22 Amendments of Jörg MEUTHEN related to 2017/0333R(APP)
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution
–
–
The European Parliament rejects [the Commission proposal].
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)
Citation 8 a (new)
- having regard to the German Federal Constitutional Court judgment of 12 September 2012, ref. 2 BvR 1390/12, requiring a reservation to be entered under international law,
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the introduction of the euro is erroneously regarded as one of the European project’s most significant political achievements and a cornerstone of EMU construcestablishment of monetary union represents the greatest risk to European unification;
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. B. whereas the financial and economic crisis has revealed the possibility of political manipulation of the rules and the weaknesses of the euro architecture, highlighting the need for the swiftfact that there is no rules- based consensus for completion of the EMU;
Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas membership of a common currency area requires common rules and obligations, as well as common tools to respond to symmetric and asymmetric shocks and for the promotion of solidarity and socioeconomic upward convergence; whereas risk reduction and risk sharing should go hand in hand in deepening the EMUbut those conditions are not met in a multilingual, multifaceted and diverse Europe; whereas Member States are sovereign and risk sharing is out of the question;
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and its later transformation into the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) have represented, despite its intergovernmental nature, an important step towawas a serious mistake and the subsequent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) has perpetuated that mistake; whereas it is absurds the creation of a European crisis management mechanism, helping to respond to the weaknesses of the EMU and providing financial assistance to several European countries affected by the crisiso seek to set up a crisis resolution mechanism for a so-called currrency that causes crises in the first place;
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas the intergovernmental nature of the ESM has implications onmakes it possible for its decision-making process, which risks undermining the ESM’s capacity to respond swiftly to economic and financial shocks to be subject to unanimity, which is what enables the ESM Member States to exercise their fiscal sovereignty in the first place;
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the future incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework should continue to be understood as part of the EMU completion projectproject to deprive Member States of their fiscal sovereignty;
Amendment 78 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas, in the short term, the ESM reform should contribute in particular to the banking union, providing a proper common financial backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), without prejudice to the need to establish a European Depokeeping with its purpose, the ESM may provide stability assistance only if that is essential for safeguarding the financial stability of the euro area as a whole, and of its Member States, and whereas the use of ESM funding to assist Insurance Scheme (EDIS)banks must be ruled out for that very reason;
Amendment 94 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. WelcomeRejects the Commission’s proposal of 6 December 2017 for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Monetary Fund and considers it a useful contribution to the ongoing debate on the future of Europe, the completion of the EMU and the ESM reform;,
Amendment 100 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Suggests that the ESM be renamed not thenot be expanded to form a European Monetary Fund (EMF), but the European Stability Fund (ESF), making it clear that the eurozone’s monetary policy remains the competence of the ECB, rather, that it be wound up and phased out instead;
Amendment 107 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Highlights that the proper functioning of an EMU depends on the existence of an institution serving as a ‘lender of last resort’; acknowledges, in this context, the positive contribution of the ESM, despite its intergovernmental nature, towards addressing its rules being complied with and on the existence of a direct link between action and liability; acknowledges, in this context, that, by establishing the ESM, political leaders have permanently broken that link; stresses that that has further weakenesses ofd the institutional setting of the EMU, namely by providing financial assistance to several Member States affected by the financial crisis and the Great Recession;
Amendment 118 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Insists that a European insolvency procedure finally be introduced for euro area Member States;
Amendment 120 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Recalls its previous positions in favour of thejects incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework, which would make it a fully-fledged EU body; insists that this incorporation should continue to be understood as part of the EMU completion project; believes that such an integration would allow for management in accordance with the Community method, ensure the full consistency of fiscal rules and obligations, facilitate economic and fiscal policy coordination, and enhance democratic legitimacy and accountability through the European Parliament; points to the sovereignty of national parliaments over their national budgets; points out that fiscal sovereignty is the primary prerogative of each and every parliament; rejects, therefore, the Community method for the ESM, since it weakens the fiscal responsibility of euro area members and jeopardises fiscal sovereignty; points out that the democratic legitimacy of the European Parliament is weaker than that of national parliaments and that democratic legitimacy is lessened when powers are transferred to the Union;
Amendment 138 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Notes that the Commission’s proposal has generated a lively discussion on its political, financial and legal implications, and that discussions continue on a number of important issues; stresses, however, that this debate on the long-term vision of the ESM’s institutional setting should not delay the steps urgently required to strengthen the; underscores the fact that there is no legal basis for an EMUF and its capacity to promote financial stability and respond to economic shocks; calls, therefore, for a meaningful ESM reform in the short term by means of a revision of the ESM Treaty, without prejudice to more ambitious developments in the futurethat Article 352 TFEU in particular is not relevant;
Amendment 144 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Underlines that the primary mission of the new ESF should continue to be to provide transitional financial assistance to Member States in need, on the basis of the agreed adjustment programmes; stresses that the ESF must have adequate firepower for that purpose; opposes,e fact that the adjustment programmes carried out to date, which have been intended to provide transitional financial assistance, delay the necessary adjustment process and are counterproductive; therefore, rejects any attempt to turn the reformed ESM into an instrument for banks only, or to reduce its financial capacity to support Member States; recalls that financial assistance provided to Member States underthat serves the banks; recalls that, to date, the new ESF has to be complemented by other fiscal capacity tools, including precautionary instruments,not definitively established that it is in a position to promote economic and financial stabilisation, investment and upward socioeconomic convergence in the euro area;
Amendment 163 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
Amendment 186 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Highlights the need for an efficient decision-making procedure in the reformed ESM, particularly ESM, while safeguarding the case ofprinciple of unanimity, including in urgent situations;
Amendment 196 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Calls for a swift- in the event of an ESM reform that also redefines its role, functions and financial tools, so that the new ESF can - for no provision to be made for the ESM either to offer liquidity support in case of resolution andor to serve as a financial backstop for the SRF; calls for the SRF to be made operational as soon as possible and, in any case, before 2024;
Amendment 216 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Underlines the risks arising from the delay in completingon of the banking union; welcomerejects, in this context, the European Council’s commitment to a common backstop for the SRF and recalls the need also topoints out that the EDIS must not be establish the EDISed either;
Amendment 227 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12