26 Amendments of Leila CHAIBI related to 2020/2133(INI)
Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 12 a (new)
Citation 12 a (new)
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas the independence, transparency and accountability of public institutions and their elected representatives, Commissioners and officials are of the utmost importance for promoting the trust of citizens that is necessary for the legitimate functioning of democratic institutions;
Amendment 12 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the ethical standards applicable to the European institutions are in many respects ahead of those applicable in their national equivalents but have not been enforced in a satisfactory manner, particularly in Parliament where, in spite of there having been at least 27 breaches of the code of conduct, no procedure has ever led to any sanction; whereas an independent body with investigative, seizure and sanctioning powers is necessary in order for the EU’s ambition of being ethical and transparent to be truly effective;
Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the shortcomings of the current EU ethics framework derive largely from the fact that it relies on a self- regulatory approach and lacks adequate human and financial resources and competences to verify information; whereas this independent ethics body is essential for restoring trust in the European institutions and their democratic legitimacy; whereas the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, despite the rejection by referendum in France and the Netherlands of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2005, has significantly undermined citizens’ trust in the European institutions;
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas, as a consequence, multiple cases of unethical conduct and their inadequate handling by the EU institutions have harmed the trust which European citizens place in the EU institutions; whereas the European Ombudsman recommended in 2018, in the wake of Mr Barroso joining Goldman Sachs, that the Commission grant its Ethics Committee the power to act on its own initiative whenever it considers it appropriate1 a; whereas the Commission has not taken the necessary measures to follow up the Ombudsman’s recommendations on the obligation to deal properly with the revolving door issue; whereas half of the former European Commissioners have left to join the private sector, often without respecting the cooling-off period and other ethical criteria; _________________ 1a https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/rec ommendation/en/90956
Amendment 38 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
Fa. whereas in their examination of potential conflicts of interest of Commissioner-designates in 2019, the Members of the Committee on Legal Affairs highlighted fundamental shortcomings in the current procedure; whereas these shortcomings include limited access to certain information, a lack of time for examination, a lack of investigative power and a lack of support from independent experts; whereas Article 17(3) of the Treaty on European Union provides that the Members of the European Commission are to be chosen ‘from persons whose independence is beyond doubt’;
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas all lead candidates in the 2019 European elections committed to the creation of an independent ethics body common to all EU institutions; whereas the President of the Commission committed to it in her political guidelines and whereas Parliament has already supported this view; whereas the mission letter of the Vice- President of the European Commission responsible for values and transparency stressed the need for such an ethics body which is ‘common to all EU institutions’; whereas the European Parliament should set an example with regard to rules on ethics and their enforcement;
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. BConsiders that the best way to strengthen, or restore, citizens’ trust in the European institutions is to apply high standards of transparency and accountability; believes that a single independent EU ethics body is necessary to ensure the consistent and full implementation of ethics standards across the EU institutions; proposesconsiders that the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement (IIA) to set up an EU Ethics Body for Parliament and the Commission open to the participation of would risk limiting its scope to Parliament and the Commission; is concerned that other less virtuous institutions, agencies and bodies may not, on a voluntary basis, participate in an independent ethics body; considers it appropriate to revise the Treaties in order for participation in such an independent ethics body to be binding on all EU institutions, agencies and bodies; recommendstresses that the IIA contain the following provisions:Convention on the Future of Europe is an opportunity for European citizens to debate a possible treaty change which would include a binding requirement for all EU institutions to establish such an independent ethics body;
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Believes that the Members and staff of the participatingall the institutions should be covered by the agreementindependent ethics body before, during and after the term of office or service in line with the applicable rules; considers that this should apply to Members of Parliament, Commissioners and all EU staff falling under the scope of the Staff Regulation;
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Insists that the IIA should be open to the participation ofis independent ethics body should be mandatory for all EU institutions and bodies; believes that the IIA should allow the Ethics BodyEthics Body should be able to conclude agreements with national authorities with a view to ensuring the exchange of information necessary for the performance of its tasks;
Amendment 105 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Considers that all the participating institutions should entrust the EU Ethics Body with monitoring powers over ethics standards, as well as advisory, investig powers, the power to investigate on its own initiative and enforcement powers;
Amendment 111 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Considers that this monitoring capacity should include the verification of the veracity of the declaration of financial interests, the handling of conflicts of interest, checks on transparency obligations and the verification of compliance with revolving doors rules, as well as the possibility for the independent ethics body to impose penalties in the event of delay or bad faith in the provision of information and updates of information in declarations;
Amendment 116 #
6a. Suggests that the independent ethics body should work on establishing a common definition of conflict of interest for the European institutions on the basis of the highest standards; stresses that many Member States have demanding rules; notes the OECD Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service, which lay down a set of basic principles and standards for the design and implementation of conflict of interest policies1 a; _________________ 1a https://www.oecd.org/governance/ethics/c onflict-of-interest/
Amendment 122 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Takes the view that the EU Ethics Body could also be given authority over the obligations imposed by the Transparency Register; considers, therefore, that the independent ethics body should have the power to carry out checks on the basis of records or on the spot in order to monitor compliance with the reporting obligations of lobbyists; considers that the ethics body should have the power to impose penalties on interest representatives involved in a breach of ethical rules; stresses that the transparency bodies or authorities of the Member States have the capacity to impose financial penalties on lobbyists who fail to comply with their transparency obligations, and do so very effectively, without bureaucracy undermining that effectiveness;
