50 Amendments of Markus FERBER related to 2023/0112(COD)
Amendment 37 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 2
Recital 2
(2) Several years into its implementation, the Union resolution framework as currently applicable does not deliver as intended with respect of some of those objectives. In particular, while institutions and entities have made significant progress towards resolvability and have dedicated significant resources to that end, in particular through the build-up of the loss absorption and recapitalisation capacity and the filling-up of resolution financing arrangements, the Union resolution framework is seldom resorted to. Failures of certain smaller and medium- sized institutions and entities are instead mostly addressed through unharmonised national measures. Taxpayer money is used rather than resolution financing arrangements. That situation appears to arise from inadequate incentives. Those inadequate incentives result from the interplay of the Union resolution framework with national rules, whereby the broad discretion in the public interest assessment is not always exercised in a way that reflects how the Union resolution framework was intended to apply. At the same time, the Union resolution framework saw little use due to the risks for depositors of deposit-funded institutions to bear losses to ensure that those institutions can access external funding in resolution, in particular in the absence of other bail-inable liabilities. Finally, the fact that there are less stringent rules on access to funding outside resolution than in resolution has discouraged the application of the Union resolution framework in favour of other solutions, which often entail the use of taxpayers’ money instead of the own resources of the institution and entity or industry-funded safety nets. That situation, in turn, generates risks of fragmentation, risks of suboptimal outcomes in managing institutions and entities’ failures, in particular in the case of smaller and medium-sized institutions and entities, and opportunity costs from unused financial resources. It is therefore necessary to ensure a more effective and coherent application of the Union resolution framework and to ensure that it can be applied whenever that is in the public interest, including for certain smaller and medium-sized institutions primarily funded through deposits and without sufficient other bail-inable liabilities.;
Amendment 50 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 9
Recital 9
(9) The resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business model, if the tools available under national law are not adequate to manage its failure. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified. In particular, it is necessary to clarify that, depending on the specific circumstances, certain functions of the institution or entity can be considered critical even if their discontinuance would impact financial stability or critical services only at regional level.
Amendment 56 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 10
Recital 10
Amendment 64 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 11
Recital 11
(11) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or DGSs) and, on the other hand, funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline. Therefore, when assessing the objective of minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, resolution authorities should find funding through the resolution financing arrangements or the DGS preferable to funding through an equal amount of resources from the budget of Member States. However, this should not lead to expectation that burden sharing requirements will be reduced as burden sharing by shareholders and creditors should remain primary source of funding.
Amendment 73 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 12
Recital 12
(12) To ensure that the resolution objectives are attained in the most effective way, the outcome of the public interest assessment should be negative only where the winding up of the failing institution or entity under normal insolvency proceedings would achieve the resolution objectives more effectively and not only to the same extent as in case of resolution.
Amendment 100 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 34
Recital 34
(34) After the initial build-up period of the resolution financing arrangements referred to in Article 102(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU, their respective available financial means may face slight decreases below their target level, in particular resulting from an increase in covered deposits. The amount of the collection of ex -ante contributions likely to be called in those circumstances is thus likely to be small. It may therefore be possible that, in some years, the amount of such ex ante contributions is no longer commensurate to the cost of the collection of those contributions. Resolution authorities should therefore be able to defer the collection of the ex ante contributions for 1 or more years until the amount to be collected reaches an amount that is proportionate to the cost of the collection process, provided that such deferral does not materially affect the capacity of resolution authorities to use resolution financing arrangementsends once the target level of 1% of covered deposits has been reached.
Amendment 107 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 37
Recital 37
(37) Directive 2014/59/EU partially harmonised the ranking of deposits under national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings. Those rules provided for a three-tier ranking of deposits, whereby covered deposits had the highest priority ranking, followed by eligible deposits of natural persons and micro, smaller and medium-sized enterprises above the coverage level. The remaining deposits, i.e. deposits of large corporates exceeding the coverage level and deposits that are not eligible for repayment by the DGS, were required to have a lower priority ranking, but their position was not otherwise harmonised. Finally, the claims of DGSs benefitted from the same higher priority ranking as covered deposits. Nevertheless, this has not proved to be the optimal solution for depositor protection. Partial harmonisation created differences in the treatment of those remaining depositors across Member States, in particular as an increasing number of Member States have decided to also grant a legal preference to the remaining deposits. Those differences also created difficulties when determining the insolvency counterfactual for cross- border groups during the resolution valuations. Furthermore, the lack of general depositor preference along with the three-tiered ranking of depositors’ claims had the potential to create problems regarding compliance with the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle, particularly when the deposits the priority of which had not been harmonised by Directive 2014/59/EU ranked at the same level as senior claims. Lastly, the high priority ranking given to the claims of DGSs had not made it possible for the available financing means of those schemes to be used in a more efficient and effective way in interventions other than the payout of covered deposits in insolvency, namely in the context of resolution, alternative measures in insolvency or preventive measures. The protection of covered deposits does not rely on the priority ranking of the claims of the DGS but is instead ensured through the mandatory exclusions from bail-in in resolution and the prompt repayment from the DGS in case of unavailability of deposits. Therefore, the ranking of deposits in the current hierarchy of claims should be amended.
Amendment 112 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 38
Recital 38
(38) The ranking of all deposits should be fully harmonised through the implementation of a general depositor preference with a single-tiered approach, whereby all deposits benefit from a higher priority ranking over ordinary unsecured claims, without any differentiation between different types of deposits. At the same time, the use of the deposit guarantee schemes in resolution, insolvency and in preventive measures should always remain subject to compliance with the relevant conditionality, in particular the so-called ‘least cost test’.
Amendment 117 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 39
Recital 39
Amendment 125 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 40
Recital 40
Amendment 131 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 41
Recital 41
Amendment 133 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 41 a (new)
Recital 41 a (new)
(41a) While covered deposits are protected from losses in resolution, other eligible deposits are potentially available for loss absorbency purposes. In order to provide a certain level of protection for natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises holding eligible deposits above the level of covered deposits, such deposits should have a higher priority ranking over the claims of ordinary unsecured, non-preferred creditors under the national law governing normal insolvency proceedings. The claim of the deposit guarantee scheme should have an even higher ranking under such national law than the aforementioned categories of eligible deposits. Harmonisation of national insolvency law in that area is necessary in order to minimise exposure of the resolution funds of Member States under the no creditor worse off principle as specified in this Directive.
Amendment 138 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 44
Recital 44
(44) The contribution of the DGS in resolution should be subject to certain limits. First, it should be ensured that any loss which the DGS may bear as a result of an intervention in resolution does not exceed the loss that the DGS would bear in insolvency if it paid out covered depositors and subrogated to their claims over the institution’s assets. That amount should be determined on the basis of the least cost test, in accordance with the criteria and methodology set out in Directive 2014/49/EU. Those criteria and methodology should also be used when determining the treatment that the DGS would have received had the institution entered normal insolvency proceedings when carrying out the ex-post valuation for the purposes of assessing compliance with the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle and determining any compensation owed to the DGS. Second, the amount of the DGS’s contribution aimed at covering the difference between the assets and liabilities to be transferred to a purchaser or to a bridge institution should not exceed the difference between the transferred assets and the transferred deposits and liabilities with the same or a higher priority ranking in insolvency than those deposits. That would ensure that the contribution of the DGS is only used for the purposes of avoiding the imposition of losses on depositors, where appropriate, and not for the protection of creditors that rank below deposits in insolvency. Nevertheless, the sum of the contribution of the DGS to cover the difference between assets and liabilities with the contribution of the DGS towards the own funds of the recipient entity should not exceed the cost of repaying covered depositors as calculated under the least cost testvery strict limits.
Amendment 146 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 46
Recital 46
(46) Given the possibility to use DGS in resolution, it is necessary to specify further the way in whichclarify that the DGS contribution candoes not count towards the calculation of the requirements to access resolution financing arrangements. IOnly if the contribution made by shareholders and creditors of the institution under resolution through reductions, write- down or conversion of their liabilities, summed with the contribution made by the DGS, amounts to at least 8 % of the institution’s total liabilities including own funds, the institution should be able to access the resolution financing arrangement to receive further funding, where necessary to ensure effective resolution in line with the resolution objectives. If those conditions are met, the contribution of the DGS should be limited to the amount necessary to enable access to the resolution financing arrangement. To ensure that resolution continues to be primarily financed by the institution’s internal resources and to minimise distortions of competition, the possibility to use the DGS contribution to ensure access to resolution financing arrangements should only be possible for institutions for which the resolution plan or the group resolution plan does not provide for their winding up in an orderly manner in case of failure, givenTo ensure that resolution continues to be primarily financed by the institution’s internal resources and to minimise distortions of competition, it remains of key importance that the MREL determined by resolution authorities for those institutions has been set at a level that includes both the loss absorption and the recapitalisation amountsensures that resolution remains feasible.
Amendment 155 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 35
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 35
(35) ‘critical functions’ means activities, services or operations the discontinuance of which is likely in one or more Member States to lead to the disruption of services that are essential to the real economy or to disrupt financial stability at national or regional level, due to the size, market share, external and internal interconnectedness, complexity or cross- border activities of an institution or group, with particular regard to the substitutability of those activities, services or operations;;
Amendment 160 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point e a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point e a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 93 b (new)
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 93 b (new)
(ea) the following point is inserted: (93b) ‘total liabilities including own funds’ means total liabilities as defined in Section 3 of Council Directive 86/635/EEC, or as defined in accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards referred to in Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council, including own funds as defined in point (118) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, in the case of institutions operating promotional loans, excluding the liabilities of the intermediary institution towards the originating or another promotional bank or another intermediary institution and the liabilities of the promotional bank towards its funding parties in so far as the amount of those liabilities is matched by the promotional loans of that institution;
Amendment 162 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point e b (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point e b (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 93 c (new)
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 93 c (new)
(eb) the following point is inserted: (93c) ‘promotional bank’ means any undertaking or entity set up by a Member State, central or regional government, which grants promotional loans on a non- competitive, not for profit basis in order to promote that government's public policy objectives, provided that that government has an obligation to protect the economic basis of the undertaking or entity and maintain its viability throughout its lifetime, or that at least 90 % of its original funding or the promotional loan it grants is directly or indirectly guaranteed by the Member State's central or regional government;
Amendment 164 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point e c (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point e c (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 93 d (new)
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 93 d (new)
(ec) the following point is inserted: (93d) ‘promotional loan’ means a loan granted by a promotional bank or through an intermediate bank on a noncompetitive, not for profit basis, in order to promote the public policy objectives of central or regional governments in a Member State;
Amendment 166 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point e d (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point e d (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 93 e (new)
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 93 e (new)
(ed) the following point is inserted: (93e) ‘intermediary institution’ means a credit institution which intermediates promotional loans provided that it does not give them as credit to a final customer;’
Amendment 168 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
In the absence of changes referred to in the first subparagraph in 12 months following the latest annual update of the recovery plan, the competent authorities mayshall exceptionally waive, until the subsequent 12-month period, the obligation to update the recovery plan.
Amendment 221 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
Article 30 a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
Amendment 225 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b
Article 30 a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) an non-binding overview of the measures which would prevent the failure of the institution or entity within a reasonable timeframe, their expected impact on the institution or entity as regards the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) and the expected timeframe for the implementation of those measures.
Amendment 229 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 a (new)
Article 30 a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 a (new)
The notification referred to in the first subparagraph shall not constrain the ability of institutional protection schemes to implement measures. Decisions relating to any measures by an institutional protection scheme shall remain under the sole discretion of the institutional protection scheme.
Amendment 233 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15
4. TSubject to alternative private sector measures, including measures by an IPS, that would prevent the failure or the likely failure of the institution within a reasonable timeframe, the powers of resolution authorities shall include the power to market to potential purchasers, or make arrangements for such marketing, the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), to potential purchasers, or require the institution or entity to do so, for the following purposes:
Amendment 240 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 31 – paragraph 2 – point c
Article 31 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, in particular when provided from the budget of a Member State;
Amendment 248 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 31 – paragraph 2 – point d
Article 31 – paragraph 2 – point d
(d) to protect depositors, while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemes, and to protect covered by Directive 2014/49/EU and investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;
Amendment 250 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 32 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) having regard to the timing, the need to implement effectively the resolution strategy and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measure including measures by an IPS, supervisory action, early intervention measures, or write down or conversion of relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in Article 59(2) taken in respect of the institution would prevent the failure of the institution within a reasonable timeframe;
Amendment 257 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3 a (new)
Article 32 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3 a (new)
The assessment of the conditions referred to in paragraph 1, points (a) and (b), shall only be made by the relevant authority after having consulted an IPS of which the institution is a member.
