49 Amendments of Sven MIKSER related to 2020/2001(INI)
Amendment 12 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 19 a (new)
Citation 19 a (new)
— having regard to the Joint Comprehensive Planof Action (JCPOA),
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 19 b (new)
Citation 19 b (new)
— having regard to the E3 statement on the JCPOA of 19 August 2021,
Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas in the current tense geopolitical context, key arms control treaties that came into force at the end of the Cold War have recently been dismantled; whereas in a world of global interdependence, the EU's security cannot be achieved without renewed global arms control and disarmament efforts;
Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the EU aims to be a global actor for peace and supports the rules-based international order; whereas arms control and nuclear non- proliferation were at the very root of the start of the EU project, notably with EURATOM; whereas the EU, through its Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), is proactively contributing to the prevention of the use and proliferation of WMDs;
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas in more than fifty years of its existence, the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) with its three mutually reinforcing pillars has proven to be a cornerstone of global nuclear arms control architecture and an effective tool to uphold international peace and security, by ensuring the compliance by the vast majority of signatory states with their non-proliferation obligations through implementation of stringent safeguards and norms against the acquisition of nuclear weapons;
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been playing an instrumental role in the implementation of the NPT; whereas the Additional Protocol (AP), substantially expands the IAEA’s ability to check for clandestine nuclear facilities;
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas tensions and dislack of trust among NPT parties have been increasing in the recent years; , exacerbated by growing deterioration of bilateral US-Russian relations and subsequent steps taken to reassess the nuclear factor in military doctrines; whereas the NPT Review Conference has been postpones due to the COVID-19 pandemic; whereas the US and the Russian Federation committed to an integrated Strategic Stability Dialogue on 16 June 2021;
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) washad been an achievement of multilateral diplomacy led by the EU; whereas the US and Iran have begun indirect negotiations with a view tof their return to the JCPOA, which have been interrupted by Iran; whereas Iran has ceased the application of the aAdditional pProtocol;
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has not yet been universally ratified; whereas the EU has been consistently promoting the contribution of the CTBT Treaty to peace, security, disarmament and non- proliferation;
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital K
Recital K
K. whereas following the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the US and Russia are now no longer prohibited from building and deploying this category of weapons and from engaging in a new arms race; whereas Russia recently moved several nuclear-capable, ballistic missile systems believed to be capable of exceeding the range of 500 km;
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L a (new)
Recital L a (new)
L a. whereas the voluntary unilateral measures, the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), have led to substantial reductions of both the US and Russian deployed arsenal;
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L b (new)
Recital L b (new)
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital N
Recital N
N. whereas since the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, France is now the only nuclear Member StateFrance and the UK both share the view that minimum, credible nuclear deterrence is essential to Europe’s and NATO's collective security; whereas since the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, France is now the only Member State being a nuclear State; whereas France offered to launch a strategic dialogue with willing EU partners on the role played by France’s nuclear deterrence in the EU collective security and to associate those Member States to French exercises;
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital O
Recital O
O. whereas a number of middle powers have acquired the scientific, technological and industrial capabilities required to produce ballistic and cruise missiles; whereas India and Pakistan, states outside the NPT framework, have declared themselves to be in possession of nuclear weapons;
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital Q
Recital Q
Q. whereas the Open Skies Treaty, in force since 2002, was intended to build trust, confidence and mutual understanding between Russia and the US and its European allies; whereas Russia has failed for many years to comply with its obligations under the Open Skies Treaty; whereas the US and Russia have successively withdrawn from the treaty;
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital R
Recital R
R. whereas the Chemical Weapons Convention is the world’s first multilateral disarmament agreement to provide for the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction; whereas in the past decade, the ethical norm against the use of chemical weapons has begun to show alarming signs of erosion; whereas the CWC needs to adapt to the new industrial production processes, innovative chemical industry and the emergency of new actors;
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital S
Recital S
S. whereas the EU has been fully engaged in international efforts to improve bio-safety and bio-diversity through the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; whereas 13 countries are not yet parties to the Convention; whereas the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was agreed without on- site verification mechanisms to ensure compliance;
Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital T a (new)
Recital T a (new)
T a. whereas the emergence of humanitarian disarmament has positively challenged the traditional disarmament practices inherited from the Cold War;
