2023/0112(COD) | [ParlTrack]

Proposal for a directive
Recital 34

(34) After the initial build-up period of the resolution financing arrangements referred to in Article 102(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU, their respective available financial means may face slight decreases below their target level, in particular resulting from an increase in covered deposits. The amount of the ex ante contributions likely to be called in those circumstances is thus likely to be small. It may therefore be possible that, in some years, the amount of such ex ante contributions is no longer commensurate to the cost of the collection of those contributions. Resolution authorities should therefore be able to defer the collection of the ex ante contributions for 1 or more years until the amount to be collected reaches an amount that is proportionate to the cost of the collection process, provided that such deferral does not materially affect the capacity of resolution authorities to use resolution financing arrangementsgular collection of contributions ends when the target level of 1% of the amount of covered deposits of all the institutions authorised in their territory has been reached for the first time.

Amendment 102 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 34

(34) After the initial build-up period of the resolution financing arrangements referred to in Article 102(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU, their respective available financial means may face slight decreases below their target level, in particular resulting from an increase in covered deposits. ~~The amount of the ex ante contributions likely to be called in those circumstan~~On the other hand, there is no mechanism that would enable the redemption of contributions already paid- in that would stand in excess isof th~~us likely to be small. It may therefore be~~ e target level in the event of a decrease of the covered depossi~~ble that, in some years, the amount of such ex ante contributions is no longer commensurate to the cost of the collection of those contributions. R~~ts. Also, there is no evidence as to whether the rules governing contributions should be amended to preserve a sound "polluter pays" principle after the entry into force of this directive. As a result, resolution authorities should therefore be able to defer the collection of the ex ante contributions ~~for 1 or more years~~ until the amount to be collected reaches a~~n amount that is proportionate to the cost of the collection process, provided that such deferral does not materially affect the capacity of~~ certain threshold that would trigger a res~~olu~~umption ~~authorities to use resolution financing arrangement~~of ex-ante contributions.

Amendment 103 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 34 a (new)

(34a) Contributions to the Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) and the resolution financing arrangements should be determined in a manner that accurately assesses the likelihood of a contributing bank to impose losses for the DGS or the resolution financing arrangement. To that end, the rules governing contributions of individual banks to these funds shall mainly take into account the Minimum Requirement for Own Funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL) capacity and quality of the concerned banks.

Amendment 104 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 34 b (new)

(34b) The target level of the resolution financing arrangements and the deposit guarantee schemes were determined in 2014 to withstand a certain adverse shock to the banking system given its loss absorption capacity at the time. Since then, the banking system has considerably increased its loss absorption capacity by building up its capital and MREL buffers, and by improving the overall asset quality primarily, with the reduction in NPLs. As a result, the same target level enables today to withstand a much bigger shock, which in turn means that there is no need to increase the target levels as a result of this review.

Amendment 105 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 35

(35) Irrevocable payment commitments are one of the components of the available financial means of resolution financing arrangements. It is therefore necessary to specify the circumstances in which those payment commitments may be called and the applicable procedure when terminating the commitments in case an institution or entity ceases to be subject to the obligation to pay contributions to a resolution financing arrangement. In addition, to provide more transparency and certainty with respect to the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of ex ante contributions to be raised, resolution authorities should ~~determine~~grant such share oin ~~an annual basis, subject to the applicable limits~~the full amount as specified in Article 103(3) of Directive 2014/59/EU.

Amendment 106 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 37

(37) Directive 2014/59/EU partially harmonised the ranking of deposits under national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings. Those rules provided for a three-tier ranking of deposits, whereby covered deposits had the highest priority ranking, followed by eligible deposits of natural persons and micro, smaller and medium-sized enterprises above the coverage level. The remaining deposits, i.e. deposits of large corporates exceeding the coverage level and deposits that are not eligible for repayment by the DGS, were required to have a lower priority ranking, but their position was not otherwise harmonised. Finally, the claims of DGSs benefitted from the same higher priority ranking as covered deposits. Nevertheless, this has not proved to be the optimal solution for depositor protection. Partial harmonisation created differences in the treatment of those remaining depositors across Member States, in particular as an increasing number of Member States have decided to also grant a legal preference to the remaining deposits. Those differences also created difficulties when determining the insolvency counterfactual for cross- border groups during the resolution valuations. Furthermore, the lack of general depositor preference along with the three-tiered ranking of depositors’ claims had the potential to create problems regarding compliance with the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle, particularly when the deposits the priority of which had not been harmonised by Directive 2014/59/EU ranked at the same level as senior claims. Lastly, the high priority ranking given to the claims of DGSs had not made it possible for the available financing means of those schemes to be used in a more efficient and effective way in interventions other than the payout of covered deposits in insolvency, namely in the context of resolution, alternative measures in insolvency or preventive measures. The protection of covered deposits does not rely on the priority ranking of the claims of the DGS but is instead ensured through the mandatory exclusions from bail-in in resolution and the prompt repayment from the DGS in case of unavailability of deposits. Therefore, the ranking of deposits in the current hierarchy of claims should be amended.deleted

Amendment 107 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 37

(37) Directive 2014/59/EU partially harmonised the ranking of deposits under national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings. Those rules provided for a three-tier ranking of deposits, whereby covered deposits had the highest priority ranking, followed by eligible deposits of natural persons and micro, smaller and medium-sized enterprises above the coverage level. The remaining deposits, i.e. deposits of large corporates exceeding the coverage level and deposits that are not eligible for repayment by the DGS, were required to have a lower priority ranking, but their position was not otherwise harmonised. Finally, the claims of DGSs benefitted from the same higher priority ranking as covered deposits. Nevertheless, this has not proved to be the optimal solution for depositor protection. Partial harmonisation created differences in the treatment of those remaining depositors across Member States, in particular as an increasing number of Member States have decided to also grant a legal preference to the remaining deposits. Those differences also created difficulties when determining the insolvency counterfactual for cross- border groups during the resolution valuations. Furthermore, the lack of general depositor preference along with the three-tiered ranking of depositors’ claims had the potential to create problems regarding compliance with the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle, particularly when the deposits the priority of which had not been harmonised by Directive 2014/59/EU ranked at the same level as senior claims. Lastly, the high priority ranking given to the claims of DGSs had not made it possible for the available financing means of those schemes to be used in a more efficient and effective way in interventions other than the payout of covered deposits in insolvency, namely in the context of resolution, alternative measures in insolvency or preventive measures. The protection of covered deposits does not rely on the priority ranking of the claims of the DGS but is instead ensured through the mandatory exclusions from bail-in in resolution and the prompt repayment from the DGS in case of unavailability of deposits. Therefore, the ranking of deposits in the current hierarchy of claims should be amended.

Amendment 108 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 37

(37) Directive 2014/59/EU partially harmonised the ranking of deposits under national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings. Those rules provided for a three-tier ranking of deposits, whereby covered deposits had the highest priority ranking, followed by eligible deposits of natural persons and micro, smaller and medium-sized enterprises above the coverage level. The remaining deposits, i.e. deposits of large corporates exceeding the coverage level and deposits that are not eligible for repayment by the DGS, were required to have a lower priority ranking, but their position was not otherwise harmonised. Finally, the claims of DGSs benefitted from the same higher priority ranking as covered deposits. Nevertheless, this has not proved to be the optimal solution for depositor protection. Partial harmonisation created differences in the treatment of those remaining depositors across Member States, in particular as an increasing number of Member States have decided to also grant a legal preference to the remaining deposits. Those differences also created difficulties when determining the insolvency counterfactual for cross- border groups during the resolution valuations. Furthermore, the lack of general depositor preference along with the three-tiered ranking of depositors’ claims had the potential to create problems regarding compliance with the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle, particularly when the deposits the priority of which had not been harmonised by Directive 2014/59/EU ranked at the same level as senior claims. Lastly, the high priority ranking given to the claims of DGSs had not made it possible for the available financing means of those schemes to be used in a more efficient and effective way in interventions other than the payout of covered deposits in insolvency, namely in the context of resolution, alternative measures in insolvency or preventive measures. The protection of covered deposits does not rely on the priority ranking of the claims of the DGS but is instead ensured through the mandatory exclusions from bail-in in resolution and the prompt repayment from the DGS in case of unavailability of deposits. Therefore, the ranking of deposits in the current hierarchy of claims should be amended.

Amendment 109 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 37 a (new)

(37a) In the midst of evolving financial landscapes the modification in the ranking of creditors coupled with the removal of the DGS super preference boost the accessibility of DGSs and the single resolution fund (SRF) over the traditional reliance on public support, and also lays the foundation for more financially astute solutions when addressing the complexities of resolving financial institutions.

Amendment 110 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 38

(38) The ranking of all deposits should be fully harmonised through the implementation of a general depositor preference with a single-tiered approach, whereby all deposits benefit from a higher priority ranking over ordinary unsecured claims, without any differentiation between different types of deposits. At the same time, the use of the deposit guarantee schemes in resolution, insolvency and in preventive measures should always remain subject to compliance with the relevant conditionality, in particular the so-called ‘least cost test’.deleted

Amendment 111 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 38

(38) The ranking of all deposits should be fully harmonised through the implementation of a general depositor preference with a single-tiered approach, whereby all deposits benefit from a higher priority ranking over ordinary unsecured claims, without any differentiation between different types of deposits. At the same time, the use of the deposit guarantee schemes in resolution, insolvency and in preventive measures should always remain subject to compliance with the relevant conditionality, in particular the so-called ‘least cost test’.deleted

Amendment 112 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 38

(38) The ranking of all deposits should be fully harmonised through the implementation of a general depositor preference with a single-tiered approach, whereby all deposits benefit from a higher priority ranking over ordinary unsecured claims, without any differentiation between different types of deposits. At the same time, the use of the deposit guarantee schemes in resolution, insolvency and in preventive measures should always remain subject to compliance with the relevant conditionality, in particular the so-called ‘least cost test’.

Amendment 113 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Recital 38

(38) The ranking of all deposits should be fully harmonised through the implementation of a ~~general depositor preference with a single-tiered approach, whereby all deposits~~two-tiered approach, whereby all covered deposits and that part of eligible deposits from natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises which exceeds the coverage level provided for in Article 6 of Directive 2014/49/EU benefit from a higher priority ranking over other deposits and ordinary unsecured claims, w~~ithout any differentiation between different types of deposits~~hich should both rank pari passu. At the same time, the use of the deposit guarantee schemes in resolution, insolvency and in preventive measures should always remain subject to compliance with the relevant conditionality, in particular the so-called ‘least cost test’.

Amendment 114 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 38

(38) The ranking of all deposits should be fully harmonised through the implementation of a general depositor preference with a ~~single~~two-tiered approach, whereby ~~all~~ deposits benefit from a higher priority ranking over ordinary unsecured claims~~, without any differentiation between different types of deposits~~. At the same time, the use of the deposit guarantee schemes in resolution, insolvency and in preventive measures should always remain subject to compliance with the relevant conditionality, in particular the so-called ‘least cost test’.

Amendment 115 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 38

(38) The ranking of all deposits should be fully harmonised through the implementation of a general depositor preference with a ~~single~~two-tiered approach, whereby all deposits benefit from a higher priority ranking over ordinary unsecured claims~~, without any differentiation between different types of deposits~~. At the same time, the use of the deposit guarantee schemes in resolution, insolvency and in preventive measures should always remain subject to compliance with the relevant conditionality, in particular the so-called ‘least cost test’.

Amendment 116 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 38

(38) The ranking of all deposits should be fully harmonised through the implementation of a ~~general depositor preference with a single~~two-tiered approach, whereby ~~all~~eligible deposits ~~benefit from a higher priority ranking over ordinary unsecured claims, without any differentiation between different types of deposits~~, DGS and corporate deposits held for payment and settlement purposes rank above non- eligible deposits and large corporates deposits held for investment purposes. . At the same time, the use of the deposit guarantee schemes in resolution, insolvency and in preventive measures should always remain subject to compliance with the relevant conditionality, in particular the so-called ‘least cost test’.

Amendment 117 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 39

(39) A general depositor preference will contribute to reinforcing depositors’ confidence and to further prevent the risk of bank runs. Enhanced depositor protection is also aligned with the central role deposits play in the real economy, being the primary tool for savings and for payments, as well as in the banking activity, where the deposits represent an important source of funding and are a key driver of confidence in the banking system, which becomes of particular relevance in times of market stress. Moreover, a general depositor preference improves the resolvability of institutions and entities by increasing their ability to comply with the requirements to access the resolution financing arrangements and decreasing the amount of funding required from those arrangements, due to the lower risk of breaching the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle where bailing-in ordinary unsecured debt. In particular, the removal of deposits from the insolvency class of ordinary unsecured claims would increase the bail- inability of remaining ordinary unsecured claims by minimising the risk of breaches of the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle. By reducing the likelihood of deposits being written down or converted to ensure access to the resolution financing arrangements, the general depositor preference would contribute to making the bail-in tool more effective and credible and would lead to an increase of the transparency and legal certainty of the resolution framework. The general depositor preference would also contribute to the credibility of transfer strategies in resolution, as it would facilitate the inclusion of the entire deposit contract in the perimeter of liabilities to be transferred to a private purchaser or to a bridge institution, to the benefit of the customer relationship and the franchise value of the institution under resolution. Lastly, a full harmonisation of the insolvency ranking of depositors would be beneficial from the cross-border and level playing field perspective.deleted

Amendment 118 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 39

(39) A general depositor preference will contribute to reinforcing depositors’ confidence and to further prevent the risk of bank runs. Enhanced depositor protection is also aligned with the central role deposits play in the real economy, being the primary tool for savings and for payments, as well as in the banking activity, where the deposits represent an important source of funding and are a key driver of confidence in the banking system, which becomes of particular relevance in times of market stress. Moreover, a general depositor preference improves the resolvability of institutions and entities by increasing their ability to comply with the requirements to access the resolution financing arrangements and decreasing the amount of funding required from those arrangements, due to the lower risk of breaching the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle where bailing-in ordinary unsecured debt. In particular, the removal of deposits from the insolvency class of ordinary unsecured claims would increase the bail- inability of remaining ordinary unsecured claims by minimising the risk of breaches of the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle. By reducing the likelihood of deposits being written down or converted to ensure access to the resolution financing arrangements, the general depositor preference would contribute to making the bail-in tool more effective and credible and would lead to an increase of the transparency and legal certainty of the resolution framework. The general depositor preference would also contribute to the credibility of transfer strategies in resolution, as it would facilitate the inclusion of the entire deposit contract in the perimeter of liabilities to be transferred to a private purchaser or to a bridge institution, to the benefit of the customer relationship and the franchise value of the institution under resolution. Lastly, a full harmonisation of the insolvency ranking of depositors would be beneficial from the cross-border and level playing field perspective.deleted

Amendment 119 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 39

(39) A general depositor preference will contribute to reinforcing depositors’ confidence and to further prevent the risk of bank runs. Enhanced depositor protection is also aligned with the central role deposits play in the real economy, being the primary tool for savings and for payments, as well as in the banking activity, where the deposits represent an important source of funding and are a key driver of confidence in the banking system, which becomes of particular relevance in times of market stress. Moreover, a general depositor preference improves the resolvability of institutions and entities by increasing their ability to comply with the requirements to access the resolution financing arrangements and decreasing the amount of funding required from those arrangements, due to the lower risk of breaching the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle where bailing-in ordinary unsecured debt. In particular, the removal of deposits from the insolvency class of ordinary unsecured claims would increase the bail- inability of remaining ordinary unsecured claims by minimising the risk of breaches of the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle. By reducing the likelihood of deposits being written down or converted to ensure access to the resolution financing arrangements, the general depositor preference would contribute to making the bail-in tool more effective and credible and would lead to an increase of the transparency and legal certainty of the resolution framework. The general depositor preference would also contribute to the credibility of transfer strategies in resolution, as it would facilitate the inclusion of the entire deposit contract in the perimeter of liabilities to be transferred to a private purchaser or to a bridge institution, to the benefit of the customer relationship and the franchise value of the institution under resolution. Lastly, a full harmonisation of the insolvency ranking of depositors would be beneficial from the cross-border and level playing field perspective.deleted

Amendment 120 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 39

(39) A ~~general depositor preference~~two-tiered approach will contribute to reinforcing depositors’ confidence and to further prevent the risk of bank runs. Enhanced depositor protection is also aligned with the central role deposits play in the real economy, being the primary tool for savings and for payments, as well as in the banking activity, where the deposits represent an important source of funding and are a key driver of confidence in the banking system, which becomes of particular relevance in times of market stress. Moreover, a ~~general depositor preference~~two- tiered approach improves the resolvability of institutions and entities by increasing their ability to comply with the requirements to access the resolution financing arrangements and decreasing the amount of funding required from those arrangements, due to the lower risk of breaching the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle where bailing-in ordinary unsecured debt. In particular, the removal of deposits from the insolvency class of ordinary unsecured claims would increase the bail-inability of remaining ordinary unsecured claims by minimising the risk of breaches of the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle. By reducing the likelihood of deposits being written down or converted to ensure access to the resolution financing arrangements, the general depositor preference would contribute to making the bail-in tool more effective and credible and would lead to an increase of the transparency and legal certainty of the resolution framework. The general depositor preference would also contribute to the credibility of transfer strategies in resolution, as it would facilitate the inclusion of the entire deposit contract in the perimeter of liabilities to be transferred to a private purchaser or to a bridge institution, to the benefit of the customer relationship and the franchise value of the institution under resolution. Lastly, a full harmonisation of the insolvency ranking of depositors would be beneficial from the cross-border and level playing field perspective.

Amendment 121 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 39

(39) A general depositor preference will contribute to reinforcing depositors’ confidence and to further prevent the risk of bank runs. Enhanced depositor protection is also aligned with the central role deposits play in the real economy, being the primary tool for savings and for payments, as well as in the banking activity, where the deposits represent an important source of funding and are a key driver of confidence in the banking system, which becomes of particular relevance in times of market stress. Moreover, a general depositor preference improves the resolvability of institutions and entities by increasing their ability to comply with the requirements to access the resolution financing arrangements ~~and decreasing the amount of funding required from those arrangements, due to the lower risk of breaching the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle where bailing-in ordinary unsecured debt~~. In particular, the removal of deposits from the insolvency class of ordinary unsecured claims would increase the bail-inability of remaining ordinary unsecured claims by minimising the risk of breaches of the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle. By reducing the likelihood of deposits being written down or converted to ensure access to the resolution financing arrangements, the general depositor preference would contribute to making the bail-in tool more effective and credible and would lead to an increase of the transparency and legal certainty of the resolution framework. The general depositor preference would also contribute to the credibility of transfer strategies in resolution, as it would facilitate the inclusion of ~~the enti~~more deposit ~~contract~~s in the perimeter of liabilities to be transferred to a private purchaser or to a bridge institution, to the benefit of the customer relationship and the franchise value of the institution under resolution. Lastly, a full harmonisation of the insolvency ranking of depositors would be beneficial from the cross-border and level playing field perspective.

Amendment 122 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 40

(40) A single-tiered approach for the priority ranking of deposits under national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings contributes to a more efficient and less costly protection of all deposits. For covered deposits, that approach facilitates the financing by the DGS of measures other than the payout of covered deposits, which can be more effective and less disruptive in protecting access to the deposited funds as they do not lead to an interruption of access to bank accounts and payment services. For the deposits that are not covered, that approach facilitates their protection where necessary for the protection of financial stability and depositor confidence. Finally, by introducing flexibility in the use of those potentially less costly mechanisms for depositor protection, that approach minimises the immediate disbursement needs of the DGSs, thereby ensuring a better preservation of their available financing means in case other crises occur and decreasing the burden on the banking sector, who are called to replenish those funds.deleted

Amendment 123 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 40

(40) A single-tiered approach for the priority ranking of deposits under national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings contributes to a more efficient and less costly protection of all deposits. For covered deposits, that approach facilitates the financing by the DGS of measures other than the payout of covered deposits, which can be more effective and less disruptive in protecting access to the deposited funds as they do not lead to an interruption of access to bank accounts and payment services. For the deposits that are not covered, that approach facilitates their protection where necessary for the protection of financial stability and depositor confidence. Finally, by introducing flexibility in the use of those potentially less costly mechanisms for depositor protection, that approach minimises the immediate disbursement needs of the DGSs, thereby ensuring a better preservation of their available financing means in case other crises occur and decreasing the burden on the banking sector, who are called to replenish those funds.deleted

Amendment 124 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 40

(40) A single-tiered approach for the priority ranking of deposits under national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings contributes to a more efficient and less costly protection of all deposits. For covered deposits, that approach facilitates the financing by the DGS of measures other than the payout of covered deposits, which can be more effective and less disruptive in protecting access to the deposited funds as they do not lead to an interruption of access to bank accounts and payment services. For the deposits that are not covered, that approach facilitates their protection where necessary for the protection of financial stability and depositor confidence. Finally, by introducing flexibility in the use of those potentially less costly mechanisms for depositor protection, that approach minimises the immediate disbursement needs of the DGSs, thereby ensuring a better preservation of their available financing means in case other crises occur and decreasing the burden on the banking sector, who are called to replenish those funds.deleted

Amendment 125 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Recital 40

(40) A single-tiered approach for the priority ranking of deposits under national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings contributes to a more efficient and less costly protection of all deposits. For covered deposits, that approach facilitates the financing by the DGS of measures other than the payout of covered deposits, which can be more effective and less disruptive in protecting access to the deposited funds as they do not lead to an interruption of access to bank accounts and payment services. For the deposits that are not covered, that approach facilitates their protection where necessary for the protection of financial stability and depositor confidence. Finally, by introducing flexibility in the use of those potentially less costly mechanisms for depositor protection, that approach minimises the immediate disbursement needs of the DGSs, thereby ensuring a better preservation of their available financing means in case other crises occur and decreasing the burden on the banking sector, who are called to replenish those funds.deleted

Amendment 126 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 40

(40) A ~~single~~two-tiered approach for the priority ranking of deposits under national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings contributes to a more efficient and less costly protection of all deposits. For covered deposits, that approach facilitates the financing by the DGS of measures other than the payout of covered deposits, which can beimproves the use of DGS in the context of resolution, thus enabling a more effective and less disruptive inoption which protect~~ing~~s access to the deposited funds as they do not lead to an interruption of access to bank accounts and payment services. For the deposits that are not covered, that approach facilitates their protection where necessary for the protection of financial stability and depositor confidence. Finally, by introducing flexibility in the use of thoseBy introducing potentially less costly mechanisms for depositor protection, thatis approach minimises the immediate disbursement needs of the DGSs, thereby ensuring a better preservation of their available financing means in case other crises occur and decreasing the burden on the banking sector, who are called to replenish those funds.

Amendment 127 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 40 a (new)

(40a) The two-tier priority system, as reflected in the amendments in this Directive to Article 108 of Directive 2014/59/EU, ensures that deposits excluded from coverage under Directive 2014/49/EU, as well as certain deposits of large corporates that are used for compliance with MREL, enjoy a higher priority ranking compared to ordinary unsecured creditors, but one that is lower than covered deposits, eligible deposits of natural persons and SMEs exceeding the coverage level, deposits of large corporates that do not count towards MREL, as well as claims by the DGS subrogating for covered deposits. That tiered approach is designed to provide enhanced protection for a wide range of depositors, reflecting the unique characteristics of their deposits, while opening up the possibility of resolution to entities not covered by the current framework.

Amendment 128 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 41

(41) The changes to the priority ranking of deposits, in particular the elimination of the higher ranking of covered deposits and the claims of the DGSs relative to all other deposits, would not negatively affect the protection afforded to covered deposits in the event of failure, as that protection would continue to be guaranteed through the mandatory exclusion of covered deposits from loss absorption in case of resolution and, ultimately, by the payout provided by the DGS in event of unavailability of deposits.deleted

Amendment 129 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 41

(41) The changes to the priority ranking of deposits, in particular the elimination of the higher ranking of covered deposits and the claims of the DGSs relative to all other deposits, would not negatively affect the protection afforded to covered deposits in the event of failure, as that protection would continue to be guaranteed through the mandatory exclusion of covered deposits from loss absorption in case of resolution and, ultimately, by the payout provided by the DGS in event of unavailability of deposits.deleted

Amendment 130 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 41

(41) The changes to the priority ranking of deposits, in particular the elimination of the higher ranking of covered deposits and the claims of the DGSs relative to all other deposits, would not negatively affect the protection afforded to covered deposits in the event of failure, as that protection would continue to be guaranteed through the mandatory exclusion of covered deposits from loss absorption in case of resolution and, ultimately, by the payout provided by the DGS in event of unavailability of deposits.deleted

Amendment 131 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 41

(41) The changes to the priority ranking of deposits, in particular the elimination of the higher ranking of covered deposits and the claims of the DGSs relative to all other deposits, would not negatively affect the protection afforded to covered deposits in the event of failure, as that protection would continue to be guaranteed through the mandatory exclusion of covered deposits from loss absorption in case of resolution and, ultimately, by the payout provided by the DGS in event of unavailability of deposits.deleted

Amendment 132 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 41

(41) The changes to the priority ranking of deposits, in particular the elimination of the higher ranking of covered deposits and the claims of the DGSs relative to all other eligible deposits, would not negatively affect the protection afforded to covered deposits in the event of failure, as that protection would continue to be guaranteed through the mandatory exclusion of covered deposits from loss absorption in case of resolution and, ultimately, by the payout provided by the DGS in event of unavailability of deposits.