Amendment 263 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1
For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives more effectivelyto the same extent. For entities designated as significant in accordance with Article 6(4) of Regulation 1024/2013 there shall be a presumption that winding up under insolvency procedures would not meet the resolution objectives to the same extent.
Amendment 271 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2
Amendment 279 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 a (new)
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 a (new)
An institution’s membership in an IPS shall, in general, be considered as a sufficient guarantee of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31.
Amendment 301 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b
Amendment 307 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
(b a) subject to the cases referred to under point (bb), none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) are present;
Amendment 308 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b b (new)
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b b (new)
(b b) in case of a deposit guarantee scheme which is acknowledged as IPS, the resolution authority has not taken any resolution action under Article 32;
Amendment 341 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 23 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 23 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 36 – paragraph 1 – sentence 1
Article 36 – paragraph 1 – sentence 1
1. Before determining whether the conditions for resolution or the conditions fotaking resolution action or exercising the power theo write down or conversion oft relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to inin accordance with Article 59 are met, resolution authorities shall ensure that a fair, prudent and realistic valuation of the assets and liabilities of the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), is carried out by a person that is independent from any public authority, including the resolution authority, and the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d).;
Amendment 346 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point b
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 44 – paragraph 5 – point a
Article 44 – paragraph 5 – point a
(a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 36, has been made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write down or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) and Article 60(1), and by the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 109 where relevant;
Amendment 352 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point c
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point c
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 44 – paragraph 7 – point b
Article 44 – paragraph 7 – point b
(b) all unsecured, non-preferred liabilities ranking lowother than deposits, and not excluded from bail-in pursuant to Article 44(2) and 44(3), have been written down or converted in full.
Amendment 368 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. When applying Article 45c to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3) in a proportionate way that ensures that the resolution group can be resolved in all possible scenarios without the need for external funding on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:
Amendment 373 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile, and the depth of the market in which the resolution entity operates;
Amendment 380 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii a (new)
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii a (new)
(iii a) any risks to succesful implementation of the preferred resolution strategy, in particular a potentially adverse market environment at the time of resolution;
Amendment 382 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point c – point i
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point c – point i
(i) any material impediments to resolvability, identified by the resolution authority, that are directly related to the application of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool;
Amendment 384 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point c – point ii a (new)
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point c – point ii a (new)
(ii a) a potentially adverse market environment at the time of resolution;
Amendment 388 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point ea (new)
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point ea (new)
(e a) the potential recapitalisation amount required under an alternative resolution strategy;
Amendment 390 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1a (new)
Article 45ca – paragraph 1a (new)
1 a. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to institutions that are designated as "small and non-complex institutions" in line with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
Amendment 391 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 2
Article 45ca – paragraph 2
Amendment 409 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 45
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 45
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 74 – paragraph 3 – point d
Article 74 – paragraph 3 – point d
(d) when determining the losses that the deposit guarantee scheme, where it does not qualify as an institutional protection scheme, would have incurred had the institution been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, apply the criteria and methodology referred to in Article 11e of Directive 2014/49/EU and in any delegated act adopted pursuant to that Article.;
Amendment 418 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 52
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 52
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 102 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
Article 102 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
If, after the initial period of time referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the available financial means diminish below the target level specified in that paragraph, the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 103 shall resume until the target level specified in paragraph 1 of this Article is reached. Resolution authorities may defer the collection of the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 103 for 1 or more years where the amount to be collected reaches an amount that is proportionate to the costs of the collection process, provided that such deferral does not materially affect the capacity of the resolution authority to use the resolution financing arrangements pursuant to Article 101. After the target level has been reached for the first time and where the available financial means have subsequently been reduced to less than two thirds of the target level, those contributions shall be set at a level allowing for reaching the target level within 6 years.;
Amendment 428 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1
Article 108 – paragraph 1
Amendment 464 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraphs 1 & 2
Article 109 – paragraphs 1 & 2
Amendment 488 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point d
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point d
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraph 5 – subparagraphs 2 & 3
Article 109 – paragraph 5 – subparagraphs 2 & 3