18 Amendments of Markus FERBER related to 2015/2344(INI)
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 12
Citation 12
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas it became apparent during the sovereign debt crisis that the European Treaties do not provide the euro area with the instruments to deal effectively with shocks; countries which did not comply with the fiscal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which did not budget responsibly but triggered large budget deficits through high spending and had postponed relevant reforms of their labour markets and public administration, were more vulnerable and could not effectively handle economic shocks; whereas it became apparent that the lack of responsibility of one Member of the euro area is a risk for the euro area as a whole, meaning that one country not adhering to the rules can affect the economy of all Member States of the Union; whereas the currency union is only as strong as its Members, which requires all participating countries to respect economic and financial rules at national level and at the same time to strengthen their economies in their own interest and in that of the whole euro area, thus guaranteeing the well-being of all citizens in the long-term, as the consequences of irresponsible policies at national level have to be borne by the Union as a whole;
Amendment 88 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas substantial progress has been achieved in addressing the flaws ofimproving and strengthening the governance of the EMU through legislation such as the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack regulations, as well as through the introduction of the European Semester and the creation of new instruments such as the ESM, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) including the Fiscal Compact and the Euro-Plus Pact, thereby making the EMU more resilient against possible shocks in the future, however, these instruments cannot fulfil their function if they are not enforced;
Amendment 156 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Considers, against this background, that shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception under the Maastricht Treaty with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while budgetary policy remains within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policies which are largely ignored by some Member States and are not sufficiently implemented by the Commission;
Amendment 179 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalancthe causes of the sovereign debt crisis were mainly unsustainable levels of public and private debt, lack of competitiveness and proper regulation in the banking and financial sectors; underlines, triggered by capital flows fhat high levels of debt limited the space of manoeuvre for eurom core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States, aggravated and led to a sovereuntries and led to an increase in financing costs, which impeded the repayment of debt at maturity; stresses that high costs of servicing debt due to high interest rates were too big of a burden given the overall debt level of some euro countries; whereas too hignh debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the merelevels entail high interest rates which have to be served instead of being able to invest in growth enhancing measures, social spending, healthcare and education; whereas the causes of the crises differed in existence of thet among euro area Member States;
Amendment 185 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability, in the context of the global financial and economic crisis, when unsustainable imbalances, triggered by capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery and a risingich arose from an excessive public spending ratio in some Member States, aggravated and led to a sovereign debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the mere existence of the euro area;
Amendment 194 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Points out that the crisis has proved that, in the context of a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks, compliance with and enforcement of the common fiscal rules and the rules of economic governance are crucial;
Amendment 270 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a vital element in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning thacompliance with its own set of rules as a vital element financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria this enterprise;
Amendment 398 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
Amendment 450 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)
Paragraph 22 a (new)
22a. Emphasises that the current design of the EMU foresees the prohibition of monetary financing (Article 123 TFEU), the prohibition of privileged access to financial institutions (Article 124 TFEU), the no-bail-out clause (Article 125 TFEU), the fiscal provisions to avoid excessive government deficits (Article 126 TFEU, including the excessive deficit procedure), and the Stability and Growth Pact (secondary legislation based on Articles 121 and 126 TFEU) and any fiscal capacity should be set up under the current Treaty framework;
Amendment 485 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)
Paragraph 24 a (new)
24a. Suggests that reforms advocated in the CSRs can be incentivised through financial and technical assistance facilitated by a fiscal capacity without Treaty change and therefore be realisable in the short-term; considers that fundamental attention should be given to the CSRs, which already emphasize thoroughly the areas in need of reform, however, since the implementation rate of these measures is not satisfactory and recent reflections have not yielded to any significant tools able to improve it, the fiscal capacity could leverage the transposition of CSRs by providing positive incentives in form of financial assistance for Member States to implement reforms, especially in years of economic growth; stresses that no compensation should be granted to countries that did not pursue budgetary discipline and postponed necessary reforms; emphasizes that convergence towards the level of the most competitive countries in the euro area should be fostered through reforms that are conducive to more investment, profitable projects, productivity enhancing and have the objective of reaching full employment;
Amendment 606 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
Amendment 638 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
Amendment 713 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Considers that symmetric shocks that are caused by a lack of supply must be diminished by improving the competitiveness of the euro area viaprimarily via ambitious structural reforms and, possibly, appropriate financial incentives, including via the financing of professional training or financial incentives for R&D spending;
Amendment 725 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
36. Considers that instability in the financial sector could also pose severe challenges for the euro area as a whole; urges completion of the Banking Union in order to lessen these challenges; calls for the fiscal capacity to operate as a fiscal backstop for the Banking Union, as agreed in the SRMthat measures already adopted under the Banking Union should be implemented in full by all the Member States;
Amendment 739 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
37. Points out that the fiscal capacity has to be of significant size in order to be able to address these euro-area-wide shocks and to finance its functions; insists that in order to provide sufficient financial resources, the euro area fiscal capacity, including the EMF, should be able to increase the issuance of equities via a rise in guarantees; considers that these common issued equities should have the highest credit rate;
Amendment 781 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41