2017/0333R(APP) | [ParlTrack]

Draft opinion
Recital A a (new)

A a. whereas, as outlined in the 'Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Monetary Fund'(1), Explanatory Memorandum, Point 1 - CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL, 'The financial and economic crisis that hit Europe in 2008, the consequences of which are still felt to this day, did not start in the euro area but it laid bare some of its institutional weaknesses.' (1) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52017 PC0827.

Amendment 10 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. ~~Welcom~~Notes the new set of measures proposed by the Commission to complete the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in line with Parliament’s longstanding position on the integration of the ESM into the EU legal framework~~; consider~~ but notes also the ongoing major difficulties in completing that EMU; notes that each of the three pillars of the Banking Union should deepen the global financial architecture but notes further that the third of those pillars, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), has still not been completed, with no prospect in sight that it will be;

Amendment 11 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. ~~Welcom~~Notes the transformation of the eurozone’s ESM rescue fund into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) within the Union legal framework, this institutional anchoring constituting a key step in the evolution of the overall reform and deepening of the EMU;

Amendment 12 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8 a. Suggests to task the EMF with evaluating and making recommendations on the implementation of the Union fiscal framework and the appropriateness of the actual fiscal stance at euro area and national level in order to ensure independent assessments of the member states’ budgets and economic forecasts;

Amendment 13 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 b (new)

8 b. Requests that the EMF is complemented with an insolvency procedure for sovereigns. This would increase the incentives for sound fiscal policies and avoid that investors consider lending to unsustainably run economies;

Amendment 14 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 8 c (new)

8 c. Requests that, together with the transformation of the ESM into the European Monetary Fund, risk weighting should be introduced with regard to sovereign bonds on banks’ books. Banks have been and are still to a large extent intertwined with their sovereigns by holding significant amounts of national public debt. This reform would motivate banks to focus on the solidity rather than the nationality of sovereign bonds;

Amendment 2 #

Draft opinion
Recital A b (new)

A b. whereas the cost of those 'institutional weaknesses' was borne directly by those Member States worst affected by that financial and economic crisis, the critical support structures for a new currency marked only by their absence during those catastrophic early years;

Amendment 3 #

Draft opinion
Recital A c (new)

A c. whereas had a European Monetary Fund or some such mechanism existed at that time, the cost of that crisis would have been shared proportionately across the entire eurozone;

Amendment 4 #

Draft opinion
Recital A d (new)

A d. whereas those countries who had thus been adversely affected by that crisis, should now retroactively be compensated from this new European Monetary Fund;

Amendment 5 #

Draft opinion
Recital A e (new)

A e. whereas within ten years of its launch, five Member States of the eurozone - Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain - were in major financial difficulties, where ten years earlier they had been financially healthy;

Amendment 6 #

Draft opinion
Recital B a (new)

B a. whereas in terms of what the European Central Bank did in countries such as Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece after the onset of the financial and economic crisis was not transparent;

Amendment 7 #

Draft opinion
Recital C

C. whereas the parliamentary dimension of the future EMF should be clearly ensured by mirroring current practices at the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation and the World Bank, including in the area of debt forgiveness and/or writedown, with parliamentary networks or dialogues;

Amendment 8 #

Miguel VIEGAS, Luke Ming FLANAGAN

Draft opinion
Recital E

E. whereas Member States and national authorities cannot address on their own the systemic risks generated by a Member State to the financial stability of the Union, nor should they be expected to bear the entire cost of such risks;

Amendment 9 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. The Committee on Budgetary Control intends to reject the proposal of the European Commission to create a European Monetary Fund and, to this end, calls on both the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, as the committees responsible, to propose rejection of the proposal.

source: 630.650

2018/12/18 AFCO 27 amendments...

Amendment 1 #

Pervenche BERÈS, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA, Roberto GUALTIERI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Welcomes the integration of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) into the EU legal order; recalls that such integration must be accompanied by appropriate democratic accountability; notes that only such integration will ensure ESM management in accordance with the Community method, enable consistency of fiscal rules and obligations, facilitate fiscal and economic policy coordination, and enhance democratic legitimacy and accountability through the European Parliament;

Amendment 10 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2 a. Believes that the relevant accountability framework for the future ESF should refer to the economic governance as a whole, recalls the request of this Parliament for an interinstitutional arrangement in this field,

Amendment 11 #

Pervenche BERÈS

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2 a. Believes that any provisional arrangement concluded between the EP and the ESF would give a signal that increases the autonomy of the latter when the strong position of the EP is that it should, as proposed by the Commission, be integrated in the Treaty and the EU legal order,

Amendment 12 #

Pervenche BERÈS, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA, Roberto GUALTIERI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Requests that the European Parliament be informed immediately and in an appropriate manner of the decisions that have been taken by the EMF and approved by the Council; urges the future Managing Director of the EMF to hold transparent and regular dialogue with the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament;

Amendment 13 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Requests that the European Parliament be informed immediately and in an appropriate manner of the decisions that have been taken by the EMSF and approved by the Council;

Amendment 14 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Requests ~~that~~a bigger role for the European Parliament ~~be informed immediately and in an appropriate manner of the decisions that have been taken by the EMF and approved by the Council~~and to strive for a genuinely democratic EMF with co- decision rights for the European Parliament in EMF decisions;

Amendment 15 #

Pervenche BERÈS, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA, Roberto GUALTIERI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Stresses that complete, accurate and timely information is a prerequisite for proper accountability; insists therefore, that the highest standard of transparency ~~be laid down in the future interinstitutional agreement between the EMF and the European Parliament~~and accountability be laid down regarding the decisions of the EMF, the background of such decisions, access to EMF documents and the records of discussions within the EMF;

Amendment 16 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Stresses that complete, accurate and timely information is a prerequisite for proper accountability; insists therefore, that the highest standard of transparency be laid down in the future interinstitutional agreement between the EMSF and the European Parliament regarding the decisions of the EMSF, the background of such decisions, access to EMSF documents and the records of discussions within the EMSF;

Amendment 17 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4 a. Emphasizes the need for democratic accountability of the future Board of Directors of the EMF; regrets the lack of institutional involvement in their proposed selection procedure and calls for the inclusion of the European Parliament and the European Council in the decision on their appointment;

Amendment 18 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4 a. Requests that the European Court of Auditors should be given a clear and formal role in the discharge procedure of the EMF, and that such reports should be examined by the European Parliament;

Amendment 19 #

Pervenche BERÈS, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA, Roberto GUALTIERI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4 a. Calls for ensuring gender balance in the composition of the EMF governing bodies and in the shortlist of candidates for the position of Managing Director;

Amendment 2 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Welcomes the proposal for an integration of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) into the EU legal order; recalls that such integration must be accompanied by appropriate democratic accountability;

Amendment 20 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 b (new)

4 b. Suggests that, should a separate Eurozone budget come to reality, sufficient accountability could be guaranteed by requiring the EMF to share information with a consultative euro area sub-formation of the European Parliament in order to strengthen its accountability to citizens;

Amendment 21 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 b (new)

4 b. Calls for the inclusion in the EMF of a debt restructuring settlement mechanism consistent with the basic principles on sovereign debt restructuring processes adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2015;

Amendment 22 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 c (new)

4 c. Requests that the financial assistance programmes be approved by the Council after the consent of the European Parliament in order to ensure the direct accountability of the EMF to the European Parliament;

Amendment 23 #

Pervenche BERÈS, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA, Roberto GUALTIERI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Understands the need for the Member States ~~to validate decision~~of being involved in the decision-making procedures that have an impact on fiscal resources; stresses, however, that the EMF is an instrument for crisis management, and should therefore be able to act swiftly; calls for the right balance to be struck between, on the one hand, ensuring democratic control of the EMF and its accountability to the participating Member States and, on the other hand, the need to enable the requisite actions to be taken quickly, in particular by preventing an overly cumbersome decision-making process when approval has to be obtained from the Council; calls for the modification of the voting mechanism in order to prevent ESM decisions being vetoed by one Member State; welcomes the provisions that ensure the transparency of the EMF and its accountability to the national parliaments of the EMF members and of the other participating Member States.

Amendment 24 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. Understands the need for the Member States to validate decisions that have an impact on fiscal resources; stresses, however, that the EMSF is an instrument for crisis management, and should therefore be able to act swiftly; calls for the right balance to be struck between, on the one hand, ensuring democratic control of the EMSF and its accountability to the participating Member States and, on the other hand, the need to enable the requisite actions to be taken quickly, in particular by preventing an overly cumbersome decision-making process when approval has to be obtained from the Council; ~~welcomes~~takes note of the provisions that ensure the transparency of the EMSF and its accountability to the national parliaments of the EMSF members and of the other participating Member States.

Amendment 25 #

Markus PIEPER

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5

5. ~~Understands the need for the Member States to validate decisions that have an impact on fiscal resources; stress~~Recognises the budgetary powers of national parliaments over decisions that have an impact on fiscal resources and stresses the need for Member States to therefore validate such decisions; acknowledges, however, that the EMF is an instrument for crisis management, and should therefore be able to act swiftly; calls for the right balance to be struck between, on the one hand, ensuring democratic control of the EMF and its accountability to the participating Member States and, on the other hand, the need to enable the requisite actions to be taken quickly~~, in particular by preventing an overly cumbersome decision-making process when approval has to be obtained from the Council~~; welcomes the provisions that ensure the transparency of the EMF and its accountability to the national parliaments of the EMF members and of the other participating Member States.

Amendment 26 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5 a. Calls for initiating a meaningful ESM reform in the short term by means of a revision of the ESM Treaty, without prejudice to more ambitious developments in the future; notes that such reform should focus on strengthening the EMU and improvement of the decision-making procedure, especially in urgent situations;

Amendment 27 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 b (new)

5 b. Notes that both the inclusion of the ESM and the introduction of the EMF change the institutional architecture of the EU, calls therefore for the matter to be incorporated in the wider discussion on the possible future revision of the Treaties.

