Activities of Markéta GREGOROVÁ related to 2023/2072(INI)
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on the security and defence implications of China’s influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union
Amendments (17)
Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 4 a (new)
Citation 4 a (new)
– having regard to joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank of 1 December 2021 entitled “The Global Gateway” JOIN(2021) 30 final,
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 4 b (new)
Citation 4 b (new)
– having regard to the Commission recommendation of 3.10.2023 on critical technology areas for the EU's economic security for further risk assessment with Member States (C(2023) 6689),
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)
Citation 8 a (new)
– having regard to the G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué of 20 May 2023,
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Recital E a (new)
Ea. whereas China’s national security related legislation, such as the 2015 National Security Law of People's Republic of China, requires citizens and organisations to provide support and assistance to the PRC’s public security, state security or military organs;
Amendment 35 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E b (new)
Recital E b (new)
Eb. whereas China is restricting non- Chinese companies from participating in infrastructure projects due to security risks and is putting forward legislation with regard to critical infrastructure, such as Critical Information Infrastructure Security Protection Regulations;
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Considers that in China’s party-driven political system and economy often require private companieseconomic system private companies are often required to align their commercial interestactivities with the CCP’s mipolitary, repression and political interference activitiesical interests; notes that CCP party cells inside private companies are commonly used as tools of direct party control; highlights that, consequentially, Chinese companies’ international activities helpmay enable the CCP to expand its influence over foreignin third countries and underminepursue its geopolitical rivgoals;
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Believes that MCF must be understood in a larger political and strategic context, taking into account its interconnections with other initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (including the Digital Silk Road); believes that the ultimate aim of MCF is to advance China’s long-term strategic goal to become the world’s leading pow, Made in China 2025, Dual Circulation Strategy and China Standards 2035; believes that the ultimate aim of MCF is to create a world- class military force, which could be used to challenge the existing international security order;
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 2
Subheading 2
Consequences of the PRC’s civil-military-civil fusion strategy
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Warns of the risk of Chinese companies having any involvement with EU strategic assets, especially those companies that have direct or indirect links to China’s military system; underlines, in this regard, its concern that technology and technological expertise willrisk being be transferred to China’s military, increasing the PLA’s ability to develop the next generation of military technology, which may be used to coerce partners in Asia and around the world;
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Emphasises that China produces 70 % of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60 % of global aluminium production and 75 % of silicon production, is the leading refiner of 60 % of lithium and 70 % of copper processing and produces 84 % of the world’s nickel and 85 % of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly on the production and processing of these critical commodities, creates crucial dependencies and therefore presents not only an acute geopolitical challenge for the EU, but also a huge risk for Europe’s defence and other industrial sectors;
Amendment 84 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Warns that the deterioration in the security environment in Europe and around the globe requires urgent reflection on how to strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomycapacity as a security provider and reduce its critical dependencies on countries like the PRC that are systemic rivals, not strategic partners; stresses the need to prevent sensitive emerging technologies and key dual-use items from being leaked to destinations of concern that pursue transferred to China; regards the establishment of EU- wide electronic customs and export licensing systems as a critical step towards effective common European export collaborate in MCF strategiesntrols and urges all Member States to make these systems operational by the end of 2023;
Amendment 114 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Welcomes the potential of the Commission’s proposal for a European economic security strategy to expand the EU toolkit to export controls or outwarbound investments in a narrow set of key enabling technologies with military applications, inter alia, in the areas of quantum computing, advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence; calls foron the swift adoption of the Commission’s proposalsCommission to propose the announced proposals by Spring 2024 and for the Member States to fully implement the EU’s expanded regulatory framework to exclude entities that could contribute to MCF;
Amendment 123 #
12. Welcomes the adoption of the European Chips Act, which will increase the EU’s ability to produce semiconductors and create a strategic map of, inter alia, capability gaps in the semiconductor value chain in the EU, thereby limiting the EU’s dependence on third countries such as China; calls for further proposals to secure the production and supply chains of critical infrastructure and material within the EU, as well as strengthening strategic partnerships, such as with Taiwan;
Amendment 131 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Calls on the Commission to propose a new legislative framework to mitigate the security risks coming from the suppliers of undersea cable systems; stresses the need to prevent cable system suppliers, such as Chinese companies, from sharing data with intelligence services other than to protect the infrastructure from outside intrusions or malignant attacks;
Amendment 137 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Is cognisant of the PRC’s penetration ofrole that Chinese companies play in the EU’s market and its wider neighbourhood; calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to ensure that the measures taken to strengthen the resilience of the EU in the face of Chinese influence, including de-risking, diversification and reduction of critical dependencies, are also extended to the EU’s closest partners, in particular accession countries and those part of the EUs neighbourhood policy;
Amendment 139 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Notes that despite European FDI screening mechanisms, Chinese companies have been granted contracts in European critical infrastructure, leading to security risks; calls therefore on the Council and the Commission to exclude the use of equipment and software from manufacturers based in the PRC, particularly ByteDance, Huawei, ZTE and Nuctech; calls on critical sectors to exclude the use of hardware and software from the PRC in order to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data and services; considers the TikTok app, owned by Chinese conglomerate ByteDance, to be in breach of the European data privacy framework, making it a potential risk and a source of Chinese-backed disinformation; welcomes the decision of the EU institutions to restrict the use of TikTok on corporate devices; recommends the banning of TikTok at all levels of national government and in the EU institutions;
Amendment 149 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. Emphasises the need for a geopolitical approach to global cooperation on critical infrastructure in order for the EU to successfully face up to the new security challenges; in this context welcomes the European Union’s Global Gateway Initiative that seeks to provide connectivity solutions, including in the area of critical infrastructure, to third countries that are sustainable and trusted; urges Council and Commission to swiftly implement projects, especially lighthouse projects, under the initiative;