Amendment 80 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital T b (new)
Recital T b (new)
T b. whereas the number of women involved in efforts aimed at eliminating WMD remains alarmingly low, including in the areas of non-proliferation and disarmament (NPD) diplomacy;
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital U
Recital U
U. whereas climate-related risks could negatively affect our strategic security environment; whereas WMD disarmament and non-proliferation efforts can contribute to sustainable development; and to the protection of livelihoods and of the environment;
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital V
Recital V
V. whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has shown the need to increase EU chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence (CBRN) preparedness, to build a CBRN pool of expertise and to foster the link between health and security;
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. Is deeply concerned about the decision taken by several states amid ongoing growing tensions among major powers to reassess the nuclear factor in their national doctrines and modernise and diversify their arsenal; welcomes the intention of the US to assess, in the framework of the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review, possible ways to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy;
Amendment 98 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Reaffirms its full support to the NPT; expects nuclear-weapon states to take steps to demonstrate their genuine commitment to nuclear disarmament; exhorts States Parties to do their utmost to contribute to a successful and ambitious outcome of the upcoming 10th Review Conference; and its three mutually reinforcing pillars as one of the most universally accepted legally binding instruments and a cornerstone of nuclear non- proliferation regime; recalls that the Treaty contributed to uphold a broad set of norms related to disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy, while enforcing the nuclear non-proliferation norm; expects nuclear-weapon states to take steps to demonstrate their genuine commitment to nuclear disarmament, including via setting realistic goals under the Art. VI of the Treaty, and well as by strengthening the non-proliferation norm and expanding the IAEA’s safeguards capacity; warns that the future of the NPT should not be taken for granted and exhorts States Parties to do their utmost to contribute to a successful and ambitious outcome of the upcoming 10th Review Conference by agreeing on a substantive final declaration that would contribute to further strengthening the Treaty and would be a key element in preserving strategic stability and containing a new arms race; calls on all States to sign, accede to and remain committed to the NPT;
Amendment 104 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Insists on the need to ensure that the EU plays a strong and constructive role in developing and reinforcing the global rules-based non-proliferation efforts and arms control and disarmament architecture; welcomes the work of the Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in this respect; calls on the Council to strive towards the EU speaking with one voice in international disarmament, non- proliferation and arms control forums; underlines the need to use the work undertaken in the framework of the Strategic Compass to fully take the questions of WMD proliferation into the joint understanding of threats and achieve a common strategic culture on this issue;
Amendment 109 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Amendment 111 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. CUnderlines the crucial importance of training and awareness raising, therefore calls for the available expertise in non-proliferation and arms control in the EU to be strengthened and the training of EU and Member State personnel to be improved; welcomes continued financial support to the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN), the EU non- proliferation and disarmament consortium and the European Nuclear Security Training Centre (EUSECTRA); underlines the potential for synergies in training and education projects with the European Security and Defence College; calls on further investing in disarmament education and on facilitating youth engagement;
Amendment 116 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Calls on EU Delegations to put the question of disarmament, non- proliferation and arms control high on the agenda of Political Dialogue with third countries, in order for the EU to assist efforts to universalise existing treaties and instruments; asks the European External Action Service to also work on strengthening the training and capacity- building of our partnersclosest partners, notably the Neighbourhood and Enlargement countries, in the areas of disarmament, non proliferation and arms control; praises the EU CBRN risk mitigation Centres of Excellence initiative, funded under the NDICI, in this respect;
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. UWelcomes NATO’s commitment to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, and its support and facilitation of dialogue among Allies and partners to implement their non-proliferation obligations; underlines that NATO Allies remain committed to creating the conditions for the further reduction of the nuclear arsenal on the basis of reciprocity and calls for constructive and trustworthy dialogue in this respect in the relevant international and bilateral forums;
Amendment 124 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Stresses its full support for the work of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, for the UN Secretary-General’s ambitious Agenda for Disarmament and for the multilateral deliberative processes and negotiations under the auspices of the UN; underlines the need to ensure the involvement of all stakeholders, civil society and academia and the meaningful and diverse participation of citizens in disarmament and non-proliferation debates; supports the confidence-building measures set out by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe as important contributions to limiting misunderstanding or miscalculation and ensuring greater openness and transparency;
Amendment 128 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Welcomes the EU’s commitment to establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, and the promotion of confidence-building measures in support of this process;
Amendment 139 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Recalls the central role played by the IAEA as a guarantor of the compliance by the participating States with the provisions of the NPT Treaty; highlights that the Agency’s verification activities are instrumental in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons; calls on the states that have not yet done so to ratify the IAEA additional protocol without delay;
Amendment 142 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11 a. Highlights the IAEA’s crucial role in monitoring and verifying Iran’s compliance with the safeguard agreement, and praises in particular the key role it has been playing since 23 February 2021, by implementing a temporary bilateral technical understanding reached with Iran, allowing for the IEAE to continue with its necessary verification and monitoring activities;
Amendment 143 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Reaffirms its full support for the JCPOA as a key element of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture, stressing that a full implementation of the agreement is crucial for European security, as well as for the stability and security in the Middle East and worldwide; welcomes the EU’s continued engagement with Iran on issues related to civil nuclear cooperation, and the measures taken to implement projects to improve nuclear safety under the Annex III of the JOPOA; exhorts Iran to immediately cease its nuclear activities violating the JCPOA, which should go hand-in-hand with the lifting of all nuclear-related sanctions; calls on all parties to return to the negotiations with a view to returning to full and effective compliance with the agreement;
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Confirms that the entry into force and ratification of the CTBT as a strong trust and confidence-building instrument continues to be an important objective of the EU’s Strategy against Proliferation of WMD; welcomes EU’s diplomatic efforts to reach out to non-signatory countries in view of soliciting their commitment for the ratification of the Treaty and universal adherence to it; welcomes the Union’s support, including via financial contribution, for the activities of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organisation aimed at strengthening its verification and monitoring capabilities;
Amendment 150 #
14. Reiterates its longstanding support for the launch of negotiations on the FMCT, and calls on all nuclear-weapon states that have not yet done so to adopt an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; welcomes the financial support provided by the EU to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to facilitate the participation of African, Asian and Latin American and Caribbean countries to the FMCT related activities;
Amendment 152 #
15. Reiterates its deep regret at the withdrawal from the INF Treaty by the US and the Russian Federation following Russia’s persistent failure to comply with the treaty, which led to its termination; is particularly concerned about possible re- emergence of ground-based intermediate- range missiles in the European theatre of operations in the post-INF context; underlines its strong opposition to a new arms race and re-militarisation on European soil; welcomes the commitment made by the US and Russia to continue working towards the achievement of their stated common goal of ensuring predictability in the strategic domain and reducing the risks of armed conflict and the threat of nuclear war; urges both sides to use this momentum to set realistic basis for re-launching negotiations about new arms control architecture and risk reduction measures that would take into account the changing geo-political context and emergence of new powers; calls on all other countries, notably China, in possession or in the process of the development of missile systems to engage in efforts to multilateralise and universalise the successor treaty to the INF;
Amendment 160 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Warmly welcomes the decision taken by the US and the Russian Federation to extend the New START Treaty; as an important contribution to the upcoming 10th NPT review conference, and to the implementation of the Article VI of the Treaty; highlights that the extension of the New START might provide a foundation for a negotiation of a new arms control agreement that would encompass both deployed and non- deployed, as well as strategic and non- strategic weapons; invites both signatories to thoroughly assess all options in relation with the scope, deployment and category of weapons to be covered, and advocates the involvement of other nuclear-armed countries, notably China, in negotiations on any new arms control agreement;
Amendment 166 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. NHighlights the importance of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) with the aim of reducing deployed short- range “tactical” nuclear weapons; notes with concern the ongoing Russian modernisation programmes which raise questions about Russian compliance with the objectives of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives; recalls that the PNI’s, despite their non-binding nature, have played an instrumental role in arms control architecture and calls on both the US and the Russian Federation to stick to their commitments in relation to non-strategic nuclear weapons and to ensure transparency on arsenals, deployments and the status of their respective weapons;
Amendment 176 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Highlights that the international community must work on active measures to counter the adverse strategic implications of cruise-missile proliferation; calls on states possessing significant numbers of cruise missiles to focus, as a first step, on confidence and transparency measures, including i.a. negotiation and adoption of codes of conduct for deployment and use of cruise missiles; calls on the VP/HR to engage in dialogue with exporting states in view of fully adhering to and coordinating efforts through the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the only existing multilateral arrangement that covers the transfer of missiles and missile-related equipment;
Amendment 180 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Welcomes the efforts made by the Vice President of the European Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to promote the universalisation of the HCoC, the only multilateral transparency and confidence-building instrument in the area of proliferation of ballistic missiles, in view of further contributing to efforts to contain the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction; calls on VP/HR to lead efforts towards greater cooperation between the HCoC and other arms control instruments;
Amendment 183 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Stresses the crucial role played by the Open Skies Treaty in transatlantic relations and its valuable contribution to global arms control architecture, trust- building and transparency about military activities carried out by signatory states; highlights that the US withdrawal has hindered smaller European states’ capacity to monitor their neighbours and hold them accountable for their military activities; regrets the recent adoption, by the Russian State Duma, of a bill of withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty; calls on the remaining signatories to continue implementing the treaty; urges the US and the Russian Federation to resume talks with a view to returning to the treaty and to its full, effective and verifiable implementation;
Amendment 186 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Is alarmed at the threat posed by chemical warfare following the most significant and sustained use of chemical weapons in decades is particularly worried by the increased capability of some State and non-State actors to produce forbidden chemical agent more rapidly, and with limited indicators for detection; insists on the need to uphold the global ethical norm against chemical weapons by preventing impunity for their use; calls to make effective use of the newly adopted EU Global Human Rights sanction regime in this respect; welcomes the adoption by the Council of a horizontal sanctions regime to address the growing use and proliferation of chemical weapons; reiterates its grave concern at the attempted assassination of Alexei Navalny using a banned nerve agent, considered as use of a chemical weapons under the CWC; welcomes the sanctions imposed on Russian officials on 14 October 2020 in response to this blatant violation of international norms;
Amendment 193 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Praises the instrumental role the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has been playing in the verified destruction of chemical agents; strongly condemns the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic; welcomes the decision taken at the twenty- Fifth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to suspend certain rights and privileges of Syria under the OPCW;
Amendment 198 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Reiterates its full support for the BWC; welcomes the financial contribution provided by the EU directly to the BTWC and in support of strengthening bio-safety outside the EU; calls on the VP/HR to continue his efforts to promote the universalisation of the convention; points to the need to step up efforts to put in place a legally binding mechanism to verify compliance with the BWC;
Amendment 200 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23 a. Underlines the important work carried out by EU SatCen in using space assets, satellite imagery and geospatial intelligence to monitor compliance to WMD disarmament and non-proliferation commitments;
Amendment 201 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. RIs concerned about DPRK’s continued nuclear and ballistic activities in violation of numerous UNSC Resolutions, and DPKR’s development of new capabilities; reiterates its will to work towards achieving a complete, irreversible and verifiable denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula; urges the DPRK to immediately abandon its nuclear and missile activities, fully comply with all relevant UNSC Resolutions, swiftly sign and ratify the CTBT and return to compliance with the NPT;
Amendment 205 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Points to the rapid advances in the development of artificial intelligence- enabled systems in the military domain; reiterates therefore its call on the EU to take the lead on international regulatory efforts to ensure that the development and application of AI for military uses stay within the strict limits set by international law, including international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law, and to pave the way to global negotiations with a view to updating all existing arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation instruments so as to take AI-enabled systems used in warfare into account; underlines that emerging technologies not covered by international law should be judged by the principle of humanity and the dictates of public conscience; calls on the VP/HR, the Member States and the European Council to adopt a joint position on autonomous weapons systems that ensures meaningful human control over the critical functions of weapons systems; insists on the launch of international negotiations on a legally binding instrument that would prohibit fully autonomous weapons;
Amendment 209 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Calls for the equal, full and meaningful participation of women in NPT forums to be ensured, including disarmament diplomacy and in all decision-making processes related to disarmament;
Amendment 213 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Points to the need to take additional measures to fight the financing of the proliferation of WMD to disrupt technological and knowledge transfer to non-State hostile actors, as well as to the threat that CBRN terrorism could represent for our collective security; points to the need for the EU to foster responsible science, in order to prevent misuse of scientific research and experiment ;underlines the need to combat CBRN material smuggling and illicit trafficking and to prevent diversion risks; invites the EEAS and the Commission to tackle this issue in the expected Joint communication on a strategic approach to support the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR);