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24 Amendments of Markus FERBER related to 2016/2247(INI)

Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 9 a (new)
- having regard to European Court of Auditors Special Report 29/2016 on the Single Supervisory Mechanism1a; _________________ 1a Single Supervisory Mechanism - Good start but further improvements needed http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocu ments/SR16_29/SR_SSM_EN.pdf
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas the capital and liquidity ratios of EU banks have steadily improved over the last years; whereas risks to financial stability nevertheless remain; whereas the current situation calls for caution when introducing regulatory changes, particularly with regard to the financing environment of the real economy;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 81 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas in carrying out its supervisory activities the European Central Bank has so far failed to take sufficient account of the proportionality principle;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Notes the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs) in some jurisdictions; considers that this issue is crucial and has yet to be solvedmust be solved as a matter of urgency; welcomes the work of the SSM and its draft guidance on this issue as a first step, and calls for further efforts in that direction; looks forward to the results of the work on a minimum EU insolvency framework; calls on Member States to improve their insolvency legislation and to stimulate growth in order to tackle NPLs;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Expresses concern at the statement by the European Court of Auditors2a that the European Central Bank does not have enough qualified staff to guarantee a high level of on-the-spot inspections as part of its supervisory activity; calls on the ECB to address this problem immediately and work towards achieving high quality in its on-the-spot assessments; _________________ 2aSpecial Report 29/2016: Single Supervisory Mechanism - Good start but further improvements needed
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 114 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. Expresses concern at the European Court of Auditors’ reservations3a with regard to the lack of organisational separation between supervisory functions and monetary policy at the ECB and the resulting potential for conflicts of interest; calls on the ECB to take immediate steps to bring about a clear separation between supervisory functions and monetary policy in order to prevent potential conflicts of interest; _________________ 3aSpecial Report 29/2016: Single Supervisory Mechanism - Good start but further improvements needed
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Considers that there are considerable risks associated with sovereign debt; notes, however, that modifying its prudential treatment could have a significant effect on the financial sector, which calls for caution which have not thus far been reflected in own capital backing reform efforts; awaits with interest the results of the international work on this issue; considers that, in the end, a better regulatory framework, be it European or international, will be neededquirements; calls on the Commission to address this issue;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 145 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Considers it essential to ensure the comparability of risk-weighted assets across institutions in order to allow for effective supervision; welcomes the work done internationally to streamline the resort to internal models, as well as the introduction of a leverage ratio to act as a backstop; recalls, however, that the regulatory changes planned should not result in significant increases in capital requirements, nor harm the ability of banks to finance the real economy, in particular SMEs; stresses that work carried out at international level must in particular be consistent with the proportionality principle;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 159 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Points out that guidance provided by international fora should be used in order to avoid the risk of regulatory fragmentation; stresses that the proposals made by international bodies should be translated into European law in some form, with due account being taken of the specific characteristics of the European banking sector;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 166 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Stresses that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) standards in particular should not be enacted wholesale into European law without taking proper account of the specific characteristics of the European banking system and of the proportionality principle;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 180 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Stresses that national options and discretions aremay in certain cases hindering the creation of a level playing field between Member States; welcomes the ECB guidance and regulation harmonising the exercise of some of these within the Banking Union; looks forward to the upcoming amendments to the CRR as a means of closing thestresses that in that connection the ECB must not overstep its mandate and that far-reaching decisions moust significant onesultimately be left to the European legislator;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 198 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Notes that the ‘too-big-to-fail’ issue still needs to be addressed;deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 233 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Recalls the need to find, in the exercise of supervision, a balance between the need for proportionality and the need for a consistent approach; stresses that the proportionality principle, in particular, has not been sufficiently taken into account thus far in the exercise of supervision;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 241 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Draws attention to the division of responsibilities between the ECB and the European Banking Authority (EBA); stresses that the ECB should not become the de facto standard-setter for non-SSM banks;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 247 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)
9b. Notes that, on 18 May 2016, the ECB Council adopted the regulation on the collection of granular credit and credit risk data - AnaCredit; calls on the ECB to allow national central banks as much leeway as possible when implementing AnaCredit;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 254 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 c (new)
9c. Calls on the ECB not to begin work on any further stages of AnaCredit until after a public consultation exercise has been carried out, with the full involvement of the European Parliament and with particular account being taken of the proportionality principle;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 283 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Recalls the need to adhere to State aid rules in the context of bank resolution; takes the view that enough flexibility is embedded within the current framework to address specific situations and might be better exploited, in particular in the case of preventive measures involving the use of DGS funds; calls on the Commission, therefore, to reconsider its interpretation of the relevant State aid rules in an effort to guarantee that the preventive measures provided for by the European legislator in the Deposit Guarantee Directive can actually be implemented;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 316 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Stresses that it is crucial to harmonise the hierarchy of claims in bank insolvency across Member States in order to make the implementation of the BRRD more consistent and effective; stresses that the legal framework already in place in some Member States should be taken into account on this issue and that legal uncertainty for the financial institutions affected should be prevented;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 342 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Calls on the Commission to carry out with the utmost care the review of the calculation of the contributions to the SRF provided for in recital 27 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 and, in so doing, to review, in particular, the appropriateness of the risk factor in order to ensure that the risk profile of less complex institutions is properly taken into account;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 349 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Regrets that the Commission did not allow for more time to assess the implementation of the DGSD before proposing the EDIS and did not conduct a proper impact assessment of the proposal; stands ready, however, to seize the opportunity generated by the proposal to discuss the DGSD and address some of the options and discretions it includespoints out that this is fundamentally at odds with the principles of sound regulation;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 365 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Is aware of the potential benefits ofmajor risk of distorting incentives associated with an EDIS; is neverthelesstherefore of the opinion that risk reduction measures are an indispensable counterparty to its establishment in order to prevent moral hazard, and that such measures should preferabmust categorically precede risk sharing;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 380 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Welcomes a European approach to deposit insurance, which must make it possible to address outstanding DGSD implementation issues and phase in the risk reduction measures;deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 392 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Recommends that the Commission, the ECB and the EBA study the possibility and suitability of accompanying the introduction of the EDIS with an assessment of the capital and liquidity situation of banks in order to better quantify the risks to be insurdeleted;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 404 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
22. Highlights that Article 114 seems to be anPoints out that there are still significant doubts regarding the appropriate legal basis for the establishment of both the EDIS and the DIF;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON