criticised for potentially jeopardising the independence of the judiciary; points out, however, that judicial independence is aimed at shielding courts from exposure to political pressure, but not from accountability for not complying with the applicable law;
Amendment 250 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Recommends nevertheless that, in the event of a revision of the Treaties, the principle of primacy be codified; recalls that the precedence of EU law was explicitly laid down in the Constitutional Treaty; regrets the fact that this primacy clause but was not included in the Treaty of Lisbon;