8 Amendments of Svenja HAHN related to 2023/2072(INI)
Amendment 7 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Notes that China was the seventh biggest investor in the EU in 2021 and that Chinese investments in Europe continued to decline in 2022, reaching a 10-year low of EUR 7.9 billion, following a different pattern than the global recovery in FDI flows seen in 2021;
Amendment 9 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Highlights that according to an Evaluation from the European Union Court of Auditors, Chinese investments in the EU have been concentrated during 2000-2020 in strategic areas such as transport and infrastructure, information and communication technologies, and energy;
Amendment 10 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 b (new)
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Points out that the political system in China provides for investors based on a combination of private and state actors or of state-owned enterprises, closely linked to the ruling party, and therefore brings ambiguity regarding the interest behind their investments in third countries’ critical infrastructure;
Amendment 12 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Is nevertheless convinced that the trade and investment relationship between the EU and China isare of strategeconomic importance and should bethat these should be reciprocal and rules- based, with the multilateral trading system and the principle of reciprocity at its cobe it on a bilateral level or under the multilateral trading system; regrets that this is not the case today and believes that the enlarged EU trade toolbox with autonomous measures such as the FDI screening, the International Procurement and the Foreign Subsidies Instruments, the Enforcement as well as the Anti- Coercion regulations, are of major importance when it comes to foreign ownership, control or access to EU critical infrastructure;
Amendment 19 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Emphasises that trade and investment are key drivers of sustainable growth, job creation and, innovation and that the EU should therefore maintain its economic openness 1 ; Meanwhile the European Union must strike a balance between investment attractiveness and the defence of its critical infrastructures and at the same time its autonomy; in this sense welcomes the new de-risking strategy in the Commission’s and the High Representative’s Communication on a European Economic Security Strategy in June 2023; _________________ 1 Commission communication of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’ (COM(2021)0066).
Amendment 38 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Welcomes the Commission’s proposed European economic security strategy2 , which aims to maximise the benefits of the EU’s economic openness while minimising the risks resulting from economic interdependencies; and to protect, promote and strengthen the European open autonomy strategy;. Approves of the fact that the strategy explicitly recognises that risks to the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure are key security vulnerabilities for European economies; _________________ 2 Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on ‘European Economic Security Strategy’ (JOIN(2023)0020).
Amendment 44 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Raises concerns over the fact that Chinese investment in critical infrastructure in third countries may lead to gaining control in or over some sectors, which in turn could facilitate espionage and control of access; believes in this respect that cooperation between EU Member States is key, in ensuring security and public order when it comes to foreign direct investments into the EU but also in order to ensure incentives for Union wide strategic cooperation that makes configurations like the 14+1 less attractive ;
Amendment 55 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Recalls that the Regulation on the screening of foreign direct investments3 addresses risks to security and public order resulting from investments from outside the EU; notes that critical infrastructure is among the factors that may be taken into consideration by the Member States or the Commission in determining whether an investment is likely to affect security or public order.; expresses strong concerns that all Member States do not have in place or use screening on foreign investment in critical infrastructure and believes that there is scope and need for strengthening the Regulation in its upcoming review at the end of the year; _________________ 3 Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (OJ L 79I, 21.3.2019, p. 1).