Amendment 3 #

Pervenche BERÈS, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA, Roberto GUALTIERI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1 a. Recalls that the Commission proposal provides for the establishment of the EMF as an EU body, which makes the EMF accountable towards the European Parliament and the Council and subject to judicial control by the Court of Justice;

Amendment 4 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1 a. Recalls that the monetary policy in the Union is an exclusive competence of the ECB;

Amendment 5 #

Pervenche BERÈS, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA, Roberto GUALTIERI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1 b. Believes that any attempt to introduce the IMF framework into the EU legal framework should be avoided taking into account the whole institutional setting of the EU and of the Euro area,

Amendment 6 #

Pervenche BERÈS, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA, Roberto GUALTIERI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 c (new)

1 c. Asks the successor of the European Stability Mechanism to be called the European Stability Fund (ESF)

Amendment 7 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Takes note of the proposed provisions regarding the accountability of the European Monetary Fund (EMF) to the European Parliament and the Council; notes in particular that the rules regarding the accountability of the EMF to the European Parliament mirror the already existing arrangements applicable to the Single Resolution Board (SRB), the European Central Bank (ECB) acting within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB);

Amendment 8 #

Pervenche BERÈS, Ramón JÁUREGUI ATONDO, Pedro SILVA PEREIRA, Roberto GUALTIERI

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. ~~Takes note of the proposed provisions regarding the accountability of the European Monetary Fund (EMF) to the European Parliament and the Council; n~~Notes in particular that the rules regarding the accountability of the EMF to the European Parliament mirror the already existing arrangements applicable to the Single Resolution Board (SRB), the European Central Bank (ECB) acting within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB);

Amendment 9 #

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2

2. Takes note of the proposed provisions regarding the accountability of the future European ~~Monetar~~Stability Fund (EMSF) to the European Parliament and the Council; notes in particular that the rules regarding the accountability of the EMF to the European Parliament mirror the already existing arrangements applicable to the Single Resolution Board (SRB), the European Central Bank (ECB) acting within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB);

source: 632.679

2019/01/09 BUDG, ECON 237 amendments...

Amendment 1 #

Miguel VIEGAS

Motion for a resolution
–

The European Parliament rejects the European Commission’s proposal of 6 December 2017 for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Monetary Fund.

Amendment 10 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 a (new)

- having regard to the report of the Eurogroup to the Heads of State and Government of 4 December 2018 and the annex thereto on the arrangements for the reform of the European Stability Mechanism,

Amendment 100 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Suggests that the ESM ~~be renamed not the~~not be expanded to form a European Monetary Fund (EMF), but ~~the European Stability Fund (ESF), making it clear that the eurozone’s monetary policy remains the competence of the ECB~~, rather, that it be wound up and phased out instead;

Amendment 101 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Suggests that the ESM be renamed not the European Monetary Fund (EMF) but the European Stability Fund (ESF), making it clear that the eurozone’s monetary policy remains the competence of the ECB; stresses the need to reform the Statute of the ECB so as to extend its mandate and objectives beyond merely controlling inflation and enable the ECB to use the levers necessary to pursue an integrated monetary policy that ensures stability, employment and ecological transition; stresses, furthermore, the importance of revising the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in order to guarantee the economic, monetary, social and democratic stability of the European Union;

Amendment 102 #

Jean ARTHUIS, Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Suggests that the ESM ~~be renamed not the European Monetary Fund (EMF) but the European Stability Fund (ESF)~~retain its current name, which is recognised on the capital market, making it clear that the eurozone’s monetary policy remains the competence of the ECB;

Amendment 103 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Suggests that the ESM be renamed not the European Monetary Fund (EMF) but be called the European Stability Fund (ESF), making it clear that the eurozone’s monetary policy remains the exclusive competence of the ECB;

Amendment 104 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Suggests that the ESM be renamed ~~not the European Monetary Fund (EMF) but the~~ European Stability Fund (ESF), making it clear that the eurozone’s monetary policy remains the competence of the ECB;

Amendment 105 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

Amendment 106 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

Amendment 107 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Highlights that the proper functioning of an EMU depends on ~~the existence of an institution serving as a ‘lender of last resort’; acknowledges, in this context, the positive contribution of the ESM, despite its intergovernmental nature, towards addressing~~ its rules being complied with and on the existence of a direct link between action and liability; acknowledges, in this context, that, by establishing the ESM, political leaders have permanently broken that link; stresses that that has further weakene~~sses of~~d the institutional setting of the EMU, namely by providing financial assistance to several Member States affected by the financial crisis and the Great Recession;

Amendment 108 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Highlights that the proper functioning of an EMU depends on the existence of an institution serving as a ‘lender of last resort’; acknowledges, in this context, the positive contribution of the ESM, despite its intergovernmental nature, towards addressing the weaknesses of the institutional setting of the EMU, namely by providing financial assistance to several Member States affected by the financial crisis and the Great RecessionESM may only function as a ‘lender of last resort’ to thwart an immediate threat to the stability of the euro area as a whole; highlights that assistance should only be provided to help with liquidity problems, but not solvency problems; highlights that the granting of financial assistance is subject to strict conditions; recalls that ultimately, ESM funds can only finance the necessary adjustment process, and thus "buy time", as only economic policy in the affected country itself can solve economic problems in a structural manner;

Amendment 109 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Highlights that the proper functioning of an EMU depends on the existence of an institution serving as a ‘lender of last resort’; ~~acknowledg~~notes, in this context, the ~~positive~~controversial contribution of the ESM, despite its intergovernmental nature, towards addressing the weaknesses of the institutional setting of the EMU, namely by providing financial assistance to several Member States affected by the financial crisis ~~and the Great Recession~~, subject to recessive fiscal measures, cuts to wages and public services resulting in severe socio- economic conditions, increasing unemployment, poverty and inequalities;

Amendment 11 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 a (new)

- having regard to the Eurogroup report to Leaders on EMU deepening of 4 December 2018,

Amendment 110 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

Amendment 111 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Highlights that the proper functioning of an EMU depends on the existence of an institution serving as a ‘lender of last resort’; acknowledges, in this context, the ~~positive~~ contribution of the ESM, despite ~~its intergovernmental nature~~the inadequacy of its financial capacity, towards addressing the weaknesses of the institutional setting of the EMU, namely by providing financial assistance to several Member States affected by the financial crisis and the Great Recession;

Amendment 112 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

Amendment 113 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Highlights that the proper functioning of an EMU ~~depends on~~is supported by the existence of an institution serving as a ‘lender of last resort’; acknowledges, in this context, the positive contribution of the ESM~~, despite its intergovernmental nature,~~ towards addressing the weaknesses of the institutional setting of the EMU, namely by providing financial assistance to several Member States affected by the financial crisis and the Great Recession;

Amendment 114 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Highlights that the proper functioning of an EMU depends on the existence of an institution serving as a ‘lender of last resort’; ~~acknowledg~~notes, in this context, the positive contribution of the ESM, despite its intergovernmental nature, towards addressing the weaknesses of the institutional setting of the EMU, namely by providing financial assistance to several Member States affected by the financial crisis and the Great Recession;

Amendment 115 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

Amendment 116 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3 a. Strongly deplores that previous macroeconomic adjustment programmes have not adequately respected the Union's fundamental rights and overall legal framework, nevertheless escaped judicial scrutiny benefiting from the ESM intergovernmental structure; agrees with the Commission that adjustment programmes shall be accompanied by and consistent with social impacts assessments; stresses, however, that these impact assessments shall analyse, monitor and manage on a quantifiable basis the intended and unintended social consequences of planned policy measures and any social change processes invoked by those interventions rather than provide an uncritical ratification of fiscal consolidation measures as it has been the case so far; calls for the integration of such detailed obligation in the EMF statute and for the conduct of meaningful social impact assessments on all previous programmes;

Amendment 117 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Recalls that this role of ‘lender of last resort’ is naturally one for the European Central Bank, or, failing that, for each national central bank, and that the reform of the EMU should underline this role and abandon the ideology that prevailed at the time of drafting of the Maastricht Treaty and which gave rise to the euro area debt crisis twenty years later;

Amendment 118 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Insists that a European insolvency procedure finally be introduced for euro area Member States;

Amendment 119 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Recalls its previous positions ~~in favour of~~against the incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework, which would make it a fully-fledged EU body~~; insists that this incorporation~~, i.e. a bureaucratic entity disconnected from effective democratic control, as is currently the case with the ECB; stresses that the establishment of effective mechanisms for democratic scrutiny of the ECB’s action as well as that of the future ESF should continue to be ~~understood~~seen as part of the EMU ~~completion~~reform project; believes that such a~~n integration would allow for management in accordance with the Community method, ensure the full consistency of fiscal rules and obligations, facilitat~~ reform would permit democratic management and ensure economic efficiency, unlike systems designed to impose austerity and a permanent, covert financial crisis; considers that economic and fiscal policy coordination is necessary, but must also address the rec~~onomic and fiscal policy coordination, and enhance democratic legitimacy and accountability through the European Parliament~~essionary impact on their neighbours of predatory policies in countries with excessive twofold surpluses, both external and budgetary; recalls that the enhancement of the democratic legitimacy of the governance of the euro area and of its institutions, such as the ECB or the ESM, should on no account be achieved by increasing the powers of the European Parliament, whose ‘supervision’ of the ECB is clearly a comedy that fools nobody as regards its total lack of reality;

Amendment 12 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 b (new)

- having regard to the statement adopted at the euro area summit on 14 December 2018,

Amendment 120 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Re~~calls its previous positions in favour of the~~jects incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework, which would make it a fully-fledged EU body; insists that this incorporation should continue to be understood as part of the EMU completion project; believes that such an integration would allow for management in accordance with the Community method, ensure the full consistency of fiscal rules and obligations, facilitate economic and fiscal policy coordination, and enhance democratic legitimacy and accountability through the European Parliament; points to the sovereignty of national parliaments over their national budgets; points out that fiscal sovereignty is the primary prerogative of each and every parliament; rejects, therefore, the Community method for the ESM, since it weakens the fiscal responsibility of euro area members and jeopardises fiscal sovereignty; points out that the democratic legitimacy of the European Parliament is weaker than that of national parliaments and that democratic legitimacy is lessened when powers are transferred to the Union;

Amendment 121 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Recalls its previous positions in favour of the incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework, which would make it a fully-fledged EU body; insists that this incorporation should continue to be understood as part of the EMU completion project; believes that such an integration would allow for management in accordance with the Community method, ensure the full consistency of fiscal rules and obligations, facilitate economic and fiscal policy coordination, and enhanceStresses the need to maintain the intergovernmental governance of the ESM, especially the ESM majority requirements; believes that such an intergovernmental approach provides the best guarantees to protect the interests of the member states, especially those member states who are net contributors to the ESM, to safeguard democratic legitimacy and accountability through the ~~European Parliament~~national parliaments, and guarantees its independence;

Amendment 122 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Recalls its previous positions in favour of the incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework, which would make it a fully-fledged EU body; iconsi~~sts that this incorporation should continue to be understood as part of the EMU completion project~~ders, therefore, that the European Stability Fund should be incorporated into the EU budget with a corresponding rise in the ceilings, which is a necessary precondition for the success of the project to complete the EMU; believes that such an integration would allow for management in accordance with the Community method, ensure the full consistency of fiscal rules and obligations, facilitate economic and fiscal policy coordination, and enhance the democratic legitimacy ~~and accountability through the~~of the ESF by a European Parliament decision;

Amendment 123 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Recalls its previous positions in favour of the incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework, which would make it a fully-fledged EU body, subject to democratic accountability and transparency rules; insists that this incorporation should continue to be understood as part of the EMU completion project; believes that such an integration wshould allow for management in accordance with the Community method, ~~ensure the full consistency of fiscal rules and obligations,~~ facilitate economic and fiscal policy coordination away from restrictive fiscal policies, and enhance democratic legitimacy and accountability through the European Parliament;

Amendment 124 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Recalls its previous positions in favour of the incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework, which would make it a fully-fledged EU body, creating, inter alia, legal certainty that its acts and omissions are subject to judicial scrutiny on the basis of EU law; insists that this incorporation should continue to be understood as part of the EMU completion project; believes that such an integration would ~~allow~~be an insufficient per se, yet indispensable condition for management in accordance with the Community method, ~~ensure the full consistency of fiscal rules and ob~~faciligtati~~ons, facilitate~~ng economic and fiscal policy coordination, and enhanceing democratic legitimacy and accountability through the European Parliament;

Amendment 125 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Recalls its previous positions in favour of the incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework, which would make it a fully-fledged EU body; insists that this incorporation ~~should cont~~must not underminue t~~o be understood as part of the EMU completion project~~he fiscal and democratic oversight prerogatives of national parliaments; believes that such an integration would allow for management in accordance with the Community method, ensure the full consistency of fiscal rules and obligations, facilitate economic and fiscal policy coordination, and enhance democratic legitimacy and accountability through the European Parliament;

Amendment 126 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Recalls its previous positions in favour of the incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework, which would make it a fully-fledged EU body; welcomes the Commission proposal for an integration of the ESM into the EU legal order; insists that this incorporation should continue to be understood as part of the EMU completion project; believes that such an integration would allow for management in accordance with the Community method, ensure the full consistency of fiscal rules and obligations, facilitate economic and fiscal policy coordination, and enhance democratic legitimacy and accountability through the European Parliament;

Amendment 127 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

Amendment 128 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Recalls its previous positions in favour of the incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework, which would make it a fully-fledged EU body; insists that this incorporation should continue to be understood as part of the EMU completion project; believes that such an integration would allow for management in accordance with the Community method, ensure the full consistency of fiscal rules and obligations, facilitate economic and fiscal policy coordination, and enhance democratic legitimacy and accountability through the European Parliament; points out that all these objectives would be further enhanced if a reformed ESM was headed by the already proposed Minister of Finances of the eurozone, also serving as Commission Vice President responsible for the euro and President of the Eurogroup;

Amendment 129 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4 a. Stresses that the role for national Parliaments remains fully preserved, in view of the large contributions of the Member States to the EMF; urges for a more explicit scrutiny role for national Parliaments in comparison to the current state of play in the ESM Treaty; national Parliaments should have the right to obtain information about the activities of the EMF, and to engage in a dialogue with the EMF;

Amendment 13 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 b (new)

- having regard to the statement of the Euro Summit of 14 December 2018,

Amendment 130 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4 a. Emphasises in particular the need to further increase the transparency and accountability of the decision-making process leading to the adoption of macroeconomic adjustment programmes, providing for a clearer and well- delimitated mandate for all involved stakeholders; asks for such provisions to be integrated in the future EMF statute as well as in case of a future proposal to amend Regulation(EU) No 472/2013;

Amendment 131 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4 a. Notes that when integrated into the EU legal framework, the European Court of Auditors should be considered as the independent external auditor and should be given a clear and formal role in the discharge procedure; underlines that the Parliament should have the political power in considering audit reports;

Amendment 132 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 b (new)

4 b. Notes that the ECB’s role is not sufficiently defined, as both the ESM Treaty and the EMF Commission proposal state that the Commission should work ‘in liaison with the ECB’, thus reducing the ECB to an advisory role; reminds that the ECJ has ruled in the Pringle case that the tasks allocated to the ECB by the ESM Treaty are in line with the various tasks which the TFEU and the Statute of the ESCB [and the ECB] confer on it provided that a certain number of conditions are permanently fulfilled; reminds that the ECB’s mandate is circumscribed by the TFEU to the areas of monetary policy and financial stability and that involvement of the ECB in the decision-making process related to budgetary, fiscal and structural policies is not foreseen by the Treaties; reiterates that potential ECB conflicts of interest in the previous adjustments programmes, especially as regards crucial liquidity policy, need to be effectively addressed;

Amendment 133 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 c (new)

4 c. Is further of the opinion that macroeconomic adjustment programmes shall be adopted by means of Delegated Acts on the basis of Article 290 TFEU, granting the Parliament and the Council equal rights in repealing them;

Amendment 134 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 d (new)

4 d. Regrets that in the Commission proposal the revenue and expenditure of the EMF are outside the EU budget, pre- empting the Parliament from exercising its discharge powers and violating the principle of unity of the EU budget as enshrined in Article 310 TFEU; calls, therefore, for the integration of the EMF in the Union budget by creating a budget line financed by ear-marked Member States contributions with the rest of the general budget offering a guarantee to the EMF operations up to a pre-defined amount; considers that any opposite approach, whereby the EMF escapes budgetary scrutiny by the Parliament, contradicts the letter and the spirit of the treaties and constitutes, as noted by ECA “a key gap in the proposed accountability arrangements of the EMF”1a; _________________ 1a Opinion No 2/2018 “The audit and accountability considerations concerning the proposal of 6 December 2017 for the establishment of a European Monetary Fund within the Union legal framework”, paragraph 42 (Based on: Repasi 2016 (Study for the AFCO Committee): Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty - Improving functioning of the EU: Economic and Monetary Policy (Page 42 f.) (PE 556.952))

Amendment 135 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 e (new)

4 e. Calls for ensuring gender balance in the composition of EMF governing bodies and in the shortlist of the candidates for the position of the Managing Director; Member States should be required to select subsequent Directors of alternating gender;

Amendment 136 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 f (new)

4 f. Asks for a stronger role for the European Parliament in the selection of the EMF Managing Director; calls, in this respect, for granting the Parliament the right to approve the shortlist of candidates for the position of the Managing Director as well as to object selected candidates after the selection made by the Council;

Amendment 137 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Notes that the Commission’s proposal has generated a lively discussion on its political, financial and legal implications, and that discussions continue on a number of important issues; stresses, however, that this debate on the long-term vision of the ESM’s institutional setting should not delay the steps urgently required to strengthen the EMU and its capacity to promote financial stability and respond to economic shocks; calls, therefore, for a meaningful ESM reform in the short term by means of a revision of the ESM Treaty, without prejudice to more ambitious developments in the future;deleted

Amendment 138 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Notes that the Commission’s proposal has generated a lively discussion on its political, financial and legal implications, and that discussions continue on a number of important issues; stresses, however, that this debate on the long-term vision of the ESM’s institutional setting should not delay the steps urgently required to strengthen the; underscores the fact that there is no legal basis for an EMUF and its capacity to promote financial stability and respond to economic shocks; calls, therefore, for a meaningful ESM reform in the short term by means of a revision of the ESM Treaty, without prejudice to more ambitious developments in the futurethat Article 352 TFEU in particular is not relevant;

Amendment 139 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Notes that the Commission’s proposal has generated a lively discussion on its political, financial and legal implications, and that discussions continue on a number of important issues; stresses, however, that ~~this~~all concerns raised in the debate on the long-term vision of the ESM’s institutional setting should not delay the steps urgently required to strengthen the EMU and its capacity to promote financial stability and respond to economic shocks; calls, therefore, for a meaningful ESM reform in the short term by means of a revision of the ESM Treaty, without prejudice to more ambitious developments in the futurebe duly addressed;

Amendment 14 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 c (new)

- having regard to the Joint Position on future cooperation between the European Commission and the ESM of 14 November 2018,

Amendment 140 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Notes that the Commission’s proposal has generated a lively discussion on its political, financial and legal implications, and that discussions continue on a number of important issues; stresses, however, that this debate on the long-term vision of the ESM’s institutional setting should not delay the steps urgently required to ~~strengthen~~reform the EMU and its capacity to promote financial stability and respond to economic shocks; calls, therefore, for a meaningful ESM reform in the short term by means of a revision of the ESM Treaty, without prejudice to more ambitious developments in the future;

Amendment 141 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Notes that the Commission’s proposal has generated a ~~lively~~ discussion on its political, financial and legal implications~~, and that discussions continue on a number of important issues~~; stresses, however, that this debate on the long-term vision of the ESM’s institutional setting should not delay the steps urgently required to strengthen and enforce democratic accountability of the EMU and its capacity to promote financial stability and respond to economic shocks, alongside inclusive growth, economic, social and regional cohesion; calls, therefore, for a meaningful ESM reform in the short term by means of a revision of the ESM Treaty, without prejudice to more ambitious developments in the future;

Amendment 142 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Notes that the Commission’s proposal has generated a lively discussion on its political, financial and legal implications, and that discussions continue on a number of important issues; stresses, however, that this debate on the long-term vision of the new ESMF’s institutional setting should not delay the steps urgently required to strengthen the EMU and its capacity to promote financial stability and respond to economic shocks; calls, therefore, for a meaningful ESM reform in the short term by means of a revision of the ESM Treaty, without prejudice to more ambitious developments in the future;

Amendment 143 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Amendment 144 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Underlines that the primary mission of the new ESF should continue to be to provide transitional financial assistance to Member States in need, on the basis of the agreed adjustment programmes; stresses that the ESF must have adequate firepower for that purpose; opposes,e fact that the adjustment programmes carried out to date, which have been intended to provide transitional financial assistance, delay the necessary adjustment process and are counterproductive; therefore, rejects any attempt to turn the reformed ESM into an instrument ~~for banks only, or to reduce its financial capacity to support Member States; recalls that financial assistance provided to Member States under~~that serves the banks; recalls that, to date, the ~~new~~ ESF has ~~to be complemented by other fiscal capacity tools, including precautionary instruments,~~not definitively established that it is in a position to promote economic and financial stabilisation, investment and upward socioeconomic convergence in the euro area;

Amendment 145 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Underlines that the primary mission of the new ESF should continue to be to provide transitional financial assistance to Member States in need, on the basis of the agreed adjustment programmes; stresses that the ESF must have adequate firepower for that purpose~~; opposes, therefore,~~, and therefore proposes that the ECB issue the ESF with a banking licence enabling it to provide the liquidity needed to resolve large asymmetric shocks to conduct an effective counter-cyclical policy; opposes any attempt to turn the reformed ESM into an instrument for banks only, or to reduce its financial capacity to support Member States; recalls that financial assistance provided to Member States under the new ESF has to be complemented by other fiscal capacity tools, including precautionary instruments, to promote economic and financial stabilisation, investment and upward socioeconomic convergence in the euro area; insists on the establishment of an objective of transparency and fair tax practices in the award of the European Monetary Fund;

Amendment 146 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Underlines that the primary mission of the new ESF should continue to be to provide transitional financial assistance to Member States in need~~, on the basis of the agreed adjustment programmes~~; stresses that the ESF must have adequate firepower for that purpose; opposes, therefore, any attempt to ~~turn the reformed ESM into an instrument for banks only, or to~~ reduce its financial capacity to support Member States; recalls that financial assistance provided to Member States under the new ESF has to be complemented by other fiscal capacity tools, including precautionary instruments, to promote economic and financial stabilisation, investment and upward socioeconomic convergence in the euro area;

Amendment 147 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Underlines that the primary mission of the new ESF should continue to be to provide transitional financial assistance to Member States in need, on the basis of the agreed adjustment programmes; stresses that the ESF must have adequate firepower for that purpose; opposes, therefore, any attempt to turn the reformed ESM into an instrument for banks only, or to reduce its financial capacity to support Member States; recalls that financial assistance provided to Member States under the new ESF has to be complemented by other fiscal capacity tools, including precautionary instruments, to promote economic and financial stabilisation, investment and upward socioeconomic convergence in the euro areabe to ensure the stability in the Euro Area and prevent new crises; stresses therefore that the reformed ESM should be responsible for a more rigorous implementation of the common binding fiscal rules, should have a greater responsibility for the development and monitoring of financial assistance programmes and should promote debt sustainability;

Amendment 148 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Underlines that the primary mission of the new ESF should ~~continue to be to~~ provide transitional financial assistance to Member States in need, on the basis of the agreed adjustment programmes; stresses that the ESF must have adequate firepower for that purpose; opposes, therefore, any attempt to turn the reformed ESM into an instrument for banks only, or to reduce its financial capacity to support Member Statf intervening in the private banking sector, and having an appropriate European Deposit Insurance Scheme or an equivalent system to coordinate the existing national deposit insurance schemes; stresses that the ESF must have adequate firepower for that purpose; opposes, therefore, any attempt to turn the reformed ESM into an instrument to protect the interest of private banks, or for delivering the financial support to Member States to rescue private banks, overloading the productive classes with higher and more regressive taxes, or cutting public expenditure for social policies and public services; recalls that financial assistance provided to Member States under the new ESF has to be complemented by other fiscal capacity tools~~, including precautionary instruments, to promote economic and financial stabilisation,~~ to promote investment and upward socioeconomic convergence in the euro area;

Amendment 149 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Underlines that the primary mission of the new ESF should continue to be to provide transitional financial assistance to Member States in need, on the basis of the agreed adjustment programmes based on lessons learned by austerity measures imposed to member states by Troika and IMF; stresses that the ESF must have adequate firepower for that purpose; opposes, therefore, any attempt to turn the reformed ESM into an instrument for banks only, or to reduce its financial capacity to support Member States; recalls that financial assistance provided to Member States under the new ESF has to be complemented by other fiscal capacity tools, ~~including precautionary instruments,~~ to promote economic and financial stabilisation, public investment and upward socioeconomic convergence in the euro area as part of a new more sustainable inclusive and democratic economic governance framework;

Amendment 15 #

Dimitrios PAPADIMOULIS

Motion for a resolution
Citation 5

— having regard to the Five Presidents’ Report of 22 June 2015 on completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union, to the Commission white paper of 1 March 2017 on the future of Europe, and to the Commission reflection paper of 31 May 2017 on the deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union, as well as to the fact that the Five Presidents' Report is referring to the euro as a "political and economic project",

Amendment 150 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Amendment 151 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Underlines that the primary mission of the new ESF should continue to be to ~~provide transitional~~increase financial ~~assista~~resilience tof Member States ~~in need~~, on the basis of the agreed adjustment programmes; ~~stresses that the ESF must have adequate firepower for that purpose; opposes, therefore, any attempt to turn the reformed ESM into an instrument for banks only, or~~welcomes any steps considered to reduce its financial capacity to support Member States; recalls that financial assistance provided to Member States under the new ESF has to be complemented by other fiscal capacity tools, including precautionary instruments, to promote economic and financial stabilisation, investment and upward socioeconomic convergence in the euro area;

Amendment 152 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Underlines that the primary mission of the new ESFM should continue to be to provide transitional financial assistance to Member States in need, on the basis of the agreed adjustment programmes; stresses that the ESFM must have adequate firepower for that purpose; opposes, therefore, any attempt to turn the reformed ESM into an instrument for banks only, or to reduce its financial capacity to support Member States; recalls that financial assistance provided to Member States under the new ESF has to be complemented by other fiscal capacity tools, including precautionary instruments, to promote economic and financial stabilisation, investment and upward socioeconomic convergence in the euro area;

Amendment 153 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Underlines that the primary mission of the new ESF should continue to be to provide transitional financial assistance to Member States in need, on the basis of the agreed adjustment programmes; stresses that the ESF must have adequate firepower for that purpose; opposes, therefore, any attempt to turn the reformed ESM into an instrument for banks only, or to reduce its financial capacity to support Member States; recalls that ~~financial assistance provided to Member States under the new ESF has to be complemented by other fiscal capacity tools, including~~the range of financial instruments currently available for the ESM should also be available for the EMF, including the possibility to provide precautionary fin~~struments, to promote economic and financial stabilisation, investment and upward socioeconomic convergence in the euro area~~ancial assistance, allowing EMF Member States the possibility to access EMF assistance before they face major difficulties raising funds in the capital markets, in order to promote economic and financial stabilisation;

Amendment 154 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Amendment 155 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Underlines that the primary mission of the new ESFM should continue to be to provide transitional financial assistance to Member States in need, on the basis of the agreed adjustment programmes; stresses that the ESFM must have adequate firepower for that purpose; opposes, therefore, any attempt to turn the reformed ESM into an instrument for banks only, or to reduce its financial capacity to support Member States; recalls that financial assistance provided to Member States under the new ESFM has to be complemented by other fiscal capacity tools, including precautionary instruments, to promote economic and financial stabilisation, investment and upward socioeconomic convergence in the euro area;

Amendment 156 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Amendment 157 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Underlines that the primary mission of the new ESF should continue to be to provide transitional financial assistance to Member States in need, on the basis of the agreed adjustment programmes; stresses that the ESF must have adequate firepower for that purpose; opposes, therefore, any attempt to turn the reformed ESM into an instrument for banks only, or to reduce its financial capacity to support Member States; recalls that financial assistance provided to Member States under the new ESF has to be complemented by ~~other fiscal capacity tools, including precautionary instruments,~~precautionary instruments, such as structural reforms to promote economic and financial stabilisation, investment and upward socioeconomic convergence in the euro area;

Amendment 158 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6 a. Calls for the inclusion in the EMF of a debt restructuring settlement mechanism consistent with the basic principles on sovereign debt restructuring processes adopted by the UN General Assembly in 20151b and asks for a debt sustainability analysis on the basis of an enlarged debt sustainability concept underpinning a fundamental rights oriented approach; _________________ 1b Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes, UN resolution 2015, A/69/L.84.

Amendment 159 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6 a. Underlines that the Economic and Monetary Union comprises all Member States of the European Union, all of which, except Denmark and the United Kingdom, are required to adopt the euro and join the euro area, therefore, any EMF should be open for participation to all Member States of the EU;

Amendment 16 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 a (new)

- having regard to the Five Presidents' Report which refers that euro "requires solidarity in times of crisis and respect for commonly agreed rules from all members",

Amendment 160 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6 a. Underlines that the EMF should not be allowed to raise debt, directly or indirectly;

Amendment 161 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)

6 b. Raises concern regarding the problem of obliging the EMF to deal with the continuous monitoring of EMU countries also in non-crisis times, since this would affect the staff and costs of the IMF, the Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD), the EU Commission, and also to some extent the ECB, since they already perform this task; proposes that the EMF could potentially be allowed to borrow staff from the Commission and the ECB when a crisis arises; this staff could work under EMF management in order to guarantee sufficient independence;

Amendment 162 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 c (new)

6 c. Stresses the need to introduce a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism to reinforce the no-bailout rule, which will make financial market actors apply more scrutiny;

Amendment 163 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Believes that the reformed ESM should play a more prominent role in the management of financial assistance programmes, alongside the Commission and in close cooperation with the ECB, ensuring that the EU institutional framework has more autonomy whenever needed, without prejudice to appropriate partnerships with other institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund;deleted

Amendment 164 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Believes that the reformed ESM should play a more prominent role in the management of financial assistance programmes, ~~alongside~~instead of the Commission ~~and in close cooperation with the ECB~~, ensuring that the EU institutional framework has more autonomy whenever needed, without prejudice to appropriate partnerships with other institutions~~, namely the International Monetary Fund~~;

Amendment 165 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Believes that the reformed ESM should play a more prominent role in the implementation of the SGP and the management of financial assistance programmes, ~~alongside the Commission and in close cooperation with the ECB,~~ ensuring that the EU institutional framework has more autonomy whenever needed, without prejudice to appropriate partnerships with other institutions, ~~namely~~such as the ECB and the International Monetary Fund;

Amendment 166 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Believes that the reformed ESM should play a more prominent role in the management of financial assistance programmes, alongside the Commission and in close cooperation with the ECB, ensuring that the EU institutional framework has more autonomy whenever needed, under effective democratic control, without prejudice to appropriate partnerships with other institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund;

Amendment 167 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Believes that the reformed ESM should play a more prominent role in the management of financial assistance programmes, alongside the Commission and in close cooperation with the ECB, ensuring that the EU institutional framework has more autonomy whenever needed~~, without prejudice to appropriate partnerships with other institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund~~;

Amendment 168 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Believes that the ~~reformed~~new ESMF should play a more prominent role in the management of financial assistance programmes, alongside the Commission and in close cooperation with the ECB, ensuring that the EU institutional framework has more autonomy whenever needed, without prejudice to appropriate partnerships with other institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund;

Amendment 169 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7 a. Believes that any attempt to introduce the IMF framework into the EU legal framework should be avoided taking into account the whole institutional setting of the EU and of the Euro area;

Amendment 17 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 b (new)

- having regard to the European Court of Auditors reports 18/2015 of 26 January 2016 on financial assistance provided to countries in difficulties and 17/2017 of 16 November 2017 on the Commission intervention in the Greek financial crisis,

Amendment 170 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7 a. Believes that if the EMF would be sufficiently autonomous, the conditionality principle would be strengthened and the politically influenced EU Commission would no longer be involved;

Amendment 171 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7 a. Calls on the Commission to propose a review of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) Regulation to allow it to use this facility to invest in ESM shares;

Amendment 172 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Amendment 173 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Stresses that evaluation of the financial assistance requests made by the ESF, as well as its decision-making on the design of the adjustment programmes, in cooperation with other institutions, should in no way replace, duplicate or overlap the normal macroeconomic and fiscal surveillance provided for in the EU’s financial rules and regulations, which must remain the Commission’s exclusive competence; stresses the urgent need for a comprehensive reform of the European Semester, taking into account the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (including gender equality, protection of biodiversity and measures to combat climate change, discrimination and poverty) as performance indicators;

Amendment 174 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Stresses that evaluation of the financial assistance requests made by the ESF, as well as its decision-making on the design of the adjustment programmes, in cooperation with other institutions, should ~~in no way replace, duplicate or overlap~~not replace the normal macroeconomic and fiscal surveillance provided for in the EU’s fi~~nanci~~scal rules and regulations~~, which must remain the Commission’s exclusive competence~~; considers that the Commission's track record in monitoring and enforcing the EU's fiscal framework is poor and that the Commission's decision making process has often been clouded by political considerations; therefore considers it necessary to upgrade the ESF's role in the macroeconomic and fiscal surveillance procedures;

Amendment 175 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Stresses that evaluation of the financial assistance requests made by the ESF, as well as its decision-making on the design of the adjustment programmes, in cooperation with other institutions, should in no way replace, duplicate or overlap the normal macroeconomic and fiscal surveillance provided for in the EU’s financial rules and regulations, which must remain the Commission’s exclusive competenceuggests to task the ESM with evaluating and making recommendations on the implementation of the Union fiscal framework and the appropriateness of the actual fiscal stance at euro area and national level in order to ensure independent assessments of the member states’ budgets and economic forecasts;

Amendment 176 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Stresses that evaluation of the financial assistance requests made by the ESF, as well as its decision-making on the design of the adjustment programmes, in cooperation with other institutions, should in no way replace, duplicate or overlap the normal macroeconomic and fiscal surveillance provided for in the EU’s financial rules and regulations, which must remain the Commission’s exclusive competence; the evaluation should take into consideration reports and opinions being produced by the European Parliament, respective National Parliaments and the European Economic and Social Committee;

Amendment 177 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Amendment 178 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Amendment 179 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Amendment 18 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 8

~~— having regard to its resolution of 16 February 2017 on budgetary capacity for the euro area3 , _________________ 3 OJ C 252, 18.7.2018, p. 235.~~deleted

Amendment 180 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Stresses that evaluation of the financial assistance requests made by the ESFM, as well as its decision-making on the design of the adjustment programmes, in cooperation with other institutions, should in no way replace, duplicate or overlap the normal macroeconomic and fiscal surveillance provided for in the EU’s financial rules and regulations, which must remain the Commission’s exclusive competence;

Amendment 181 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Stresses~~Underlines that the ESF should have its own expertise to produce and assess the elements required by its statute; stresses, however, that evaluation of the financial assistance requests made by the ESF, as well as its decision-making on the design of the adjustment programmes, in cooperation with other institutions, should in no way replace, duplicate or overlap the normal macroeconomic and fiscal surveillance provided for in the EU’s financial rules and regulations, which must remain the Commission’s exclusive competence;

Amendment 182 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8 a. Requests that the reformed ESM is complemented with an insolvency procedure for sovereigns. This would increase the incentives for sound fiscal policies and avoid that investors consider lending to unsustainably run economies;

Amendment 183 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8 a. The EMF should report regularly to the European Parliament as well as to national parliaments on its undertaking activities, with a view to achieving greater democratic control;

Amendment 184 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)

8 b. Requests that together with reforming the ESM risk weighting should be introduced with regard to sovereign bonds on banks’ books. Banks have been and are still to a large extent intertwined with their sovereigns by holding significant amounts of national public debt. This reform would motivate banks to focus on the solidity rather than the nationality of sovereign bonds.

Amendment 185 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. ~~Highlights the need for an efficient~~Stresses that the transformation of the ESM into a fully-fledged EU body is ad odds with the foreseen unanimity voting rule, intrinsic to an intergovernmental modus operandi; calls for the backstop to the SRF to be provided avoiding complex decision- making procedure ~~in the reformed ESM, particularly in the case of urgent s~~s that limit its effectiveness in stabilising confidence in the banking union; the backstop should be established as an EMF credit line that can be used without a new round of national decisions; considers that such a decision making process would enhance EMF’s capacity to respond swiftly to economic and financial shocks, whilst respecting Member States’ constituationsal order;

Amendment 186 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Highlights the need for an efficient decision-making procedure in the ~~reformed ESM, particularly~~ ESM, while safeguarding the ~~case of~~principle of unanimity, including in urgent situations;

Amendment 187 #

Nicola CAPUTO

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Highlights the need for an efficient decision-making procedure in the reformed ESM, particularly in the case of urgent situations, by a stronger majority vote, while unanimity would be maintained for all major decisions with a financial impact;

Amendment 188 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Highlights the need for an efficient, balanced and democratic decision-making procedure in the reformed ESM, particularly in the case of urgent situations where inclusive dialogue with all interested parties and with respect to national particularities, transparency, accountability and simplicity will be ensured;

Amendment 189 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Highlights the need for an efficient decision-making procedure in the reformed ESM, particularly in the case of urgent situations while safeguarding, where applicable, the prerogatives of national parliaments;

Amendment 19 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)

- having regard to the German Federal Constitutional Court judgment of 12 September 2012, ref. 2 BvR 1390/12, requiring a reservation to be entered under international law,

Amendment 190 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Highlights the need for an efficient decision-making procedure in the reformed ESM, particularly in the case of urgent situations; points out that the existing decision making procedures have worked in terms of speed and efficiency;

Amendment 191 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Highlights the need for an efficient and democratic decision-making procedure in the reformed ESM, particularly in the case of urgent situations;

Amendment 192 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Highlights the need for an efficient decision-making procedure in the ~~reformed~~new ESMF, particularly in the case of urgent situations;

Amendment 193 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Highlights the need for an efficient decision-making procedure in the reformed ESM, particularly in the case of urgent situations; in this context, calls for an assessment of the current governance setting;

Amendment 194 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)

9 a. Believes that financial assistance instruments under the ESF could be improved, notably the financial assistance through Precautionary Conditioned Credit Line (PCCL); notes that these tools shall be used whenever necessary by a Member State facing symmetrical or asymmetrical shocks; believes that the eligibility conditions to activate such tools should be balanced and provide appropriate flexibility clauses; defends that the access to the PCCL could be available without requiring a Memorandum of Understanding;

Amendment 195 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Amendment 196 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Calls ~~for a swift~~- in the event of an ESM reform that also redefines its role, functions and financial tools~~, so that the new ESF can~~ - for no provision to be made for the ESM either to offer liquidity support in case of resolution ~~and~~or to serve as a financial backstop for the SRF; ~~calls for the SRF to be made operational as soon as possible and, in any case, before 2024;~~

Amendment 197 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Calls for a swift ESM reform that also redefines its role, functions and financial tools, so that the new ESF can offer adequate liquidity support in case of resolution and serve as a financial backstop for the SRF, without recessive and austerity policies conditionality; calls for the SRF to be made operational as soon as possible and, in any case, before 2024;

Amendment 198 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Calls for a swift ESM reform that also redefines its role, functions and financial tools, so that the new ESF can offer liquidity support in case of resolution and serve as a financial backstop for the ~~SRF; calls for the SRF to be made operational as soon as~~ implementation of an coordinated Deposit Insurance Scheme, and to address any banking crisis in a manner which protects ordinary citizens and ensures that those resposnsible ~~and, in any case, before 2024~~for triggering such crises do not benefit from the subsequent policy responses;

Amendment 199 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Considers that a credible funding- in-resolution framework has to clearly distinguish between solvency and liquidity needs; calls for a swift ESM reform that also redefines its role, functions and financial tools, so that the new ESF can offer liquidity support in case of resolution and serve as a financial backstop for the SRF; calls for the SRF to be made operational as soon as possible and, in any case, before 20241;

Amendment 2 #

Motion for a resolution
–

The European Parliament rejects [the Commission proposal].

Amendment 20 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 9 a (new)

- having regard to its interim report adopted on 14 November 2018 on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021- 2027 and the Union’s own resources,

Amendment 200 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Calls for a swift ESM reform that also redefines its role, functions and financial tools, so that the new ESFM can offer liquidity support in case of resolution and ~~serve as a~~ , once signifincan~~cial backstop for the SRF; calls for the SRF to be made operational as soon as possible and,~~ t risk reduction has taken place in all participating Member States, serve as a fin an~~y case, before 2024~~cial backstop for the SRF;

Amendment 201 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Calls for a swift ESM reform that also redefines its role, functions and financial tools, so that the new ESF can offer liquidity support in case of resolution and serve as a financial backstop ~~for~~to be used by the SRFB; calls for th~~e SRF~~is financial backstop to be made operational as soon as possible and, in any case, before 2024;

Amendment 202 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Calls for a swift ESM reform that also redefines its role, functions and financial tools, so that the new ESF can provide for financial stability, and can offer liquidity support in case of resolution and serve as a financial backstop for the SRF; calls for the SRF to be made operational as soon as possible and, in any case, before 2024;

Amendment 203 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Calls for a swift ESM reform that also redefines its role, functions and financial tools, so that the new ESFM can offer liquidity support in case of resolution and serve as a financial backstop for the SRF; calls for the SRF to be made operational as soon as possible and, in any case, before 2024;

Amendment 204 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Amendment 205 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)

10 a. Welcomes the conclusions of the Eurogroup of 4 December 2018, which were endorsed by the Euro Summit of 14 December 2018; welcomes namely the anticipation of the introduction of the backstop to the SRF by 2020 and the endorsement of the Term Sheet on the ESM; regrets, however, that no concrete outcome regarding the future eurozone fiscal capacity and the stabilization function has been reached; underlines that significant progress has been achieved recently on the side of risk reduction; recalls also that the European Parliament has made substantial contributions to enable this in particular on the so-called Banking package and the Non-Performing Loans prudential backstop;

Amendment 206 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)

10 a. Regrets that the Eurogroup agreement of December 2018 is silent on the modalities of how the SRB would provide liquidity support to banks when using the proposed ESM/EMF credit line; considers as a way forward the possibility of the SRF to issue guarantees or bonds to be lent to the banks, that can then be used as collateral for either ELA or the ordinary monetary policy operations by the ECB; underlines, however, that the proposed framework is not suitable for such a construction, as borrowing from the ESM/EMF would make it more difficult for the SRB to issue bonds with a good credit rating, due to the preferred- creditor status of the ESM/EMF; (Source: Demertzis et al. 2018: How to provide liquidity to banks after resolution in Europe’s banking union, Bruegel external publication.(http://bruegel.org/2018/11/ho w-to-provide-liquidity-to-banks-after- resolution-in-europes-banking-union/))

Amendment 207 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)

10 a. Highlights the importance of a credible EMF provided with adequate firepower linked to strict conditionality, in order to safeguard individual Member States against financial market turbulence; stresses that conditionality consists of both ex-post conditionality, the policies agreed upon for crisis programmes, and ex-ante conditionality, sound economic policies based on European budgetary rules;

Amendment 208 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 b (new)

10 b. Welcomes the fact that the Euro group agreement of December 2018 makes the ESM’s Precautionary Conditioned Credit Line (PCCL) conditional on transparent and precise ex- ante eligibility criteria and not on ex-post policy conditions, while replacing the PCCL’s MoU by a ‘Letter of Intent’, that should help reduce the strong disincentives to use the ESM, in the case of liquidity crises; calls, however, for a revision of the proposed criteria to access the PCCL, given that as they stand, they would render more than half of the Eurozone countries ineligible to use it[1];stresses the need for the ECB to clarify whether it considers the PCCL as a suitable programme to access the OMT1c; _________________ 1c http://bruegel.org/2018/12/does-the- eurogroups-reform-of-the-esm-toolkit- represent-real- progress/?utm_source=GDPR&utm_cam paign=34a728f379EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_ 2018_12_13_09_09&utm_medium=email &utm_term=0_7c51e322b7-34a728f379- 278611705

Amendment 209 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 b (new)

10 b. Recalls the urgent need for decisive progress to be made on risk sharing measures, namely the swift conclusion of the EDIS and the establishment of the eurozone fiscal capacity including a European Stabilization Function; stresses the need to deliver concrete results and avoid further postponing of decisions on critical issues that could affect the stability of the EMU as a whole;

Amendment 21 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 12 a (new)

- having regard to the agreement of 4 December 2018 by the Eurogroup on a term sheet for the further development of the ESM1a, _________________ 1a https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/3 7267/esm-term-sheet- 041218_final_clean.pdf

Amendment 210 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 c (new)

10 c. Takes note of the Joint Position on future cooperation between the European Commission and the ESM of 14 November 2018; regrets the non- involvement of the European Parliament in this matter; recalls the exclusive competence of the European Commission in macroeconomic and fiscal surveillance and, therefore, is concerned about the implications of the participation of the ESM in future missions related to economic policy coordination and budgetary monitoring within the framework of cooperation outside financial assistance;

Amendment 211 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 c (new)

10 c. Further welcomes the replacement of two-limb CACs by single limb CACs, that can facilitate debt restructuring in exceptional insolvency crises;

Amendment 212 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

Amendment 213 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

Amendment 214 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

Amendment 215 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Underlines the risks arising from the delay in completing the Banking Union, which mean that the incomplete banking union is far more dangerous to financial stability than the absence of a banking union; welcomes, in this context, the European Council’s commitment to a common backstop for the SRF and recalls the need also to establish the EDIS; stresses that, in particular in the absence of EDIS, it is preferable to undo the entire Banking Union;

Amendment 216 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Underlines the risks arising from ~~the delay in~~ completingon of the banking union; ~~welcome~~rejects, in this context, the European Council’s commitment to a common backstop for the SRF and ~~recalls the need also to~~points out that the EDIS must not be establish ~~the EDIS~~ed either;

Amendment 217 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Underlines the risks arising from the delay in completing the banking union; welcomes, in this context, the European Council’s commitment to a common backstop for the SRF ~~and recalls the need also to establish the EDIS~~;

Amendment 218 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Underlines the risks arising from the delay in completing the banking union; while welcomesing, in this context, the European Council’s commitment to a common backstop for the SRF ~~and recalls the need also to establish the EDIS~~, it is concerned that any reform of the ESM will not be undertaken before 2021; recalls the need also to establish the EDIS in the form of a full reinsurance scheme for national deposit insurance scheme respecting the principle of subsidiarity;

Amendment 219 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Underlines the risks arising from the delay in completing the banking union~~; welcom~~, but stresses that risk reduction is a condition for risk sharing; notes, in this context, the European Council’s commitment to a common backstop for the SRF and recalls the ‘ne~~ed also to establish the EDIS~~w approach’ to an EDIS as put forward by the Commission in its communication of 11 October 2017;

Amendment 22 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 12 a (new)

- having regard to the 'Non-paper for paving the way towards a Stability Union' from former German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble,

Amendment 220 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Underlines the risks arising from the delay in completing the banking union; welcomes, in this context, the European Council’s commitment to a common backstop for the SRF and recalls the need also to establish ~~the EDIS~~a fully-insured EDIS, as proposed by the European Commission in its (2015)586 proposal of 24 November 2015;

Amendment 221 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

Amendment 222 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

Amendment 223 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

11 a. Stresses that using the EMF as a common fiscal backstop for the Banking Union requires a large increase in risk taking. Therefore, exposure limits for the EMF need to be designed and the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) should be forced to repay the EMF in due course;

Amendment 224 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

11 a. Believes that the relevant accountability framework for the future ESF should refer to the economic governance as a whole, recalls the request of this Parliament for an interinstitutional arrangement in this field;

Amendment 225 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

11 a. Acknowledges that the ESM reformis parallel to the completion of the banking union, further risk reduction measures vis-à-vis risk sharing instruments, which need to be implemented at European and Member State level;

Amendment 226 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 b (new)

11 b. Believes that any provisional arrangement concluded between the EP and new ESF would give a signal that increases the autonomy of the latter when the strong position of the EP is that it should, as proposed by the Commission, be integrated in the Treaty and the EU legal order;

Amendment 227 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Amendment 228 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Invites the ESM to establish a protocol for a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) with the European Parliament, with immediate effect, to further promote institutional dialogue and enhance the ESM’s transparency, accountability and democratic legitimacy in line with the further deepening of interinstitutional cooperation on the economic governance of the euro area; the MoC should specify the rights of the European Parliament and its members as regards questions put to the EMF, regular hearings, nomination rights, budgetary control rights and discharge procedures;

Amendment 229 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Invites the ESM to ~~establish a protocol for a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) with the European Parliament, with immediate effect, to~~ further promote institutional dialogue with the European Parliament and enhance the ESM’s transparency, accountability and democratic legitimacy in line with the further deepening of interinstitutional cooperation on the economic governance of the euro area;

Amendment 23 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 12 a (new)

- having regard to the Eurogroup report to Leaders on EMU deepening of 4 December 2018 (Press release 738/18),

Amendment 230 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Amendment 231 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Amendment 232 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Invites the ESMF to establish a protocol for a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) with the European Parliament, with immediate effect, to further promote institutional dialogue and enhance the ESMF’s transparency, accountability and democratic legitimacy in line with the further deepening of interinstitutional cooperation on the economic governance of the euro area;

Amendment 233 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Invites the ESM to establish a protocol for an interim Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) with the European Parliament, with immediate effect, to ~~further promot~~improve the institutional dialogue and enhance the ESM’s transparency~~, accountability and democratic legitimacy in line with the further~~; calls also for a deepening of the interinstitutional cooperation framework on the economic governance ~~of the euro area~~as a whole in order to enhance its accountability and democratic legitimacy; recalls the request of this Parliament for an interinstitutional arrangement in this field;

Amendment 234 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12 a. Stresses that complete, accurate and timely information is a prerequisite for proper accountability; insists therefore, that the highest standard of transparency be laid down in the future interinstitutional agreement between the ESF and the European Parliament regarding the decisions of the ESF, the background of such decisions, the access to ESF documents and the records of discussions within the ESF;

Amendment 235 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12 a. Calls for the increasing role of the national parliaments in all stages of the EMF activities, well beyond addressing their observations, asking questions and simply exchanging of views with the EMF Managing Director in relation to the progress made regarding the implementation of the financial stability support programs;

Amendment 236 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12 a. Stresses that the Director of the EMF should be elected by the European Parliament, and should report to the European Parliament;

Amendment 237 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 b (new)

12 b. Denounces the Council proposal that the Managing Director shall hold confidential oral discussions behind closed doors with the Chair and Vice- Chairs of the competent Committees of the European Parliament concerning its tasks, including social impact assessment, the implementation of financial stability support and the provision of credit lines or setting of guarantees in support of the SRB; calls therefore this dialogue to kick- off to the European Parliament, enforcing democratic accountability and transparency;

Amendment 24 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 12 b (new)

- having regard to the study for the AFCO Committee of April 2016 on the Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty - Improving functioning of the EU: Economic and Monetary Policy (PE 556.952),

Amendment 25 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the introduction of the euro is erroneously regarded as one of the European project’s most significant political achievements and ~~a cornerstone of EMU construc~~establishment of monetary union represents the greatest risk to European unification;

Amendment 26 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the introduction of the euro is one of the ~~European project’s most significant political achieve~~main causes of Europe’s major economic problems, such as over- indebtedness, unemployments and ~~a cornerstone of EMU construction~~weak economic growth;

Amendment 27 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the introduction of the euro is one of the European project’s most significant political ~~achieve~~developments and a cornerstone of ~~EMU construction~~the EMU, there remains no clear route towards real convergence, social inclusion, and a cooperative and complementary economy within the EU. The detrimental impact of the EMU is further exacerbated by the monetary policy of the ECB and the economic restrictions of the Growth and Stability Pact;

Amendment 28 #

Barbara KAPPEL, Ralph PACKET, Bernd KÖLMEL

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the introduction of the euro ishas been one of the ~~European project’s most significant political achievements and a cornerstone of EMU construction~~most political achievements, with the most serious implications, for the European project, most of the Member States now being locked into EMU with no way out;

Amendment 29 #

Dimitrios PAPADIMOULIS

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the introduction of the euro is one of the European project’s most significant political achievements and a cornerstone of EMU construction, it remains incapable of addressing the existing challenges of inequalities among and within the member states and enforce an economic strategy which benefits all the member states in a fair;

Amendment 3 #

Motion for a resolution
–

The European Parliament rejects [the Commission proposal].

Amendment 30 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the introduction of the euro is one of the most important European project’s and most significant political achievements ~~and a cornerstone of~~, it is also essential for the EMU construction;

Amendment 31 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

A a. whereas the ESM can recapitalise credit institutions directly via the Direct Recapitalisation Instrument (DRI);

Amendment 32 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. B. whereas the financial and economic crisis has revealed the possibility of political manipulation of the rules and the weaknesses of the euro architecture, highlighting the ~~need for the swift~~fact that there is no rules- based consensus for completion of ~~the~~ EMU;

Amendment 33 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the financial and economic crisis has revealed the weaknesses of the euro ~~architecture, highlighting the need for the swift completion of the EMU~~;

Amendment 34 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the financial and economic crisis has revealed the weaknesses of the euro architecture, highlighting the need for the swift ~~completion of the EMU~~reform of the economic architecture, in order to off-set the external imbalances within the Eurozone, and correct the internal divergences, which creates a structured disadvantage for the countries on the European periphery;

Amendment 35 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the financial and economic crisis has revealed ~~the~~structural weaknesses in some of the euro ar~~chitecture~~ea Member States, highlighting the need for compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact in order to guarantee sound public finances, the implementation of structural reforms and the swift completion of the EMU;

Amendment 36 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the twenty years of its existence and the financial and economic crisis hasve revealed the weaknesses of the euro architecture, highlighting the need for ~~the swift completion~~a thorough overhaul of the EMU;

Amendment 37 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the financial and economic crisis has revealed the weaknesses of the euro architecture, whi~~ghlighting the need for the swift~~ch brought the major financial difficulties that Member of the States from the EU were put through, the completion of the EMU is highly necessary;

Amendment 38 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the financial and economic crisis has revealed the weaknesses of the euro architecture, ~~highlighting the need~~ whereas its consequences have not led to measures commensurate with the urgent need to reform the ~~swift completion of the EMU~~governance of the EMU and whereas the crisis has thus highlighted the need to complete it swiftly;

Amendment 39 #

Laura AGEA, Fabio Massimo CASTALDO, Marco VALLI

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the financial and economic crisis has revealed the weaknesses of the euro architecture, highlighting the need for the ~~swift~~ completion and urgent democratisation of the EMU;

Amendment 4 #

Motion for a resolution
–

The European Parliament rejects the Commission proposal.

Amendment 40 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the financial and economic crisis has revealed the weaknesses of the euro architecture, highlighting the need for ~~the swift completion of~~rethinking the EMU;

Amendment 41 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

B a. whereas the current EU economic governance framework proved inadequate to prevent and deal in a sufficient and timely way with the economic and financial crisis since 2010, leaving the space for IMF’s austerity-oriented policies, which resulted in further inequalities, unemployment and poverty in the countries following adjustment programmes;

Amendment 42 #

Nicola CAPUTO

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

B a. whereas Euro offers protection and opportunity to the European citizens, and a strong and stable Eurozone is essential for its members and for the EU;

Amendment 43 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

B a. whereas the accumulation of sovereign and bank support in one public body could negatively affect the sovereign-bank nexus;

Amendment 44 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas membership of a common currency area requires common rules and obligations, as well as common tools to respond to symmetric and asymmetric shocks and for the promotion of solidarity and socioeconomic upward convergence; whereas risk reduction and risk sharing should go hand in hand in deepening the EMU to be respected;

Amendment 45 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas membership of a common currency ~~area~~ requires common rules and obligations, as well as common tools to respond to symmetric and asymmetric shocks and for the promotion of solidarity and socioeconomic upward convergence; whereas risk reduction and risk sharing should go hand in hand in deepening the EMUbut those conditions are not met in a multilingual, multifaceted and diverse Europe; whereas Member States are sovereign and risk sharing is out of the question;

Amendment 46 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas ~~membership of~~ a common currency area ~~requires common rules and obligations, as well as common tools to respond to symmetric and asymmetric shocks and for the promotion of solidarity and socioeconomic upward convergence; whe~~such as the euro area, where member states are responsible for their fiscal and economic policy, requireas ~~risk reduction and risk sharing should go hand in hand in deepening the EMU~~binding common fiscal rules and stringent implementation;

Amendment 47 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

Amendment 48 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas membership of a common currency area requires common rules and obligations, as well as ~~common~~ tools to respond to symmetric and asymmetric shocks ~~and for the promotion of solidarity and socioeconomic upward convergence; whereas risk reduction and risk sharing should go hand in hand~~; whereas risk reduction should precede risk sharing in deepening the EMU;

Amendment 49 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas membership of a common currency area requires common rules and obligations, as well as common tools to respond to symmetric and asymmetric shocks and ~~for the promotion of solidarity and~~promote socioeconomic upward convergence; whereas risk reduction ~~and risk sharing should go hand in hand in deepen~~should be a necessary condition before risk sharing should be considered ing the EMU;

Amendment 5 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation –1 (new)

-1 having regard to its resolution of 7 May 2009 on the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the development of the institutional balance of the European Union,

Amendment 50 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas membership of a common currency area requires common rules and obligations, as well as common tools to respond to symmetric and asymmetric shocks and for the promotion of solidarity and socioeconomic upward convergence; whereas the creation of a euro area budget is therefore necessary in order to ensure its sustainability and to neutralise any possible shocks; whereas risk reduction and risk sharing should go hand in hand in deepening the EMU;

Amendment 51 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas membership of a common currency area requires common budgetary rules and obligations, as ~~well as common tools to respond to symmetric and asymmetric shocks and for the promotion of solidarity and socioeconomic upward convergence~~set out by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), socioeconomic upward convergence, and common tools to respond to economic shocks; whereas risk reduction and risk sharing should go hand in hand in deepening the EMU;

Amendment 52 #

Nicola CAPUTO

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

Amendment 53 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas membership of a common currency area certainly requires common rules and obligations, ~~as well a~~but also requires common tools to respond to symmetric and asymmetric shocks and for the promotion of solidarity and socioeconomic upward convergence; whereas risk reduction and risk sharing should go hand in hand ~~in deepening~~with a thorough overhaul of the governance of the EMU;

Amendment 54 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

Amendment 55 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas membership of a common currency area requires common rules and obligations, as well as common tools to respond to symmetric and asymmetric shocks and for the promotion of solidarity and socioeconomic upward real convergence~~; whereas risk reduction and risk sharing should go hand in hand in deepening the EMU~~ in terms of investment, unemployment rate or income and wealth distribution;

Amendment 56 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Ca. whereas almost EUR 100 billion per year is lost as a result of tax avoidance through unfair tax practices, in addition to the EUR 1 000 billion per year lost as a result of tax evasion facilitated in particular by the illegal practices of certain banks in the European Union;

Amendment 57 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Ca. whereas the appointment of a full- time, independent European Finance Minister, who should not be permitted to perform a similar role in a Member State of the euro area, in order to avoid any conflict of interests, is an absolute necessity;

Amendment 58 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) ~~and its later transformation into the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) have represented, despite its intergovernmental nature, an important step towa~~was a serious mistake and the subsequent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) has perpetuated that mistake; whereas it is absurds t~~he creation of a European crisis management mechanism, helping to respond to the weaknesses of the EMU and providing financial assistance to several European countries affected by the crisis~~o seek to set up a crisis resolution mechanism for a so-called currrency that causes crises in the first place;