Amendment 128 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Considers that the EU Ethics Body should have the power to initiate procedures by itself and to conduct on-the- spot and records-based investigations based on the information it has collected or that it has received from third parties, such as journalists, NGOs, whistleblowers, stakeholders, civil society or the European Ombudsman; insists that any third party referring a matter to the independent ethics body must be protected and their identity kept anonymous;
Amendment 129 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Stresses the need for the body to protect whistleblowers, in particular European public officials, so that they can express their concerns about possible violations of rules without fear of reprisals; suggests, in this connection, that the body should supervise the internal and confidential complaint mechanisms under the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and Conditions of Employment of Other Servants; stresses that only a safe and protective working environment will enable public officials to express their concerns and thereby help to make the work of the independent ethics body effective;
Amendment 131 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)
Paragraph 8 b (new)
8b. Believes that the body should also monitor the independence and ethical behaviour of EU officials before, during and after they hold a post or function within the EU institutions; stresses the importance of combating the phenomenon of revolving doors between public and private organisations; suggests that the body be tasked with issuing recommendations for harmonised and adequate cooling-off periods in all EU institutions, including for Members of the European Parliament;
Amendment 139 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Believes that in relation to its enforcement powers, the body could take over from the Appointing Authority in dealing with staff ethics obligations, and that in relation to Members of Parliament or Commissioners, the body could be granted enforcement powers within the limits of the provisions contained in the Treaties, and without prejudice to any additional mechanisms provided for in Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, in particular concerning termination of office;
Amendment 140 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Considers that the EU Ethics Body should be entrusted with advisory tasks in order to provide advice to any individual or entity covered by its scope who wishes to request interpretation of an ethical standard in relation to appropriate conduct in a specific case; calls on the institutions to take advantage of the body’s expertise in the implementation of their ethical standards; considers that, in the long term, the body should harmonise the ethical standards of all the institutions, agencies and bodies;
Amendment 158 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Believes that the Ethics Body should be composed of nine Mmembers, three selected by the Commission, three elected by Parliament, and three assigned de jureby the Council, as follows: - three members selected by the Commission, including one from among former members of the Commission's staff and two from among the former Presidents of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the Court of Auditors, OLAF and former EU Ombudsmen; - three members elected by the European Parliament:one member elected from among former members of Parliament’s staff and two NGOs;suggests that Parliament's Rules of Procedure be revised to include the election of these three representatives;recommends the creation of a new article based on Article 231 on the method of appointing the European Ombudsman; - three members appointed by the Council from among the staff of the national ethics committees or the national ombudsman, if the institution is willing to participate in the IIA; Stresses that each institution must propose gender-balanced nominations;
Amendment 161 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Amendment 163 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Considers that its members must be independent, chosen on the basis of their competence, experience and professional qualities, as well as their personal integrity, have an impeccable record of ethical behaviour and provide a declaration of the absence of conflicts of interest; is of the opinion that the composition of the body should be, whose accuracy and compatibility with the post will be verified by the ethics officer; calls on the ethics officer to take charge of the verification of candidates’ declarations; considers that the members should work in a spirit of collaboration and consistency in their decisions and recommendations; calls for a guarantee of gender- balanced in the composition of the body;
Amendment 169 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Suggests that each institution choose these members in particular from among former judges of the CJEU, former presidents of OLAF and the Court of Auditors, former or current members of highest courts of Member States, former Members of the European Parliament, former staff of the participating institutions and bodies, former EU Ombudsmen, and members of the ethics authorities in Member States; suggests further that the body elect a President and two Vice- Presidents from among its members; stresses the need to ensure the diversity of members’ backgrounds and independent expertise; suggests limiting the participation of former MEPs and Commissioners to a third of the composition of the body; considers that the appointment of members should be validated by a two-thirds majority vote in Parliament’s plenary;
Amendment 173 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Calls for inspiration to be drawn from the Member States' best practices with a view to combating the practice of self-regulation; calls for a guarantee that the members of the body do not participate in the debate, decision or vote on any issue in which they have a private or direct interest; stresses more specifically that revolving door cases and the lack of ambition in the institutions' current ethical standards are mainly due to the lack of an independent authority;
Amendment 184 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Proposes a two-step approach whereby, in the event that the EU Ethics Body becomes aware of a breach or possible breach of ethics rules, it first recommends actions to put an end to the breach; considers that this first preventive step should ensure confidentiality and the right of the person to be heard; suggests that in the event that the individual concerned refuses to take the appropriate actions, the EU Ethics Body should make relevant information about the case publicly available and decide, if appropriate, on sanctions; considers that this two-step approach should apply provided that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the individual acted in bad faith and recommends that intentional breach, gross negligence, the concealment of evidence and non- compliance with the obligation to cooperate should be, as such, subject to sanctions, even when the breach itself has ceased; stresses that it is essential for the body to be able to investigate breaches of ethical rules by Members of the European Parliament and impose appropriate penalties, such as fines or the withholding of allowances; considers that the body should be able to investigate serious conflicts of interest arising in connection with a Member’s position as rapporteur or shadow rapporteur for specific files and take appropriate and effective decisions to remedy any contentious situations;
Amendment 189 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. Calls for an example to be drawn from Member States' best practices on transparency in public life; stresses, in particular, the provisions of national law on gifts and invitations from lobbyists, including paid travel; points out that in some cases gifts worth more than EUR 15 are prohibited, which is one-tenth of the figure in Parliament and the Commission;