BETA

30 Amendments of Olivier CHASTEL related to 2020/0361(COD)

Amendment 188 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 42
(42) Where a hosting service provider decides to remove or disable information provided by a recipient of the service, for instance following receipt of a notice or acting on its own initiative, including through the use of automated means that have been proven to be efficient, proportionate and accurate, that provider should inform the recipient of its decision, the reasons for its decision and the available redress possibilities to contest the decision, in view of the negative consequences that such decisions may have for the recipient, including as regards the exercise of its fundamental right to freedom of expression. That obligation should apply irrespective of the reasons for the decision, in particular whether the action has been taken because the information notified is considered to be illegal content or incompatible with the applicable terms and conditions. Available recourses to challenge the decision of the hosting service provider should always include judicial redress.
2021/06/10
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 198 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 46
(46) Action against illegal content can be taken more quickly and reliably where online platforms take the necessary measures to ensure that notices submitted by trusted flaggers through the notice and action mechanisms required by this Regulation are treated with priority, without prejudice to the requirement to process and decide upon all notices submitted under those mechanisms in a timely, diligent and objective manner. Such trusted flagger status should only be awarded to entities, and not individuals, that have demonstrated, among other things, that they have particular expertise and competence in tackling illegal content, that they represent collective interests and that they work in a diligent and objective manner. Such entities can be public in nature, such as, for terrorist content for instance, internet referral units of national law enforcement authorities or of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (‘Europol’) or they can be non-governmental organisations and semi- public bodies, such as the organisations part of the INHOPE network of hotlines for reporting child sexual abuse material and organisations committed to notifying illegal racist and xenophobic expressions online. For intellectual property rights, organisations of industry and of right- holders could be awarded trusted flagger status, where they have demonstrated that they meet the applicable conditions. The rules of this Regulation on trusted flaggers should not be understood to prevent online platforms from giving similar treatment to notices submitted by entities or individuals that have not been awarded trusted flagger status under this Regulation, from otherwise cooperating with other entities, in accordance with the applicable law, including this Regulation and Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council.43 _________________ 43Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA, OJ L 135, 24.5.2016, p. 53
2021/06/10
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 203 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 48
(48) An online platform may in some instances become aware, such as through a notice by a notifying party or through its own voluntary measures, of information relating to certain activity of a recipient of the service, such as the provision of certain types of illegal content, that reasonably justify, having regard to all relevant circumstances of which the online platform is aware, the suspicion that the recipient may have committed, may be committing or is likely to commit a serious criminal offence involving a threat to the life or safety of person, notably when it concerns vulnerable users such as children, such as offences specified in Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council44 . In such instances, the online platform should inform without delay the competent law enforcement authorities of such suspicion, providing all relevant information available to it, including where relevant the content in question and an explanation of its suspicion. This Regulation does not provide the legal basis for profiling of recipients of the services with a view to the possible identification of criminal offences by online platforms. Online platforms should also respect other applicable rules of Union or national law for the protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals when informing law enforcement authorities. _________________ 44Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA (OJ L 335, 17.12.2011, p. 1).
2021/06/10
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 209 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 52
(52) Online advertisement plays an important role in the online environment, including in relation to the provision of the services of online platforms. However, online advertisement can contribute to significant risks, ranging from advertisement that is itself illegal content, to contributing to financial incentives for the publication or amplification of illegal or otherwise harmful content and activities online, or the discriminatory display of advertising with an impact on the equal treatment and opportunities of citizens. In addition to the requirements resulting from Article 6 of Directive 2000/31/EC, online platforms should therefore be required to ensure that the recipients of the service have certain individualised information necessary for them to understand when and on whose behalf the advertisement is displayed. In addition, recipients of the service should have an easy access to information on the main parameters used for determining that specific advertising is to be displayed to them, providing meaningful explanations of the logic used to that end, including when this is based on profiling. The requirements of this Regulation on the provision of information relating to advertisement is without prejudice to the application of the relevant provisions of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, in particular those regarding the right to object, automated individual decision- making, including profiling and specifically the need to obtain consent of the data subject prior to the processing of personal data for targeted advertising. Similarly, it is without prejudice to the provisions laid down in Directive 2002/58/EC in particular those regarding the storage of information in terminal equipment and the access to information stored therein.
2021/06/10
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 210 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 53
(53) Given the importance of very large online platforms, due to their reach, in particular as expressed in number of recipients of the service, in facilitating public debate, economic transactions and the dissemination of information, opinions and ideas and in influencing how recipients obtain and communicate information online, it is necessary to impose specific obligations on those platforms, in addition to the obligations applicable to all online platforms. Those additional obligations on very large online platforms are necessary to address those public policy concerns, t specifically regarding disinformation, misinformation, hate speech or any other types of harmful content. There being no alternative and less restrictive measures that would effectively achieve the same result.
2021/06/10
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 213 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 56
(56) Very large online platforms are used in a way that strongly influences safety online, the shaping of public opinion and discourse, as well as on online trade. The way they design their services is generally optimised to benefit their often advertising-driven business models and can cause real societal concerns. In the absence of effective regulation and enforcement, they can set the rules of the game, without effectively identifying and mitigating the risks and the societal and economic harm they can cause. Under this Regulation, very large online platforms should therefore assess the systemic risks stemming from the functioning and use of their service, as well as by potential misuses by the recipients of the service, and take appropriate mitigating measures.
2021/06/10
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 223 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 58
(58) Very large online platforms should deploy the necessary means to diligently mitigate the systemic risks identified in the risk assessment. Very large online platforms should under such mitigating measures consider, for example, enhancing or otherwise adapting the design and functioning of their content moderation, algorithmic recommender systems and online interfaces, so that they discourage and limit the dissemination of illegal content, adapting their decision-making processes, or adapting their terms and conditions as well as making content moderation policies, as well as the way they are enforced fully transparent for the users. They may also include corrective measures, such as discontinuing advertising revenue for specific content, or other actions, such as improving the visibility of authoritative information sources. Very large online platforms may reinforce their internal processes or supervision of any of their activities, in particular as regards the detection of systemic risks. They may also initiate or increase cooperation with trusted flaggers, organise training sessions and exchanges with trusted flagger organisations, and cooperate with other service providers, including by initiating or joining existing codes of conduct or other self-regulatory measures. Any measures adopted should respect the due diligence requirements of this Regulation and be effective and appropriate for mitigating the specific risks identified, in the interest of safeguarding public order, protecting privacy and fighting fraudulent and deceptive commercial practices, and should be proportionate in light of the very large online platform’s economic capacity and the need to avoid unnecessary restrictions on the use of their service, taking due account of potential negative effects on the fundamental rights of the recipients of the service.
2021/06/10
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 229 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 60
(60) Given the need to ensure verification by independent experts, very large online platforms should be accountable, through independent auditing, for their compliance with the obligations laid down by this Regulation and, where relevant, any complementary commitments undertaking pursuant to codes of conduct and crises protocols. They should give the auditor access to all relevant data necessary to perform the audit properly. Auditors should also be able to make use of other sources of objective information, including studies by vetted researchers. Auditors should guarantee the confidentiality, security and integrity of the information, such as trade secrets, that they obtain when performing their tasks and have the necessary expertise in the area of risk management and technical competence to audit algorithms. Auditors should be independent, so as to be able to perform their tasks in an adequate, efficient and trustworthy manner. If their independence is not beyond doubt, they should resign or abstain from the audit engagement.
2021/06/10
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 249 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 68
(68) It is appropriate that this Regulation identify certain areas of consideration for such codes of conduct. In particular, risk mitigation measures concerning specific types of illegal content should be explored via self- and co-regulatory agreements. Another area forspect which needs to be considerationed is the possible negative impacts of systemic risks on society and democracy, such as disinformation, harmful content, in particular hate speech, or manipulative and abusive activities. This includes coordinated operations aimed at amplifying information, including disinformation, such as the use of bots or fake accounts for the creation of fake or misleading information, sometimes with a purpose of obtaining economic gain, which are particularly harmful for vulnerable recipients of the service, such as children. In relation to such areas, adherence to and compliance with a given code of conduct by a very large online platform may be considered as an appropriate risk mitigating measure. The refusal without proper explanations by an online platform of the Commission’s invitation to participate in the application of such a code of conduct could be taken into account, where relevant, when determining whether the online platform has infringed the obligations laid down by this Regulation.
2021/06/10
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 251 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 69
(69) The rules on codes of conduct under this Regulation could serve as a basis for already established self-regulatory efforts at Union level, including the Product Safety Pledge, the Memorandum of Understanding against counterfeit goods, the Code of Conduct against illegal hate speech as well as the Code of practice on disinformation. In particular for the latter, since the Commission willhas issued guidance for strengthening the Code of practice on disinformation as announced in the European Democracy Action Plan, in May 2021.
2021/06/10
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 253 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 71
(71) In case of extraordinary circumstances affecting public security or public health, the Commission may initiate the drawing up of crisis protocols to coordinate a rapid, collective and cross- border response in the online environment in the public interest. Extraordinary circumstances may entail any unforeseeable event, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, pandemics and other serious cross-border threats to public health, war and acts of terrorism, where, for example, online platforms may be misused for the rapid spread of illegal content or disinformation or where the need arises for rapid dissemination of reliable information. In light of the important role of very large online platforms in disseminating information in our societies and across borders, such platforms should be encouraged in drawing up and applying specific crisis protocols. Such crisis protocols should be activated only for a limited period of time and the measures adopted should also be limited to what is strictly necessary to address the extraordinary circumstance. Those measures should be consistent with this Regulation, and should not amount to a general obligation for the participating very large online platforms to monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal content.
2021/06/10
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 327 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 b (new)
Article 7 b No limitation of encryption and security No general obligation to limit the level of their security and encryption measures shall be imposed on providers of intermediary services.
2021/06/10
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 328 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 c (new)
Article 7 c No general and indiscriminate retention of data No general obligation to retain personal data of the recipients of their services shall be imposed on providers of intermediary services. Any obligation to retain data shall be limited to what is strictly necessary with respect to the categories of data to be retained, the means of communication affected, the persons concerned and the retention period adopted.
2021/06/10
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 335 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 2 – point a – introductory part
(a) the orders contains the following elements:
2021/06/10
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 342 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 34
(34) In order to achieve the objectives of this Regulation, and in particular to improve the functioning of the internal market and ensure a safe and transparent online environment, it is necessary to establish a clear and balanced set of harmonised due diligence obligations for providers of intermediary services. Those obligations should aim in particular to guarantee different public policy objectives such as the safety, health and trust of the recipients of the service, including minors, women and vulnerable users, protect the relevant fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter, to ensure meaningful accountability of those providers and to empowerprovide recourse to recipients and other affected parties, whilst facilitating the necessary oversight by competent authorities.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 397 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1
1. Providers of intermediary services shall include information on any restrictions that they impose in relation to the use of their service in respect of information provided by the recipients of the service, in their terms and conditions. That information shall include information on any policies, procedures, measures and tools used for the purpose of content moderation, including algorithmic decision-making and human review. It shall be set out in clear and, unambiguous, very easily comprehensible language and shall be publicly available in an easily accessible format.
2021/06/10
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 433 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 1
1. Providers of hosting services shall put mechanisms in place to allow any individual or entity to notify them of the presence on their service of specific items of information that the individual or entity considers to be illegal content. Those mechanisms shall be easy to access, user- friendly, and allow for the submission of notices exclusively by electronic means. For instance a clearly identifiable banner, allowing the users of those hosting services to notify quickly and easily the providers of hosting services, of illegal content or manifestly illegal content when it is encountered by users, as well as putting at users’ disposal, including children, information regarding what is considered illegal content under Union and national law. They shall also, where applicable, inform users, including children, of available public tools in the Member State which provides a service to signal manifestly illegal content to the authorities.
2021/06/10
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 478 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 57
(57) Three categories of systemic risks should be assessed in-depth. A first category concerns the risks associated with the misuse of their service through the dissemination of illegal content, such as the dissemination of child sexual abuse material or illegal hate speech, and the conduct of illegal activities, such as the sale of products or services prohibited by Union or national law, including counterfeit products. For example, and without prejudice to the personal responsibility of the recipient of the service of very large online platforms for possible illegality of his or her activity under the applicable law, such dissemination or activities may constitute a significant systematic risk where access to such content may be amplified through accounts with a particularly wide reach. A second category concerns the impact of the service on the exercise of fundamental rights, as protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, including the freedom of expression and information, the right to private life, the right to non-discrimination, the right to gender equality and the rights of the child. Such risks may arise, for example, in relation to the design of the algorithmic systems used by the very large online platform or the misuse of their service through the submission of abusive notices or other methods for silencing speech or hampering competition. A third category of risks concerns the intentional and, oftentimes, coordinated manipulation of the platform’s service through the submission of abusive notices, with a foreseeable impact on health, civic discourse, electoral processes, public security and protection of minors, having regard to the need to safeguard public order, protect privacy and fight fraudulent and deceptive commercial practices. Such risks may arise, for example, through the creation of fake accounts, the use of bots, and other automated or partially automated behaviours, which may lead to the rapid and widespread dissemination of information that is illegal content or incompatible with an online platform’s terms and conditions.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 513 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Recipients of the service addressed by the decisions referred to in Article 17(1), shall be entitled to select any out-of- court dispute settlement body that has been certified in accordance with paragraph 2 in order to resolve disputes relating to those decisions, including complaints that could not be resolved by means of the internal complaint-handling system referred to in that Article. Online platforms shall engage, in good faith, with the body selected with a view to resolving the dispute and shall be bound by the decision taken by the body.
2021/06/10
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 591 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) the number of suspensions imposed pursuant to Article 20, distinguishing clearly between suspensions enacted for the provision of manifestly illegal content, the submission of manifestly unfounded notices and the submission of manifestly unfounded complaints;
2021/06/10
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 734 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 31 – paragraph 1
1. Very large online platforms shall provide the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment or the Commission, upon their reasoned request and within a reasonable period, specified in the request, access to data that are necessary to monitor and assess compliance with this Regulation. That Digital Services Coordinator and the Commission shall only request, access, and use that data for those purposes.
2021/06/10
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 802 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 41 – paragraph 3 – point b
(b) where the Digital Services Coordinator considers that the provider has not sufficiently complied with the requirements of the first indent, that the infringement persists and causes serious harm, and that the infringement entails a serious criminal offence involving a direct and imminent threat to the life or safety of persons, request the competent judicial authority of that Member State to order the temporary restriction of access to that infringement of recipients of the service concerned by the infringement or, only where that is not technically feasible, to the online interface of the provider of intermediary services on which the infringement takes place.
2021/06/10
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 1550 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Very large online platforms shall identify, analyse and assess, from the date of application referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 25(4), at least once a year thereafter,on an ongoing basis, the probability and severity of any significant systemic risks stemming from the functioning and use made of their services in the Union. This risk assessment shall be specific to their services and shall include the following systemic risks:
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1563 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) any negative effects for the exercise of any of the fundamental rights listed in the Charter, in particular on the fundamental rights to respect for private and family life, freedom of expression and information, the prohibition of discrimination, the right to gender equality and the rights of the child, as enshrined in Articles 7, 11, 21, 23 and 24 of the Charter respectively;
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1606 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Very large online platforms shall put in place reasonable, proportionate and effective mitigation measures, tailored to the specific systemic risks identified pursuant to Article 26. Such measures mayshall include, where applicable:
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1626 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Where a very large online platform decides not to put in place any of the mitigating measures listed in Article 27(1), it shall provide a written explanation that describes the reasons why those measures were not put in place, which shall be provided to the independent auditors in order to prepare the audit report in Article 28(3).
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 1658 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the obligations set out in Chapter III; in particular the quality of the identification, analysis and assessment of the risks referred to in Article 26, and the necessity, proportionality and effectiveness of the risk mitigation measures referred to in Article 27
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2099 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 50 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
The Commission acting on its own initiative, or the Board acting on its own initiative or upon request of at least three Digital Services Coordinators of destination, mayshall, where it has reasons to suspect that a very large online platform infringed any of those provisions, recommend the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment to investigate the suspected infringement with a view to that Digital Services Coordinator adopting such a decision within a reasonable time periodout undue delay and in any event within two months.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2120 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 51 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. The Commission, acting either upon the Board’s recommendation or on its own initiative after consulting the Board, mayshall initiate proceedings in view of the possible adoption of decisions pursuant to Articles 58 and 59 in respect of the relevant conduct by the very large online platform that:
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO
Amendment 2130 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 51 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Wheren the Commission decides to initiates proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1, it shall notify all Digital Services Coordinators, the Board and the very large online platform concerned.
2021/07/08
Committee: IMCO