BETA

Activities of Sander LOONES related to 2016/2247(INI)

Plenary speeches (1)

Banking Union - Annual Report 2016 (debate) NL
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2016/2247(INI)

Shadow reports (1)

REPORT on Banking Union - Annual Report 2016 PDF (323 KB) DOC (73 KB)
2016/11/22
Committee: ECON
Dossiers: 2016/2247(INI)
Documents: PDF(323 KB) DOC(73 KB)

Amendments (30)

Amendment 12 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 9 a (new)
- having regard to the EBA report of July 2016 on the dynamics and drivers of non-performing exposures in the EU banking sector,
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 13 a (new)
- having regard to the EBA report of August 2016 on the Leverage Ratio requirements under Article 511 of the CRR,
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 22 a (new)
- having regard to the Commission's supplementary analytical report of October 2016 on the effects of the proposal for a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS),
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 55 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas the capital and liquidity ratios of EU banks have in general steadily improved over the last years; whereas risks to financial stability nevertheless remain paramount; whereas the current situation calls for caution when introducing extensive regulatory changes;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas the objective of the new resolution regime that entered into force in January 2016 representedis to bring about a change of paradigm from bail-out to bail-in; whereas market participants need to fully undstill need clarification with regard to cerstand andin issues in order to be able to fully adapt to the new system;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas the European Central Bank might in specific occasions suffer from conflict of interests due to its dual responsibilities as both a monetary policy authority and a banking supervisor;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 92 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Notes the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs) in some jurisdictions; considers that this issue is crucial andis a crucial issue that has yet to be solved; welcomes the wEBA's reporkt ofn the SSM and its draft guidance on this issue; looks forward to the results of the work on a minimum EU insolvency framework; calls on Member States to improve their insolvency legislation and to stimulate growth in order to tackle NPLdynamics and drivers of non-performing exposures in the EU banking sector and the ECB's consultation on draft guidance to banks on non-performing loans; notes the Commission's proposal on business insolvency, including early restructuring and second chance, in the framework of the CMU; considers, however, that more work needs first and foremost to be done at national level, especially with regard to the length of recovery procedures, and more generally, the functioning of judicial systems;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 119 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Considers that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes, however, that modifying its prudential treatment could have a significant effect on the financial sector, which calls for caution in reform efforts; considers that the introduction of non-zero risk weights for sovereign bonds or measures to address concentration risk, including large exposure limits, would create incentives for banks to better manage their sovereign exposures, helping them to limit the impact of sovereign stress on their balance sheets; awaits with interest the results of the international work on this issue; considers that, in the end, a better regulatory framework, be it European or international, will beis needed;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 148 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Considers it essential for depositors, investors and supervisors to ensure the comparability of risk-weighted assets across institutions in order to allow for effective supervision; welcomes; welcomes, in this respect, the work done on internationally to streamline the resort to internal models, as well as thel models by the Basel Committee, the EBA and the ECB; stresses, nonetheless, the absolute necessity of introduction ofing a leverage ratio to act as a backstop; recalls, however, that the regulatory changes planned should not result in significant increases in capital requirements, nor harm the ability of banks to finance the real economy, in particular SMEsas a sufficiently robust backstop, in particular for global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs); notes, in this respect, the Commission proposal amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 163 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Points out that guidanceRecalls that standards provided by international fora should be used in order to avoiavoid regulatory fragmentation and the risk of regulatory fragmentationlp to promote a level playing field for all internationally active banks;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 167 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Calls on the Commission to duly take into account the proportionality principle and the existence of different banking models when assessing the impact of future legislation implementing internationally agreed standards;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 193 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Recalls the need to clarify the objectives ofNotes the clarifications with regard to Pillar 2 and its place within the stacking order of capital requirements; is of the view that the use of capital guidance is a relevant way forward in order to balance financial stability concerns with flexibility needn the Commission proposal amending Directive (EU) 2013/36/EU; believes that the use of capital guidance should not lead to lower capital requirements;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 209 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Notes that the 'too-big-to-fail' issue still needs to be addressed; considers that the implementation of the TLAC standard in EU legislation is a necessary but not sufficient measure to be taken in this regard;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 232 #
9. Recalls the need to find, in regulation as well as in the exercise of supervision, a balance between the need for proportionality and the need for a consistent approach; notes, in this respect, the changes put forward regarding reporting and remuneration requirements in the Commission proposal amending Directive 2013/36/EU;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 234 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Notes the results of the 2016 EBA EU-wide stress test of 51 banks, of which 37 are directly supervised by the ECB; points out that the ECB conducted its own stress test as an internal supervisory exercise of an additional 56 banks under its direct supervision, using the same methodology; stresses the limitations of the current stress test methodology; welcomes, therefore, the EBA's and the ECB's efforts to pursue improvements to the stress testing framework; believes, however, that more should be done to better reflect the possibility and reality of real crisis situations by, inter alia, better incorporating more dynamic elements such as contagion effects in the methodology; encourages, in this respect, the EBA and especially the ECB to further study alternative methodologies, including the ones used in the UK and the US1a ; _________________ 1a https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwp s/ecbwp1920.en.pdf?1215f5857f5622dfedf dad9cef2f0f7e
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 251 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)
9b. Insists on a more thorough organisational separation of the ECB's supervisory and monetary policy responsibilities;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 278 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. RecallsConsiders that it is a priority to ensure that State aid rules are strictly adhered to at all times when dealing with future banking crises; recalls, in particular, the need to adhere to State aid rules in the context of bank resolution; taknotes the view that enough flexibility is embedded within the current framework to address specific sat the use of deposit guarantee schemes to prevent the failure of a credit instituations and might be better exploited, in particular in the case of preventive measures involving the use of DGS fund should be carried out within a clearly defined framework and should in any event comply with State aid rules;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 303 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. TNotes the Commission proposals implementing the TLAC standard in EU legislation; takes note of the differences between the FSB TLAC standard and the MREL; stresses, however, that both standards share the same objective; concludes therefore that anotes the Commission's holistic approach to loss- absorption can be reached by combining the two; highlights that due consideration should be given to retaining the two criteria of size and risk- weighted assets;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 304 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. TNotes the Commission proposals implementing the TLAC standard in EU legislation; takes note of the differences between the FSB TLAC standard and the MREL; stresses, however, that both standards share the same objective; concludes therefore that anotes the Commission's holistic approach to loss- absorption can be reached by combining the two; highlights that due consideration should be given to retaining the two criteria of size and risk- weighted assetsin combining the two;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 318 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Stresses that it is crucial to harmonise the hierarchy of claims in bank insolvency across Member States in order to make the implementation of the BRRD more consistent and effective; considers a common approach to bank creditor hierarchy a necessary precondition for the introduction of any deposit insurance scheme at Banking Union level;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 334 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Recalls that the substance of the IGA on the SRF is to be ultimately incorporated into the Union legal framework; calls on the Commission to reflect on ways of doing so; stresses that the upcoming incorporation of the fiscal compact into EU law could provide a usefTakes note of the Statement of the ECOFIN Ministers of 8 December 2015 on the system of bridge financing arrangements for the SRF; notes, in this respect, that 15 out of 19 euro area Member States have already signed a harmonised Loan Facility Agreement with the SRB; recalls that these individual credit lines will only be available as a last resort; stresses that any form of common fiscal backstop neglects that the bulk of economic policy measures and all fiscal policy measures are, in accordance with the Treaties, taken at national level; believes, therefore, that any form of fiscal backstop should be set up at the level of the individual Member States, should templatehey wish to do so;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 346 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Regrets that the Commission did not allow for more time to assess the implementation of the DGSD before proposing the EDIS and did not conduct a proper impact assessment of the proposal; stands ready, however, to seize the opportunity generated by the proposal to discuss the DGSD and address some of the options and discretions it includes; questions the objectivity of the effects analysis, of which the main objective seems to have been to describe the possible benefits of an EDIS, without objectively studying all risks connected to it; remains convinced that an objective assessment of all deposit guarantee schemes recognised as such by competent authorities in accordance with the DGSD, including their responsibilities under national law and their available means, should have been part of the effects analysis published by the Commission in October 2016; believes that such an objective assessment remains necessary;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 362 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Is aware ofNotes the potential benefitrisks of an EDIS; is nevertheless of the opinion that risk reduction measures are an indispensable counterparty to its establishment in order to prevent moral hazard, and that such measures should preferably precede risk sharing, in particular those related to moral hazard; recalls that the large majority of national economic and fiscal policy measures eventually affect banks' balance sheets and the national banking systems as a whole; points out that risks still differ greatly between different national banking systems, as some of them are still in a very precarious situation; deems, therefore, that the current EDIS proposal is as much about legacy sharing, considering the high level of non- performing loans in some Member States, as it is about risk sharing; highlights, in this respect, that risk reduction should precede any form of legacy sharing and risk sharing; considers that, in the end, a fair deposit insurance system at European level should not harm the level of protection that depositors currently enjoy and can only be established when participating banks are all in a similar, financially stable position;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 384 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Welcomes aConsiders that the current European approach to deposit insurance, which must make it possible to address outstanding DGSD implementation issues and phase in the should focus on DGSD implementation and evaluation, as well as on risk reduction measures;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 396 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Recommends that the Commission, the ECB and the EBA study the possibility and suitability of accompanying the introduction of the EDIS with an assessment ofnecessity of, on the one hand, adopting measures aimed at reducing overall risks in the Banking Union and risks specific to national banking systems, and on the other hand, assessing the capital and liquidity situation of banks in order to better quantify the risks to be insured, before any form of a deposit insurance scheme is established;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 409 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
22. HighlightNotes that Article 114 seems to be an appropriate legal basis for the establishment of both the EDIS and the DIF;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 413 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
23. Stresses that the introduction of the EDIS and discussions on this project should not lead to a weakening of the efforts towards improving the implementshould be preceded by the implementation and evaluation of the DGSD; welcomes the work done recently by the EBA to promote convergence in this field;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 418 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 4
Fiscal backstopdeleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 420 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
24. Welcomes the establishment of loan facility agreements between the SRF and the Banking Union Member States; is of the opinion, nevertheless, that this solution is not sufficient to do away with the bank-sovereign vicious circle and that the work on a common fiscal backstop for the SRF, which should be fiscally neutral over the medium term, should continue step by step;deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 437 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
25. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the ECB and the SRB, the SRB, the national parliaments and the competent authorities as defined in point (40) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON