BETA

71 Amendments of Martin SCHIRDEWAN related to 2023/0137(CNS)

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
–

The European Parliament rejects the Commission proposal.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1

(1) The coordination of the economic policies of the Member States within the Union, as provided for by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), entails compliance with the guiding principles of stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments. All this framework curtails the sovereignty of Member States.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2

(2) The economic governance framework of the Union, which comprises an elaborate system of policy coordination and surveillance of Member States’ economic policies, has ~~guid~~failed Member States in achieving their economic and fiscal policy objectives. Since the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, the framework has ~~helped achieve~~failed in promoting macroeconomic convergence, ~~safeguard sound public finances and address macroeconomic imbalances~~as well complying with the goals for public debt and government deficit. Together with a common monetary policy ~~and~~ a common currency in the euro area, the framework has ~~created~~failed in creating the conditions for economic stability, sustainable and inclusive economic growth and higher employment for citizens of the Union.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3

(3) The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which initially consisted of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/9719 , Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 199720 and the Resolution of the European Council of 17 June 1997 on the SGP21 , is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable and inclusive growth underpinned by financial stability~~, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union’s objectives for sustainabl~~. Such framework failed in promoting full employment, sustainable and inclusive growth, and ~~employment~~overall macroeconomic convergence between Member States. __________________ 19 Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1). 20 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6). 21 Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact Amsterdam, 17 June 1997 (OJ C 236, 2.8.1997, p. 1).

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3 a (new)

(3a) The set goals of 3% and 60% of GDP for government deficit and public debt, respectively, lack a sound economic justification. Moreover, evidence shows the compliance by Member States with such rules is unrealistic, especially clear regarding the public debt threshold.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3 b (new)

(3b) The Commission recognizes the large amount of public and private investment to accomplish the EU’s climate goals and the even higher when referring to the climate goals set in the Paris Agreement. However, evidence shows that EU net public investment as a proportion of GDP has not fully recovered since its sharp fall after the financial crisis, especially serious in Southern Europe, due to fiscal consolidation pressure under the former EU economic governance rules. Moreover, recent independent studies show that the current Commission’s proposal fails to guarantee sufficient fiscal capacity to Member States to promote the investment needed to promote climate transition and conversion.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3 c (new)

(3c) EU's past experience showed the limits of fiscal consolidation in promoting sustainable public finances and promoting full-employment. Recently, the IMF published evidence that, on average, fiscal consolidation does not reduce debt- to-GDP ratio. Moreover, the so-called Troika programmes failed to accomplish its own economic goals and accentuated the economic downturn.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4

~~(4) In stage three of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the Member States are, according to Article 126(1) TFEU, under the obligation to avoid excessive government deficits.~~deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5

(5) The economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to better take into account the macroeconomic divergences and disparities in production capacities, growing heterogeneity of fiscal positions, sustainability risks and other vulnerabilities across Member States. The strong policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic proved effective in mitigating the economic and social damage of the crisis, but resulted in a significant increase in public- and private-sector debt ratios, underscoring the importance of reducing debt ratios to prudent levels in a gradual, sustained and growth-friendly manner and addressing macroeconomic imbalances, while paying due attention to employment and social objectives. At the same time, the economic governance framework of the Union should be adapted to help address the medium- and long-term challenges facing the Union, including achieving a fair digital and green transition, including the Climate Law22 , ensuring energy security, open strategic autonomy, addressing demographic change, strengthening social and economic resilience, and implementing the strategic compass for security and defence, all of which requires reforms and sustained high levels of investment in the years to come. __________________ 22 The European Climate Law sets a Union-wide climate neutrality objective by 2050 and requires Union institutions and Member States to progress in enhancing adaptive capacity, requiring significant public investment to reduce the negative socio-economic impacts of climate change on the EU and its Member States, including negative impacts on growth and fiscal sustainability.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6

(6) The economic governance framework of the Union should put ~~debt sustainability and sustainable growth~~full employment and the achievement of the climate goals set in the Paris Agreement at its core and therefore differentiate between Member States by taking into account ~~their public debt challenges and allowing country-specific fiscal trajectori~~country-specific challenges. Moreover, it should allow for true ownership and democratic scrutiny of such choices.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7

(7) At the same time, to ensure a transparent and common Union framework based on the reference values referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the TFEU and the Treaty on the European Union (TUE), stronger enforcement underpinning multilateral surveillance should be the necessary counterpart of a risk-based surveillance framework that allows for country-specific fiscal trajectories.deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8

(8) In order to simplify the Union fiscal framework and increase transparency, a single operational indicator anchored in debt sustainability should serve as a basis for setting the fiscal path and carrying out annual fiscal surveillance for each Member State. That single indicator should be based on nationally financed net primary expenditure, that is to say expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures and excluding interest expenditure as well as cyclical unemployment expenditure and expenditure on Union programmes fully matched by revenue from Union funds. This indicator allows for macro-economic stabilisation as it is not affected by the operation of automatic stabilisers, including revenue and expenditure fluctuations outside the direct control of the government.deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9

(9) The excessive deficit procedure (EDP) for breaches of the deficit reference value of 3 % of gross domestic product (GDP) (‘deficit-based EDP’), referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 is a well-established element of the Union’s fiscal surveillance framework that has been effective in influencing fiscal policy in the Member States.deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10

(10) To strengthen the EDP for breaches of the debt criterion of 60 % of GDP (‘debt-based EDP’), referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 the focus should be on departures from the fiscal path set by the Council under Regulation (EU) […] of the European Parliament and of the Council23 . __________________ 23 Regulation (EU) […] of the European Parliament and of the Council of […] [on the effective coordination of economic policies and multilateral budgetary surveillance] (OJ L …, …, p….).deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11

(11) On the basis of Article 126(2) TFEU, the deficit criterion is also fulfilled where the excess over the reference value of 3 % of GDP is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value. Therefore, a temporary breach that remains close to the reference value should not lead to the opening of a deficit-based EDP if it results from exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a majorWhen social or ecological circumstances with a significant impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned~~, which includes a severe~~ occur, or an economic downturn in the Member State concerned, the excess of a primary deficit should be considered exceptional.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12

(12) Moreover, in case of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole, and following the application of Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission and the Council may decide not to conclude on the existence of an excessive deficit.deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13

(13) In accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], ~~the Council, following a recommendation from the Commission, can allow~~ Member States tocan deviate from the ~~net expenditure path set by the Council under~~reference trajectory they set that Regulation in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole, or in the event of exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, provided that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. As a consequence, such a deviation should not lead to the opening of a debt-based EDP.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14

(14) When assessing the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission should take into account, a~~s a key~~ll relevant factor, the degree of debt challenge in the Member State concerned. A substantial public debt challenge established according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor should be considered a key factor leading to the opening of an EDP as a rule. Since, in accordance with Article 126(3) TFEUs on equal footing. Besides the sustainability of public debt, the Commission ~~is to~~should take into account all ~~other relevant factors, in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and debt criteria by the Member State concerned, that should include in particular~~ the developments in the medium-term economic position and the developments in the medium-term budgetary position, ~~and the i~~the progress on the national targets on empleoyment~~ation of structural reforms and investment. In order to increase national ownership,~~, skills and poverty reduction and the implementation of investment. In order to increase national ownership, national parliaments, representatives of workers' associations and the independent fiscal institutions referred to in Article 8 of Council Directive [on the national budgetary frameworks]24 , should provide an opinion on the relevant factors. __________________ 24 Council Directive […] of […] [amending Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States] (OJ L …, …, p….).

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15

(15) To keep track of actual and planned annual deviations from the net expenditure path as set out in Annex IV to Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission should set up a control account for each Member State summing those deviations over time. The information in the control account should be the basis of enforcement actions, in particular of a report pursuant to Article 126(3) TFEU following a deviation from the net expenditure path. At the same time, the degree of ambition of the net expenditure path in the national medium- term fiscal-structural plan referred to in Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] should be considered when deciding on the opening of a debt-based EDP. In particular, if the Member State’s net expenditure path set by the Council is more ambitious than the medium-term technical trajectory put forward by the Commission in accordance with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] and the deviation from the path is not significant when measured against this trajectory, the opening of an excessive deficit procedure should be avoided.deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16

(16) TWhe corrective net expenditure path under the EDP should bring or keep the general government deficit durably below the reference value of 3 % of GDP referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 by the deadline established by the Council. The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP should also ensure sufficient progress during the period covered by the recommendation regarding putting the projected debt ratio on a plausibly downward path or remaining at a prudent level. When setting the corrective net expenditure path under the EDP, the Council should also ensure that there is no back-loading of the required fiscal adjustment effort. The corrective net expenditure path under the EDP would in principle be the one originally set by the Council, while taking into account the need to correct the deviation from that path. In case the original path is no longer feasible, due to objective circumstances, the Council should be able to set a different path under the EDPn a Member State, in dialogue with the Commission and the Council, defines primary deficit as excessive, it should present a detailed economic explanation, including a list of growth- enhancing investments and a budgetary plan laying down the expenditure and revenue options, to overcome it.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17

(17) ~~For~~ Member States under an EDP~~, the Council, on a recommendation from the Commission,~~ should continue to be able to extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit where it establishes the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], or in the case of exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of an individual Member State and provided that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. Such extension should require that the overall size of the shock exceeds a normal range, for example costs of natural disasters should be anticipated within bandwidths.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18

(18) Specific provisions of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 related to the contributions to second pillar pension systems should be deleted since the net expenditure path set by the Council should already take into account the revenue loss related to such contributions.deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19

(19) Independent fiscal institutions ~~have proven their capacity to foster fiscal discipline and strengthen the credibility of Member States’ public finances. I~~should have a pluralistic and multidisciplinary board, where minority views have representation as well as representatives of workers' associations, in order to truly enhance national ownership~~, the role of~~. Moreover, when requested by the Member State concerned, such independent ~~fiscal~~ institutions~~, traditionally mandated to monitor compliance with the national framework, should be expanded to the economic governance framework of the Union~~ should be responsible to produce the forecasts and the impact assessments needed to the budgetary practices.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20

(20) Clear conditions should be laid down for abrogation of excessive deficit procedures. Abrogation should require the deficit to remain credibly below the reference value of 3 % of GDP referred to in Article 126(2) TFEU and Protocol No 12 and, for a debt-based EDP, that the Member State demonstrates compliance with the net expenditure path under the EDP.deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21

(21) The fines provided for in Article 126(11) TFEU should not provide for a minimum amount but they should accumulate until effective action is taken, in order to constitute a real incentive for compliance with the notices given to Member States under an EDP in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU.deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23

(23) This Regulation is part of a package together with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] and Directive (EU) […] amending 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States. Together, they establish a reformed Union economic governance framework that incorporates into Union law the substance of Title III ‘Fiscal Compact’ of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) in the Economic and Monetary Union25 , in accordance with Article 16 thereof. By building on the experience with the implementation of the TSCG by the Member States, the package retains the Fiscal Compact’s medium- term orientation as a tool to achieve budgetary discipline and growth promotion. The package includes a strengthened country-specific dimension aimed at enhancing national ownership, including by means of a stronger role for independent fiscal institutions, which draws on the Fiscal Compact’s common principles proposed by the Commission26 in accordance with Article 3(2) of the TSCG. The analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures for the overall assessment of compliance required by the Fiscal Compact is set out in Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. As in the Fiscal Compact, temporary deviations from the medium-term plan are allowed only in exceptional circumstances in Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. Similarly, in case of significant deviations from the medium-term plan, measures should be implemented to correct the deviations over a defined period of time. The package strengthens fiscal surveillance and enforcement procedures to deliver on the commitment of promoting sound and sustainable public finances and sustainable growth. The economic governance framework reform, thus, retains the fundamental objectives of budgetary discipline and debt sustainability set out in the TSCGhe package includes a strengthened country-specific dimension aimed at enhancing national ownership, including by Member States being the ones deciding on their fiscal choices and requiring its parliamentary approval. __________________ 25 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union of 2 March 2012. 26 Communication COM(2012) 342 final of 20 June 2012 from the Commission ‘Common principles on national fiscal correction mechanisms’.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point a a (new)

(aa) 'reference trajectory' means the trajectory for the primary balance each Member State shall present, as set in Article 5 of Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council [on the preventive arm]*;

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point b

(b) ‘net expenditure’ means government expenditure net of interest expenditure, discretionary revenue measures and other budgetary variables outside the control of the government, as defined in Annex II, point (a) of Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council [on the preventive arm]*;deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point c

~~(c) ‘technical trajectory’ means the net expenditure trajectory put forward by the Commission in accordance with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm];~~deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

~~(d) ‘net expenditure path’ means the multi-annual trajectory for net expenditure of a Member State as set by the Council in accordance with Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm];~~deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point e

~~(e) ‘control account’ means a record of a Member State’s cumulated deviations of the actual net expenditure from the net expenditure path.~~deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 1

The excess of a government deficit over the reference value shall be considered exceptional, in accordance with Article 126(2), second indent, point (a), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), where the ~~Council~~Member State concerned has established the existence of a ~~severe~~n economic downturn in ~~the euro area or the Union as a whole in~~ accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] or of ~~exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned,~~significant social or ecological circumstances with a significant impact on the public finances in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm].

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

In addition, the excess over the reference value shall be considered temporary where budgetary forecasts as provided by the ~~Commission~~Member State indicate that the deficit will ~~fall~~orient towards below the reference value following the end of the ~~severe~~ economic downturn or the ~~exceptional~~ circumstances referred to in the first subparagraph.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 1a

1a. WThen it exceeds the reference value, the ratio of the government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) shall be considered sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace in accordance with Article 126(2), point (b), TFEU if the Member State concerned respects its net expenditure path Member State shall present a detailed economic explanation, including a list of growth-enhancing investments and a budgetary plan laying down the expenditure and revenue options, to overcome such excessive primary deficit.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 2

2. The Commission and the Council, when assessing ~~and deciding upon~~ the existence of an excessive deficit in accordance with Article 126(3) to (6) TFEU, ~~may~~shall consider an excess over the reference value resulting from a ~~severe~~n economic downturn as exceptional in the sense of Article 126(2), second indent, point (a), TFEU where the ~~Council~~Member State concerned establishes the existence of exceptional circumstances in accordance with ~~Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]~~paragraph 1.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account as a key relevant factor the degree of debt challenges in the Member State concerned. In particular, where the Member State faces substantial public debt challenges according to the most recent Debt Sustainability Monitor, it shall be considered a key factor leading to the opening of an excessive deficit procedure as a rule, on an equal footing, all relevant factors as indicated in that Article 126(3) TFEU, in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of the sustainability of the primary deficit and public debt criteria of the Member State concerned.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2

TAdditionally, when preparing the report the Commission shall ~~also~~ take into account ~~all other relevant factors as indicated in Article 126(3) TFEU, in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and debt criteria by the Member State concerned~~the economic and social circumstances of the Member State in relation to progress on the national targets on employment, skills and poverty reduction and measures implementing Directive 2022/2041. Moreover, the report needs to also take into account progresses toward the common priorities as referred to in Annex VI of the Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] with the specific aim to analyse how an excessive deficit procedure would affect investments needed to enable an energy transition.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point a

(a) the developments in the medium- term economic position, in particular inflation developments and cyclical developments ~~compared to the assumptions underlying the net expenditure path~~;

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point b

(b) the developments in the medium- term budgetary positions, including, in particular, the size of the actual deviation from the net expenditure path, in annual and cumulative terms as measured by the control account, and the extent to which the deviation is due to a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole or to exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned in accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. Where relevant, the deviation compared to the technical trajectory shall also be taken into account when considering the size of the deviation;

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point c

(c) the evolution of the government debt stock, but also its position and its financing, including possible ECB temporary support put in place, and the related risk factors, including in particular the debt structure, maturity structure, and the currency denomination of the debt and contingent liabilities;

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3 – point d

(d) the implementation ~~of reforms and~~ investments including, in particular policies to ~~prevent and correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances and policies to~~ implement the common growth and employment strategy of the Union including those supported by NextGenerationEU, and the overall quality of public finances, in particular the effectiveness of national budgetary frameworks.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4

The Commission shall give due and express consideration to a~~ny o~~ll ther factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess ~~compliance with deficit and debt criteria~~the sustainability of primary deficit and public debt and which the Member State has put forward to the Council and the Commission. In that context, particular consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity and achieving the policy goals of the Union. ~~The opinion submitted to the Commission by the Member State concerned shall include the opinion of its national independent fiscal institution on relevant factors.~~

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

The Commission shall give due and express consideration to any other factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess compliance with deficit and debt criteria and which the Member State has put forward to the Council and the Commission. In that context, particular consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity and achieving the policy goals of the Union. The opinion submitted to the Commission by the Member State concerned shall include the opinion ~~of its nation~~submitted to the Commission by the Member State concerned shall in~~dependent fiscal institu~~clude the opinion on relevant factors, but also the identification of any risks or difficulties in complying with the objectives of this Regulation, o~~n relevant factors~~f the: (i) national parliament of the state concerned; (ii) representatives of workers' associations; (iii) national independent fiscal institution.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1

The Council and the Commission shall make a balanced overall assessment of all the relevant ~~factors, specifically, the extent to which they affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and/or the debt criteria as aggravating or mitigating~~ factors.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2

When assessing compliance on the basis of the deficit criterion, if the ratio of the government debt to GDP exceeds the reference value, those factors shall be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit provided for in Article 126(4), (5) and (6) TFEU only if the double condition of the overarching principle — that, before these relevant factors are taken into account, the general government deficit remains close to the reference value and its excess over the reference value is temporary — is fully met.deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3

~~However, those factors shall be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit when assessing compliance on the basis of the debt criterion.~~deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 5

5. Where Member States ~~are allowed~~decides to deviate from their ~~net expenditure path in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole~~reference trajectory in accordance with paragraph 1 pursuant to Article 24 and Article 25 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Commission and the Council, in their assessment, ~~may~~shall decide not to conclude on the existence of an excessive deficit.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 6

If the Council, acting under Article 126(6) TFEU, decides that an excessive deficit exists in a Member State, the Council and the Commission shall, in the subsequent procedural steps of that Article of the TFEU, take into account the relevant factors referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, as they affect the situation of the Member State concerned, including as specified in Article 5(2) of this Regulation, in particular in ~~establishing a deadlin~~the deadline agreed with the Member State for the correction of the excessive deficit and eventually extending that deadline. ~~However, t~~Those relevant factors shall ~~not~~also be taken into account for the decision of the Council under Article 126(12) TFEU on the abrogation of some or all of its decisions under Article 126(6) to (9) and (11) TFEU.’;

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 3

~~3. T~~The Member State, the Commission and the Council shall decide on the 3. existence of an excessive ~~deficit in accordance with Article 126(6) TFEU, as a rule within four months of the reporting dates established in Article 3(2) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No 479/2009~~primary deficit. When it decides that an excessive deficit exists, the Commission and the Council ~~shall~~may at the same time make recommendations to the Member State concerned in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU. The ~~Council shall make its decisions and~~ recommendations shall be made public.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1

The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU shall establish a maximum deadline of six months for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. When warranted by the seriousness of the situation, the deadline for effective action may be three months. The Council recommendation shall also establish a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit. In its recommendaMember State shall agree with the Commission and the Council on a maximum deadline for effective action, the Council shall also request that the Member State implements a corrective net expenditure path, which ensures that the general government deficit remains or is brought and maintained below the reference value within the deadline set in the recommendation. For the years when the general government deficit is expected to exceed the reference value, the corrective net expenditure path shall be consistent with a minimum annual adjustment of at least 0,5% of GDP as a benchmarko be taken and for the correction of the excessive deficit.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2

The corrective net expenditure path shall also put the debt ratio on a plausibly downward path or keep it at a prudent level having regard to the criteria established in Annex I of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm]. The corrective net expenditure path shall ensure that the average annual fiscal adjustment effort in the first three years is at least as high as the average annual fiscal effort of the total adjustment period.deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 5

~~5. Within the deadline provided for in 5. paragraph 4 of this Article, t~~The Member State concerned shall report to the Council and the Commission on action taken in response ~~to the Council’s recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU~~. The report shall include: (i) the targets for government expenditure and revenue and for the discretionary measures on both the expenditure and the revenue side ~~consistent with the Council’s recommendation,~~ as well as information on the measures taken and the nature of those envisaged to achieve the targets. (ii) an analysis on the impact that such measures may have in relation to progress on the national targets on employment, skills and poverty reduction and measures implementing Directive 2022/2041 (iii) an analysis on the progresses toward the common priorities of which in Annex VI of the Regulation [preventive arm] with the specific aim to analyse how an excessive deficit procedure would affect investments needed to enable an energy transition. The report shall also include the opinion of the national parliament and the independent fiscal institution of the Member State concerned on the adequacy of the measures taken ~~and envisaged with respect to the targets~~. The Member State shall make the report public.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 6

6. Where effective action has been taken in compliance with a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU or where exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, including on the respect of the corrective net expenditure path recommended by the Council pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, occur after the adoption of that recommendation, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU. The revised recommendation, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule. In case the Council has established the existence of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole in accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm], the Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU provided that this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The revised recommendation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule.;deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 4

(3) Article 4 is ~~replaced by the following:~~deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 5

(4) Article 5 is ~~amended as follows:~~deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 6

(5) in Article 6, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: ‘ 1. whether effective action has been taken in response to its notice made in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU, shall base its decision on the report submitted by the Member State concerned in accordance with Article 5(1a) of this Regulation and its implementation, as well as on any other publicly announced and sufficiently detailed decisions by the government of the Member State concerned. The outcome of the surveillance mission carried out by the Commission in accordance with Article 10a of this Regulation shall be taken into account.; ’deleted The Council, when considering

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 8

(6) Article 8 is replaced by the following: ‘ Article 8 1. Article 126(11) TFEU to intensify sanctions shall be taken no later than two months after the reporting dates pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 479/2009. 2. Article 126(12) TFEU to abrogate some or all of its decisions shall be taken as soon as possible and in any event no later than two months after the reporting dates pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 479/2009. 3. taken pursuant to Article 126(12) TFEU where budgetary forecasts as provided by the Commisdeleted Any Council decision iundicate that the deficit has been brought durably below the reference value and, where the excessive deficit procedure was opened on the basis of the debt criterion, the Member State concerned respected the corrective net expenditure path set by the Council in accordance with Article 3(4) or Article 5(1) of this Regulation over the previous 2 years and is projected to continue to do so in the current year on the basis of the Commission forecast.; ’er Any Council decision under A Council decision shall only be

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) where the Member State concerned acts ~~in compliance with recommendations made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU~~employs active economic and fiscal measures to address its fiscal situation, taking under consideration the public recommendations made by the Commission and the Council;

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b

~~(b) where the participating Member State concerned acts in compliance with notices given in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU.;~~deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 10 – paragraph 1

1. The Council and the Commission shall regularly monitor the implementation of action taken: — response to recommendations made under Article 126(7) TFEU; — by the participating Member State concerned in response to notices given under Article 126(9) TFEU.deleted by the Member State concerned in

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 10 – paragraph 2

2. Where action by a participating Member State is not being implemented or, in the Council's view, is proving to be inadequate, the Council shall immediately take a decision under Article 126(9) TFEU or Article 126(11) TFEU respectively.deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 10 – paragraph 3

3. Where actual data pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 indicate that an excessive deficit has not been corrected by a participating Member State within the time limits specified either in recommendations issued under Article 126(7) TFEU or notices issued under Article 126(9) TFEU, the Council shall immediately take a decision under Article 126(9) TFEU or Article 126(11) TFEU respectively.;deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point a

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 10a – paragraph 1

1. The Commission shall ensure a permanent dialogue with authorities of the Member States in accordance with the objectives of this Regulation~~. To that end, the Commission shall, in particular, carry out missions~~, for the purpose of the assessment of the actual economic situation in the Member State and the identification of any risks or difficulties in complying with the objectives of this Regulation and allow an exchange with national parliaments and other relevant stakeholders, including the national independent fiscal institutions.; During such dialogue, the Commission shall invite representatives of workers' associations to offer their views on the socio-economic situation in the Member State and the identification of any risks or difficulties in complying with the objectives of this Regulation.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 10a – paragraph 2

2. Following the adoption by the Council of a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, the Commission shall carry out a dedicated surveillance mission to the Member State concerned to discuss the measures that the Member State intends to take in response to the measures judged necessary following the notice under Article 126(9) TFEU. Upon invitation by the parliament of the Member State concerned, the Commission may present its assessment of the economic and fiscal situation in the Member State. Enhanced surveillance may be undertaken for Member States which are the subject of recommendations and notices issued following a decision pursuant to Article 126(8) TFEU and decisions under Article 126(11) TFEU for the purposes of on-site monitoring. The Member States concerned shall provide all necessary information for the preparation and the conduct of the surveillance mission.;Upon invitation by the parliament of the Member State concerned, the Commission may present its assessment of the economic and fiscal situation in the Member State.

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 12 – paragraph 1

1. The amount of the fine shall amount to up to 0,05% of GDP for a 6- month period and be paid every 6 months until the Council assesses that the Member State concerned has taken effective action in response to the notice issued under Article 126(9) TFEU.deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 12 – paragraph 2

2. In each 6-month period following that in which a fine is imposed, until the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit is abrogated, the Council shall assess whether the participating Member State concerned has taken effective action in response to the Council notice in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU. In this semi-annual assessment the Council shall decide, in accordance with Article 126(11) TFEU, to intensify the sanctions, unless the participating Member State concerned has complied with the Council’s notice.deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 12 – paragraph 3

~~3. The cumulated amount of the fines referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exceed 0,5 % of GDP.;~~deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN, Manon AUBRY

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 14

1. In accordance with Article 126(12) TFEU, the Council shall abrogate the sanctions referred to in Article 126(11), first and second indent, TFEU depending on the significance of the progress made by the participating Member State concerned in correcting the excessive deficit.deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 15

In accordance with Article 126(12) TFEU, the Council shall abrogate all outstanding sanctions if the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit is abrogated. Fines imposed in accordance with Article 12 of this Regulation will not be reimbursed to the participating Member State concerned.;deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 17b – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, shall adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU or a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU to Member States subject to a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU or to a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU on [date of entry into force of amending Regulation], and that have taken effective action.deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON

José GUSMÃO, Martin SCHIRDEWAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 17b – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

It shall adopt the revised recommendation or notice together with the adoption of the recommendation pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EU) [on the preventive arm] setting the net expenditure path.;deleted

2023/10/25
Committee: ECON