Amendment 59 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and its later transformation into the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) have represented, despite its intergovernmental nature, an important step towards the creation of a European crisis management mechanism, helping to respond to the weaknesses of the EMU and providing financial assistance to several European countries affected by the crisis a significant departure from the Maastricht framework and the principle of individual national responsibility;

Amendment 6 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation –1 a (new)

-1 a having regard to the report of the Reflection Group on the Future of the EU 2030 to the European Council,

Amendment 60 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and its later transformation into the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) have ~~represented, despite its intergovernmental nature,~~played an important ~~step towards~~role in the creation of a European crisis management mechanism, helping to respond to the weaknesses of the EMU and providing financial assistance to several European countries affected by the crisis;

Amendment 61 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and its later transformation into the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) have represented~~, despite its intergovernmental nature,~~ an important step towards the creation of a European crisis management mechanism, helping to respond to the weaknesses of the EMU and providing financial assistance to several European countries affected by the crisis;

Amendment 62 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and its later transformation into the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) have represented, despite its intergovernmental nature, an important step towards the creation of a European crisis management mechanism, ~~helping to respond to the weaknesses of the EMU and~~ providing financial assistance to several European countries affected by the crisis;

Amendment 63 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and its later transformation into the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) have represented, despite its intergovernmental nature, a~~n important~~ step towards the creation of a European crisis management mechanism, trying to help~~ing~~ to respond to the weaknesses of the EMU and providing financial assistance to several European countries affected by the crisis;

Amendment 64 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and its later transformation into the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) have represented, despite its intergovernmental nature, an important step towards the creation of a European crisis management mechanism, helping to partially respond to the weaknesses of the EMU and providing financial assistance to several European countries affected by the crisis;

Amendment 65 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)

Da. whereas the austerity measures laid down in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance have had a devastating impact on investment, public services and social balance in the European Union;

Amendment 66 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)

D a. whereas the European Court of Auditors' reports on financial crisis and assistance have underlined in many cases delays and insufficient results of the proposed measures, presenting valuable recommendations;

Amendment 67 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

~~E. whereas the intergovernmental nature of the ESM has implications on its decision-making process, which risks undermining the ESM’s capacity to respond swiftly to economic and financial shocks;~~deleted

Amendment 68 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

Amendment 69 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas the intergovernmental nature of the ESM ~~has implication~~provides safeguards on its decision-making process, which ~~risks undermining the ESM’s capacity to r~~guarantees profound scrutiny by Member Statesp on~~d swiftly to economic and financial shock~~ planned and disbursed financial assistance, especially by net paying Member States;

Amendment 7 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation –1 b (new)

-1 b having regard to its resolution of 20 December 2016 on possible evolutions and adjustments to the current institutional set-up of the European Union,

Amendment 70 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas the intergovernmental nature of the ESM ~~has implications on~~makes it possible for its decision-making process~~, which risks undermining the ESM’s capacity to respond swiftly to economic and financial shocks~~ to be subject to unanimity, which is what enables the ESM Member States to exercise their fiscal sovereignty in the first place;

Amendment 71 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E

E. whereas the intergovernmental nature of the ESM has implications on its decision-making process, ~~which risks undermining the ESM’s capacity to respond swiftly to economic and financial shocks~~ensuring a minimum of democratic control over its decision-making;

Amendment 72 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

~~F. whereas the future incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework should continue to be understood as part of the EMU completion project;~~deleted

Amendment 73 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas ~~the future~~ incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework should continue to be understood as part of the ~~EMU completion project~~project to deprive Member States of their fiscal sovereignty;

Amendment 74 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas the future incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework ~~should continue to be understood as part of the EMU completion project~~is a further step towards creating a new bureaucratic structure completely beyond any effective democratic control, as is already the case with the ECB;

Amendment 75 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas the future incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework should continue to be understood as ~~part of the EMU completion project~~an intergovernmental tool for financial assistance and governmental and financial sector reform;

Amendment 76 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas the future incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework should continue to be understood as a decisive part of the EMU completion project;

Amendment 77 #

Dimitrios PAPADIMOULIS

Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)

F a. whereas the EMF should take concrete actions with respect to the goals of the completion of the EMU, especially the social pillar which should take into account, among other factors, the social effects of economic adjustments;

Amendment 78 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas the ongoing debate on the future of Europe and the EMU has highlighted differing political views among Member States on the long-term future of the ESM, but also provides a good basis for an important first step towards strengthening its role, developing its financial tools and improving its efficiency and democratic accountability as part of the ESM reform;deleted

Amendment 79 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas the ongoing debate on the future of Europe and the EMU has highlighted differing political views among Member States on the long-term future of the ESM, ~~but also provides a good basis~~ and whereas this debate is therefore a~~n important first step towards~~ good reason to reconsider the need to support the strengthening of its role, and the develop~~ing~~ment of its financial tools and ~~improving~~to question its efficiency and above all its democratic accountability as part of the ESM reform;

Amendment 8 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation –1 c (new)

-1 c having regard to its resolution of 16 February 2017 on Improving the functioning of the European Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty,

Amendment 80 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas the ongoing debate on the future of Europe and the EMU has highlighted differing political views among Member States on the long-term future of the ESM~~, but also provides a good basis for an important first step towards strengthening its role, developing its financial tools and improving its efficiency and democratic accountability as part~~; whereas for that reason the discussion on the deepening of the EMU should find a consensus on ‘need to haves’, such as the strenghtening of the ESM ~~reform~~;

Amendment 81 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas in the short term, the ESM reform should contribute in particular to making the banking union more sustainable and less dysfunctional, providing a proper common financial backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), without ~~prejudice to the need to~~losing sight of the fact that the impossibility of establishing a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) demonstrates the failure of the Banking Union and, in the face of more risks and negative consequences than positive consequences, the need to reverse this incomplete and harmful reform;

Amendment 82 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas, in the short term, the ESM reform should contribute in particular to the banking union, providing a proper common financial backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), without prejudice to the need to establish a European Depokeeping with its purpose, the ESM may provide stability assistance only if that is essential for safeguarding the financial stability of the euro area as a whole, and of its Member States, and whereas the use of ESM funding to assist ~~Insurance Scheme (EDIS)~~banks must be ruled out for that very reason;

Amendment 83 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas ~~in the short term, the~~ ESM reform should contribute in particular to the ~~banking union, providing a proper common financial backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), wit~~financial sustainability of the banking sector, ensuring the social function of credit, preventingany socialisation of losses, making sure shareholders and big creditors are not bail-out at the expense of taxpayers; this might imply the asset conversion of banks into public ownership. The ESF shoutld pr~~ejudice to the need to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS)~~ovide financing to endowing a financial basis for a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), or make punctual public interventions possible in order to recover valuable assets and protecting useful employment;

Amendment 84 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas in the short term, the ESM reform should ~~contribute in particular to the banking union, providing a proper common financial backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), without prejudice to the need to establish~~be separated from the discussion on the necessity to implement a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS);

Amendment 85 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas in the short term, the ESM reform should contribute in particular to the banking union, providing a proper common financial backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), with~~out~~ prejudice to the need to establish a fully insured European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) as proposed by the European Commission proposal (2015)586 on 24 November 2015;

Amendment 86 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas ~~in the short term, the ESM reform should contribute in particular to~~a reformed ESM could contribute to the stability of the Eurozone and also strenghten the credibility of the banking union, providing a proper common financial backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), w~~ithout prejudice to the need to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS)~~hich should be fiscally neutral in the medium-term and ensure an appropriate level of conditionality;

Amendment 87 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas in the short term, the ESM reform should contribute in particular to the banking union, providing a proper common financial backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF)~~, without prejudice to the need to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS)~~;

Amendment 88 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas in the short term, the ESM reform should contribute in particular to the banking union, providing a proper common financial backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), without prejudice to the implementation of the package of measures to tackle non-performing loans (NPLs) in Europe or the need to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS);

Amendment 89 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas in the short term, the ESM reform should contribute in particular to the banking union, providing a proper common financial backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), without prejudice to the need to implement the package to reduce non-performing loans and to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS);

Amendment 9 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation –1 d (new)

-1 d having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 6 July 2018 on the Reform proposals for the Economic and Monetary Union,

Amendment 90 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas in the short term, the ESM reform should contribute in particular to the banking union, providing a proper common financial backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), without prejudice to the ~~need~~possibility to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS);

Amendment 91 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas in the short term, the ESM reform should contribute in particular to the banking union, providing a proper common financial backstop ~~for~~to be used by the Single Resolution ~~Fun~~Board (SRFB), without prejudice to the need to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS);

Amendment 92 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)

H a. whereas the actual capacity of the common financial backstop to the SRF will depend on the capability of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) to repay any backstop use by collecting sufficient contributions from the banking sector in the aftermath of a severe financial crisis; whereas the common backstop for the SRF would make that the ESM would have the necessary capacity to mobilise large amounts at short notice to the benefit of the SRF;

Amendment 93 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal of 6 December 2017 for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Monetary Fund and considers it a useful contribution to the ongoing debate on the future of Europe, the completion of the EMU and the ESM reform;deleted

Amendment 94 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. ~~Welcome~~Rejects the Commission’s proposal of 6 December 2017 for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Monetary Fund ~~and considers it a useful contribution to the ongoing debate on the future of Europe, the completion of the EMU and the ESM reform;~~,

Amendment 95 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. ~~Welcom~~Notes the Commission’s proposal of 6 December 2017 for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Monetary Fund and considers it a useful, although inadequate, contribution to the ongoing debate on the future of Europe, the ~~completion~~reform of the EMU and reconsideration of the role of the ESM ~~reform~~;

Amendment 96 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

Amendment 97 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1 a. welcomes the agreement of 4 December 2018 by the Eurogroup on a term sheet for the further development of the ESM1a; considers that the further work on the reform of the ESM should be based on this agreement; _________________ 1a https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/3 7267/esm-term-sheet- 041218_final_clean.pdf

Amendment 98 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1 b. Urges the importance of individual Member States' financial stability; stresses that the provision of financial stability in an individual Member State is a concern of the whole EU, and should be supported by the EU, however subject to strict conditionality;

Amendment 99 #