Amendment 133 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 41 a (new)

(41a) While covered deposits are protected from losses in resolution, other eligible deposits are potentially available for loss absorbency purposes. In order to provide a certain level of protection for natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises holding eligible deposits above the level of covered deposits, such deposits should have a higher priority ranking over the claims of ordinary unsecured, non-preferred creditors under the national law governing normal insolvency proceedings. The claim of the deposit guarantee scheme should have an even higher ranking under such national law than the aforementioned categories of eligible deposits. Harmonisation of national insolvency law in that area is necessary in order to minimise exposure of the resolution funds of Member States under the no creditor worse off principle as specified in this Directive.

Amendment 134 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 42

(42) Resolution financing arrangements can be used to support the application of the sale of business tool or of the bridge institution tool, whereby a set of assets, rights and liabilities of the institution under resolution are transferred to a recipient. In that case, the resolution financing arrangement may have a claim against the residual institution or entity in its subsequent winding up under normal insolvency proceedings. That may occur where the resolution financing arrangement is used in connection to losses that creditors would have otherwise borne, including under the form of guarantees to assets and liabilities or coverage of the difference between the transferred assets and liabilities. To ensure that the shareholders and creditors left behind in the residual institution or entity effectively absorb the losses of the institution under resolution and improve the possibility of repayments in insolvency to the resolution-specific safety net, those claims of the resolution financing arrangement against the residual institution or entity, and claims that arise from reasonable expenses properly incurred, should rank in insolvency above the claims of deposits and of the DGS. Since compensations paid to shareholders and creditors by resolution financing arrangements due to breaches of the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle aim to compensate for the results of resolution action, those compensations should not give rise to claims of those arrangements.deleted

Amendment 135 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 43

(43) To ensure sufficient flexibility and to facilitate DGS interventions in support of the use of the resolution tools, where they lead to the exit from the market of the institution under resolution and where necessary to prevent losses being borne by depositors, certain aspects of the use of DGS in resolution should be specified. In particular, it is necessary to specify that the DGS can be used to support transfer transactions that include deposits, including eligible deposits beyond the coverage level provided by the DGS, and also deposits excluded from repayment by a DGS, in certain cases and under clear conditions. The contribution of the DGS should be aimed at covering the shortfall in the value of the assets transferred to a buyer or bridge institution in comparison to the value of the transferred deposits. Where a contribution is required by the buyer as part of the transaction to ensure its capital neutrality and preserve compliance with the buyer’s capital requirements, the DGS should also be allowed to contribute to that effect. The support of the DGS to resolution action should take the form of cash or other forms, such as guarantees or loss sharing agreements that can minimise the impact of the support on the available financial means of the DGS while simultaneously allowing the contribution of the DGS to meet its purposes.deleted

Amendment 136 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 43

(43) To ensure sufficient flexibility and to facilitate DGS interventions in support of the use of the resolution tools, where they lead to the exit from the market of the institution under resolution and where necessary to prevent losses being borne by depositors, certain aspects of the use of DGS in resolution should be specified. In particular, it is necessary to specify that the DGS can be used to support transfer transactions that include deposits, including eligible deposits beyond the coverage level provided by the DGS, and also deposits excluded from repayment by a DGS, in certain cases and under clear conditions. The contribution of the DGS should be aimed at covering the shortfall in the value of the assets transferred to a buyer or bridge institution in comparison to the value of the transferred deposits. Where a contribution is required by the buyer as part of the transaction to ensure its capital neutrality and preserve compliance with the buyer’s capital requirements, the DGS should also be allowed to contribute to that effect. The support of the DGS to resolution action should take the form of cash or other forms, such as guarantees or loss sharing agreements that can minimise the impact of the support on the available financial means of the DGS while simultaneously allowing the contribution of the DGS to meet its purposes.deleted

Amendment 137 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 44

(44) The contribution of the DGS in resolution should be subject to certain limits. First, it should be ensured that any loss which the DGS may bear as a result of an intervention in resolution does not exceed the loss that the DGS would bear in insolvency if it paid out covered depositors and subrogated to their claims over the institution’s assets. That amount should be determined on the basis of the least cost test, in accordance with the criteria and methodology set out in Directive 2014/49/EU. Those criteria and methodology should also be used when determining the treatment that the DGS would have received had the institution entered normal insolvency proceedings when carrying out the ex-post valuation for the purposes of assessing compliance with the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle and determining any compensation owed to the DGS. Second, the amount of the DGS’s contribution aimed at covering the difference between the assets and liabilities to be transferred to a purchaser or to a bridge institution should not exceed the difference between the transferred assets and the transferred deposits and liabilities with the same or a higher priority ranking in insolvency than those deposits. That would ensure that the contribution of the DGS is only used for the purposes of avoiding the imposition of losses on depositors, where appropriate, and not for the protection of creditors that rank below deposits in insolvency. Nevertheless, the sum of the contribution of the DGS to cover the difference between assets and liabilities with the contribution of the DGS towards the own funds of the recipient entity should not exceed the cost of repaying covered depositors as calculated under the least cost test.deleted

Amendment 138 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Recital 44

(44) The contribution of the DGS in resolution should be subject to certain limits. First, it should be ensured that any loss which the DGS may bear as a result of an intervention in resolution does not exceed the loss that the DGS would bear in insolvency if it paid out covered depositors and subrogated to their claims over the institution’s assets. That amount should be determined on the basis of the least cost test, in accordance with the criteria and methodology set out in Directive 2014/49/EU. Those criteria and methodology should also be used when determining the treatment that the DGS would have received had the institution entered normal insolvency proceedings when carrying out the ex-post valuation for the purposes of assessing compliance with the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle and determining any compensation owed to the DGS. Second, the amount of the DGS’s contribution aimed at covering the difference between the assets and liabilities to be transferred to a purchaser or to a bridge institution should not exceed the difference between the transferred assets and the transferred deposits and liabilities with the same or a higher priority ranking in insolvency than those deposits. That would ensure that the contribution of the DGS is only used for the purposes of avoiding the imposition of losses on depositors, where appropriate, and not for the protection of creditors that rank below deposits in insolvency. Nevertheless, the sum of the contribution of the DGS to cover the difference between assets and liabilities with the contribution of the DGS towards the own funds of the recipient entity should not exceed the cost of repaying covered depositors as calculated under the least cost testvery strict limits.

Amendment 139 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 44

(44) The contribution of the DGS in resolution should be subject to certain limits. First, it should be ensured that any loss which the DGS may bear as a result of an intervention in resolution does not exceed the loss that the DGS would bear in insolvency if it paid out covered depositors and subrogated to their claims over the institution’s assets. That amount should be determined on the basis of the least cost test, in accordance with the criteria and methodology set out in Directive 2014/49/EU. Those criteria and methodology should also be used when determining the treatment that the DGS would have received had the institution entered normal insolvency proceedings when carrying out the ex-post valuation for the purposes of assessing compliance with the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle and determining any compensation owed to the DGS. Second, the amount of the DGS’s contribution aimed at covering the difference between the assets and liabilities to be transferred to a purchaser or to a bridge institution should not exceed the difference between the transferred assets and the transferred deposits and liabilities with the same or a higher priority ranking in insolvency than those deposits. That would ensure that the contribution of the DGS is only used for the purposes of avoiding the imposition of losses on depositors, where appropriate, and not for the protection of creditors that rank below deposits in insolvency. Nevertheless, the sum of the contribution of the DGS to cover the difference between assets and liabilities with the contribution of the DGS towards the own funds of the recipient entity should not exceed the cost of repaying covered depositors as calculated under the least cost test.

Amendment 140 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Recital 44

(44) The contribution of the DGS in resolution should be subject to certain limits. First, it should be ensured that any loss which the DGS may bear as a result of an intervention in resolution does not exceed the loss that the DGS would bear in insolvency if it paid out covered depositors and subrogated to their claims over the institution’s assets. That amount should be determined on the basis of the least cost test, in accordance with the criteria and methodology set out in Directive 2014/49/EU, taking into account all relevant factors, including the time value of money as well as delays in the recovery of funds and the recovery rates expected in insolvency proceedings, based on national specificities. Those criteria and methodology should also be used when determining the treatment that the DGS would have received had the institution entered normal insolvency proceedings when carrying out the ex-post valuation for the purposes of assessing compliance with the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle and determining any compensation owed to the DGS. Second, the amount of the DGS’s contribution aimed at covering the difference between the assets and liabilities to be transferred to a purchaser or to a bridge institution should not exceed the difference between the transferred assets and the transferred deposits and liabilities with the same or a higher priority ranking in insolvency than those deposits. That would ensure that the contribution of the DGS is only used for the purposes of avoiding the imposition of losses on depositors, where appropriate, and not for the protection of creditors that rank below deposits in insolvency. Nevertheless, the sum of the contribution of the DGS to cover the difference between assets and liabilities with the contribution of the DGS towards the own funds of the recipient entity should not exceed the cost of repaying covered depositors as calculated under the least cost test.

Amendment 141 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 44

(44) The contribution of the DGS in resolution should be subject to certain limits. First, it should be ensured that any loss which the DGS may bear as a result of an intervention in resolution does not exceed the loss that the DGS would bear in insolvency if it paid out covered depositors and subrogated to their claims over the institution’s assets. That amount should be determined on the basis of the least cost test, in accordance with the criteria and methodology set out in Directive 2014/49/EU. Those criteria and methodology should also be used when determining the treatment that the DGS would have received had the institution entered normal insolvency proceedings ~~when carrying out the ex-post valuation for the purposes of assessing compliance with the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle and determining any compensation owed to the DGS~~. Second, the amount of the DGS’s contribution aimed at covering the difference between the assets and liabilities to be transferred to a purchaser or to a bridge institution should not exceed the difference between the transferred assets and the transferred deposits and liabilities with the same or a higher priority ranking in insolvency than those deposits. That would ensure that the contribution of the DGS is only used for the purposes of avoiding the imposition of losses on eligible depositors, where appropriate, and not for the protection of creditors that rank below eligible deposits in insolvency. Nevertheless, the sum of the contribution of the DGS to cover the difference between assets and liabilities with the contribution of the DGS towards the own funds of the recipient entity should not exceed the cost of repaying covered depositors as calculated under the least cost test.

Amendment 142 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 45

(45) It should be specified that the DGS may only contribute to a transfer of liabilities other than covered deposits in the context of a resolution if the resolution authority concludes that deposits others than covered deposits cannot be bailed-in, nor left in the residual institution under resolution which will be wound up. In particular, the resolution authority should be allowed to avoid allocating losses to those deposits where the exclusion is strictly necessary and proportionate to preserve the continuity of critical functions and core business lines or where necessary to avoid widespread contagion and financial instability, which could cause a serious disturbance to the economy of the Union or of a Member State. The same reasons should apply to the inclusion in the transfer to a buyer or to a bridge institution of bail-inable liabilities with a priority ranking lower than that of deposits. In that case, the transfer of those bail-inable liabilities should not be supported by the contribution of the DGS. If any financial support to the transfer of those bail-inable liabilities is required, that support should be provided by the resolution financing arrangement.deleted

Amendment 143 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 46

(46) Given the possibility to use DGS in resolution, it is necessary to specify further the way in which the DGS contribution can count towards the calculation of the requirements to access resolution financing arrangements. If the contribution made by shareholders and creditors of the institution under resolution through reductions, write-down or conversion of their liabilities, summed with the contribution made by the DGS, amounts to at least 8 % of the institution’s total liabilities including own funds, the institution should be able to access the resolution financing arrangement to receive further funding, where necessary to ensure effective resolution in line with the resolution objectives. If those conditions are met, the contribution of the DGS should be limited to the amount necessary to enable access to the resolution financing arrangement. To ensure that resolution continues to be primarily financed by the institution’s internal resources and to minimise distortions of competition, the possibility to use the DGS contribution to ensure access to resolution financing arrangements should only be possible for institutions for which the resolution plan or the group resolution plan does not provide for their winding up in an orderly manner in case of failure, given that the MREL determined by resolution authorities for those institutions has been set at a level that includes both the loss absorption and the recapitalisation amounts.deleted

Amendment 144 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 46

(46) Given the possibility to use DGS in resolution, it is necessary to specify further the way in which the DGS contribution can count towards the calculation of the requirements to access resolution financing arrangements. If the contribution made by shareholders and creditors of the institution under resolution through reductions, write-down or conversion of their liabilities, summed with the contribution made by the DGS, amounts to at least 8 % of the institution’s total liabilities including own funds, the institution should be able to access the resolution financing arrangement to receive further funding, where necessary to ensure effective resolution in line with the resolution objectives. If those conditions are met, the contribution of the DGS should be limited to the amount necessary to enable access to the resolution financing arrangement. To ensure that resolution continues to be primarily financed by the institution’s internal resources and to minimise distortions of competition, the possibility to use the DGS contribution to ensure access to resolution financing arrangements should only be possible for institutions for which the resolution plan or the group resolution plan does not provide for their winding up in an orderly manner in case of failure, given that the MREL determined by resolution authorities for those institutions has been set at a level that includes both the loss absorption and the recapitalisation amounts.deleted

Amendment 145 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 46

(46) Given the possibility to use DGS in resolution, it is necessary to specify further the way in which the DGS contribution can count towards the calculation of the requirements to access resolution financing arrangements. If the contribution made by shareholders and creditors of the institution under resolution through reductions, write- down or conversion of their liabilities~~, summed with the contribution made by the DGS,~~ amounts to at least 8 % of the institution’s total liabilities including own funds, the institution should be able to access the resolution financing arrangement to receive further funding, where necessary to ensure effective resolution in line with the resolution objectives. If those conditions are met, the contribution of the DGS should be limited to the amount necessary to enable access to the resolution financing arrangement. To ensure that resolution continues to be primarily financed by the institution’s internal resources and to minimise distortions of competition, the possibility to use the DGS contribution to ensure access to resolution financing arrangements should only be possible for institutions for which the resolution plan or the group resolution plan does not provide for their winding up in an orderly manner in case of failure, given that the MREL determined by resolution authorities for those institutions has been set at a level that includes both the loss absorption and the recapitalisation amounts.

Amendment 146 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 46

(46) Given the possibility to use DGS in resolution, it is necessary to ~~specify further the way in which~~clarify that the DGS contribution ~~can~~does not count towards the calculation of the requirements to access resolution financing arrangements. IOnly if the contribution made by shareholders and creditors of the institution under resolution through reductions, write- down or conversion of their liabilities~~, summed with the contribution made by the DGS,~~ amounts to at least 8 % of the institution’s total liabilities including own funds, the institution should be able to access the resolution financing arrangement to receive further funding, where necessary to ensure effective resolution in line with the resolution objectives. If those conditions are met, the contribution of the DGS should be limited to the amount necessary to enable access to the resolution financing arrangement. To ensure that resolution continues to be primarily financed by the institution’s internal resources and to minimise distortions of competition, the possibility to use the DGS contribution to ensure access to resolution financing arrangements should only be possible for institutions for which the resolution plan or the group resolution plan does not provide for their winding up in an orderly manner in case of failure, givenTo ensure that resolution continues to be primarily financed by the institution’s internal resources and to minimise distortions of competition, it remains of key importance that the MREL determined by resolution authorities for those institutions has been set at a level that ~~includes both the loss absorption and the recapitalisation amounts~~ensures that resolution remains feasible.

Amendment 147 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 46

(46) Given the possibility to use DGS in resolution, it is necessary to specify further the way in which the DGS contribution can count towards the calculation of the requirements to access resolution financing arrangements. If the DGS is facing a risk of liquidity shortfall, and if the contribution made by shareholders and creditors of the institution under resolution through reductions, write- down or conversion of their liabilities, summed with the contribution made by the DGS, amounts to at least 8 % of the institution’s total liabilities including own funds, the institution should be able to access the resolution financing arrangement to receive further funding, where necessary to ensure effective resolution in line with the resolution objectives upon approval of the resolution authorities. If those conditions are met, the contribution of the DGS should initially be limited to the amount necessary to enable access to the resolution financing arrangement, and should be later complemented, over an appropriate period of time, by the amount required to repay the contribution made by the resolution financing arrangement. To ensure that resolution continues to be primarily financed by the institution’s internal resources and to minimise distortions of competition, the possibility to use the DGS contribution to ensure access to resolution financing arrangements should only be possible for institutions for which the resolution plan or the group resolution plan does not provide for their winding up in an orderly manner in case of failure, given that the MREL determined by resolution authorities for those institutions has been set at a level that includes both the loss absorption and the recapitalisation amounts.

Amendment 148 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 46

(46) Given the possibility to use DGS in resolution, it is necessary to specify further the way in which the DGS contribution can count towards the calculation of the requirements to access resolution financing arrangements. If the contribution made by shareholders and creditors of the institution under resolution through reductions, write- down or conversion of their liabilities, summed with the contribution made by the DGS, amounts to at least 8 % of the institution’s total liabilities including own funds, the institution should be able to access the resolution financing arrangement to receive further funding, where necessary to ensure effective resolution in line with the resolution objectives. If those conditions are met, the contribution of the DGS should be limited to the amount necessary to enable access to the resolution financing arrangement, and to shield covered deposits should they not have been protected from bail-in. To ensure that resolution continues to be primarily financed by the institution’s internal resources and to minimise distortions of competition, the possibility to use the DGS contribution to ensure access to resolution financing arrangements should only be possible for institutions for which the resolution plan or the group resolution plan does not provide for their winding up in an orderly manner in case of failure, given that the MREL determined by resolution authorities for those institutions has been set at a level that includes both the loss absorption and the recapitalisation amounts, and only in cases where the concerned institution has been compliant at least once with its fully fledged MREL requirements.

Amendment 149 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 35

(35) ‘critical functions’ means activities, services or operations the discontinuance of which is likely in one or more Member States to lead to the disruption of services that are essential to the real economy or to disrupt financial stability at national level, or regional level on a significant scale, due to the size, market share, external and internal interconnectedness, complexity or cross- border activities of an institution or group, with particular regard to the substitutability of those activities, services or operations;;. For the purposes of this point, the regional level shall be assessed with reference to the territorial unit corresponding to level 1 or level 2 territorial units of the Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS level 1 or 2) within the meaning of Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council*; * Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 on the establishment of a common classification of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) (OJ L 154, 21.6.2003, p. 1).

Amendment 150 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 35

(35) ‘critical functions’ means activities, services or operations the discontinuance of which is likely in one or more Member States to lead to the disruption of services that are essential to the real economy or to disrupt financial stability at national ~~or reg~~level or where the disturbance of services at regional level implies a material risk of a systemic crisis at national level, due to the size, market share, external and internal interconnectedness, complexity or cross- border activities of an institution or group, with particular regard to the substitutability of those activities, services or operations;;

Amendment 151 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 35

(35) ‘critical functions’ means activities, services or operations the discontinuance of which is likely in one or more Member States to lead to the disruption of services that are essential to the real economy or to disrupt financial stability at national ~~or reg~~level, or where the disruption of services at regional level implies a material risk of a systemic crisis at national level, due to the size, market share, external and internal interconnectedness, complexity or cross- border activities of an institution or group, with particular regard to the substitutability of those activities, services or operations;;

Amendment 152 #

Ralf SEEKATZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 35

(35) ‘critical functions’ means activities, services or operations the discontinuance of which is ~~likely~~ in one or more Member States to lead to the disruption of services that are essential to the real economy or to the disruption of financial stability at national orlevel, or at the discretion of the Member States at regional level, due to the size, market share, external and internal interconnectedness, complexity or cross- border activities of an institution or group, with particular regard to the substitutability of those activities, services or operations;;

Amendment 153 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 35

(35) ‘critical functions’ means activities, services or operations the discontinuance of which is likely in one or more Member States to lead to the disruption of services that are essential to the real economy or to disrupt financial stability at national or regional level, due to the size, market share, external and internal interconnectedness, complexity, relative importance in a specific economic sector or cross- border activities of an institution or group, with particular regard to the substitutability of those activities, services or operations;;

Amendment 154 #

Othmar KARAS

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 35

(35) ‘critical functions’ means activities, services or operations the discontinuance of which is likely in one or more Member States to lead to the disruption of services that are essential to the real economy or to disrupt financial stability at Unational or ~~reg~~national level, due to the size, market share, external and internal interconnectedness, complexity or cross- border activities of an institution or group, with particular regard to the substitutability of those activities, services or operations;;

Amendment 155 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 35

(35) ‘critical functions’ means activities, services or operations the discontinuance of which is likely in one or more Member States to lead to the disruption of services that are essential to the real economy or to disrupt financial stability at national ~~or regional~~ level, due to the size, market share, external and internal interconnectedness, complexity or cross- border activities of an institution or group, with particular regard to the substitutability of those activities, services or operations;;

Amendment 156 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 35

(35) ‘critical functions’ means activities, services or operations the discontinuance of which is likely in one or more Member States to lead to the disruption of services that are essential to the real economy or to disrupt financial stability at national ~~or regional~~ level, due to the size, market share, external and internal interconnectedness, complexity or cross- border activities of an institution or group, with particular regard to the substitutability of those activities, services or operations;;

Amendment 157 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 35

(35) ‘critical functions’ means activities, services or operations the discontinuance of which is likely in one or more Member States to lead to the disruption of services that are essential to the real economy or to disrupt financial stability at national ~~or regional~~ level, due to the size, market share, external and internal interconnectedness, complexity or cross- border activities of an institution or group, with particular regard to the substitutability of those activities, services or operations;;

Amendment 158 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point d a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 90 a (new)

(da) the following point is inserted: (90a) ‘significant branches’ means a branch of a credit institution that has been considered significant in accordance with Article 51 of Directive 2013/36/EU

Amendment 159 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point e

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 93 a (new)

~~(93a) ‘deposit’ means, for the purposes of Articles 108 and 109, deposit as defined in Article 2(1), point (3), of Directive 2014/49/EU;;~~deleted

Amendment 160 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point e a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 93 b (new)

(ea) the following point is inserted: (93b) ‘total liabilities including own funds’ means total liabilities as defined in Section 3 of Council Directive 86/635/EEC, or as defined in accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards referred to in Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council, including own funds as defined in point (118) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, in the case of institutions operating promotional loans, excluding the liabilities of the intermediary institution towards the originating or another promotional bank or another intermediary institution and the liabilities of the promotional bank towards its funding parties in so far as the amount of those liabilities is matched by the promotional loans of that institution;

Amendment 161 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point e a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 97 a (new)

(ea) the following point is inserted: (97a) ‘retail deposits’ means a deposit that is held by a natural person or a small and medium enterprise as defined in Article 3(2) and 3(3) of Directive 2013/34/EU

Amendment 162 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point e b (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 93 c (new)

(eb) the following point is inserted: (93c) ‘promotional bank’ means any undertaking or entity set up by a Member State, central or regional government, which grants promotional loans on a non- competitive, not for profit basis in order to promote that government's public policy objectives, provided that that government has an obligation to protect the economic basis of the undertaking or entity and maintain its viability throughout its lifetime, or that at least 90 % of its original funding or the promotional loan it grants is directly or indirectly guaranteed by the Member State's central or regional government;

Amendment 163 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point e b (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 97 b (new)

(eb) the following point is inserted: (97b) ‘corporate deposit for payment and settlement purposes’ means a deposit held by a legal person which have all the following features: (a) it is payable at par on demand; (b) it is able to provide payment and settlement services; (c) it does not bear interest; (d) it is not a financial instrument as defined in Article 4(1)(15) of Directive 2014/65/EU;

Amendment 164 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point e c (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 93 d (new)

(ec) the following point is inserted: (93d) ‘promotional loan’ means a loan granted by a promotional bank or through an intermediate bank on a noncompetitive, not for profit basis, in order to promote the public policy objectives of central or regional governments in a Member State;

Amendment 165 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point e c (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 97 c (new)

(ec) the following point is inserted: (97c) ‘Other corporate deposit’ means a deposit held by a legal person which is not a corporate deposit for payment and settlement purposes;

Amendment 166 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point e d (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 93 e (new)

(ed) the following point is inserted: (93e) ‘intermediary institution’ means a credit institution which intermediates promotional loans provided that it does not give them as credit to a final customer;’

Amendment 167 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

In the absence of changes referred to in the first subparagraph in 12 months following the latest annual update of the recovery plan, the competent authorities may exceptionally waive, until the subsequent 12-month period, the obligation to update the recovery plan.deleted

Amendment 168 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

In the absence of changes referred to in the first subparagraph in 12 months following the latest annual update of the recovery plan, the competent authorities ~~may~~shall exceptionally waive, until the subsequent 12-month period, the obligation to update the recovery plan.

Amendment 169 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

In the absence of changes referred to in the first subparagraph in 12 months following the latest annual update of the recovery plan, the competent authorities ~~may~~shall exceptionally waive, until the subsequent 12-month period, the obligation to update the recovery plan.

Amendment 170 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 5 – paragraph 3 – point c a (new)

(ca) support from a deposit guarantee scheme, whatever the form of the intervention.

Amendment 171 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 5 – paragraph 4

4. Recovery plans shall include, where applicable, an analysis of how and when an institution may apply, in the conditions addressed by the plan, for the use of central bank facilities not excluded from the scope of the recovery plan pursuant to paragraph 3 and identify on a regular and at least on a quarterly basis those assets which would be expected to qualify as collateral.;

Amendment 172 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 5 – paragraph 8

(2a) in Article 5, paragraph 8 is replaced by the following: "Member States ~~may~~shall provide that competent authorities have the power to require an institution to maintain detailed records of financial contracts to which the institution concerned is a party. " Or. en (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0059)

Amendment 173 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 b (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 5 – paragraph 10 a (new)

(2b) in Article 5, the following paragraph 10a is added: "10a. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the methodology for determining a significant deterioration of the financial situation referred to in paragraph 1 and the changes to the legal or organizational structure of the institution, its business or its financial situation referred to in paragraph 2.EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 6 months [ please insert 12 after entry into force of this Directive]. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

Amendment 174 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 c (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point a

(2c) in Article 6(2), point (a) is replaced by the following: "(a) the implementation of the arrangements proposed in the plan is reasonably likely to maintain or restore ~~the viabil~~within a reasonable timeframe the viability, liquidity and financial position of the institution or of the group, taking into account the preparatory measures that the institution has taken or has planned to take; " Or. en (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0059)

Amendment 175 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 d (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 6 – paragraph 4

(2d) in Article 6, paragraph 4 is replaced by the following: "4. The competent authority shall provide the recovery plan to the resolution authority. The resolution authority ~~may~~shall examine the recovery plan with a view to identifying any actions in the recovery plan which may adversely impact the resolvability of the institution and make recommendations to the competent authority with regard to those matters. " Or. en (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0059)

Amendment 176 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – introductory part

(3) in Article 6, paragraph 5, the first subparagraph is replaced by the following:

Amendment 177 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 6 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

5. Where the competent authority assesses that there are material deficiencies in the recovery plan, or material impediments to its implementation, or where the resolution authority makes recommendations referred to in paragraph 4, the competent authority shall notify the institution or the parent undertaking of the group of its assessment and shall require the institution to submit, within 31 months, extendable with the authorities’ approval by 1 month, a revised plan demonstrating how those deficiencies or impediments are addressed.;

Amendment 178 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 a (new)

(3a) in Article 6, paragraph 6 is replaced by the following: "6. If the institution fails to submit a revised recovery plan, or if the competent authority determines that the revised recovery plan does not adequately remedy the deficiencies or potential impediments identified in its original assessment, and it is not possible to adequately remedy the deficiencies or impediments through a direction to make specific changes to the plan, the competent authority shall require the institution to identify within a ~~reasonable~~specified timeframe changes it can make to its business in order to address the deficiencies in or impediments to the implementation of the recovery plan. If the institution fails to identify such changes within the timeframe set by the competent authority, or if the competent authority assesses that the actions proposed by the institution would not adequately address the deficiencies or impediments, the competent authority may or direct the institution to take any measures it considers to be ~~necessary and proportion~~appropriate, taking into account the seriousness of the deficiencies and impediments and the effect of the measures on the institution’s business. The competent authority may, without prejudice to Article 104 of Directive 2013/36/EU, direct the institution to: (a)reduce the risk profile of the institution, including liquidity risk; and restore within a specified timeframe the liquidity coverage ratio to a certain threshold above the minimum requirement established in Regulation (EU) N° 575/2013; (b)enable timely recapitalisation measures; (c)review the institution’s strategy and structure; (d)make changes to the funding strategy so as to improve the resilience of the core business lines and critical functions; (e)make changes to the governance structure of the institution. The list of measures referred to in this paragraph does not preclude Member States from authorising competent authorities to take additional measures under national law. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

Amendment 179 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 8 – paragraph 2

(4) in Article 8(2), the third subparagraph is replaced by the following: ‘ EBA may, at the request of a competent authority, assist the competent authorities in reaching a joint decision in accordance with Article 31(2), point (c), of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.; ’deleted

Amendment 180 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – first subparagraph

(4a) In Article 9(1), the first subparagraph is replaced by the following: "1. For the purpose of Articles 5 to 8, competent authorities shall require that each recovery plan includes a framework of indicators established by the institution which identifies the points at which appropriate actions referred to in the plan may be taken. The indicators shall at least include a minimum set of triggers developed under Article 27. Such indicators shall be agreed by competent authorities when making the assessment of recovery plans in accordance with Articles 6 and 8. The indicators may be of a qualitative or quantitative nature relating to the institution’s financial position and shall be capable of being monitored easily. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions put in place appropriate arrangements for the regular monitoring of the indicators. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

Amendment 181 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 a (new)

(4a) in Article 10(3), the following point is added: ‘(ca) any use of deposit guarantee schemes’

Amendment 182 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 b (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 10 – paragraph 2

(4b) in Article 10, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: "2. When drawing up the resolution plan, the resolution authority shall identify any material impediments to resolvability and, where ~~necessary and proportion~~appropriate, outline relevant actions for how those impediments could be addressed, according to Chapter II of this Title. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

Amendment 183 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 c (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 10 – paragraph 4

(4c) in Article 10, paragraph 4 is replaced by the following: "4. The resolution plan shall include an analysis of how and when an institution may apply, in the conditions addressed by the plan, for the use of central bank facilities and shall identify those assets which would be expected to qualify as collateral. while providing a prudent estimation of its average yearly value in aggregate for central bank liquidity purposes taking due account of relevant haircuts. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

Amendment 184 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 d (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 10 – paragraph 7

(4d) in Article 10, paragraph 7 is replaced by the following: "7. Without prejudice to Article 4, the resolution plan shall set out options for applying the resolution tools and resolution powers referred to in Title IV to the institution. It shall include, quantified whenever appropriate and possible: (a)a summary of the key elements of the plan; (aa) where applicable, a detailed description of the reasons for determining that an institution is to be qualified as a liquidation entity; (b)a summary of the material changes to the institution that have occurred after the latest resolution information was filed; (c)a demonstration of how critical functions and core business lines could be legally and economically separated, to the extent necessary, from other functions so as to ensure continuity upon the failure of the institution; (d)an estimation of the timeframe for executing each material aspect of the plan; (e)a detailed description of the assessment of resolvability carried out in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article and with Article 15; (f)a description of any measures required pursuant to Article 17 to address or remove impediments to resolvability identified as a result of the assessment carried out in accordance with Article 15; (g)a description of the processes for determining the value and marketability of the critical functions, core business lines and assets of the institution; (h)a detailed description of the arrangements for ensuring that the information required pursuant to Article 11 is up to date and at the disposal of the resolution authorities at all times;(i)an explanation by the resolution authority as to how the resolution options could be financed without the assumption of any of the following: (i)any extraordinary public financial support besides to the entity under resolution or entities acquiring parts of its business the use of the financing arrangements established in accordance with Article 100; (ii)any central bank emergency liquidity assistance;or (iii)any central bank liquidity assistance provided under non-standard collateralisation, tenor and interest rate terms; (j)a detailed description of the different resolution strategies that could be applied according to the different possible scenarios and the applicable timescales;(k)a description of critical interdependencies; (l)a description of options for preserving access to payments and clearing services and other infrastructures and, an assessment of the portability of client positions; (m)an analysis of the impact of the plan on the employees of the institution, including an assessment of any associated costs, and a description of envisaged procedures to consult staff during the resolution process, taking into account national systems for dialogue with social partners where applicable; (n)a plan for communicating with the media and the public; (o)the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities required pursuant to Article 45(1) and a deadline to reach that level, where applicable; (p)where applicable, the minimum requirement for own funds and contractual bail-in instruments pursuant to Article 45(1), and a deadline to reach that level, where applicable; (pa) a detailed and comprehensive list of eligible liabilities instruments including whether their holders qualify as retail or professional investors pursuant to Directive 2014/65/EU. (pb) a detailed and quantified list of covered deposits, retail deposits, corporate deposits for payment and settlement purposes and other corporate deposits as defined respectively in Article 2(1) points (95), (97), (98) and (98a) (q)a description of essential operations and systems for maintaining the continuous functioning of the institution’s operational processes; (r)where applicable, any opinion expressed by the institution in relation to the resolution plan. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

Amendment 185 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 e (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 10 – paragraph 8

(4e) in Article 10, paragraph 8 is replaced by the following: "8. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities have the power to require an institution and an entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) to maintain detailed records of financial contracts to which it is a party. The resolution authority ~~may~~shall specify a time- limit within which the institution or entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) is to be capable of producing those records. The same time-limit shall apply to all institutions and all entities referred to in point (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) under its jurisdiction. The resolution authority may decide to set different time-limits for different types of financial contracts as referred to in Article 2(100). This paragraph shall not affect the information gathering powers of the competent authority. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

Amendment 186 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 10 – paragraph 8 a

(5) in Article 10, the following paragraph 8a is inserted: ‘ 8a. adopt resolution plans where an institution is being wound up in accordance with the applicable national law pursuant to Article 32b or where Article 37(6) applies.; ’deleted Resolution authorities shall not

Amendment 187 #

Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 10 – paragraph 7 – point f a (new)

(4a) in Article 10(7), the following point is inserted: (fa) a detailed description of the reasons for determining that an institution is to be qualified as a liquidation entity, including explaining how the resolution authority came to the conclusion that the institution lacks critical functions;

Amendment 188 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 10 – paragraph 8 a

8a. Resolution authorities shall not adopt resolution plans where an institution is being wound up in accordance with the applicable national law pursuant to Article 32b or where Article 37(6) applies.;deleted

Amendment 189 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 10 – paragraph 8 a a (new)

8aa. The resolution authority shall disclose on its website the resolution plans of institutions under its remit on an annual basis. Commercially sensitive information or information that is protected by statutory confidentiality provisions, shall be redacted from such disclosures.

Amendment 190 #

Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 10 – paragraph 9 – subparagraph 2

(5a) in Article 10(9), the second subparagraph is replaced by the following: "EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by ~~3 July 2015. (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059)~~[6 months after entry into force of this amending Directive]. " Or. en

Amendment 191 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 11 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

(5a) in Article 11(1), the second subparagraph is replaced by the following: "In particular the resolution authorities shall have the power to require within 24 hours, among other information, the information and analysis specified in Section B of the Annex. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

Amendment 192 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3

The identification of the measures to be taken in respect of the subsidiaries referred to in the first subparagraph, point (b), that are not resolution entities may be subject to a simplified approach by resolution authorities if such approach does not negatively affect the resolvability of the group, taking into account the size of the subsidiary, its risk profile, the absence of critical functions and the group resolution strategy.;deleted

Amendment 193 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3

(a) in paragraph 1, the following third and fourth subparagraph iss are added: ‘The identification of the measures to be taken in respect of the subsidiaries referred to in the first subparagraph, point (b), that are not resolution entities may be subject to a simplified approach by resolution authorities if such approach does not negatively affect the resolvability of the group, taking into account the size of the subsidiary, its risk profile, the absence of critical functions and the group resolution strategy.~~’ (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014L0059-20221114)~~ The group resolution plan shall also determine whether entities within a resolution group other than the resolution entity, qualify as liquidation entities. Without prejudice to other factors that may be deemed relevant by resolution authorities, entities that provide critical functions or critical services or are material subsidiaries pursuant Article 4(1) point 135 of Regulation (EU) 575/2013 shall not qualify as liquidation entities. " Or. en

Amendment 194 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point a a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 12 – paragraph 2

(aa) in Article 12, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: "2. The group resolution plan shall be drawn up on the basis of the requirements under Article 10 and the information provided pursuant to Article 11. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

Amendment 195 #

Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point a a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 12 – paragraph 3 – point – a a (new)

(aa) in paragraph 3, the following point is inserted: (-aa) a detailed description of the reasons for determining that a group entity referred to in points (a) to (d) of paragraph 1 is to be qualified as a liquidation entity, including explaining how the resolution authority came to the conclusion that the institution lacks critical functions, and how the ratio of its total risk exposure amount and operating income in the group’s total risk exposure amount and operating income, as well as the leverage ratio of the group entity in the context of the group have been taken into account;

Amendment 196 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point a a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 12 – paragraph 3 – points a b and a c (new)

(aa) in paragraph 3, the following points (ab) and (ac) are inserted: "(ab) where a group comprises more than one resolution group, set out the resolution actions that are to be taken for the resolution entities of each resolution group and the implications of those actions on both of the following: (i) other group entities that belong to the same resolution group; (ii) other resolution groups; (ac) a detailed description of the reasons for determining that a group entity referred to in points (a) to (d) of paragraph 1 is to be qualified as a liquidation entity; " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

Amendment 197 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 12 – paragraph 5 a

~~5a. Resolution authorities shall not adopt resolution plans where an entity is being wound up in accordance with the applicable national law pursuant to Article 32b or where Article 37(6) applies.;~~deleted

Amendment 198 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 13 – paragraph 4

(7) in Article 13(4), the fourth subparagraph is replaced by the following: ‘ EBA may, at the request of a resolution authority, assist the resolution authorities in reaching a joint decision in accordance with Article 31(2), point (c), of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.; ’deleted

Amendment 199 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 17 – paragraph 1

(9a) in Article 17, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: "1. Member States shall ensure that when, pursuant to an assessment of resolvability for an institution carried out in accordance with Articles 15 and 16, a resolution authority after consulting the competent authority determines that there are substantive impediments to the resolvability of that institution, the resolution authority shall notify in writing that determination to the institution concerned, to the competent authority and to the resolution authorities of the jurisdictions in which significant branches are located. The inability to provide any of the information required for the contents of the resolution plans under Article 10(7) to the satisfaction of the resolution authority shall be considered a substantive impediment to resolvability. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

Amendment 200 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 16 a – paragraph 1 – introductory part

(9a) In Article 16a(1), the introductory part is replaced by the following: "Article 16a Power to prohibit certain distributions 1. Where an entity is in a situation where it meets the combined buffer requirement when considered in addition to each of the requirements referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 141a(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU, but it fails to meet the combined buffer requirement when considered in addition to the requirements referred to in Articles 45c and 45d of this Directive, when calculated in accordance with point (a) of Article 45(2) of this Directive, or where an entity fails to meet the requirements referred to in Articles 45c and 45d of this Directive, when calculated in accordance with point (b) of Article 45(2) of this Directive the resolution authority of that entity shall ~~have the power~~, in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, to prohibit an entity from distributing more than the Maximum Distributable Amount related to the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (‘M- MDA’), calculated in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article, through any of the following actions: ~~(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014L0059-20221114)~~" Or. en

Amendment 201 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 b (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 17 – paragraph 4

In identifying alternative measures, the resolution authority shall demonstrate how the measures proposed by the institution would not be able to remove the impediments to resolvability and how the alternative measures proposed are proportionate in removing them. (9b) in Article 17(4), the second subparagraph is replaced by the following: "The resolution authority shall take into account the threat to financial stability of those impediments to resolvability and the effect of the measures on the business of the institution, its stability and its ability to contribute to the economy. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

Amendment 202 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 17 – paragraph 4 – subparagraphs 2 a (new) and 3

in Article 17(4), the following third and fourth subparagraph ~~is added:~~s are added: The institution shall have the right to demonstrate how the measures it proposed would be able to remove the impediments to resolvability and how the alternative measures proposed by the authority are unnecessarily burdensome in removing them. If the measures proposed by the entity concerned effectively reduce or remove the impediments to resolvability, the resolution authority shall take a decision, after consulting the competent authority. That decision shall indicate that the measures proposed effectively reduce or remove the impediments to resolvability and require the entity to implement the measures proposed.;

Amendment 203 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 17 – paragraph 5 – introductory part

(10a) in Article 17, the introductory part of paragraph 5 is replaced by the following: "5. For the purposes of paragraph 4, resolution authorities shall ~~have the power to~~require the institution take any of the following measures: within a specified timeframe: " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

Amendment 204 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 b (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 17 – paragraphs 8 a and 8 b (new)

(10b) in Article 17, paragraphs (8a) and (8b) are inserted: "8a. Taking into account, where appropriate, experience acquired in the application of the guidelines referred to in paragraph 8, EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify further details on the measures provided for in paragraph 5 and the circumstances in which each measure may be applied. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by [please insert 1 year after entry into force of the amended Directive. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 8b. The resolution authority shall publish at the end of each resolution planning cycle an anonymised list with identified impediments including substantive impediments to resolvability and relevant actions to address them. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

Amendment 205 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 – point -a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 18 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

(-a) In Article 18 (2), the first sub- paragraph is replaced by the following: "2. The group-level resolution authority, in cooperation with the consolidating supervisor and EBA in accordance with Article 25(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, shall prepare and submit a report to the Union parent undertaking, to the resolution authorities of subsidiaries, which shall provide it to the subsidiaries within their remit, and to the resolution authorities of jurisdictions in which significant branches are located. The report shall be prepared after consulting the competent authorities, and shall analyse the substantive impediments to the effective application of the resolution tools and the exercising of the resolution powers in relation to the group, and also in relation to resolution groups where a group is composed of more than one resolution group. The report shall consider the impact on the group's business model and recommend any proportionate and targeted measures that, in the view of the group- level resolution authority, are ~~necessary or~~ appropriate to remove those impediments. ~~(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014L0059-20221114)~~" Or. en

Amendment 206 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 – point a a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 18 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

~~Within four~~(aa) in paragraph 3, the first sub- paragraph is replaced by the following: "Within three months of the date of receipt of the report, the Union parent undertaking may submit observations and propose to the group-level resolution authority alternative measures to remedy the impediments identified in the report. ~~(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014L0059-20221114)~~" Or. en

Amendment 207 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 27 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

Member States shall ensure that competent authorities mconsider without undue delay, appnd if necessary adopt swiftly, early intervention measures where an institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d) meets any of the following conditions:

Amendment 208 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 27 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Member States shall ensure that competent authorities ~~may~~ apply early intervention measures where an institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d) meets any of the following conditions:

Amendment 209 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 27 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point a – point ii

(ii) the competent authority deems that remedial actions other than early intervention measures are insufficient to address the problems ~~due inter alia to a rapid and significant deterioration of the financial condition of the institution or entity;~~

Amendment 210 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 27 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point a – point ii

(ii) the competent authority deems that remedial actions other than early intervention measures are insufficient to address the problems due inter alia to a ~~rapid and~~ significant deterioration of the financial condition of the institution or entity;

Amendment 211 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 27 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b

(b) the institution or entity infringes or is likely to infringe in the 12 months following the assessment of the competent authority the requirements laid down in Title II of Directive 2014/65/EU, in Articles 3 to 7, Articles 14 to 17, or Articles 24, 25 and 26 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, or in Articles 45e or 45f of this Directive. Where appropriate to characterise such infringement, Member States shall ensure that the resolution authority informs the competent authority without delay.

Amendment 212 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 27 – paragraph 1a

~~(d) the requirement to change the legal structure of the institution;~~deleted

Amendment 213 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 27 – paragraph 1a – point d

~~(d) the requirement to change the legal structure of the institution;~~deleted

Amendment 214 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 27 – paragraph 1 a – point f a (new)

(fa) the requirement for the management body to contact potential purchasers and to put in place a digital platform for sharing the information that is necessary for the marketing of the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d) with potential purchasers or with advisors and valuers in order to prepare for the resolution of that institution or entity, subject to the conditions laid down in Article 39(2) and the confidentiality provisions laid down in Article 84.

Amendment 215 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Irene TINAGLI, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 27 – paragraph 1 a – point f a (new)

(fa) the requirement for the management body of the entity to draw up a plan that the entity can implement in case the relevant corporate body decides to initiate the voluntary wind-down of the entity; the plan shall include at least analyses of the necessary capital and liquidity support for winding down and of the concrete relevant strategic options for a possible market exit.

Amendment 216 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 27 – paragraph 1 a – point f a (new)

(fa) the requirement for the management body of the entity to draw up a plan that the entity can implement in case the relevant corporate body decides to initiate the voluntary wind-down of the entity

Amendment 217 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12

3. For each of the measures referred to in paragraph 1a, competent authorities shall set a deadline that is appropriate for completion of that measure and that enables the competent authority to evaluate its effectiveness. The evaluation of the measure shall be carried out immediately after the deadline is reached and shared with the resolution authority. Should the evaluation conclude that the measures have not been fully implemented or are not effective, the competent authority shall make an assessment of the condition referred to in Article 32(1), point (a) of this Directive, after having consulted the resolution authority.

Amendment 218 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 27 – paragraph 4

4. EBA shall, by … [PO please insert the date = 12 months from the date of entry into force of this amending Directive], issue ~~guidelines in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 to promote the consistent application of the triggers referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article~~draft regulatory technical standards in order to specify a minimum set of triggers for the use of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article. Such triggers shall in particular take into account a rapidly deteriorating financial condition of an institution, including deteriorating liquidity situation, increasing level of leverage, non- performing loans or concentration of exposures, and include the institution’s own funds requirement plus at least 1,5 percentage points. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.

Amendment 219 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point a

(a) any of the measures referred to in Article 104(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU they require an institution or an entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), of this Directive to take that aim to address a deterioration in the situation of those entities and groups;

Amendment 220 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

Competent authorities shall closely monitor, in close cooperation with the resolution authorities, the situation of the institution or entity and their compliance with the measures referred to in the first subparagraph, point (a), that aim to address a deterioration in the situation of that institution or entity and with the early intervention measures referred to in the first subparagraph, point (c).

Amendment 221 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

CWithout legal effect to any alternative private sector measure, including measures by an IPS, that would prevent the failure or the likely failure of the institution within a reasonable timeframe, competent authorities shall notify resolution authorities as early as possible where they consider that there is a material risk that ~~one or more of the circumstances in~~an institution will fail according to Article 32(4) would apply in relation to an institution or an entity referred to Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d). That notification shall contain:

Amendment 222 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

Competent authorities shall notify resolution authorities as early as possible where they consider that there is a material risk that one or more of the circumstances in Article 32(4) would apply in relation to an institution or an entity referred to Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d- without legal effect to any alternative private sector measure, including measures by an IPS, that would prevent the failure or the likely failure of the institution within a reasonable timeframe - notify resolution authorities as early as possible where they consider that there is a material risk that an institution will fail according to Article 32(4) would apply (…). That notification shall contain:

Amendment 223 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b

(b) an non-binding and non-complete overview of the measures which would prevent the failure of the institution or entity within a reasonable timeframe, their expected impact on the institution or entity as regards the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) and the expected timeframe for the implementation of those measures.

Amendment 224 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b

(b) an non-binding and non-exhaustive overview of the measures which would prevent the failure of the institution or entity within a reasonable timeframe, their expected impact on the institution or entity as regards the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) and the expected timeframe for the implementation of those measures.

Amendment 225 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b

(b) an non-binding overview of the measures which would prevent the failure of the institution or entity within a reasonable timeframe, their expected impact on the institution or entity as regards the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) and the expected timeframe for the implementation of those measures.

Amendment 226 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

After having received the notification referred to in the first subparagraph, resolution authorities shall assess, in close cooperation with competent authorities, what constitutes a reasonable timeframe for the purposes of the assessment of the condition referred to in Article 32(1), point (b), taking into account the speed of the deterioration of the conditions of the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), the need to implement effectively the resolution strategy and any other relevant considerations. Resolution authorities shall communicate that assessment to competent authorities as early as possible. The notification referred to in the first subparagraph does not impact the ability of institutional protection schemes to implement any measures. Any decisions relating to measures by an institutional protection scheme are within the sole discretion of the institutional protection scheme.

Amendment 227 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

After having received the notification referred to in the first subparagraph, resolution authorities shall assess, in close cooperation with competent authorities, what constitutes a reasonable timeframe for the purposes of the assessment of the condition referred to in Article 32(1), point (b)~~, taking~~. Resolution authorities should take into account the speed of the deterioration of the conditions of the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), the potential impact on the financial system and protection of depositors and client funds, need to implement effectively the resolution strategy and any other relevant considerations. Resolution authorities shall communicate that assessment to competent authorities as early as possible.

Amendment 228 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

After having received the notification referred to in the first subparagraph, resolution authorities shall assess, in close cooperation with competent authorities, what constitutes a reasonable timeframe for the purposes of the assessment of the condition referred to in Article 32(1), point (b), taking into account the speed of the deterioration of the conditions of the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), the risk that a prolonged process increases the overall costs for customers and the economy, the need to implement effectively the resolution strategy and any other relevant considerations. Resolution authorities shall communicate that assessment to competent authorities as early as possible.

Amendment 229 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 a (new)

The notification referred to in the first subparagraph shall not constrain the ability of institutional protection schemes to implement measures. Decisions relating to any measures by an institutional protection scheme shall remain under the sole discretion of the institutional protection scheme.

Amendment 230 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3

Following the notification referred to in the first subparagraph, competent authorities ~~and resolution authorities shall, in close cooperation,~~shall monitor the situation of the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), the implementation of the any relevant measures within their expected timeframe and any other relevant developments. For that purpose, resolution authorities and competent authorities shall meet regularly, with a frequency set by resolution authorities considering the circumstances of the case. Competent authorities and resolution authorities shall provide each other with any relevant information without delay.

Amendment 231 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3

Following the notification referred to in the first subparagraph, competent authorities ~~and resolution authorities~~ shall, in close cooperation with resolution authorities, monitor the situation of the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), the implementation of the any relevant measures within their expected timeframe and any other relevant developments. For that purpose, resolution authorities and competent authorities shall meet regularly, with a frequency set by resolution authorities considering the circumstances of the case. Competent authorities and resolution authorities shall provide each other with any relevant information without delay.

Amendment 232 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3 a (new)

Any measure in the context of preparing for resolution as referred to in this paragraph must not hinder preventive measures as referred to in Article 11(3) of Directive 2014/49/EU. Preventive measures should be given priority over resolution measures.

Amendment 233 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

4. TSubject to alternative private sector measures, including measures by an IPS, that would prevent the failure or the likely failure of the institution within a reasonable timeframe, the powers of resolution authorities shall include the power to market to potential purchasers, or make arrangements for such marketing, the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), to potential purchasers, or require the institution or entity to do so, for the following purposes:

Amendment 234 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 4 – introductory part

4. TSubject to alternative private sector measures, including measures by an IPS, preventing the failure or the likely failure of the institution within a reasonable timeframe, the powers of resolution authorities shall include the power to market to potential purchasers, or make arrangements for such marketing, the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), to potential purchasers, or require the institution or entity to do so, for the following purposes:

Amendment 235 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Where, in the use of the power referred to in paragraph 4, the resolution authority decides to directly market to potential purchasers, it shall have due regard to the circumstances of the case and the potential impact that the exercise of that power might have on the entity's overall position;

Amendment 236 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 5

5. For the purposes of the paragraph 4, 5. resolution authorities shall have the power to request the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), to put in place a digital platform for sharing the information that is necessary for the marketing of that institution or entity with potential purchasers or with advisors and valuers engaged by the resolution authority. In such a case, Article 84(1), point (e) shall apply.

Amendment 237 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 2

Competent authorities and resolution authorities shall ensure that those measures and actions are consistent, coordinated and effective.; The provisions of this Article shall not prejudice the proper functioning of national institutional protection schemes. Member States may decide to exempt national institutional protection schemes from the requirements of this Article.

Amendment 238 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 31– paragraph 2 – point c

(c) to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support~~, in particular when provided from the budget of a Member State;~~

Amendment 239 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 31 – paragraph 2 – point c

(c) to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support~~, in particular when provided from the budget of a Member State~~;

Amendment 240 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 31 – paragraph 2 – point c

(c) to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support~~, in particular when provided from the budget of a Member State~~;

Amendment 241 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 31 – paragraph 2 – point c

(c) to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support~~, in particular when provided from the budget of a Member State~~;

Amendment 242 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 31 – paragraph 2 – point d

(d) to protect ~~depositor~~covered deposits, and to the extent possible also that uncovered part of eligible deposits from natural persons and micro, small and medium- sized enterprises, while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemes, and to protect investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;

Amendment 243 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Irene TINAGLI, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 31 –paragraph 2 – point d

(d) to protect depositors~~, while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemes,~~ and to protect investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;

Amendment 244 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 31 – paragraph 2 – point d

(d) to protect depositors~~, while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemes,~~ and to protect investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;

Amendment 245 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 31 – paragraph 2 – point d

(d) to protect depositors~~, while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemes, and to protect~~ covered by Directive 2014/49/EU and investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;

Amendment 246 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 31– paragraph 2 – point d

(d) to protect depositors~~, while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemes, and to protect~~ covered by Directive 2014/49/EU and investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;

Amendment 247 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

(d) to protect depositors~~, while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemes,~~ covered by Directive 2014/49/EU and to protect investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;

Amendment 248 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 31 – paragraph 2 – point d

(d) to protect depositors~~, while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemes, and to protect~~ covered by Directive 2014/49/EU and investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;

Amendment 249 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 31 – paragraph 2 a (new)

(16a) in Article 31 the following paragraph 2a is added: "2a. Subject to different provisions of this Directive, the resolution objectives are of equal significance, and resolution authorities shall balance them as appropriate to the nature and circumstances of each case. For the purposes of Article 32(5), the objectives of preserving financial stability and protecting depositors pursuant to points (b) and (d) of paragraph 2, respectively, shall be deemed to be more significant than other resolution objectives.";

Amendment 250 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) having regard to the timing~~, the need to implement effectively the resolution strategy~~ and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measure including measures by an IPS, supervisory action, early intervention measures, or write down or conversion of relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in Article 59(2) taken in respect of the institution would prevent the failure of the institution within a reasonable timeframe;

Amendment 251 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) ~~having regard to the timing, the need to implement effectively the resolution strategy~~notwithstanding point (a) of this paragraph and having regard to the timing and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measure including measures by an IPS, supervisory action, early intervention measures, or write down or conversion of relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in Article 59(2) taken in respect of the institution would prevent the failure of the institution within a reasonable timeframe;

Amendment 252 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) having regard to the timing, ~~the need to implement effectively the resolution strategy~~ and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measure including measures by an IPS, supervisory action, early intervention measures, or write down or conversion of relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in Article 59(2) taken in respect of the institution would prevent the failure of the institution within a reasonable timeframe;

Amendment 253 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) having regard to the timing~~, the need to implement effectively the resolution strategy and other relevant circumstances, there is~~ and other relevant circumstances, there is, notwithstanding point (a) of this paragraph, no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measure including measures by an IPS, supervisory action, early intervention measures, or write down or conversion of relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in Article 59(2) taken in respect of the institution would prevent the failure of the institution within a reasonable timeframe;

Amendment 254 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)

(b a) taking into account, however, that preventive measures carried out by an IPS falling under Article 1 (2) (c) of Directive 2014/49/EU shall not lead to the determination that the credit institution is failing or likely to fail according to this Article or Article 18 (1) of Regulation (EU) 806/2014 if the provisions of Article 11 f (new) of Directive 2014/49/EU are met

Amendment 255 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 2 – subaparagraph 1

~~Member States shall ensure that the competent authority makes an assessment of the condition referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), after having consulted the resolution authority~~Prior to determining an institution failing or likely to fail, the relevant authority referred to in point (a) of Article 32(1) shall examine whether there exist measures, including alternative private sector measures, supervisory action or early intervention measures, which can avoid the failing or likely to fail declaration.

Amendment 256 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3

The assessment of the conditions referred to in paragraph 1, point (a) and (b), shall only be made by the resolution authority in close cooperation with the competent authority. The competent authority shall, without delay, provide the resolution authority with any relevant information that the resolution authority requests to inform its assessment. The competent authority may also inform the resolution authority that it considers the condition laid down in the paragraph 1, point (b), to be met.;levant authority after consulting an IPS of which the institution is a member.

Amendment 257 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3 a (new)

The assessment of the conditions referred to in paragraph 1, points (a) and (b), shall only be made by the relevant authority after having consulted an IPS of which the institution is a member.

Amendment 258 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point b – point -i (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

(-i) in the first subparagraph, the introductory part is replaced by the following: For the purposes of point (a) of paragraph 1, an institution shall be deemed to be failing or likely to fail in one or more of the following circumstances and if, in the case where the institution is a member of an IPS, alternative measures by the IPS cannot prevent a likely failure, or remedy the failure of the institution that occurred, within a reasonable timeframe:

Amendment 259 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point b – point -i (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 – points a, b, c

(-i) in the first subparagraph, points (a), (b) and (c) are replaced by the following: (a) the institution infringes or there are objective elements to support a determination that the institution will, in the ~~near future~~following 12 months, infringe the requirements for continuing authorisation in a way that would justify the withdrawal of the authorisation by the competent authority including but not limited to because the institution has incurred or is likely to incur losses that will deplete part or all or a significant amount of its own funds; (b) the assets of the institution are or there are objective elements to support a determination that the assets of the institution will, in the ~~near future~~following 12 months, be less than its liabilities; (c) the institution is or there are objective elements to support a determination that the institution will, in the ~~near future~~following 12 months, be unable to pay its debts or other liabilities as they fall due

Amendment 260 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point b – point i

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 4 – point d

(d) extraordinary public financial support is required except where such support is granted in one of the forms referred to in Article 32c; or in the form of transferring all or part of the institution concerned into public ownership.

Amendment 261 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where, pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 31(3), that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, ~~one or more of~~ the resolution objectives referred ~~to in~~in that Article 31, and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives ~~more effectively~~to the same extent. Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, pursuant to Articles 10(1) and 45c(2), the resolution authority, in order to assess the appropriateness of the resolution for the institution, considers the following elements: (a) the prevalence of deposits and the absence of debt instruments in the funding model; (b) the access to the capital markets for eligible liabilities; (c) the extent to which the institution relies on Common Equity Tier 1 capital to meet its capital requirements.

Amendment 262 #

Othmar KARAS

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), for entities that are subject to simplified obligations in relation to recovery and resolution planning in accordance with Article 4, a resolution action shall not be treated as in the public interest, unless the resolution authority determines that its failure and subsequent winding up under normal insolvency proceedings would be likely to have a significant negative effect on financial markets, on other institutions, on funding conditions, or on the wider economy. For entities that are not subject subject to simplified obligations in relation to recovery and resolution planning in accordance with Article 4, a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives more effectively.

Amendment 263 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives ~~more effectively~~to the same extent. For entities designated as significant in accordance with Article 6(4) of Regulation 1024/2013 there shall be a presumption that winding up under insolvency procedures would not meet the resolution objectives to the same extent.

Amendment 264 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 considered from an holistic perspective and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives ~~more effectively.~~ to the same extent.

Amendment 265 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives ~~more effectively~~to the same extent.

Amendment 266 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where, pursuant to Article 31(3), that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to~~, one or more of~~ the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives ~~more effectively~~to the same extent.

Amendment 267 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives ~~more effectively~~to the same extent.

Amendment 268 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 –subparagraph 1

For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives ~~more effectively~~to the same degree.

Amendment 269 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1a (new)

Resolution action shall be presumed not to be in the public interest for the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), of this Article where the institution qualifies as a small and non-complex institution as defined in Article 4(1), point 145, of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. In case the resolution authority assesses that one or more of those resolution objectives would be at risk, the presumption shall not apply.

Amendment 270 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1b (new)

Resolution action shall be presumed to be in the public interest for the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), of this Article where the institution qualifies as a large institution as defined in Article 4(1), point (146) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. In case the resolution authority assesses that no resolution objective would be at risk, the presumption shall not apply.

Amendment 271 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the resolution authority, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, considers and compares all extraordinary public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the institution, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.;deleted

Amendment 272 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the resolution authority, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, considers and compares all extraordinary public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the institution, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.;deleted

Amendment 273 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the resolution authority, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, considers and compares all extraordinary public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the institution, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.; If liquidation aid is expected to be granted in winding up the institution according to the national law, the resolution action shall be assessed to be in the public interest.

Amendment 274 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the resolution authority, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, considers and compares all extraordinary public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the institution, both in the event of resolution and inpursuant to Article 10(1) and 45c(2), the resolution authority, in order to assess the appropriateness of the resolution for the institution, consider the following elements: (a) the prevalence of deposits and the absence of debt instruments in the funding model; (b) the access to the capital markets for eligible liabilities; (c) the evxtent ~~of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.;~~to which the institution relies on Common Equity Tier 1 capital to meet its capital requirements.

Amendment 275 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the resolution authority, based on the information available to it at the time ~~of that assessment~~, considers and compares all extraordinary public financial support ~~that can reasonably be expected~~ to be granted to the institution, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law, including costs related to the reimbursement of depositors, where applicable.;

Amendment 276 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the resolution authority, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, considers and compares all ~~extraordinary~~ public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the institution, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.;

Amendment 277 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the resolution authority, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, considers and compares all ~~extraordinary~~ public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the institution, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.;

Amendment 278 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2a (new)

Moreover, in the resolution plan, the resolution authority shall include its reasoning as regards the procedure best achieving resolution objectives for each of the resolution objectives laid down in Article 31. In order to ensure effective and consistent application of this Article, the EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards. The EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by …[OP – please insert the date= 12 months after the date of entry into force of this Directive]. Power is delegated to the Commission to supplement this Directive by adopting the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. By [48 months after the entry into force of this directive], the EBA shall publish a report of the practices of resolution authorities as regards the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph. ’;

Amendment 279 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 a (new)

An institution’s membership in an IPS shall, in general, be considered as a sufficient guarantee of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31.

Amendment 280 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 a (new)

5 a. EBA shall contribute to monitoring and promoting the effective and consistent application of the public interest assessment referred to in paragraph 5. By ... [three years after the date of entry into force of this amending Directive], EBA shall provide a report on the scope and application of paragraph 5 across the Union. That report shall be shared with the Commission in order to assess the effectiveness of the measures outlined in paragraph 5 and their impact on the level playing field. Based on the outcomes of the review, proposals or guidelines may be developed with the aim of converging practices and levelling the playing field among Member States.

Amendment 281 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5a (new)

5 a. By ... [three years after the date of entry into force of this amending Directive], EBA shall provide a report on the scope and application of paragraph 5 across the Union. That report shall be shared with the Commission in order to assess the effectiveness of the measures outlined in paragraph 5 and their impact on the level playing field. Based on the outcomes of the review, proposals or guidelines may be developed with the aim of enhancing market efficiency and levelling the playing field among Member States.”

Amendment 282 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 a (new)

(c a) The following paragraph 5a is added: 5a. EBA shall contribute to monitoring and promoting the effective and consistent application of the public interest assessment referred to in paragraph 5. By ... [two years after the date of entry into force of this amending Directive], EBA shall publish a report on the scope and application of paragraph 5 across the Union in order to assess the effectiveness of the measures outlined in paragraph 5 and their impact on the level playing field. Based on the outcomes of the review, the EBA may develop draft regulatory technical standards with the aim of converging practices and levelling the playing field among Member States.

Amendment 283 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18

Conditions for resolution with regard to a central body and ~~credit institutions~~ permanently affiliateds to a central body

Amendment 284 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32a – paragraph 1

When a resolution action is deemed necessary in the public interest, Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities ~~may~~shall take a resolution action in relation to a central body and all ~~credit institutions~~ permanently affiliateds to it that are part of the same resolution group where the central body and all ~~credit institutions~~ permanently affiliateds to it, or the resolution group to which they belong, comply as a whole with the conditions established in Article 32(1). The assessment of the conditions refered to in Article 32(1) shall be made exclusively for the central body and its permanent affiliates as a whole.

Amendment 285 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32b – paragraph 1

1. Member States shall ensure that, when a resolution authority determines that an institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), meets the conditions laid down in Article 32(1), points (a) and (b), but not the condition laid down in Article 32(1), point (c), the relevant national administrative or judicial authority has the power to initiate without delay the procedure to wind up the institution or entity in an orderly manner in accordance with the applicable national law. The EBA shall issue guidelines clarifying the conditions associated with that orderly manner.

Amendment 286 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32b – paragraph 3

3. Member States shall ensure that when a resolution authority determines that an institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), meets the conditions in Article 32(1), points (a) and (b), but not the condition in Article 32(1), point (c), the determination that the institution or entity is failing or likely to fail pursuant to Article 32(1), point (a) is a sufficient condition for the ~~withdrawal of the authorisation by the competent~~competent authority to withdraw the authoritysation pursuant to Article 18 of Directive 2013/36/EU.

Amendment 287 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32b – paragraph 4

4. Member States shall ensure that the withdrawal of the authorisation of the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d) declared when the conditions mentioned in paragraph 3 are met is a sufficient condition for a relevant national administrative or judicial authority to be able to initiate without delay the procedure to wind up the institution or entity in an orderly manner in accordance with the applicable national law. ’:

Amendment 288 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32b – paragraph 4

4. Member States shall ensure that the withdrawal of the authorisation of the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d) is a sufficient condition for a relevant national administrative or judicial authority to ~~be able to~~ initiate without delay the procedure to wind up the institution or entity in an orderly manner in accordance with the applicable national law.’:

Amendment 289 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – title

Extraordinary ~~public~~ financial support

Amendment 290 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – title

~~Extraordinary p~~Public financial support

Amendment 291 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – title

~~Extraordinary p~~Public financial support

Amendment 292 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. Before granting public financial support, Member States shall consider transferring all or part of the institution concerned into public ownership. If the Member State decides to grant public financial support instead of transferring all or part of the institution concerned into public ownership, it shall provide for a public statement in writing and before the national parliament explaining the reasons for its decision. Member States shall ensure that extraordinary public financial support outside of resolution action may be granted to an institution or entity as referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), on an exceptional basis ~~only in one of the following cases and provided that the extraordinary public financial support complies with the conditions and requirements established in the Union State aid framework~~:

Amendment 293 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. Member States shall ensure that ~~extraordinary~~ public financial support outside of resolution action or of the winding-up according to the applicable procedures may be granted to an institution or entity as referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), ~~on an exceptional basis~~ only in one of the following cases and provided that the ~~extraordinary~~ public financial support complies with the conditions and requirements established in the Union State aid framework:

Amendment 294 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. Member States shall ensure that ~~extraordinary~~ public financial support outside of resolution action or the winding up according to the applicable procedures may be granted to an institution or entity as referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), ~~on an exceptional basis~~ only in one of the following cases and provided that the ~~extraordinary~~ public financial support complies with the conditions and requirements established in the Union State aid framework:

Amendment 295 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. Member States shall ensure that extraordinary ~~public~~ financial support outside of resolution action may be granted to an institution or entity as referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), on an exceptional basis only in one of the following cases and provided that the extraordinary public financial support complies with the conditions and requirements established in the Union State aid framework:

Amendment 296 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point a

~~(a) where, to rem~~deletedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State or to preserve financial stability, the extraordinary public financial support takes any of the following forms: (i) facilities provided by central banks in accordance with the central banks’ conditions; (ii) liabilities; (iii) instruments other than Common Equity Tier 1 instruments, or of other capital instruments or a use of impaired assets measures, at prices, duration and other terms that do not confer an undue advantage upon the institution or entity concerned, where neither the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4), points (a), (b) or (c), nor the circumstances referred to in Article 59(3) are present at the time the public support is granted;State guarantee to back liquidity a State guarantee of newly issued an acquisition of own funds

Amendment 297 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point a – introductory part

(a) where, to remedy a sver~~ious~~ y large scale disturbance in the economy of a Member State or to preserve financial stability~~, the extraordinary~~ where that is negatively affected by systemic events of a large scale, the public financial support takes any of the following extraordinary forms:

Amendment 298 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point a – introductory part

(a) where, to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State or to preserve financial stability, the ~~extraordinary~~ public financial support takes any of the following ~~form~~extraordinary support measures:

Amendment 299 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point a – introductory part

(a) where, to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State orand to preserve financial stability, the extraordinary public financial support takes any of the following forms:

Amendment 300 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Irene TINAGLI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point a – point iii

(iii) an acquisition of own funds instruments other than Common Equity Tier 1 instruments, or of other capital instruments or a use of impaired assets measures, at prices, duration and other terms that do not confer an undue advantage upon the institution or entity concerned, where neitherr a use of impaired assets measures provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4), points (a), (b) or (c), nor the circumstances referred to in Article 59(3) are present at the time the public support is granted;

Amendment 301 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme to preserve the financial soundness and long-term viability of the credit institution in compliance with the conditions set out in Articles 11a and 11b of Directive 2014/49/EU, provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) are present;Deleted

Amendment 302 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) where ~~the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of~~ an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme to ~~preserve~~maintain the financial soundness and long-term viability of the credit institution constitutes extraordinary public financial support in compliance with the conditions set out in ~~Articles 11a and 11b of~~the Directive 2014/49/EU, provided that (i) subject to the cases referred to in point (ii), none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) are present; (ii) in case of a deposit guarantee scheme which is acknowledged as institutional protection scheme, the resolution authority has not taken any resolution action under Article 32;

Amendment 303 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) where the ~~extraordinary~~ public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme ~~to preserve the financial soundness and long-term viability of the credit institution~~ in compliance with the conditions set out in Articles 11a and 11b of Directive 2014/49/EU, provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) are present;

Amendment 304 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) where ~~the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of~~ an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme to preserve the financial soundness and long-term viability of the credit institution ~~in compliance with the conditions set out in Articles 11a and 11b of Directive 2014/49/EU, provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) are present;~~constitutes extraordinary public financial support in compliance with the conditions set out in Directive 2014/49/EU:

Amendment 305 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Irene TINAGLI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme ~~to preserve the financial soundness and long-term viability of the credit institution~~ in compliance with the conditions set out in Articles 11a and 11b of Directive 2014/49/EU, provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) are present;

Amendment 306 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) where the ~~extraordinary~~ public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme to preserve the financial soundness and long-term viability of the credit institution in compliance with the conditions set out in Articles 11a and 11b of Directive 2014/49/EU, provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) are present;

Amendment 307 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)

(b a) subject to the cases referred to under point (bb), none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) are present;

Amendment 308 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b b (new)

(b b) in case of a deposit guarantee scheme which is acknowledged as IPS, the resolution authority has not taken any resolution action under Article 32;

Amendment 309 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point c

(c) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme in the context of the winding up of an credit institution pursuant to Article 32b and in accordance with the conditions set out in Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU;

Amendment 310 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point c

(c) where the ~~extraordinary~~ public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme in the context of the winding up of an institution pursuant to Article 32b and in accordance with the conditions set out in Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU;

Amendment 311 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point c

(c) where the ~~extraordinary~~ public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme in the context of the winding up of an institution pursuant to Article 32b and in accordance with the conditions set out in Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU;

Amendment 312 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point d

(d) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU granted in the context of the winding up of the institution or entity pursuant to Article 32b of this Directive, other than the support granted by a deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU.deleted

Amendment 313 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point d

(d) where the extraordinary public financial support in response to a large- scale systemic threat to financial stability, whether ongoing or potential, takes the form of State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU granted in the context of the winding up of the institution or entity pursuant to Article 32b of this Directive, other than the support granted by a deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU.

Amendment 314 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

TMember States shall ensure that the support measures for the institution concerned are conditional on behavioural or structural measures that promote the public interest, including the reduction of risks associated with the complexity, interconnectedness and size of institutions in the banking sector. In addition, the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), shall fulfil all of the following conditions:

Amendment 315 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

The support measures referred to in paragraph 1, points (a) and (b), shall fulfil all of the following conditions:

Amendment 316 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

The support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (~~a),~~b) shall fulfil all of the following conditions:

Amendment 317 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Irene TINAGLI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b

(b) the measures are of a precautionary and temporary nature and are based on a pre-defined exit strategy approved by the competent authority~~, including a clearly specified termination date, sale date or repayment schedule for any of the measures provided~~;

Amendment 318 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d

(d) the measures are not used to offset losses that the institution or entity has incurred or is likely to incur in the ~~near future~~following 12 months.

Amendment 319 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

By way of derogation from paragraph 2, point (d), the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a) can be used to offset losses that the institution or entity is likely to incur in the near future where an exception to the burden-sharing requirement is made under Union State aid framework.

Amendment 32 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Recital 1 a (new)

(1a) The objective of this Directive is to better safeguard taxpayers’ money and establish new systemic mechanisms for addressing situations of potential insolvency of some financial institutions not covered by the existing resolution framework. That framework is designed to curtail the economic burden on society by reducing the overall costs associated with bank failures. The use of taxpayers’ money should, with the introduction of a new framework, be significantly reduced in order to ensure that the resolution financing arrangement is more effectively used.

Amendment 320 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (a), an institution or entity shall be deemed to be solvent where the competent authority has concluded that no breach has occurred~~, or is likely to occur in the 12 following months,~~ of any of the requirements referred to in Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU, Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, Article 40 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 or the relevant applicable requirements under Union or national law. The competent authority may deem an institution or entity to be solvent where it determines that a breach of these requirements is temporary in nature, taking into account the specific circumstances of each case, and provided that the institution or entity can demonstrate a reasonable plan to remedy the breach within an appropriate timeframe as determined by the competent authority.

Amendment 321 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Irene TINAGLI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (a), an institution or entity shall be deemed to be solvent where the competent authority has concluded that no breach has occurred~~, or is likely to occur in the 12 following months,~~ of any of the requirements referred to in Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU, Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, Article 40 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 or the relevant applicable requirements under Union or national law.

Amendment 322 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Irene TINAGLI, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2a (new)

The competent authority may deem an institution or entity to be solvent where it determines that a breach of these requirements is temporary in nature, taking into account the specific circumstances of each case, and provided that the institution or entity can demonstrate a reasonable plan to remedy the breach within an appropriate timeframe as determined by the competent authority.

Amendment 323 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3 a (new)

The competent authority should make its best efforts to ensure that the quantification is based on the market value of the institution or entity’s assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items.

Amendment 324 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3

For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (d), the relevant competent authority shall quantify the losses that the institution or entity has incurred or is likely to incur. That quantification shall be based, as a minimum, on asset quality reviews conducted by the European Central Bank, EBA or national authorities, or, where appropriate, on on-site inspections conducted by the competent authority. Where such exercises cannot be undertaken in due time, the competent authority can base its evaluation on the institution or entity’s balance sheet, provided that the balance sheet complies with the applicable accounting rules and standards, as confirmed by an independent external auditor, and, where available, on asset quality reviews conducted by the European Central Bank, EBA or national authorities, or, where appropriate, on on- site inspections conducted by the competent authority. The competent authority should make its best efforts to ensure that the quantification is based on the market value of the institution or entity’s assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items.

Amendment 325 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3

For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (d), the relevant competent authority shall quantify the losses that the institution or entity has incurred or is likely to incur. That quantification shall be based, as a minimum, on ~~the institution or entity’s balance sheet, provided that the balance sheet complies with the applicable accounting rules and standards, a~~asset quality reviews conducted by the European Central Bank, EBA or national authorities, or, where appropriate, on on-site inspections con~~firm~~ducted by ~~an independent~~the competent authority. Where such exter~~nal auditor, and~~cises cannot be undertaken in due time, wthe~~re available, o~~ competent authority can bas~~set quality reviews conducted by the European Central Bank, EBA or national authorities, or, where appropriate, on on- site inspection~~e its evaluation on the institution or entity’s balance sheet, provided that the balance sheet complies with the applicable accounting rules and standards, as con~~duct~~firmed by ~~the competent authority~~an independent external auditor.

Amendment 326 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 4

~~The s~~Support meausures ~~referred to in paragraph 1~~may involve an acquisition of own funds instruments other than Common Equity Tier 1 instruments, or of other capital instruments or a use of impaired assets measures, at prices, duration and other terms that do not confer an undue advantage upon the institution or entity concerned, where neither the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4), points (a)~~(iii),~~, (b) or (c), nor the circumstances referred to in Article 59(3) are present at the time the public support is granted; The support shall be limited to measures that have been assessed by the competent authority as necessary to maintain the solvency of the institution or entity by addressing its capital shortfall established in the adverse scenario of national, Union or SSM-wide stress tests or equivalent exercises conducted by the European Central Bank, EBA or national authorities, where applicable, confirmed by the competent authority. Such support shall not be used to address a capital shortfall established in the baseline scenario of national, Union or SSM-wide stress tests or equivalent exercises conducted by the European Central Bank, EBA or national authorities.

Amendment 327 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Irene TINAGLI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5

~~By way of derogation from paragraph 1, point (a)(iii), a~~Acquisition of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall be ~~exceptionally~~ permitted where the nature of the shortfall identified is such that the acquisition of any other own funds instruments or other capital instruments would not make it possible for the institution or entity concerned to address its capital shortfall established in the adverse scenario in the relevant stress test or equivalent exercise. The amount of acquired Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall not exceed 2% of the total risk exposure amount of the institution or entity concerned calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.

Amendment 328 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5

By way of derogation from paragraph 1, point (a)(iii), acquisition of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall be ~~exceptionally~~ permitted where the nature of the shortfall identified is such that the acquisition of any other own funds instruments or other capital instruments would not make it possible for the institution or entity concerned to address its capital shortfall established in the adverse scenario in the relevant stress test or equivalent exercise. The amount of acquired Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall not exceed 2% of the total risk exposure amount of the institution or entity concerned calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.

Amendment 329 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5

By way of derogation from ~~paragraph 1, point (a)(iii)~~the fourth subparagraph, acquisition of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall be exceptionally permitted where the nature of the shortfall identified is such that the acquisition of any other own funds instruments or other capital instruments would not make it possible for the institution or entity concerned to address its capital shortfall established in the adverse scenario in the relevant stress test or equivalent exercise. The amount of acquired Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall not exceed 2% of the total risk exposure amount of the institution or entity concerned calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.

Amendment 33 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Costas MAVRIDES, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Recital 1 a (new)

(1a) At present, the banking union rests on just two of its intended three pillars, namely, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). It therefore remains incomplete, due to the absence of its third pillar, the European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS). The completion of the banking union forms an integral part of economic and monetary union and of financial stability, most notably by mitigating the risks of so-called ‘doom loop’ that arise as a result of the bank-sovereign nexus.

Amendment 330 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6

In case any of the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), is not redeemed, repaid or otherwise terminated in accordance with the terms of the exit strategy established at the time of granting such measure, the competent authority shall conclude that the condition laid down in Article 32(1), point (a), is met in relation to the institution or entity which has received those support measures, and shall communicate that assessment to the resolution authority concerned.deleted

Amendment 331 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Irene TINAGLI, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6

In case any of the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), is not redeemed, repaid or otherwise terminated in accordance with the terms of the exit strategy established at the time of granting such measure, the competent authority shall conclude that the condition laid down in Article 32(1), point (a), is met in relation to the institution or entity which has received those support measures, and shall communicate that assessment to the resolution authority concernedrequest the institution or entity to submit a remediation plan describing the steps to be taken in order to ensure or restore compliance with supervisory requirements, its long-term viability and to repay the amount provided, as well as the associated timeframe.

Amendment 332 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6

In case any of the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a) and (b), is not redeemed, repaid or otherwise terminated in accordance with the terms of the exit strategy established at the time of granting such measure, the competent authority shall conclude that the condition laid down in Article 32(1), point (a), is met in relation to the institution or entity which has received those support measures, and shall communicate that assessment to the resolution authority concerned.

Amendment 333 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6

In case any of the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, ~~point (a),~~ is not redeemed, repaid or otherwise terminated in accordance with the terms of the exit strategy established at the time of granting such measure, the competent authority shall conclude that the condition laid down in Article 32(1), point (a), is met in relation to the institution or entity which has received those support measures, and shall communicate that assessment to the resolution authority concerned.

Amendment 334 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Irene TINAGLI, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6a (new)

Where the relevant national competent authority does not recognise the remediation plan as credible or feasible, or where the institution or entity fails to comply with the remediation plan, an assessment of whether the institution or entity is failing or likely to fail shall be conducted in accordance with Article 32.

Amendment 335 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 33 – paragraph 2

(20) in Article 33, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: ‘ 2. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities take a resolution action in relation to an entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (c) or (d), when that entity meets the conditions laid down in Article 32(1). For those purposes, an entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (c) or (d), shall be deemed to be failing or likely to fail in any of the following circumstances: (a) conditions laid down in Article 32(4), points (b), (c) or (d); (b) there are objective elements that show that the entity will, in the near future,deleted the entity meets one or more of the the entity infringes materially ~~the applicable requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or in Directive 2013/36/EU.; ’~~or

Amendment 336 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21 – point -a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 33a – paragraph 4

(-a) paragraph 4 is replaced by the following: "The period of the suspension pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be as short as possible and shall not exceed the minimum period of time that the resolution authority considers necessary for the purposes indicated in points (c) and (d) of paragraph 1 and in any event shall not last longer than ~~the period from the publication of a notice of suspension pursuant to paragraph 8 to midnight in the Member State of the resolution authority~~: (a) where the notice of suspension pursuant to paragraph 8 is published outside of normal trading hours, the period from the publication of the notice to midnight in the Member State of the institution or entity at the end of the second business day following the day of the publication; (b) where the notice of suspension pursuant to paragraph 8 is published on a business day during normal trading hours, the period from the publication of the notice to midnight in the Member State of the institution or entity at the end of the business day following the day of the publication. Exceptionally, where necessary to choose the appropriate resolution actions or to ensure the effective application of one or more resolution tools, the resolution authority may determine a longer period of suspension. In any event, this period of suspension shall not last longer than the period from the publication of the notice of suspension pursuant to paragraph 8 to midnight in the Member State of the institution or entity at the end of the third business day following the day of the publication. At the expiry of the period of suspension referred to in the first subparagraph, the suspension shall cease to have effect. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

Amendment 337 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 35

(22) Article 35 is amended as follows: (a) following: ‘ 1. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities may appoint a special manager to replace or to work with the management body of the institution under resolution or the bridge institution. Resolution authorities shall make public the appointment of a special manager. Resolution authorities shall ensure that the special manager has the qualifications, ability and knowledge required to carry out his or her functions. Article 91 of Directive 2013/36/EU shall not apply to the appointment of special managers.; ’ (b) is replaced by the following: ‘ The special manager shall have all the powers of the shareholders and the management body of the institution under resolution or the bridge institution.; ’ (c) paragraph 5 is replaced by the following: ‘ 5. special manager draw up reports for the appointing resolution authority on the economic and financial situation of the institution under resolution or the bridge institution and on the acts performed in the conduct of his or her duties, at regular intervals set by the resolution authority and at the beginning and the end of his or her mandate.; ’deleted paragraph 1 is replaced by the in paragraph 2, the first sentence Member States shall require that a

Amendment 338 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 35 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

TUnless a requirement of prior consent is clearly stipulated by the relevant resolution authority, the special manager shall have all the powers of the shareholders and the management body of the institution under resolution or the bridge institution.;

Amendment 339 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point b a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 35 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

(b a) the following subparagraph is added at the end of paragraph 3: Member States shall ensure that the liability of the special manager for acts or omissions in the performance of his or her duties in accordance with this Article is limited to cases of wilful misconduct or gross negligence.

Amendment 34 #

Lídia PEREIRA

Proposal for a directive
Recital 1 a (new)

(1a) The Banking Union is a fundamental pillar of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and its development has been essential to guaranteeing the stability and resilience of the banking sector, including by way of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism. Unfortunately, the Banking Union is not yet complete, owing to the slow adoption of a European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS).

Amendment 340 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 23 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 36 – paragraph 1 – sentence 1

1. Before ~~determining whether the conditions for resolution or the conditions fo~~taking resolution action or exercising the power theo write down or conver~~sion of~~t relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities ~~as referred to in~~in accordance with Article 59 ~~are met~~, resolution authorities shall ensure that a fair, prudent and realistic valuation of the assets and liabilities of the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), is carried out by a person that is independent from any public authority, including the resolution authority, and the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d).;

Amendment 341 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 23 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 36 – paragraph 1 – sentence 1

1. Before ~~determining whether the conditions for resolution or the conditions fo~~taking resolution action or exercising the power theo write down or conver~~sion of~~t relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities ~~as referred to in~~in accordance with Article 59 ~~are met~~, resolution authorities shall ensure that a fair, prudent and realistic valuation of the assets and liabilities of the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), is carried out by a person that is independent from any public authority, including the resolution authority, and the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d).;

Amendment 342 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 23 – point b a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 36 – paragraph 13a (new)

(b a) The following paragraph 13a is inserted: '13a. The independent valuer shall have no duty or responsibility to shareholders or creditors of the institution under resolution and shall have no liability to such shareholders or creditors for acts and omissions when carrying out the valuation, unless the act or omission implies gross negligence or wilful misconduct in accordance with national law which directly affects rights of such shareholders or creditors.'

Amendment 343 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 23 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 37 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

(23 a) in Article 37(4), the following subparagraph is added: ‘The resolution plan shall consider the combination of resolution tools which is the best suited to achieve resolution objectives.’

Amendment 344 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 37 – paragraph 11

(24) in Article 37, the following paragraph 11 is added: ‘ 11. EBA shall monitor the actions and preparation of resolution authorities to ensure an effective implementation of the resolution tools and powers in the event of resolution. EBA shall report to the Commission on the state of play of existing practices and possible divergences across Member States by … [PO please insert the date = 2 years after the date of entry into force of this Directive] and monitor the implementation of any recommendation set out in that report, where appropriate. The report referred to in the first subparagraph shall cover at least the following: (a) implement the bail-in tool and the level of engagement with financial market infrastructures and third-country authorities, where relevant; (b) operationalise the use of other resolution tools; (c) relevant stakeholders regarding the arrangements referred to in points (a) and (b).; ’deleted the arrangements in place to the arrangements in place to the level of transparency towards

Amendment 345 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 25 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 41 – paragraph 2

(25 a) Article 41(2) is replaced by the following: "Subject to any restrictions imposed in accordance with Union or national competition rules, the management of the bridge institution shall operate the bridge institution with a view to maintaining access to critical functions and ~~sell~~allowing the ~~institution or entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1)~~resolution authority to seek the sale of the bridge institution, its assets, rights or liabilities, to one or more private sector purchasers when conditions are appropriate and within the period specified in paragraph 45 of this Article or, where applicable, paragraph 6 of this Article. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

Amendment 346 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 44 – paragraph 5 – point a

(a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 36, has been made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write down or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) and Article 60(1)~~, and by the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 109 where relevant~~;

Amendment 347 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 44 – paragraph 5 – point a

(a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 36, has been made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write down or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) and Article 60(1)~~, and by the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 109 where relevant~~;

Amendment 348 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 44 – paragraph 5 – point a

(a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 36, has been made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write down or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) and Article 60(1)~~, and by the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 109 where relevant~~;

Amendment 349 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 44 – paragraph 5 – point a

(a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 36, has been made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write down or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) and Article 60(1)~~, and by the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 109~~ where relevant;

Amendment 35 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 1 a (new)

(1a) The Union resolution framework is not a substitute for structural reforms in the banking sector. The systemic risks to financial stability associated with institutions that are "too big to fail" remain. Therefore, structural measures, including the separation of investment banking from commercial banking, need to be taken over and above the resolution framework.

Amendment 350 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 44 – paragraph 5 – point a

(a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 36, has been made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write down or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) and Article 60(1), and by the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 109 where ~~relevant~~applicable;

Amendment 351 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 44 – paragraph 7

(c) paragraph 7 is replaced by the following: ‘ 7. The resolution financing arrangement may make a contribution from resources which have been raised through ex-ante contributions as referred to in Article 100(6) and Article 103 and which have not yet been used, provided that all of the following conditions are met: (a) arrangement has made a contribution pursuant to paragraph 4 and the 5 % limit referred to in paragraph 5, point (b), has been reached; (b) deposits, and not excluded from bail-in pursuant to Article 44(2) and 44(3), have been written down or converted in full. In extraordinary circumstances, as an alternative or in addition to the contribution from the resolution financing arrangement referred to in the first subparagraph, where the conditions laid down in the first subparagraph are met, the resolution authority may seek further funding from alternative financing sources.; ’deleted the resolution financing all liabilities ranking lower than

Amendment 352 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 44 – paragraph 7 – point b

(b) all unsecured, non-preferred liabilities ~~ranking low~~other than deposits~~, and not excluded from bail-in pursuant to Article 44(2) and 44(3),~~ have been written down or converted in full.

Amendment 353 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point c

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 44 – paragraph 7 – point b

(b) all unsecured, non-preferred liabilities ~~ranking low~~other than deposits, ~~and not excluded from bail-in pursuant to Article 44(2) and 44(3),~~ have been written down or converted in full.

Amendment 354 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 28 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 44a

(28 a) Article 44a ~~Selling of subordinated eligible liabilitie~~is replaced by the following: "Article 44a Selling of MREL eligible instruments to retail clients 1. Member States shall ensure that a seller of MREL eligible ~~liabilities which meet all conditions referred to in Article 72a of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 except for point (b) of Article 72a(1) and paragraphs 3 to 5 of Article 72b of that Regulation~~instruments qualifying as own funds or eligible liabilities sells such ~~liabilitie~~instruments to a retail client, as defined in point 11 of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU, only where all of the following conditions are fulfilled: (a) the seller has performed a suitability test in accordance with Article 25(2) of Directive 2014/65/EU; (b) the seller is satisfied, on the basis of the test referred to in point (a), that such ~~eligible liabilitie~~instruments are suitable for that retail client; (c) the seller documents the suitability in accordance with Article 25(6) of Directive 2014/65/EU. Notwithstanding the first subparagraph, Member States may provide that the conditions laid down in points (a) to (c) of that subparagraph shall apply to sellers of other instruments qualifying as ~~own funds or~~bail-inable liabilities. Notwithstanding the first subparagraph, Member States may provide that the conditions laid down in points (a) to (c) of that subparagraph shall apply to sellers of other instruments qualifying as bail-inable liabilities. 2. Where the conditions set out in paragraph 1 are fulfilled and the financial instrument portfolio of that retail client does not, at the time of the purchase, exceed EUR 500 000 the seller shall ensure, on the basis of the information provided by the retail client in accordance with paragraph 3, that both of the following conditions are met at the time of the purchase: (a) the retail client does not invest an aggregate amount exceeding 10 % of that client's financial instrument portfolio in liabilities referred to in paragraph 1; (b) thatthe initial investment amount invested in one or more ~~liabilities~~ instruments referred to in paragraph 1 is at least EUR 150 000 . 3. The retail client shall provide the seller with accurate information on the retail client's financial instrument portfolio, including any investments in ~~liabilitie~~instruments referred to in paragraph 1. 4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the retail client's financial instrument portfolio shall include cash deposits and financial instruments, but shall exclude any financial instruments that have been given as collateral. 57. ~~Without prejudice to Article 25 of Directive 2014/65/EU, and by way of derogation from the requirements set out in~~Member States shall not be required to apply this Article to liabilities referred to in paragraph 1 issued before 28 December 2020. 7a. MREL eligible instruments sold without fulfilling the conditions under paragraphs 1 ~~to 4~~and 2 of this Article~~, Member States may set a minimum denomination amount of at least EUR 50 000 for liabilities referred to in paragraph 1, taking into account the market conditions and prac~~ shall not count towards the requirements under Articles 45 to 45f of this Directive. 7b. Resolution authorities shall, as part of the assessment of resolvability in accordance with Articles of that Member State as well as existing consumer protection measures within the jurisdiction of that Member State. 6. Where the value of total assets of entities referred to in Article 1(1) that are established in a Member State and are subject to t15 to 18 monitor the extent to which MREL eligible instruments are held by retail investors and report the results to EBA at least once per year. 7c. EBA shall disclose annually on a group or, where relevant, institution specific basis the amounts of MREL eligible instruments held by retail investors. Whe re~~quirement referred to in Article 45e does not exceed EUR 50 billion, that Member State may, by way of derogation from the requireme~~, on the basis of this information, EBA deems it necessary, it shall issue warnings or recommendations for remedial action. 7d. By … [PO please insert the date = 18 months ~~set out in paragraphs 1 to 5 of this Article, apply only the requirement set out in paragraph 2(b) of this Article. 7. Member States shall not be required~~after the date of entry into force of this Directive], EBA shall report to the Commission on the application of this Article. That report shall compare the measures adopted by the Member States to apcomply with this Article ~~to liabilities referred to in paragraph 1 issued before 28 December 2020. (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014L0059-20221114)~~, analyse their effectiveness in protecting retail investors and assess their impact on cross-border operations. On the basis of that report, the Commission may submit a legislative proposal to amend this Directive " Or. en

Amendment 355 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 29a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45 – paragraph 1a (new)

(29a) in Article 45, the following paragraph 1a is inserted: 1a. Within a resolution group, subsidiaries that are institutions or entities referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) but are not resolution entities, whose total assets do not exceed EUR 5 billion and that do not reach a 2% threshold of the resolution group’s total risk exposure amount, or leverage exposure, shall not be subject to the requirement referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Amendment 356 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 29 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45 – paragraph 1 a (new)

(29 a) in Article 45, the following paragraph 1a is inserted: The calculation of the minimum requirement referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and Article 12 (4) of Regulation (EU) 806/2014 shall, in case of institutions operating promotional loans, exclude the liabilities of the intermediary institution towards the originating or another promotional bank or another intermediary institution and the liabilities of the original promotional bank towards its funding parties in so far as the amount of these liabilities is matched by the promotional loans of that institution. Or. en (see wording of Article 5 paragraph 1 point f of Regulation (EU) 2015/63)

Amendment 357 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 29 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45a

(29 a) Article 45a is replaced by the following: "Article 45a Exemption from the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities 1. Notwithstanding Article 45, resolution authorities shall exempt ~~from the requirement laid down in Article 45(1) mortgage~~ credit institutions financed by covered bonds which are not allowed to receive deposits under national law, provided that all of the following conditions are met: (a) those institutions will be wound up in national insolvency proceedings, or in other types of proceedings laid down for those institutions and implemented in accordance with Article 38, 40 or 42; and (b) the proceedings referred to in point (a), ensure that creditors of those institutions, including holders of covered bonds, where relevant, bear losses in a way that meets the resolution objectives. 2. Institutions exempted from the requirement laid down in Article 45(1) shall not be part of the consolidation referred to in Article 45e(1). from the requirement laid down in Article 45(1). " Or. en (DIRECTIVE 2014/59/EU)

Amendment 358 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point -a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

(-a) the second subparagraph of paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: " Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures, the resolution authority limits the requirement referred to in Article 45(1) for that entity, so that it does not exceed an amount sufficient to absorb losses in accordance with point (a) of the first subparagraph, except in extraordinary cases of the need for additional buffer. The buffer in any case shall be lower than the recapitalisation amount as referred to in paragraph 3."

Amendment 359 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point -a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 5

(-a) in paragraph 3, the fifth subparagraph is replaced by the following : "When setting the recapitalisation amounts referred to in the previous subparagraphs, the resolution authority shall: (a) use the most recently reported values for the relevant total risk exposure amount or total exposure measure, adjusted for any changes resulting from resolution actions set out in the resolution plan~~; and~~, including the reduced size and risk profile of the resolution group resulting from resolution, in particular when the preferred resolution strategy includes the use of resolution tools referred to in Article 37(3), points (a), (b) or (c), as well as for any changes resulting from the recovery options included in the recovery plan that are expected to be implemented by the time of resolution or shortly thereafter; (b) after consulting the competent authority, adjust the amount corresponding to the current requirement referred to in Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU downwards ~~or upwards~~ to determine the requirement that is to apply to the resolution entity after the implementation of the preferred resolution strategy. , taking into account changes referred to in point (a) of this subparagraph; (b a) after consulting the competent authority, for resolution entities subject to the requirement of Article 131 of Directive 2013/36/EU, adjust the combined buffer requirement applicable to the resolution group, taking into account the changes referred to in point (a) of this subparagraph. . " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

Amendment 36 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 1 b (new)

(1b) The Union resolution framework is not a substitute for the establishment of strong safeguards to protect the Union from financial instability. For this reason, not only must the Basel III framework be implemented in full and without derogations, but stronger regulatory capital requirements, going beyond international standards, should be implemented in the Union.

Amendment 360 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point -a a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 6

(-a a) in paragraph 3 the sixth subparagraph is replaced by the following : "The resolution authority shall be able to increase the requirement provided in point (a)(ii) of the first subparagraph by an appropriate amount necessary to ensure that, following resolution, the entity is able to sustain sufficient market confidence for an appropriate period, which shall not exceed one year. , except where its preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market. The resolution authority shall communicate to the resolution entity the rationale behind the adjustments mentioned in points (a), (b) and (c) of the fifth subparagraph. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the methodology to be used by resolution authorities to conduct the adjustments mentioned in this paragraph. EBA shall by… [PO please insert the date = 12 months from the date of entry into force of this amending Directive], submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the previous subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.’ . " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

Amendment 361 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point a a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3a (new)

(a a) the following paragraph is inserted: 3a. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the methodology to be used by resolution authorities to conduct the adjustments referred to in paragraph 3. EBA shall by… [PO please insert the date = 12 months from the date of entry into force of this amending Directive], submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.’ .

Amendment 362 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point -a (new)

Directive 2014/59 EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

(-a) in paragraph 3, the introductory part to the first subparagraph is replaced by the following: "For resolution entities, the amount referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 2 shall be at least the following: ~~(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014L0059-20221114)~~" Or. en

Amendment 363 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point -a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

(-a) in paragraph 2, the second subparagraph is replaced by the following: Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures, the resolution authority limits the requirement referred to in Article 45(1) for that entity, so that it does not exceed an amount sufficient to absorb losses in accordance with point (a) of the first subparagraph, except in extraordinary cases of the need for additional buffer. The buffer in any case shall be lower than the recapitalisation amount as referred to in paragraph 3.

Amendment 364 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point -a (new)

Directive 2014/59 EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2a (new)

~~(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014L0059-20221114)~~(-a) In paragraph 3, the following subparagraph is inserted after the second subparagraph: "The resolution authority shall be able to adjust the requirement provided for in point (a)(i) of the first subparagraph, taking into account the information requested from the competent authority relating to the institution’s business model, funding model, and risk profile, and in order to reduce or remove an impediment to resolvability or absorb losses on holdings of MREL instruments issued by other group entities as well as whenever the combined buffer requirement is deemed irrelevant to ensure that losses can be absorbed in resolution. " Or. en

Amendment 365 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca

(32) the following Article 45ca is inserted: ‘ Article 45ca Determination of the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities for transfer strategies leading to market exit 1. resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3) in a proportionate way on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant: (a) business model, funding model and risk profile, and the depth of the market in which the resolution entity operates; (b) ownership, assets, rights or liabilities to be transferred to a recipient as identified in the resolution plan, taking into consideration: (i) the core business lines and critical functions of the resolution entity; (ii) the liabilities excluded from bail-in pursuant to Article 44(2); (iii) Articles 73 to 80; (c) marketability of the shares, other instruments of ownership, assets, rights or liabilities of the resolution entity referred to in point (b), taking into account: (i) any material impediments to resolvability, identified by the resolution authority, that are directly related to the application of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool; (ii) assets, rights or liabilities left in the residual institution; (d) strategy envisages the transfer of shares odeleted When applying Article 45c to a the resolution entity’s size, the shares, other instruments of the safeguards referred to in the expected value and the losses resulting from the whether other instruments of ownership issued by the resolution entity, or of all or part of the assets, rights and liabilities of the resolution entity; (e) strategy envisages the application of the asset separation tool. 2. that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures and envisages the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU, the resolution authority shall also take into account paragraph 1 of this Article when carrying out the assessment referred to in Article 45c(2a), second subparagraph, of this Directive. 3. shall not result in an amount that is higher than the amount resulting from application of Article 45c(3).; ’ preferred resolution whether the preferred resolution Where the resolution plan provides The application of paragraph 1

Amendment 366 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Irene TINAGLI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. When applying Article 45c to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, and where its size and its ability to access the capital markets where it operates so justify in light of the princple of proportionality, the resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3) in a proportionate way on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:

Amendment 367 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. When applying Article 45c to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3) in a proportionate way that ensures that the resolution group can be resolved in all possible scenarios without the need for external funding on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:

Amendment 368 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. When applying Article 45c to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3) in a proportionate way that ensures that the resolution group can be resolved in all possible scenarios without the need for external funding on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:

Amendment 369 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. When applying Article 45c to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the resolution authority ~~shall~~may set ~~the~~a recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3), that may be higher or equal to zero, in a proportionate way on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:

Amendment 37 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Recital 2

(2) Several years into its implementation, the Union resolution framework as currently applicable does not deliver as intended with respect of some of those objectives. In particular, while institutions and entities have made significant progress towards resolvability and have dedicated significant resources to that end, in particular through the build-up of the loss absorption and recapitalisation capacity and the filling-up of resolution financing arrangements, the Union resolution framework is seldom resorted to. Failures of certain smaller and medium- sized institutions and entities are instead mostly addressed through unharmonised national measures. Taxpayer money is used rather than resolution financing arrangements. That situation appears to arise from inadequate incentives. Those inadequate incentives result from the interplay of the Union resolution framework with national rules, whereby the broad discretion in the public interest assessment is not always exercised in a way that reflects how the Union resolution framework was intended to apply. At the same time, the Union resolution framework saw little use due to the risks for depositors of deposit-funded institutions to bear losses to ensure that those institutions can access external funding in resolution, in particular in the absence of other bail-inable liabilities. Finally, the fact that there are less stringent rules on access to funding outside resolution than in resolution has discouraged the application of the Union resolution framework in favour of other solutions, which often entail the use of taxpayers’ money instead of the own resources of the institution and entity or industry-funded safety nets. That situation, in turn, generates risks of fragmentation, risks of suboptimal outcomes in managing institutions and entities’ failures, in particular in the case of smaller and medium-sized institutions and entities, and opportunity costs from unused financial resources. It is therefore necessary to ensure a more effective and coherent application of the Union resolution framework and to ensure that it can be applied whenever that is in the public interest~~, including for certain smaller and medium-sized institutions primarily funded through deposits and without sufficient other bail-inable liabilities.~~;

Amendment 370 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. When applying Article 45c to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the resolution authority ~~shall~~may set ~~the~~a recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3), that may be higher or equal to zero, in a proportionate way on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:

Amendment 371 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. When applying Article 45c to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages ~~primarily the~~the exclusively use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3) in a proportionate way on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:

Amendment 372 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) the resolution entity’s size, resolution entity’s ability to access financial market and DGS funds, business model, funding model and risk profile, and the depth of the market in which the resolution entity operates;

Amendment 373 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile~~, and the depth of the market in which the resolution entity operates~~;

Amendment 374 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile~~, and the depth of the market in which the resolution entity operates~~;

Amendment 375 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile~~, and the depth of the market in which the resolution entity operates~~;

Amendment 376 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile, and the ~~depth of the market in which the resolution entity operat~~ability to access the capital markets for eligible liabilities;

Amendment 377 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point b – point ii

(ii) the liabilities excluded from bail-in pursuant to Article 44(2) or bail-inable liabilities where Article 44(3) is likely to apply with regard to these liabilities;

Amendment 378 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii a (new)

(iii a) expected own funds requirements for any bridge institution that may be needed to implement the market exit strategy, to ensure its compliance with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Directive 2013/36/EU and Directive 2014/65/EU, as applicable;

Amendment 379 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii a (new)

(iii a) any risks to the succesful implementation of the preferred resolution strategy, in particular due to an adverse market environment at the time of resolution;

Amendment 38 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 2

(2) Several years into its implementation, the Union resolution framework as currently applicable does not deliver as intended with respect of some of those objectives. In particular, while institutions and entities have made significant progress towards resolvability and have dedicated significant resources to that end, in particular through the build-up of the loss absorption and recapitalisation capacity and the filling-up of resolution financing arrangements, the Union resolution framework is seldom resorted to. Failures of certain smaller and medium- sized institutions and entities are instead mostly addressed through unharmonised national measures. Taxpayer money is used rather than resolution financing arrangements. That situation appears to arise from inadequate incentives. Those inadequate incentives result from the interplay of the Union resolution framework with national rules, whereby the broad discretion in the public interest assessment is not always exercised in a way that reflects how the Union resolution framework was intended to apply. At the same time, the Union resolution framework saw little use due to the risks for depositors of deposit-funded institutions to bear losses to ensure that those institutions can access external funding in resolution, in particular in the absence of other bail-inable liabilities. Finally, the fact that there are less stringent rules on access to funding outside resolution than in resolution has discouraged the application of the Union resolution framework in favour of other solutions, which often entail the use of taxpayers’ money instead of the own resources of the institution and entity or industry-funded safety nets. That situation, in turn, generates risks of fragmentation, risks of suboptimal outcomes in managing institutions and entities’ failures, in particular in the case of smaller and medium-sized institutions and entities, and opportunity costs from unused financial resources. It is therefore necessary to ensure a more effective and coherent application of the Union resolution framework and to ensure that it can be applied whenever that is in the public interest~~, including for certain smaller and medium-sized institutions primarily funded through deposits and without sufficient other bail-inable liabilities~~.

Amendment 380 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii a (new)

(iii a) any risks to succesful implementation of the preferred resolution strategy, in particular a potentially adverse market environment at the time of resolution;

Amendment 381 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii b (new)

(iii b) expected demand by the recipient for the transaction to be capital neutral with regards to the requirements applicable to the acquiring entity.

Amendment 382 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point c – point i

(i) any ~~material~~ impediments to resolvability, identified by the resolution authority, that are ~~directly~~ related to the application of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool;

Amendment 383 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point c – point i

(i) any ~~material~~ impediments to resolvability, identified by the resolution authority, that are ~~directly~~ related to the application of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool;

Amendment 384 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point c – point ii a (new)

(ii a) a potentially adverse market environment at the time of resolution;

Amendment 385 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point c – point ii a (new)

(ii a) a potentially adverse market environment at the time of resolution;

Amendment 386 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point ea (new)

(e a) whether any contribution by a deposit guarantee scheme is expected to be made pursuant to Article 109.’

Amendment 387 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point e a (new)

(e a) the potential recapitalisation amount required under an alternative resolution strategy.

Amendment 388 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point ea (new)

(e a) the potential recapitalisation amount required under an alternative resolution strategy;

Amendment 389 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraphs 1a and 1b (new)

1 a. For resolution entities subject to the proportionalisation rules of paragraph 1 of this Article, the level of the requirement referred to in Article 45c(3) shall be at least equal to: (a) 16 % when calculated in accordance with point (a) of Article 45(2); and (b) 5,5 % when calculated in accordance with point (b) of Article 45(2). Resolution entities that are part of a resolution group the total assets of which exceed EUR 5 billion and resolution entities with consolidated total assets in excess of EUR 5 billion shall meet a level of the requirement referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph that is equal to 4,5 % when calculated in accordance with point (a) of Article 45(2) and to 1,5 % when calculated in accordance with point (b) of Article 45(2), using Tier 2 instruments and eligible liabilities.’ 1b. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the methodology to be used by resolution authorities to conduct the adjustments mentioned in this Article. The EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by …[OP – please insert the date= 12 months after the date of entry into force of this amending Directive]. Power is delegated to the Commission to supplement this Directive by adopting the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.

Amendment 39 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 2

(2) Several years into its implementation, the Union resolution framework as currently applicable does not deliver as intended with respect of some of those objectives. In particular, while institutions and entities have made significant progress towards resolvability and have dedicated significant resources to that end, in particular through the build-up of the loss absorption and recapitalisation capacity and the filling-up of resolution financing arrangements, the Union resolution framework is seldom resorted to. Failures of certain smaller and medium- sized institutions and entities are instead mostly addressed through unharmonised national measures. Taxpayer money is used rather than resolution financing arrangements. That situation appears to arise from inadequate incentives. Those inadequate incentives result from the interplay of the Union resolution framework with national rules, whereby the broad discretion in the public interest assessment is not always exercised in a way that reflects how the Union resolution framework was intended to apply. At the same time, the Union resolution framework saw little use due to the risks for depositors of deposit-funded institutions to bear losses to ensure that those institutions can access external funding in resolution, in particular in the absence of other bail-inable liabilities. Finally, the fact that there are less stringent rules on access to funding outside resolution than in resolution has discouraged the application of the Union resolution framework in favour of other solutions, which often entail the use of taxpayers’ money instead of the own resources of the institution and entity or industry-funded safety nets. That situation, in turn, generates risks of fragmentation, risks of suboptimal outcomes in managing institutions and entities’ failures, in particular in the case of smaller and medium-sized institutions and entities, and opportunity costs from unused financial resources. It is therefore necessary to ensure a more effective and coherent application of the Union resolution framework and to ensure that it can be applied whenever that is in the public interest, including for certain smaller and medium-sized institutions ~~primarily funded through deposits and without sufficient other bail-inable liabilities~~.

Amendment 390 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1a (new)

1 a. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to institutions that are designated as "small and non-complex institutions" in line with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.

Amendment 391 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 2

2. Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures and envisages the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU, the resolution authority shall also take into account paragraph 1 of this Article when carrying out the assessment referred to in Article 45c(2a), second subparagraph, of this Directive.deleted

Amendment 392 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 2

2. Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures and envisages the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU, the resolution authority shall also take into account paragraph 1 of this Article when carrying out the assessment referred to in Article 45c(2a), second subparagraph, of this Directive.deleted

Amendment 393 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 2

2. Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures and envisages the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU, the resolution authority shall also take into account paragraph 1 of this Article when carrying out the assessment referred to in Article 45c(2a), second subparagraph, of this Directive.deleted

Amendment 394 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 2

2. Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures and envisages the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU, the resolution authority shall also take into account paragraph 1 of this Article when carrying out the assessment referred to in Article 45c(2a), second subparagraph, of this Directive.deleted

Amendment 395 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 2

2. Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures and envisages the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU, the resolution authority shall also take into account paragraph 1 of this Article when carrying out the assessment referred to in Article 45c(2a), second subparagraph, of this Directive.deleted

Amendment 396 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 2

2. Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures and envisages the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU, ~~the resolution authority shall also take into account paragraph 1 of this Article when carrying out~~by way of derogation from Article 45c(2a), the resolution authority shall set a recapitalisation amount as provided in Article 45c(3) in a proportionate way on the bas~~sessment referred to in Article 45c(2a), second subparagraph, of this Directive~~is of the criteria referred to in paragraph 1.

Amendment 397 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 3

3. The application of paragraph 1 shall not result in an amount that is ~~high~~lower than 90% of the amount resulting from application of Article 45c(3).;

Amendment 398 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 33

Directive 2014/59 EU
Article 45d – paragraph 1 – introductory part

The requirement referred to in Article 45(1) for a resolution entity that is a G-SII entity shall at least consist of the following:;

Amendment 399 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 35 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45m – paragraph 1a (new)

(35 a) in Article 45m, the following paragraph 1a is inserted: ‘1a. Regarding entities that were not part of a resolution group prior to the [date of application of this Directive], resolution authorities shall determine appropriate transitional periods for institutions or entities referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) to comply with the requirements laid down in Article 45e or 45f, or with requirements that result from the application of Article 45b(4), (5) or (7), as appropriate. These transitional periods shall not extend beyond 1 January 2030.’

Amendment 40 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 2

(2) Several years into its implementation, the Union resolution framework as currently applicable does not deliver as intended with respect of some of those objectives. In particular, while institutions and entities have made significant progress towards resolvability and have dedicated significant resources to that end, in particular through the build-up of the loss absorption and recapitalisation capacity and the filling-up of resolution financing arrangements, the Union resolution framework is seldom resorted to. Failures of certain smaller and medium- sized institutions and entities are instead mostly addressed through unharmonised national measures. TRegrettably, taxpayer money is still used rather than industry- funded safety nets, including resolution financing arrangements. That situation appears to arise from inadequate incentives. Those inadequate incentives result from the interplay of the Union resolution framework with national rules, whereby the broad discretion in the public interest assessment is not always exercised in a way that reflects how the Union resolution framework was intended to apply. At the same time, the Union resolution framework saw little use due to the risks for depositors of deposit-funded institutions to bear losses to ensure that those institutions can access external funding in resolution, in particular in the absence of other bail-inable liabilities. Finally, the fact that there are less stringent rules on access to funding outside resolution than in resolution has discouraged the application of the Union resolution framework in favour of other solutions, which often entail the use of taxpayers’ money instead of the own resources of the institution and entity or industry-funded safety nets. That situation, in turn, generates risks of fragmentation, risks of suboptimal outcomes in managing institutions and entities’ failures, in particular in the case of smaller and medium-sized institutions and entities, and opportunity costs from unused financial resources. It is therefore necessary to ensure a more effective and coherent application of the Union resolution framework and to ensure that it can be applied when~~ever~~ that is in the public interest, including for certain smaller and medium- sized institutions primarily funded through deposits and ~~wit~~falling shourt of the sufficient ~~other~~amount of bail-inable liabilities.

Amendment 400 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 55 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b

~~(a) in paragraph 1, point (b) is replaced by the following: ‘ (b) the liability is not a deposit as referred to in Article 108(1), points (a) or (b); ’~~deleted

Amendment 401 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 55 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) the liability is not a deposit as referred to in Article 108(1), points (a) ~~or (b)~~;

Amendment 402 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point a a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 55 – paragraph 1

(a a) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: "1. Member States shall require institutions and entities referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) to include a contractual term by which the creditor or party to the agreement or instrument creating tha bail- inable liability recognises that that liability may be subject to the write down and conversion powers and agrees to be bound by any reduction of the principal or outstanding amount due, conversion or cancellation that is effected by the exercise of those powers by a resolution authority, provided that that liability complies with all of the following conditions: (a) ~~the liability is not excluded under Article 44(2);~~[deleted] (b) the liability is not a deposit as referred to in Article 108(1), points (a) or (b); (c) the liability is governed by the law of a third country; (d) the liability is issued or entered into after the date on which a Member State applies the provisions adopted in order to transpose this Section. ~~Resolution authorities may decide that the obligation in t~~The first subparagraph ~~of this paragraph~~ shall not apply to ~~institutions or entities in respect of which the requirement under Article 45(1) equals the loss-absorption amount as defined under point (a) of Article 45c(2)~~liquidation entities for which the resolution authority has not determined the requirement referred to in Article 45(1). Resolution authorities may decide that the obligation in the first subparagraph shall not apply to the following institutions or entities, provided that liabilities that meet the conditions referred to in the first subparagraph and which do not include the contractual term referred to in that subparagraph are not counted towards th~~at requirement~~e requirement referred to in Article 45(1): (a) institutions or entities that are subsidiaries of a resolution entity or of a third-country entity, but are not themselves resolution entities; (b) liquidation entities for which the resolution authority has determined the requirement referred to in Article 45(1) in accordance with Article 45c(2a), second subparagraph. The first subparagraph shall not apply where the resolution authority of a Member State determines that the liabilities or instruments referred to in the first subparagraph can be subject to write down and conversion powers by the resolution authority of a Member State pursuant to the law of the third country or to a binding agreement concluded with that third country. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

Amendment 403 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point b a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 55 – paragraph 2a (new)

(b a) the following paragraph 2a is inserted: 2a. Institutions and entities referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), shall report to the resolution authority on an annual basis the following: (a) the total outstanding amounts of all liabilities governed by the law of a third country; (b) for the items referred in point (a): (i) their composition, including their maturity profile; (ii) their ranking in normal insolvency proceedings; (iii) whether the liability is excluded under Article 44(2); (iv) whether they include in the contractual provisions the term required by paragraph 1; (v) where a determination has been made that it is legally or otherwise impracticable to include the contractual recognition of bail-in clause in accordance with paragraph 2, the category of the liability pursuant to paragraph 7. Where institutions and entities are part of a resolution group, the report shall be done by the resolution entity concerning the resolution group, to the extent required by paragraph 1, second and third subparagraphs.

Amendment 404 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point b a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 55 – paragraph 2a (new)

(b a) The following paragraph 2a is added: 2a. Institutions and entities referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), shall report to the resolution authority on an annual basis the following: (a) the total outstanding amounts of all liabilities governed by the law of a third country; (b) for the items referred in point (a): (i) their composition, including their maturity profile; (ii) their ranking in normal insolvency proceedings; (iii) whether the liability is excluded under Article 44(2); (iv) whether they include in the contractual provisions the term required by paragraph 1; (v) where a determination has been made that it is legally or otherwise impracticable to include the contractual recognition of bail-in clause in accordance with paragraph 2, the category of the liability pursuant to paragraph 7. Where institutions and entities are part of a resolution group, the report shall be done by the resolution entity concerning the resolution group, to the extent required by paragraph 1, second and third subparagraphs.

Amendment 405 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point b b (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 55 – paragraph 8a (new)

(b b) the following paragraph 8a is added: 8a. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify procedures and uniform formats and templates for the reporting to resolution authorities referred to in paragraph 2a. EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by [PO please insert the date = 1 year after the date of entry into force of this Directive]. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.

Amendment 406 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point b b (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 55 – paragraph 8a (new)

(b b) The following paragraph 8a is added: EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify procedures and uniform formats and templates for the reporting to resolution authorities referred to in paragraph 2a. EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by [PO please insert the date = 1 year after the date of entry into force of this Directive]. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.

Amendment 407 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 42 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 59 – paragraph 4 – point b

(b) having regard to timing~~, the need to implement effectively the write down and conversion powers or the resolution strategy for the resolution group,~~ and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any action, including alternative private sector measures, supervisory action or early intervention measures, other than the write down or conversion of capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in paragraph 1a, would prevent the failure of the institution or the entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), or the group within a reasonable timeframe.;

Amendment 408 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 45

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 74 – paragraph 3 – point d

(d) when determining the losses that the deposit guarantee scheme, where it does not qualify as an institutional protection scheme, would have incurred had the institution been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, apply the criteria and methodology referred to in Article 11e of Directive 2014/49/EU and in any delegated act adopted pursuant to that Article.;

Amendment 409 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 45

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 74 – paragraph 3 – point d

(d) when determining the losses that the deposit guarantee scheme, where it does not qualify as an institutional protection scheme, would have incurred had the institution been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, apply the criteria and methodology referred to in Article 11e of Directive 2014/49/EU and in any delegated act adopted pursuant to that Article.;

Amendment 41 #

René REPASI, Ernest URTASUN, Andreas SCHWAB

Proposal for a directive
Recital 2

(2) Several years into its implementation, the Union resolution framework as currently applicable does not deliver as intended with respect of some of those objectives. In particular, while institutions and entities have made significant progress towards resolvability and have dedicated significant resources to that end, in particular through the build-up of the loss absorption and recapitalisation capacity and the filling-up of resolution financing arrangements, the Union resolution framework is seldom resorted to. Failures of certain smaller and medium- sized institutions and entities are instead mostly addressed through unharmonised national measures. TExternal resources, be it industry funds or taxpayer money is used rather than ~~resolution financing arrangements~~internal loss absorption. That situation appears to arise from inadequate incentives and loopholes. Those inadequate incentives result from the interplay of the Union resolution framework with national rules, whereby the broad discretion in the public interest assessment is not always exercised in a way that reflects how the Union resolution framework was intended to apply. At the same time, the Union resolution framework saw little use due to the risks for depositors of deposit-funded institutions to bear losses to ensure that those institutions can access external funding in resolution, in particular in the absence of other bail-inable liabilities. Finally, the fact that there are less stringent rules on access to funding outside resolution than in resolution has discouraged the application of the Union resolution framework in favour of other solutions, which often entail the use of external resources like taxpayers’ money instead of the own resources of the institution and entity ~~or industry-funded safety nets~~. That situation, in turn, generates risks of fragmentation, risks of suboptimal outcomes in managing institutions and entities’ failures, in particular in the case of smaller and medium-sized institutions and entities~~, and opportunity costs from unused financial resources~~. It is therefore necessary to ensure a more effective and coherent application of the Union resolution framework and to ensure that it can be applied whenever that is in the public interest, including for certain smaller and medium-sized institutions primarily funded through deposits ~~and without sufficient other bail-inable liabilities~~.

Amendment 410 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 45 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 84 – paragraph 6 a (new)

(45 a) In Article 84, the following paragraph 6a is inserted: This Article shall not preclude the exchange of information between resolution authorities and tax authorities in the same Member State to the extent that such exchange is stipulated by national laws of Member States. Where this information originates in another Member State, it shall only be disclosed with the express agreement of the relevant authority which has disclosed it.

Amendment 411 #

René REPASI, Ernest URTASUN, Andreas SCHWAB

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 46 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 90 – paragraph 4a (new)

(46 a) In Article 90, the following paragraph is added: 4a. Article 84 shall not preclude the exchange of information between resolution authorities and tax authorities in the same Member State to the extent that such exchange is stipulated by national laws of Member States. Where this information originates in another Member State, it shall only be disclosed with the express agreement of the relevant authority which has disclosed it.

Amendment 412 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 49

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 97 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2

Competent authorities shall conclude non- binding cooperation arrangements with the relevant third-country authorities referred to in paragraph 2 where appropriate. Those arrangements shall be in line with EBA framework arrangement and shall ensure that the information disclosed to the third- country authorities is subject to a guarantee that professional secrecy requirements at least equivalent to those referred to in Article ~~53(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU~~84 of this Directive are complied with.

Amendment 413 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 50 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 101 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 a (new)

(50a) in Article 101(1), the following subparagraph is added: ‘Where the deposit guarantee scheme makes a contribution pursuant to Article 109(1) and where applicable conditions are met, to contribute the amount needed to close the remaining funding gap after the DGS contribution towards the 8% TLOF, in this case, the contribution made by the resolution financing arrangement is to be repaid in full by the DGS wihin 6 years at the most.’

Amendment 414 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 50 b (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 101 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 a (new)

(50b) in Article 101(1), the following subparagraph is added: Where the deposit guarantee scheme makes a contribution pursuant to Article 109 (1) and where applicable conditions are met, to contribute the amount needed to close the remaining funding gap after the DGS contribution towards the 8% TLOF;

Amendment 415 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 51 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 101 – paragraph 2a (new)

(51 a) in Article 101, the following paragraph is added: ‘2a. By 31 December 2028, the Commission shall report, to the European Parliament and to the Council, on the appropriateness of the rules governing the contributions to the resolution financing arrangements both at Member State level and Banking Union level. That report shall take stock of the reforms to the crisis management framework, and assess whether these changes call for a review of the rules governing the contributions to the resolution financing arrangement in order to preserve the effectiveness of the incentives of a "polluter-pays" principle. Where appropriate, the Commission shall table a legislative proposal. ’

Amendment 416 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 51 b (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 102 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1a (new)

(51 b) in Article 102(1), the following subparagraph is added: ‘When the available financial means have significantly exceeded the target level for a second consecutive year, the Commission shall assess the situation and report on the appropriateness of introducing a possibility to restitute part of available financial means.’

Amendment 417 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 52

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 102 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

~~If, a~~After the initial period of time referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the available financial means diminish below the target level specified in that paragraph, the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 103 shall resume until the target level is reached.target level has been reached for the first time, the collection of the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 103 shall be subject to the following modulations: (a) until the available financial means, net of any disbursment, diminish below 85% of the target level, Resolution authorities ~~may~~shall defer the collection of the regular contributions ~~raised in accordance with Article 103 for 1 or more years~~; (b) where the amount to be collected reaches an amount that is proportionate to the costs of the collection process, ~~provided that such deferral does not materially affect the capacity of the resolution authority to use~~Resolution authorities shall defer the collection of the regular contributions. Furthermore, the res~~olu~~umption ~~financing arrangements pursuant to Article 101. After the target level has been reached for the first time and wh~~of the regular contributions aftere the ~~available financial means have subsequently been reduced to less than two thirds of the target level, those contribution~~deferral mentioned in the previous subparagraphs shall be set at a level allowing for ~~reaching~~ the target level to be reached within 63 years .’;

Amendment 418 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 52

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 102 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

If, after the initial period of time referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the available financial means diminish below the target level specified in that paragraph, the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 103 shall resume until the target level specified in paragraph 1 of this Article is reached. Resolution authorities may defer the collection of the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 103 for 1 or more years where the amount to be collected reaches an amount that is proportionate to the costs of the collection process, provided that such deferral does not materially affect the capacity of the resolution authority to use the resolution financing arrangements pursuant to Article 101. After the target level has been reached for the first time and where the available financial means have subsequently been reduced to less than two thirds of the target level, those contributions shall be set at a level allowing for reaching the target level within 6 years.;

Amendment 419 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 52

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 102 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

If, after the initial period of time referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the available financial means diminish below the target level specified in that paragraph, the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 103 shall resume until the target level is reached. Resolution authorities may defer the collection of the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 103 for 1 ~~or more~~ years where the amount to be collected reaches an amount that is proportionate to the costs of the collection process, provided that such deferral does not materially affect the capacity of the resolution authority to use the resolution financing arrangements pursuant to Article 101. After the target level has been reached for the first time and where the available financial means have subsequently been reduced to less than two thirds of the target level, those contributions shall be set at a level allowing for reaching the target level within 6 years.;

Amendment 42 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 2 a (new)

(2a) The objective of this Directive is to better safeguard taxpayers’ money and establish mechanisms for addressing situations of potential insolvency of some institutions and entities not covered by the existing resolution framework. That framework is designed to curtail the economic burden on society by reducing the overall costs associated with bank failures. The use of taxpayers’ money should, with the introduction of a new framework, be significantly reduced in order to ensure that the resolution financing arrangement is more often and more effectively used.

Amendment 420 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 53 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 103 – paragraph 3

3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 102 may include irrevocable payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the resolution authorities for the purposes specified in Article 101(1). The share of irrevocable payment commitments shall ~~not exceed~~be 50 % of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with this Article. ~~Within that limit, t~~The resolution authority shall determine annually the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of contributions to be raised in accordance with this Article.;

Amendment 421 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 53 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 103 – paragraph 3

3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 102 may include irrevocable payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the resolution authorities for the purposes specified in Article 101(1). The share of irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed 520 % of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with this Article. Within that limit, the resolution authority shall determine annually the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of contributions to be raised in accordance with this Article.;

Amendment 422 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 53 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 103 – paragraph 3

3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 102 may include irrevocable payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the resolution authorities for the purposes specified in Article 101(1). The share of irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed 530 % of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with this Article. Within that limit, the resolution authority shall determine annually the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of contributions to be raised in accordance with this Article.;

Amendment 423 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Irene TINAGLI, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 53 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 103 – paragraph 3

3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 102 may include irrevocable payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the resolution authorities for the purposes specified in Article 101(1). The share of irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed 530 % of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with this Article. Within that limit, the resolution authority shall determine annually the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of contributions to be raised in accordance with this Article.;

Amendment 424 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 53 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 103 – paragraph 3a – subparagraph 1

The resolution authority shall call the irrevocable payment commitments made pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article when the use of the resolution financing arrangements is needed pursuant to Article 101. Where an entity stops being within the scope of Article 1 and is no longer subject to the obligation to pay contributions in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, the resolution authority shall return the irrevocable payment commitments made pursuant to paragraph 3 as soon as the subsequent regular contribution round pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article has replenished the resolution financing arrangements up to the target level.

Amendment 425 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 53 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 103 – paragraph 3a – subparagraph 2

Where an entity stops being within the scope of Article 1 and is no longer subject to the obligation to pay contributions in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, the resolution authority shall call the irrevocable payment commitments made pursuant to paragraph 3 and still due. If the contribution linked to the irrevocable payment commitment is duly paid at first call, the resolution authority shall cancel the commitment and returnthis Directive the irrevocable payment commitments shall be cancelled and the collateral backing these commitments shall be returned at the ~~col~~late~~ral. If the contribution is not duly paid at first call, the resolution author~~st two years after the entity sha~~ll seize~~s exited the sco~~llateral and cancel the commitment.~~pe of this Directive;

Amendment 426 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 54 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 104 – paragraph 3

(54 a) Article 104 (3) is replaced by the following: "3. The resolution authority may defer, in whole or in part, an institution’s payment of extraordinary ex-post contributions to the resolution financing arrangement if the payment of those contributions would jeopardise the liquidity or solvency of the institution. Such a deferral shall not be granted for a period of longer than six months but may be renewed once upon the request of the institution. The contributions deferred pursuant to this paragraph shall be paid when such a payment no longer jeopardises the institution’s liquidity or solvency. " Or. en (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014L0059)

Amendment 427 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1

(a) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: ‘ 1. their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings the following have the same priority ranking, which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors: (a) (b) located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union; (c) subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency.; ’deleted Member States shall ensure that in deposits; deposits made through branches deposit guarantee schemes

Amendment 428 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1

(a) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: ‘ 1. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings the following have the same priority ranking, which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors: (a) (b) located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union; (c) deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency.; ’deleted deposits; deposits made through branches

Amendment 429 #

Enikő GYŐRI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1

1. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings the following have the same priority ranking, which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors: (a) (b) located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union; (c) subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency.;deleted deposits; deposits made through branches deposit guarantee schemes

Amendment 43 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 2 a (new)

(2a) The current legislative review seeks to reinforce the conditions for an orderly bank resolution that provides more protection for depositors. It firmly upholds the insurance to covered deposits, while reinforcing the policy toolbox for resolution, thus allowing for smoother alternatives that provide additional safeguards to depositors and financial stability.

Amendment 430 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings ~~the following have the same priority ranking, which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors~~:

Amendment 431 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings ~~the following have the same priority ranking, which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors~~:

Amendment 432 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings the following have the same priority ranking, which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditorstablish a general depositor preference, which grants all depositors a higher ranking than claims of ordinary unsecured creditors. Notwithstanding, the highest priority ranking shall be exclusively shared by the following deposits:

Amendment 433 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

1. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings the claims arising from the following have the same priority ranking, which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors:

Amendment 434 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings the following have ~~the same~~a higher priority ranking~~, which is higher~~ than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors:

Amendment 435 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) ~~deposits~~the following have the same priority ranking which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors: (i) that part of eligible deposits from natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises which exceeds the coverage level provided for in Article 6 of Directive 2014/49/EU; (ii) deposits that would be eligible deposits from natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises were they not made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;

Amendment 436 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) ~~deposits~~the following claims that have a ranking priority higher than the ranking of claims referred to in point b): deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency, eligible deposits, corporate deposit held for payment and settlement purposes, deposits made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union ;

Amendment 437 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) (i) deposits that are excluded from coverage under Article 5 of Directive 2014/49/EU; and (ii) deposits of legal entities that are not micro, small and medium-sized enterprises that qualify as eligible liabilities for the purposes of the requirement referred to in Article 45(1);

Amendment 438 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) ~~deposits~~covered deposits, as defined in Directive 2014/49/EU;

Amendment 439 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) eligible retail deposits;

Amendment 44 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 3

(3) The intensity, and level of detail, of the resolution planning work needed with respect to subsidiaries that have not been identified as resolution entities varies depending on the size and risk profile of the institutions and entities concerned, the presence of critical functions, and the group resolution strategy. Resolution authorities should therefore be able to consider those factors when identifying the measures to be taken in respect of such subsidiaries and follow a simplified approach where appropriate, as long as the simplified approach does not, under any circumstances, result in a reduction of required standards.

Amendment 440 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) covered deposits;

Amendment 441 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) all deposits;

Amendment 442 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point aa (new)

(a a) that part of eligible deposits from natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises which exceeds the coverage level provided for in Article 6 of Directive 2014/49/EU;

Amendment 443 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

(a b) deposits that would be eligible deposits from natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises were they not made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;

Amendment 444 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point b

~~(b) deposits made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;~~deleted

Amendment 445 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

(b) ~~deposits made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;~~the following have the same priority ranking which is higher than the ranking provided for under point (a): (i) covered deposits; (ii) deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency.

Amendment 446 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) ~~deposits~~covered deposits, or parts of eligible deposits from natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises which exceeds the coverage level provided for in Article 6 of Directive 2014/49/EU made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;

Amendment 447 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) ~~deposits made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union~~eligible deposits, as defined in Directive 2014/49/EU, of natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises;

Amendment 448 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) eligible retail deposits made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;

Amendment 449 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) deposits that were made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;

Amendment 45 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 8

(8) It is necessary to ensure timely action and early coordination between the competent authority and the resolution authority, when an institution or entity is still a going concern, but where there is a material risk that the institution or entity may fail. The competent authority should therefore notify the resolution authority as early as possible of such risk. That notification should contain the reasons for the competent authority’s assessment and an overview of the alternative private sector measures, supervisory action or early intervention measures that are available to prevent the failure of the institution or entity within a reasonable timeframe. Such early notification should not prejudice the procedures to determine whether the conditions for resolution are met. The prior notification by the competent authority to the resolution authority of a material risk that an institution or entity is failing or likely to fail, or the end of the defined timeframe for the implementation of the measures to address such material risk of failure of the institution or entity should not be a condition for, nor imply, a subsequent determination that an institution or entity is actually failing or likely to fail. Moreover, if at a later stage the institution or entity is assessed to be failing or likely to fail and there are no alternative solutions to prevent such failure within a reasonable timeframe, the resolution authority has to take a decision whether to take resolution action. In such a case, the timeliness of the decision to apply resolution action to an institution or entity can be fundamental to the successful implementation of the resolution strategy, in particular because an earlier intervention in the institution or entity can contribute to ensuring sufficient levels of loss absorption capacity and liquidity to execute that strategy. It is therefore appropriate to enable the resolution authority to assess, in close cooperation with the competent authority, what constitutes a reasonable timeframe to implement alternative measures to avoid the failure of the institution or entity. To ensure a timely outcome and to enable the resolution authority to prepare properly for the potential resolution of the institution or entity, the resolution authority and the competent authority should meet regularly, and the resolution authority should decide on frequency of those meetings considering the circumstances of the case.

Amendment 450 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) ~~deposits made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;~~other corporate deposits than those referred to in point a) and non-eligible deposits

Amendment 451 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point c

~~(c) deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency.;~~deleted

Amendment 452 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point c

~~(c) deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency.;~~deleted

Amendment 453 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point c

~~(c) deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency.;~~deleted

Amendment 454 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point c

(c) deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations of ~~covered~~eligible retail depositors in insolvency.;

Amendment 455 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point c

(c) deposit guarantee schemes when subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency.;

Amendment 456 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1a (new)

1 a. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings, the following have the same priority ranking, which is higher than the ranking provided for under paragraph (1): (a) covered deposits; (b) deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency;

Amendment 457 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 2 – introductory part

(a a) The introductory part of paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: ‘2. Member States shall ensure that, for entities referred to in points (a) to (d) of the first subparagraph of Article 1(1), ordinary unsecured claims have, in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings, the same priority ranking as other deposits that are not mentioned in~~gs,~~ paragraph 1 of this Article, and a higher priority ranking than that of unsecured claims resulting from debt instruments that meet the following conditions:’ ;

Amendment 458 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 8

8. Where the resolution tools referred to in Article 37(3), point (a) or (b), are used to transfer only part of the assets, rights or liabilities of the institution under resolution, the resolution financing arrangement shall have a claim against the residual institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), for any expense and loss incurred by the resolution financing arrangement as a result of any contributions made to resolution pursuant to Article 101(1) in connection to losses which creditors would have otherwise borne.deleted

Amendment 459 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 8

8. Where the resolution tools referred to in Article 37(3), point (a) or (b), are used to transfer only part of the assets, rights or liabilities of the institution under resolution, the resolution financing arrangement shall have a claim against the residual institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), for any expense and loss incurred by the resolution financing arrangement as a result of any contributions made to resolution pursuant to Article 101(1) ~~in connection to losses which creditors would have otherwise borne~~.

Amendment 46 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 9

(9) The resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business model, if the tools available under national law are not adequate to manage its failure. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified. In particular, it is necessary to clarify that, depending on the specific circumstances, certain functions of the institution or entity can be considered critical even if their discontinuance would impact financial stability or critical services only at regional ~~level.~~ . To ensure that the assessment of the impact at a regional level can be based on data that is available in a consistent way across the Union, regional level should be understood with reference to the level 1 or the level 2 territorial units of the Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS level 1 or 2) within the meaning of Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council*; * Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 on the establishment of a common classification of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) (OJ L 154, 21.6.2003, p. 1).

Amendment 460 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 9

9. Member States shall ensure that the claims of the resolution financing arrangement referred to in paragraph 8 of this Article and in Article 37(7) have, in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings, a preferred priority ranking, which shall be higher than the ranking provided for the claims of deposits and of deposit guarantee schemes pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article.;deleted

Amendment 461 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point b

2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 9

9. Member States shall ensure that the claims of the resolution financing arrangement referred to in paragraph 8 of this Article and in Article 37(7) have, in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings, a preferred priority ranking, which shall be higher than the ranking provided for the claims of deposits and of deposit guarantee schemes pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article.;deleted

Amendment 462 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point b

Article 2014/59/EU

Article 108 – paragraph 9

9. Member States shall ensure that the claims of the resolution financing arrangement referred to in paragraph 8 of this Article and in Article 37(7) have, in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings, a preferred priority ranking, which shall be ~~higher than~~equal to the ranking provided for the claims of deposits and of deposit guarantee schemes pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article.;

Amendment 463 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109

~~(56) [...]~~deleted

Amendment 464 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraphs 1 & 2

~~(a) [...]~~deleted

Amendment 465 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraphs 1 & 2

~~(a) [...]~~deleted

Amendment 466 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Member States shall ensure that, where the resolution authorities take resolution action with respect to a credit institution, and provided that such action ensures that depositors continue to have access to their deposits, to prevent depositors from bearing losses the deposit guarantee scheme to which that credit institution is affiliated shall contribute the following amounts: (a) independently or in combination with the asset separation tool, the amount by which covered deposits would have been written down or converted in order to absorb the losses and recapitalise the institution under resolution pursuant to Article 46(1), had covered deposits been included within the scope of bail-in; (b) bridge institution tools are applied, independently or in combination with other resolution tools: (i) difference between the value of the covered deposits and of the liabilities with the same or a higher priority ranking than deposits and the value of the assets of the institution under resolution which are to be transferred to a recipient; and (ii) necessary to ensure the capital neutrality of the recipient following the transfer.deleted where the bail-in tool is applied, where the sale of business or the the amount necessary to cover the where relevant, an amount

Amendment 467 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

Member States shall ensure that, where the resolution authorities take resolution action with respect to a credit institution, and provided that such action ensures that ~~depositor~~natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises continue to have access to their deposits, to prevent ~~depositors~~them from bearing losses the deposit guarantee scheme to which that credit institution is affiliated shall contribute the following amounts:

Amendment 468 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraph 1 – point b – point i

(i) the amount necessary to cover the difference between the value of the covered deposits and of the liabilities with ~~the same or~~ a higher priority ranking than deposits and the value of the assets of the institution under resolution which are to be transferred to a recipient; and

Amendment 469 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

~~(ii) where relevant, an amount necessary to ensure the capital neutrality of the recipient following the transfer.~~deleted

Amendment 47 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 9

(9) The resolution framework is meant to be applied to ~~potentially any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business model~~certain institutions, if the tools available under national law are not adequate to manage its failure. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified. In particular, it is necessary to clarify that, depending on the specific circumstances, certain functions of the institution or entity can be considered critical even if their discontinuance would impact financial stability or critical services only at regional level.

Amendment 470 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraph 1 – subparagraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5

In the cases referred to in the first subparagraph, point (b), where the transfer to the recipient includes deposits that are not covered deposits or other bail- inable liabilities and the resolution authority assesses that the circumstances referred to in Article 44(3) apply to those deposits or liabilities, the deposit guarantee scheme shall contribute: (a) difference between the value of deposits, including deposits that are not covered, and of the liabilities with the same or higher priority ranking than deposits and the value of the assets of the institution under resolution which are to be transferred to a recipient; and (b) necessary to ensure the capital neutrality of the transfer for the recipient. Member States shall ensure that, once the deposit guarantee scheme has made a contribution in the cases referred to in the second subparagraph, the institution under resolution refrains from acquiring stakes in other undertakings as well as distributions in connection with Common Equity Tier 1 capital or payments on Additional Tier 1 instruments, or from other activities that may lead to an outflow of funds. In all cases, the cost of the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme shall not be greater than the cost of repaying depositors as calculated by the deposit guarantee scheme under Article 11e of Directive 2014/49/EU. Where it is determined by a valuation under Article 74 that the cost of the deposit guarantee scheme’s contribution to resolution was greater than the losses it would have incurred had the institution been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, the deposit guarantee scheme shall be entitled to the payment of the difference from the resolution financing arrangement in accordance with Article 75.deleted the amount necessary to cover the where relevant, an amount

Amendment 471 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point b

~~(b) where relevant, an amount necessary to ensure the capital neutrality of the transfer for the recipient.~~deleted

Amendment 472 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point b

(b) where relevant, an amount necessary to ensure the capital neutrality of the transfer for the recipient. The decision of the resolution authority to exclude eligible deposits from the application of the write-down or conversion powers shall give rise to a rebuttable presumption that such an exclusion meets the requirements laid down in Article 44(3). Paragraph 12 of Article 44 shall not apply to such an exclusion.

Amendment 473 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4

In all cases, the cost of the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme shall not be greater than the cost of repaying depositors as calculated by the deposit guarantee scheme under Article 11e of Directive 2014/49/EU and the amount equal to 50% of its target level pursuant to Article 10 of Directive 2014/49/EU. Taking into account the specificities of their national banking sector, Member States may set a percentage which is higher than 50%.

Amendment 474 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 5

Where it is determined by a valuation under Article 74 that the cost of the deposit guarantee scheme’s contribution to resolution was greater than the losses it would have incurred had the institution been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, the deposit guarantee scheme shall be entitled to the payment of the difference from the resolution financing arrangement in accordance with Article 75.deleted

Amendment 475 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraph 2

2. Member States shall ensure that the resolution authority determines the amount of the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme in accordance with paragraph 1 after having consulted the deposit guarantee scheme on the estimated cost of repaying depositors pursuant to Article 11e of Directive 2014/49/EU and in compliance with the conditions referred to in Article 36 of this Directive. The resolution authority shall notify its decision as referred to in the first subparagraph to the deposit guarantee scheme to which the institution is affiliated. The deposit guarantee scheme shall implement that decision without delay.;deleted

Amendment 476 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraph 2

2. Member States shall ensure that the resolution authority determines the amount of the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme in accordance with paragraph 1 after having consulted the deposit guarantee scheme on the estimated cost of repaying depositors pursuant to Article 11e of Directive 2014/49/EU and in compliance with the conditions referred to in Article 36 of this Directive. The resolution authority shall notify its decision as referred to in the first subparagraph to the deposit guarantee scheme to which the institution is affiliated. The deposit guarantee scheme shall implement that decision without delay.;deleted

Amendment 477 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraphs 2a & 2b

(b) the following paragraphs 2a and 2b are inserted: ‘ 2a. Where the funds of the deposit guarantee scheme are used in accordance with paragraph 1, first subparagraph, point (a), to contribute to the recapitalisation of the institution under resolution, Member States shall ensure that the deposit guarantee scheme transfers its holdings of shares or other capital instruments in the institution under resolution to the private sector as soon as commercial and financial circumstances allow. Member States shall ensure that the deposit guarantee scheme markets the shares and other capital instruments referred to in the first subparagraph openly and transparently, and that the sale does not misrepresent them or discriminate between potential purchasers. Any such sale shall be made on commercial terms. 2b. The contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, shall count towards the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a). Where the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, together with the contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities, allows for the use of the resolution financing arrangement, the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme shall be limited to the amount necessary to meet the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a). Following the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme, the resolution financing arrangement shall be used in accordance with the principles governing the use of the resolution financing arrangement set out in Articles 44 and 101. However, the first and the second subparagraphs shall not apply to institutions that have been identified as liquidation entities in the group resolution plan or in the resolution plan.; ’deleted

Amendment 478 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraph 2a

2a. Where the funds of the deposit guarantee scheme are used in accordance with paragraph 1, first subparagraph, point (a), to contribute to the recapitalisation of the institution under resolution, Member States shall ensure that the deposit guarantee scheme transfers its holdings of shares or other capital instruments in the institution under resolution to the private sector as soon as commercial and financial circumstances allow. Member States shall ensure that the deposit guarantee scheme markets the shares and other capital instruments referred to in the first subparagraph openly and transparently, and that the sale does not misrepresent them or discriminate between potential purchasers. Any such sale shall be made on commercial terms.deleted

Amendment 479 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraph 2b

2b. The contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, shall count towards the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a). Where the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, together with the contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities, allows for the use of the resolution financing arrangement, the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme shall be limited to the amount necessary to meet the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a). Following the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme, the resolution financing arrangement shall be used in accordance with the principles governing the use of the resolution financing arrangement set out in Articles 44 and 101. However, the first and the second subparagraphs shall not apply to institutions that have been identified as liquidation entities in the group resolution plan or in the resolution plan.;deleted

Amendment 48 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 9

(9) The resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business model, if the tools available under national law are not adequate to manage its failure and unless the institution is member to an Institutional Protection Scheme which provides for adequate measures to prevent or remedy failure. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified. In particular, it is necessary to clarify that, depending on the specific circumstances, certain functions of the institution or entity can be considered critical even if their discontinuance would impact ~~financial stability or~~ critical services only at regional level when there is a risk that the discontinuance will eventually cause a systemic crisis.

Amendment 480 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b

2b. The contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, shall count towards the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a). Where the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, together with the contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities, allows for the use of the resolution financing arrangement, the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme shall be limited to the amount necessary to meet the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a). Following the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme, the resolution financing arrangement shall be used in accordance with the principles governing the use of the resolution financing arrangement set out in Articles 44 and 101. However, the first and the second subparagraphs shall not apply to institutions that have been identified as liquidation entities in the group resolution plan or in the resolution plan.;deleted

Amendment 481 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b

The contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, shall count towards the thresholds laid down in Article ~~44(5), point (a), and in Article~~ 44(8), point (a).

Amendment 482 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraph 2b – subparagraph 1

The contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1~~, second subparagraph,~~ shall count towards the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a).

Amendment 483 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraph 2b – subparagraph 2

Where the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, together with the contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities, allows for the use of the resolution financing arrangement, ~~the~~and in case the DGS notifies the resolution authority that it anticipates a risk of facing a liquidity shortfall, the resolution authority may decide to limit the gross contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme ~~shall be limited~~ to the amount necessary to meet the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a). FIn such a case, following the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme, the resolution financing arrangement shall be used in accordance with the principles governing the use of the resolution financing arrangement set out in Articles 44 and 101, and any loss that the resolution financing arrangement thereby incurs as a result of its intervention shall be repaid to it by the DGS over a 6 year period at the most.

Amendment 484 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b

Where the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, together with the contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities, allows for the use of the resolution financing arrangement, the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme shall be ~~limited to~~equal to the sum of the amount necessary to meet the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a) and of the amount contributed by the resolution financing arrangement multiplied by the share of covered deposits as part of the total liabilities in the scope of the transfer. Following the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme, the resolution financing arrangement shall be used in accordance with the principles governing the use of the resolution financing arrangement set out in Articles 44 and 101.

Amendment 485 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraph 2b – subparagraph 2

Where the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, together with the contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities, allows for the use of the resolution financing arrangement, the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme shall be limited to the amount necessary to meet the thresholds laid down in Article ~~44(5), point (a), and in Article~~ 44(8), point (a). Following the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme, the resolution financing arrangement shall be used in accordance with the principles governing the use of the resolution financing arrangement set out in Articles 44 and 101.

Amendment 486 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraph 2b – subparagraph 3

~~However, the first and the second subparagraphs shall not apply to institutions that have been identified as liquidation entities in the group resolution plan or in the resolution plan.;~~deleted

Amendment 487 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraph 2b – subparagraph 3

However, the first and the second subparagraphs shall not apply to institutions that meet any of the following conditions: i) they have been identified as liquidation entities in the group resolution plan or in the resolution plan.; ii) they have never complied with their fully-loaded MREL requirements since being identified as resolution entities.

Amendment 488 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point d

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraph 5 – subparagraphs 2 & 3

~~(d) in paragraph 5, the second and third subparagraphs are~~ deleted;

Amendment 489 #

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 a (new)

Article2a Transitional period 1. Institutions or entities referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU whose preferred resolution strategy will change depending on the entry into force of this amending Directive shall comply with the requirements referred to in Articles 45e or 45f of Directive 2014/59/EU or with requirements that result from the application of Article 45b(4), (5) or (7) of Directive 2014/59/EU, as appropriate, within five years as from the date of the approval of the resolution plan including the new preferred resolution strategy. 2. During the transitional period referred to in the first paragraph, in the cases referred to in point (b), of the first subparagraph of Article 109(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU, as amended by this amending Directive, where the transfer to the recipient includes deposits that are not covered deposits or other bail-inable liabilities, by way of derogation from the second subparagraph of that paragraph, the deposit guarantee scheme shall contribute to the amount necessary to cover the difference between the value of deposits, including deposits that are not covered, of senior bail-inable liabilities held by retail clients, as defined in point (11) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU, and of the liabilities with the same or higher priority ranking than deposits and the value of the assets of the institution under resolution which are to be transferred to the recipient.

Amendment 49 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 9

(9) The resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business model, if the tools available under national law are not adequate to manage its failure. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified. In particular, it is necessary to clarify that, depending on the specific circumstances, certain functions of the institution or entity can be considered critical even if their discontinuance would impact financial stability or critical services only at regional level. This is to be distinguished from impacts at the local level only, such as cities, municipalities, counties or districts, as this hardly implies risks for financial stability.

Amendment 50 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 9

(9) The resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity, ~~irrespective of its size and business model,~~ if the tools available under national law are not adequate to manage its failure. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified. In particular, it is necessary to clarify that, depending on the specific circumstances, certain functions of the institution or entity can be considered critical ~~even~~ if their discontinuance would impact financial stability or critical services ~~only at regional level~~.

Amendment 51 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Recital 9

(9) The resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business model, if the tools available under national law are not adequate to manage its failure. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified. In particular, it is necessary to clarify that, depending on the specific circumstances, certain functions of the institution or entity can be considered critical even if their discontinuance would impact financial stability or critical services only at regional or sectoral level.

Amendment 52 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 9

(9) The resolution framework is meant to be applied to ~~potentially~~manage the failure of any institution or entity~~, irrespective of its size and business model, if~~ that has a positive public interest assessment, in particular when the tools available under national law are not adequate ~~to manage its failure~~. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to any failing institution or entity should be specified. In particular, it is necessary to clarify that, depending on the specific circumstances, certain functions of the institution or entity can be considered critical even if their discontinuance would impact financial stability or critical services only at regional level.

Amendment 53 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Recital 10

(10) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should reflect the consideration that depositors are better protected when deposit guarantee scheme (‘DGS’) funds are used more efficiently and the losses for those funds are minimised. Therefore, in the public interest assessment, the resolution objective of protecting depositors should be considered better achieved in resolution if opting for insolvency would be more costly for the DGS.deleted

Amendment 54 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 10

(10) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should reflect the consideration that depositors are better protected when deposit guarantee scheme (‘DGS’) funds are used more efficiently and the losses for those funds are minimised. Therefore, in the public interest assessment, the resolution objective of protecting depositors should be considered better achieved in resolution if opting for insolvency would be more costly for the DGS.deleted

Amendment 55 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 10

(10) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should reflect the consideration that depositors are better protected when deposit guarantee scheme (‘DGS’) funds are used more efficiently and the losses for those funds are minimised. Therefore, in the public interest assessment, the resolution objective of protecting depositors should be considered better achieved in resolution if opting for insolvency would be more costly for the DGS.deleted

Amendment 56 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Recital 10

(10) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should reflect the consideration that depositors are better protected when deposit guarantee scheme (‘DGS’) funds are used more efficiently and the losses for those funds are minimised. Therefore, in the public interest assessment, the resolution objective of protecting depositors should be considered better achieved in resolution if opting for insolvency would be more costly for the DGS.deleted

Amendment 57 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 10

(10) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should reflect, among other factors, the consideration that depositors are better protected when deposit guarantee scheme (‘DGS’) funds are used more efficiently and the losses for those funds are minimised. Therefore, in the public interest assessment, ~~the resolution objective of protecting~~protection of depositors should be considered better achieved in resolution if opting for insolvency would be more or equally costly for the DGS.

Amendment 58 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 10

(10) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should reflect the consideration that depositors are better protected when deposit guarantee scheme (‘DGS’) funds are used more efficiently and the losses for those funds are minimised. Therefore, in the public interest assessment, the resolution objective of protecting covered depositors should be considered better achieved in resolution if opting for insolvency would be more costly for the DGS.

Amendment 59 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 10 a (new)

(10a) Where national insolvency and resolution frameworks achieve effectively the objectives of the framework in a comparable manner, preference should be given to the option that minimises the risk for taxpayers and the economy. That approach ensures a prudent and responsible course of action, aligned with the overarching goal of safeguarding both the interests of taxpayers and the broader economic stability.

Amendment 60 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 11

(11) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or DGSs) and, on the other hand, funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline. Therefore, when assessing the objective of minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, resolution authorities should find funding through the resolution financing arrangements or the DGS preferable to funding through an equal amount of resources from the budget of Member States.deleted

Amendment 61 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Recital 11

(11) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or DGSs) and, on the other hand, funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline. As the public interest assessment is an ad hoc decision, it also lacks transparency and has negative consequences for the level playing field in the internal market. Therefore, when assessing the objective of minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, resolution authorities should find funding through the resolution financing arrangements or the DGS preferable toand funding through an equal amount of resources from the budget of Member States should be considered only under extraordinary circumstances.

Amendment 62 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 11

(11) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or DGSs) and, on the other hand, funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline. As the public interest assessment is an ad hoc decision, it also lacks transparency and has negative consequences for the level playing field in the internal market. Therefore, when assessing the objective of minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, resolution authorities should find funding through the resolution financing arrangements or the DGS preferable toand funding through an equal amount of resources from the budget of Member States.

Amendment 63 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Irene TINAGLI

Proposal for a directive
Recital 11

(11) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect~~, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through~~ the prioritisation of using industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or ~~DGSs) and, on the other hand,~~deposit guarantee schemes) instead of funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline. Therefore, when assessing the objective of minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, the Single Resolution Board or the resolution authorities should find funding through the resolution financing arrangements or the ~~DGS~~deposit guarantee scheme, preferable to funding through an equal amount of resources from the budget of Member States. For these purposes, funds provided by industry-funded safety nets shall not be considered as funds provided from the budget of a Member State.

Amendment 64 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 11

(11) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or DGSs) and, on the other hand, funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. ~~Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline.~~ Therefore, when assessing the objective of minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, resolution authorities should find funding through the resolution financing arrangements or the DGS preferable to funding through an equal amount of resources from the budget of Member States. However, this should not lead to expectation that burden sharing requirements will be reduced as burden sharing by shareholders and creditors should remain primary source of funding.

Amendment 65 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 11

(11) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or DGSs) and, on the other hand, funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. ~~Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline.~~ Therefore, when assessing the objective of minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, resolution authorities should find funding through the resolution financing arrangements or the DGS preferable to funding through an equal amount of resources from the budget of Member States. Nevertheless, burden sharing by shareholders and creditors must remain the primary source of funding.

Amendment 66 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 11 a (new)

(11a) Extraordinary public financial support to institutions and entities provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money or other State resources should be granted, if at all, only in extraordinary circumstances of a systemic nature or pertaining to very large economic turmoil, as it imposes a significant burden on public finances and disrupts the level playing field in the internal market.

Amendment 67 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Recital 12

(12) To ensure that the resolution objectives are attained in the most effective way, the outcome of the public interest assessment should be negative only where the winding up of the failing institution or entity under normal insolvency proceedings would achieve the resolution objectives more effectively and not only to the same extent as resolution.deleted

Amendment 68 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 12

(12) To ensure that the resolution objectives are attained in the most effective way, the outcome of the public interest assessment should be negative only where the winding up of the failing institution or entity under normal insolvency proceedings would achieve the resolution objectives more effectively and not only to the same extent as resolution.deleted

Amendment 69 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Recital 12

(12) To ensure that the resolution objectives are attained in the most effective way, the outcome of the public interest assessment should be negative only where the winding up of the failing institution or entity under normal insolvency proceedings would achieve the resolution objectives more effectively and not only to the same extent as resolution.deleted

Amendment 70 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 12

(12) To ensure that the resolution objectives are attained in the most effective way, ~~the outcome of~~ the public interest assessment should ~~be negative only where~~consider whether the winding up of the failing institution or entity under normal insolvency proceedings would achieve the resolution objectives more effectively than resolution, and not only to the same extent ~~as resolution.~~ . The assessment should include costs related to DGS payouts, such as the duration required for asset recovery and the income lost during the process.

Amendment 71 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 12

(12) To ensure that the resolution objectives are attained in the most effective way, the outcome of the public interest assessment should be negative ~~only~~ where the winding up of the failing institution or entity under normal insolvency proceedings would achieve the resolution objectives ~~more effectively and not only~~ to the same extent as resolution.

Amendment 72 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 12

(12) To ensure that the resolution objectives are attained in the most effective way, the outcome of the public interest assessment should be negative ~~only~~ where the winding up of the failing institution or entity under normal insolvency proceedings would achieve the resolution objectives ~~more effectively and not only~~ to the same extent as resolution.

Amendment 73 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 12

(12) To ensure that the resolution objectives are attained in the most effective way, the outcome of the public interest assessment should be negative ~~only~~ where the winding up of the failing institution or entity under normal insolvency proceedings would achieve the resolution objectives ~~more effectively and not only~~ to the same extent as in case of resolution.

Amendment 74 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 12

(12) To ensure that the resolution objectives are attained in the most effective way, ~~the outcome of~~ the public interest assessment should ~~be negative only where~~consider whether the winding up of the failing institution or entity under normal insolvency proceedings would achieve the resolution objectives ~~more effectively and not only~~ to the same extent as resolution.

Amendment 75 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 12 a (new)

(12a) All changes in connection with the public interest assessment are only intended to enable resolution authorities to apply the resolution tools to medium- sized or smaller institutions in a specific individual case and if there are exceptional circumstances. Resolution authorities should not be forced to apply resolution tools to the bulk of these institutions.

Amendment 76 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 16

(16) Competent authorities should be empowered to withdraw the authorisation of an institution or entity solely on the basis of the fact that the institution or entity is failing or likely to fail, there are no alternatives to prevent the failure and is not put in resolution. Competent authorities should be able to withdraw the authorisation to support the objective of winding up the institution or entity in accordance with national law, particularly in cases where the available procedures under national law cannot be initiated at the moment the institution or entity is determined to be failing or likely to fail, including the cases where the institution or entity is not yet balance sheet insolvent. To further ensure that the objective of winding up the institution or entity can be achieved, Member States should ensure that the withdrawal of the authorisation by the competent authority is also included among the possible conditions to initiate at least one of the procedures available under national law and applicable to institutions or entities that are failing or likely to fail but are not put in resolution.

Amendment 77 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Recital 17

(17) In light of the experience acquired in the implementation of Directive 2014/59/EU, Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 and Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council31 and without prejudice to the question whether a preventive measure constitutes extraordinary public financial support in the first place, it is necessary to specify further the conditions under which measures of a preventive precautionary nature that qualify as extraordinary public financial support may exceptionally be granted. To minimise distortions of competition arising from differences in nature of DGSs in the Union, interventions of DGSs in the context of preventive measures complying with Directive 2014/49/EU that qualify as extraordinary public financial support should exceptionally be allowed where the beneficiary institution or entity does not meet any of the conditions for being deemed as failing or likely to fail. It should be ensured that precautionary measures are taken sufficiently early. The European Central Bank (ECB) currently bases its consideration that an institution or entity is solvent, for the purposes of precautionary recapitalisation, on a forward-looking assessment for following 12 months of whether the institution or entity can comply with the own funds requirements set out in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council32 or in Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 of the European Parliament and of the Council33 , and the additional own funds requirement laid down in Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive (EU) 2019/2034. That practice should be laid down in Directive 2014/59/EU. Moreover, measures to provide relief for impaired assets, including asset management vehicles or asset guarantee schemes, can prove effective and efficient in addressing causes of possible financial distresses faced by institutions and entities and preventing their failure and could therefore constitute relevant precautionary measures. It should be therefore specified that such precautionary measures can take the form of impaired asset measures. __________________ 31 Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149). 32 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1). 33 Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on the prudential requirements of investment firms and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 575/2013, (EU) No 600/2014 and (EU) No 806/2014 (OJ L 314, 5.12.2019, p. 1).

Amendment 78 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 17

(17) In light of the experience acquired in the implementation of Directive 2014/59/EU, Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 and Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council31 , it is necessary to specify further the conditions under which measures of a preventive precautionary nature that qualify as extraordinary public financial support may exceptionally be granted. To minimise distortions of competition arising from differences in nature of DGSs in the Union, interventions of DGSs in the context of preventive measures complying with Directive 2014/49/EU that qualify as extraordinary public financial support should exceptionally be allowed where the beneficiary institution or entity ~~does not meet any of the conditions for being deemed as~~has been not declared failing or likely to fail. It should be ensured that precautionary measures are taken sufficiently early. The European Central Bank (ECB) currently bases its consideration that an institution or entity is solvent, for the purposes of precautionary recapitalisation, on a forward-looking assessment for following 12 months of whether the institution or entity can comply with the own funds requirements set out in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council32 or in Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 of the European Parliament and of the Council33 , and the additional own funds requirement laid down in Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive (EU) 2019/2034. That practice should be ~~laid down~~revised in Directive 2014/59/EU. Moreover, measures to provide relief for impaired assets, including asset management vehicles or asset guarantee schemes, can prove effective and efficient in addressing causes of possible financial distresses faced by institutions and entities and preventing their failure and could therefore constitute relevant precautionary measures. It should be therefore specified that such precautionary measures can take the form of impaired asset measures. __________________ 31 Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149). 32 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1). 33 Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on the prudential requirements of investment firms and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 575/2013, (EU) No 600/2014 and (EU) No 806/2014 (OJ L 314, 5.12.2019, p. 1).

Amendment 79 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Recital 17

(17) In light of the experience acquired in the implementation of Directive 2014/59/EU, Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 and Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council31 , it is necessary to specify further the conditions under which measures of a preventive precautionary nature that qualify as extraordinary public financial support may exceptionally be granted. To minimise distortions of competition arising from differences in nature of DGSs in the Union, interventions of DGSs in the context of preventive measures complying with Directive 2014/49/EU that qualify as extraordinary public financial support should exceptionally be allowed where the beneficiary institution or entity ~~does not meet any of the conditions for being deemed as~~has been not declared failing or likely to fail. It should be ensured that precautionary measures are taken sufficiently early. The European Central Bank (ECB) currently bases its consideration that an institution or entity is solvent, for the purposes of precautionary recapitalisation, on a forward-looking assessment for following 12 months of whether the institution or entity can comply with the own funds requirements set out in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council32 or in Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 of the European Parliament and of the Council33 , and the additional own funds requirement laid down in Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive (EU) 2019/2034. That practice should be ~~laid down~~revised in Directive 2014/59/EU. Moreover, measures to provide relief for impaired assets, including asset management vehicles or asset guarantee schemes, can prove effective and efficient in addressing causes of possible financial distresses faced by institutions and entities and preventing their failure and could therefore constitute relevant precautionary measures. It should be therefore specified that such precautionary measures can take the form of impaired asset measures. __________________ 31 Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149). 32 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1). 33 Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on the prudential requirements of investment firms and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 575/2013, (EU) No 600/2014 and (EU) No 806/2014 (OJ L 314, 5.12.2019, p. 1).

Amendment 80 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 18

(18) To preserve market discipline, protect public funds and avoid distortions of competition, precautionary measures should remain the exception and only be applied to address situations of serious disturbance in the market or to preserve financial stability. Moreover, precautionary measures should not be used to address incurred or likely losses unless an exception to the burden-sharing requirement is made under Union State aid framework. The most reliable instrument to identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses is an asset quality review by the ECB, the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (EBA), established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council34 or national competent authorities. Competent authorities should use such a review to identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses where such review can be carried out within a reasonable timeframe. Where that is not possible, competent authorities should identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses in the most reliable way possible under the prevailing circumstances, based on on-site inspections where appropriate. __________________ 34 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12).

Amendment 81 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Recital 18

(18) To preserve market discipline, protect public funds and avoid distortions of competition, precautionary measures should remain the exception and only be applied to address situations of serious disturbance in the market or to preserve financial stability. Moreover, precautionary measures should not be used to address incurred or likely losses unless the Union State aid framework allows for an exception to the burden-sharing requirement. The most reliable instrument to identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses is an asset quality review by the ECB, the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (EBA), established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council34 or national competent authorities. Competent authorities should use such a review to identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses where such review can be carried out within a reasonable timeframe. Where that is not possible, competent authorities should identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses in the most reliable way possible under the prevailing circumstances, based on on-site inspections where appropriate. __________________ 34 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12).

Amendment 82 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Irene TINAGLI

Proposal for a directive
Recital 18

(18) To preserve market discipline, protect public funds and avoid distortions of competition, precautionary measures should remain the exception and only be applied to address situations of serious disturbance in the market or to preserve financial stability, in particular in the event of a systemic crisis. Moreover, precautionary measures should not be used to address incurred or likely losses. The most reliable instrument to identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses is an asset quality review by the ECB, the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (EBA), established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council34 or national competent authorities. Competent authorities should use such a review to identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses where such review can be carried out within a reasonable timeframe. Where that is not possible, competent authorities should identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses in the most reliable way possible under the prevailing circumstances, based on on-site inspections where appropriate. __________________ 34 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12).

Amendment 83 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 19

(19) Precautionary recapitalisation is aimed at supporting viable institutions and entities identified as likely to encounter temporary difficulties in the near future and to prevent their situation from deteriorating further. To avoid that public subsidies are granted to businesses that are already unprofitable when the support is granted, precautionary measures granted in the form of acquisition of own funds instruments or other capital instruments or through impaired asset measures should not exceed the amount necessary to cover capital shortfalls as identified in the adverse scenario of a stress test or equivalent exercise. To ensure that public financing is ultimately discontinued, those precautionary measures should also be limited in time and contain a clear timeline for their termination (exit strategy). Perpetual instruments, including Common Equity Tier 1 capital, should only be used in exceptional circumstances and be subject to certain quantitative limits because by their nature they are not well suited for compliance with the condition of temporariness.

Amendment 84 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Irene TINAGLI, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Recital 19

(19) Precautionary recapitalisation is aimed at supporting viable institutions and entities identified as likely to encounter temporary difficulties in the near future and to prevent their situation from deteriorating further. To avoid that public subsidies are granted to businesses that are already unprofitable when the support is granted, precautionary measures granted in the form of acquisition of own funds instruments or other capital instruments or through impaired asset measures should not exceed the amount necessary to cover capital shortfalls as identified in the adverse scenario of a stress test or equivalent exercise. To ensure that public financing is ultimately discontinued, those precautionary measures should also be limited in time and contain a clear timeline for their termination (exit strategy). Perpetual instruments, including Common Equity Tier 1 capital, should only be used ~~in exceptional circumstances and be subject to certain quantitative limits because by their nature they are not well suited for compliance with the condition of temporariness~~when strictly necessary.

Amendment 85 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Recital 20

(20) Precautionary measures should be limited to the amount that the institution or entity would need to maintain its solvency in the case of an adverse scenario event as determined in a stress test or equivalent exercise. In the case of precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures, the receiving institution or entity should be able to use that amount to cover losses on the transferred assets or in combination with an acquisition of capital instruments, provided that the overall amount of the shortfall identified is not exceeded. It is also necessary to ensure that such precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures comply with existing State aid rules and best practices, that they restore the institution or entity's long-term viability, that State aid is limited to the minimum necessary and that distortions of competition are avoided. For those reasons, the authorities concerned should in case of precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures take into account the specific guidance, including the AMC Blueprint35 and the Communication on Tackling Non- Performing Loans36 . Those precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures should always be subject to the overriding condition of temporariness. Public guarantees granted for a specified period in relation to the impaired assets of the institution or entity concerned are expected to ensure better compliance with the temporariness condition than transfers of such assets to a publicly supported entity. To ensure the market exit of institutions and entities that prove not to be viable, despite the support received, it is necessary to lay down that non- compliance by the institution or entity concerned with the terms of the support measures specified at the time such measures were granted is to result in the institution or entity concerned being considered failing or likely to fail. __________________ 35 COM(2018) 133 final. 36 COM(2020) 822 final.

Amendment 86 #

Pedro MARQUES, René REPASI, Aurore LALUCQ, Irene TINAGLI, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ

Proposal for a directive
Recital 20

(20) Precautionary measures should be limited to the amount that the institution or entity would need to maintain its solvency in the case of an adverse scenario event as determined in a stress test or equivalent exercise. In the case of precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures, the receiving institution or entity should be able to use that amount to cover losses on the transferred assets or in combination with an acquisition of capital instruments, provided that the overall amount of the shortfall identified is not exceeded. It is also necessary to ensure that such precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures comply with existing State aid rules and best practices, that they restore the institution or entity's long-term viability, that State aid is limited to the minimum necessary and that distortions of competition are avoided. For those reasons, the authorities concerned should in case of precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures take into account the specific guidance, including the AMC Blueprint35 and the Communication on Tackling Non- Performing Loans36 . Those precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures should always be subject to the overriding condition of temporariness. Public guarantees granted for a specified period in relation to the impaired assets of the institution or entity concerned are expected to ensure better compliance with the temporariness condition than transfers of such assets to a publicly supported entity. To ensure th~~e market exit of institutions and entities that prove not to be viable, despite the support received, it is necessary to lay down that non- com~~at institutions receiving support comply with terms of the support measure, competent authorities should request a remediation plian~~ce by the~~ from institution ~~or entity concerned with the terms of the support measures specified at the time such measures were granted is to result in the institution or entity concerned being considered~~s that failed to fulfil their commitments. Where a competent authority is of the opinion that the measures in the remediation plan are not capable of achieving the institution’s long-term viability or where the institution failed to comply with the remediation plan, relevant authorities shall carry out an assessment of whether the institution is failing or is likely to fail, in accordance with Article 32 of Directive 2014/59/EU. __________________ 35 COM(2018) 133 final. 36 COM(2020) 822 final.

Amendment 87 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 26

(26) In certain circumstances, after the resolution financing arrangement has provided a contribution up to the maximum of 5 % of the institution or entity’s total liabilities including own funds, resolution authorities may use additional sources of funding to further support their resolution action. It should be specified more clearly in which circumstances the resolution financing arrangement may provide further support where all liabilities with a priority ranking lower than deposits that are not mandatorily or discretionarily excluded from bail-in have been written down or converted in full.deleted

Amendment 88 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 26

(26) In certain circumstances, after the resolution financing arrangement has provided a contribution up to the maximum of 5 % of the institution or entity’s total liabilities including own funds, resolution authorities may use additional sources of funding to further support their resolution action. It should be specified more clearly in which circumstances the resolution financing arrangement may provide further support where all liabilities with a priority ranking lower than deposits that are not mandatorily or discretionarily excluded from bail-in have been written down or converted in full.

Amendment 89 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 28

(28) The rules for determining the MREL are mostly focused on setting the appropriate level of the MREL with the assumption of the bail-in tool as the preferred resolution strategy. However, Directive 2014/59/EU allows resolution authorities to use other resolution tools, namely those relying on the transfer of the business of the institution under resolution to a private purchaser or to a bridge institution, as a standalone tool or in combination with other tools including bail-in. It should therefore be further specified that, in case the resolution plan envisages the use of a combination tool, or the sale of business tool or of the bridge institution tool and the resolution entity’s exit from the market, resolution authorities should always determine the level of the MREL for the resolution entity concerned on the basis of the specificities of those resolution tools and of the different loss- absorbing and recapitalisation needs those tools entail, taking into consideration the reduction in size and complexity that result from the implementation of recovery options in the runup to resolution and the resolution actions.

Amendment 90 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Recital 29

(29) The level of the MREL for resolution entities is the sum of the amount of the losses expected in resolution and the recapitalisation amount that enable the post-resolution entity to continue to comply with its conditions for authorisation and enabling it to pursue its activities for the appropriate period. Certain preferred resolution strategies entail the transfer of assets, rights and liabilities to a recipient and market exit, in particular the sale of business tool. In those cases, the objectives pursued by the recapitalisation component might not apply to the same extent, because the resolution authority will not be required to ensure that the resolution entity restores compliance with its own funds requirements after resolution action, although the acquirer might ask for the transaction to be capital neutral. Nevertheless, the losses in such cases are expected to exceed the resolution entity’s own funds requirements. It is therefore appropriate to lay down that the level of the MREL of those resolution entities continues to include a recapitalisation amount that is adjusted in a way that is proportionate to the resolution strategy, and subject to an appropriate floor.

Amendment 91 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 29

(29) The level of the MREL for resolution entities is the sum of the amount of the losses expected in resolution and the recapitalisation amount that enable the resolution entity to continue to comply with its conditions for authorisation and enabling it to pursue its activities for the appropriate period. Certain preferred resolution strategies entail the transfer of assets, rights and liabilities to a recipient and market exit, in particular the sale of business tool. In those cases, the objectives pursued by the recapitalisation component might not apply to the same extent, because the resolution authority will not be required to ensure that the resolution entity restores compliance with its own funds requirements after resolution action. ~~Nevertheless, the losses in such cases are expected to exceed the resolution entity’s own funds requirements.~~ It is therefore appropriate to lay down that the level of the MREL of those resolution entities continues to include a recapitalisation amount that is adjusted in a way that is proportionate to the resolution strategy.

Amendment 92 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Recital 29

(29) The level of the MREL for resolution entities is the sum of the amount of the losses expected in resolution and the recapitalisation amount that enable the resolution entity to continue to comply with its conditions for authorisation and enabling it to pursue its activities for the appropriate period. Certain preferred resolution strategies entail the transfer of assets, rights and liabilities to a recipient and market exit, in particular the sale of business tool. In those cases, the objectives pursued by the recapitalisation component might not apply to the same extent, because the resolution authority will not be required to ensure that the resolution entity restores compliance with its own funds requirements after resolution action. Nevertheless, the losses in such cases are expected to exceed the resolution entity’s own funds requirements. It is therefore appropriate to lay down that the level of the MREL of those resolution entities continues to include a recapitalisation amount that is adjusted in a way that ~~is proportionate to~~supports the resolution strategy.

Amendment 93 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 30

(30) Where the resolution strategy envisages the use of resolution tools other than bail-in, the recapitalisation needs of the entity concerned will generally be smaller after resolution than in case of open bank bail-in. The calibration of the MREL in such a case should take that aspect into account when estimating the recapitalisation requirement. Therefore, when adjusting the level of the MREL for resolution entities the resolution plan of which envisages the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, resolution authorities should take into account the features of those tools, including the expected perimeter of the transfer to the private purchaser or to the bridge institution, the types of instruments to be transferred, the expected value and marketability of those instruments and the design of the preferred resolution strategy, including the complementary use of the asset separation tool. Since the resolution authority has to decide on a case by case basis on any possible use in resolution of funds from DGS and since such decision cannot be assumed with certainty ex ante, the resolution authorities should not consider the potential contribution of the DGS in resolution when calibrating the level of the MREL.

Amendment 94 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 30

(30) Where the resolution strategy envisages the use of resolution tools other than bail-in or alongside bail-in, the recapitalisation needs of the entity concerned will generally be smaller after resolution than in case of the sole open bank bail-in strategy. The calibration of the MREL in such a case should take that aspect into account when estimating the recapitalisation requirement. Therefore, when adjusting the level of the MREL for such resolution entities ~~the resolution plan of which envisages the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market~~, resolution authorities should take into account the features of those tools, including the expected perimeter of the transfer to the private purchaser or to the bridge institution, the types of instruments to be transferred, the expected value and marketability of those instruments and the design of the preferred resolution strategy, including the complementary use of the asset separation tool~~. S~~ or any other tool. In the case of the transfer tool with market exit, since the resolution authority has to decide on a case by case basis on any possible use in resolution of funds from DGS and since such decision cannot be assumed with certainty ex ante, the resolution authorities should not consider the potential contribution of the DGS in resolution when calibrating the level of the MREL.

Amendment 95 #

Marco ZANNI, Valentino GRANT, Antonio Maria RINALDI

Proposal for a directive
Recital 31

(31) It is necessary to ensure equal incentives to build sufficient amounts of MREL for institutions and entities that would be subject to transfer strategies both in and outside resolution. The setting of level of the MREL for institutions or entities that may be subject to of measures in the context of national insolvency proceedings pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU should therefore follow the same rules as those applicable to the setting of the MREL for resolution entities whose preferred resolution strategy provides for the sale of business or transfer to a bridge institution leading to its exit from the market.deleted

Amendment 96 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 31

(31) It is necessary to ensure equal incentives to build sufficient amounts of MREL for institutions and entities that would be subject to transfer strategies both in and outside resolution. The setting of level of the MREL for institutions or entities that may be subject to of measures in the context of national insolvency proceedings pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU should therefore follow the same rules as those applicable to the setting of the MREL for resolution entities whose preferred resolution strategy provides for the sale of business or transfer to a bridge institution leading to its exit from the market.deleted

Amendment 97 #

Proposal for a directive
Recital 31

(31) It is necessary to ensure equal incentives to build sufficient amounts of MREL for institutions and entities that would be subject to transfer strategies both in and outside resolution. The setting of level of the MREL for institutions or entities that may be subject to of measures in the context of national insolvency proceedings pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU should therefore follow the same rules as those applicable to the setting of the MREL for resolution entities whose preferred resolution strategy provides for the sale of business or transfer to a bridge institution leading to its exit from the market.deleted

Amendment 98 #