62 Amendments of Stéphanie YON-COURTIN related to 2023/0112(COD)
Amendment 41 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 2
Recital 2
(2) Several years into its implementation, the Union resolution framework as currently applicable does not deliver as intended with respect of some of those objectives. In particular, while institutions and entities have made significant progress towards resolvability and have dedicated significant resources to that end, in particular through the build-up of the loss absorption and recapitalisation capacity and the filling-up of resolution financing arrangements, the Union resolution framework is seldom resorted to. Failures of certain smaller and medium- sized institutions and entities are instead mostly addressed through unharmonised national measures. TExternal resources, be it industry funds or taxpayer money is used rather than resolution financing arrangementsinternal loss absorption. That situation appears to arise from inadequate incentives and loopholes. Those inadequate incentives result from the interplay of the Union resolution framework with national rules, whereby the broad discretion in the public interest assessment is not always exercised in a way that reflects how the Union resolution framework was intended to apply. At the same time, the Union resolution framework saw little use due to the risks for depositors of deposit-funded institutions to bear losses to ensure that those institutions can access external funding in resolution, in particular in the absence of other bail-inable liabilities. Finally, the fact that there are less stringent rules on access to funding outside resolution than in resolution has discouraged the application of the Union resolution framework in favour of other solutions, which often entail the use of external resources like taxpayers’ money instead of the own resources of the institution and entity or industry-funded safety nets. That situation, in turn, generates risks of fragmentation, risks of suboptimal outcomes in managing institutions and entities’ failures, in particular in the case of smaller and medium-sized institutions and entities, and opportunity costs from unused financial resources. It is therefore necessary to ensure a more effective and coherent application of the Union resolution framework and to ensure that it can be applied whenever that is in the public interest, including for certain smaller and medium-sized institutions primarily funded through deposits and without sufficient other bail-inable liabilities.
Amendment 60 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 11
Recital 11
Amendment 87 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 26
Recital 26
Amendment 89 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 28
Recital 28
(28) The rules for determining the MREL are mostly focused on setting the appropriate level of the MREL with the assumption of the bail-in tool as the preferred resolution strategy. However, Directive 2014/59/EU allows resolution authorities to use other resolution tools, namely those relying on the transfer of the business of the institution under resolution to a private purchaser or to a bridge institution, as a standalone tool or in combination with other tools including bail-in. It should therefore be further specified that, in case the resolution plan envisages the use of a combination tool, or the sale of business tool or of the bridge institution tool and the resolution entity’s exit from the market, resolution authorities should always determine the level of the MREL for the resolution entity concerned on the basis of the specificities of those resolution tools and of the different loss- absorbing and recapitalisation needs those tools entail, taking into consideration the reduction in size and complexity that result from the implementation of recovery options in the runup to resolution and the resolution actions.
Amendment 90 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 29
Recital 29
(29) The level of the MREL for resolution entities is the sum of the amount of the losses expected in resolution and the recapitalisation amount that enable the post-resolution entity to continue to comply with its conditions for authorisation and enabling it to pursue its activities for the appropriate period. Certain preferred resolution strategies entail the transfer of assets, rights and liabilities to a recipient and market exit, in particular the sale of business tool. In those cases, the objectives pursued by the recapitalisation component might not apply to the same extent, because the resolution authority will not be required to ensure that the resolution entity restores compliance with its own funds requirements after resolution action, although the acquirer might ask for the transaction to be capital neutral. Nevertheless, the losses in such cases are expected to exceed the resolution entity’s own funds requirements. It is therefore appropriate to lay down that the level of the MREL of those resolution entities continues to include a recapitalisation amount that is adjusted in a way that is proportionate to the resolution strategy, and subject to an appropriate floor.
Amendment 94 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 30
Recital 30
(30) Where the resolution strategy envisages the use of resolution tools other than bail-in or alongside bail-in, the recapitalisation needs of the entity concerned will generally be smaller after resolution than in case of the sole open bank bail-in strategy. The calibration of the MREL in such a case should take that aspect into account when estimating the recapitalisation requirement. Therefore, when adjusting the level of the MREL for such resolution entities the resolution plan of which envisages the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, resolution authorities should take into account the features of those tools, including the expected perimeter of the transfer to the private purchaser or to the bridge institution, the types of instruments to be transferred, the expected value and marketability of those instruments and the design of the preferred resolution strategy, including the complementary use of the asset separation tool. S or any other tool. In the case of the transfer tool with market exit, since the resolution authority has to decide on a case by case basis on any possible use in resolution of funds from DGS and since such decision cannot be assumed with certainty ex ante, the resolution authorities should not consider the potential contribution of the DGS in resolution when calibrating the level of the MREL.
Amendment 102 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 34
Recital 34
(34) After the initial build-up period of the resolution financing arrangements referred to in Article 102(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU, their respective available financial means may face slight decreases below their target level, in particular resulting from an increase in covered deposits. The amount of the ex ante contributions likely to be called in those circumstanOn the other hand, there is no mechanism that would enable the redemption of contributions already paid- in that would stand in excess isof thus likely to be small. It may therefore be e target level in the event of a decrease of the covered depossible that, in some years, the amount of such ex ante contributions is no longer commensurate to the cost of the collection of those contributions. Rts. Also, there is no evidence as to whether the rules governing contributions should be amended to preserve a sound "polluter pays" principle after the entry into force of this directive. As a result, resolution authorities should therefore be able to defer the collection of the ex ante contributions for 1 or more years until the amount to be collected reaches an amount that is proportionate to the cost of the collection process, provided that such deferral does not materially affect the capacity of certain threshold that would trigger a resoluumption authorities to use resolution financing arrangementof ex-ante contributions.
Amendment 103 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 34 a (new)
Recital 34 a (new)
(34a) Contributions to the Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) and the resolution financing arrangements should be determined in a manner that accurately assesses the likelihood of a contributing bank to impose losses for the DGS or the resolution financing arrangement. To that end, the rules governing contributions of individual banks to these funds shall mainly take into account the Minimum Requirement for Own Funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL) capacity and quality of the concerned banks.
Amendment 104 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 34 b (new)
Recital 34 b (new)
(34b) The target level of the resolution financing arrangements and the deposit guarantee schemes were determined in 2014 to withstand a certain adverse shock to the banking system given its loss absorption capacity at the time. Since then, the banking system has considerably increased its loss absorption capacity by building up its capital and MREL buffers, and by improving the overall asset quality primarily, with the reduction in NPLs. As a result, the same target level enables today to withstand a much bigger shock, which in turn means that there is no need to increase the target levels as a result of this review.
Amendment 113 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 38
Recital 38
(38) The ranking of all deposits should be fully harmonised through the implementation of a general depositor preference with a single-tiered approach, whereby all depositstwo-tiered approach, whereby all covered deposits and that part of eligible deposits from natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises which exceeds the coverage level provided for in Article 6 of Directive 2014/49/EU benefit from a higher priority ranking over other deposits and ordinary unsecured claims, without any differentiation between different types of depositshich should both rank pari passu. At the same time, the use of the deposit guarantee schemes in resolution, insolvency and in preventive measures should always remain subject to compliance with the relevant conditionality, in particular the so-called ‘least cost test’.
Amendment 118 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 39
Recital 39
Amendment 124 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 40
Recital 40
Amendment 132 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 41
Recital 41
(41) The changes to the priority ranking of deposits, in particular the elimination of the higher ranking of covered deposits and the claims of the DGSs relative to all other eligible deposits, would not negatively affect the protection afforded to covered deposits in the event of failure, as that protection would continue to be guaranteed through the mandatory exclusion of covered deposits from loss absorption in case of resolution and, ultimately, by the payout provided by the DGS in event of unavailability of deposits.
Amendment 141 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 44
Recital 44
(44) The contribution of the DGS in resolution should be subject to certain limits. First, it should be ensured that any loss which the DGS may bear as a result of an intervention in resolution does not exceed the loss that the DGS would bear in insolvency if it paid out covered depositors and subrogated to their claims over the institution’s assets. That amount should be determined on the basis of the least cost test, in accordance with the criteria and methodology set out in Directive 2014/49/EU. Those criteria and methodology should also be used when determining the treatment that the DGS would have received had the institution entered normal insolvency proceedings when carrying out the ex-post valuation for the purposes of assessing compliance with the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle and determining any compensation owed to the DGS. Second, the amount of the DGS’s contribution aimed at covering the difference between the assets and liabilities to be transferred to a purchaser or to a bridge institution should not exceed the difference between the transferred assets and the transferred deposits and liabilities with the same or a higher priority ranking in insolvency than those deposits. That would ensure that the contribution of the DGS is only used for the purposes of avoiding the imposition of losses on eligible depositors, where appropriate, and not for the protection of creditors that rank below eligible deposits in insolvency. Nevertheless, the sum of the contribution of the DGS to cover the difference between assets and liabilities with the contribution of the DGS towards the own funds of the recipient entity should not exceed the cost of repaying covered depositors as calculated under the least cost test.
Amendment 147 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 46
Recital 46
(46) Given the possibility to use DGS in resolution, it is necessary to specify further the way in which the DGS contribution can count towards the calculation of the requirements to access resolution financing arrangements. If the DGS is facing a risk of liquidity shortfall, and if the contribution made by shareholders and creditors of the institution under resolution through reductions, write- down or conversion of their liabilities, summed with the contribution made by the DGS, amounts to at least 8 % of the institution’s total liabilities including own funds, the institution should be able to access the resolution financing arrangement to receive further funding, where necessary to ensure effective resolution in line with the resolution objectives upon approval of the resolution authorities. If those conditions are met, the contribution of the DGS should initially be limited to the amount necessary to enable access to the resolution financing arrangement, and should be later complemented, over an appropriate period of time, by the amount required to repay the contribution made by the resolution financing arrangement. To ensure that resolution continues to be primarily financed by the institution’s internal resources and to minimise distortions of competition, the possibility to use the DGS contribution to ensure access to resolution financing arrangements should only be possible for institutions for which the resolution plan or the group resolution plan does not provide for their winding up in an orderly manner in case of failure, given that the MREL determined by resolution authorities for those institutions has been set at a level that includes both the loss absorption and the recapitalisation amounts.
Amendment 148 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 46
Recital 46
(46) Given the possibility to use DGS in resolution, it is necessary to specify further the way in which the DGS contribution can count towards the calculation of the requirements to access resolution financing arrangements. If the contribution made by shareholders and creditors of the institution under resolution through reductions, write- down or conversion of their liabilities, summed with the contribution made by the DGS, amounts to at least 8 % of the institution’s total liabilities including own funds, the institution should be able to access the resolution financing arrangement to receive further funding, where necessary to ensure effective resolution in line with the resolution objectives. If those conditions are met, the contribution of the DGS should be limited to the amount necessary to enable access to the resolution financing arrangement, and to shield covered deposits should they not have been protected from bail-in. To ensure that resolution continues to be primarily financed by the institution’s internal resources and to minimise distortions of competition, the possibility to use the DGS contribution to ensure access to resolution financing arrangements should only be possible for institutions for which the resolution plan or the group resolution plan does not provide for their winding up in an orderly manner in case of failure, given that the MREL determined by resolution authorities for those institutions has been set at a level that includes both the loss absorption and the recapitalisation amounts, and only in cases where the concerned institution has been compliant at least once with its fully fledged MREL requirements.
Amendment 159 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point e
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point e
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 93 a (new)
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 93 a (new)
Amendment 170 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 5 – paragraph 3 – point c a (new)
Article 5 – paragraph 3 – point c a (new)
(ca) support from a deposit guarantee scheme, whatever the form of the intervention.
Amendment 181 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 a (new)
(4a) in Article 10(3), the following point is added: ‘(ca) any use of deposit guarantee schemes’
Amendment 207 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 27 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
Article 27 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
Member States shall ensure that competent authorities mconsider without undue delay, appnd if necessary adopt swiftly, early intervention measures where an institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d) meets any of the following conditions:
Amendment 211 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 27 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
Article 27 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) the institution or entity infringes or is likely to infringe in the 12 months following the assessment of the competent authority the requirements laid down in Title II of Directive 2014/65/EU, in Articles 3 to 7, Articles 14 to 17, or Articles 24, 25 and 26 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, or in Articles 45e or 45f of this Directive. Where appropriate to characterise such infringement, Member States shall ensure that the resolution authority informs the competent authority without delay.
Amendment 217 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12
3. For each of the measures referred to in paragraph 1a, competent authorities shall set a deadline that is appropriate for completion of that measure and that enables the competent authority to evaluate its effectiveness. The evaluation of the measure shall be carried out immediately after the deadline is reached and shared with the resolution authority. Should the evaluation conclude that the measures have not been fully implemented or are not effective, the competent authority shall make an assessment of the condition referred to in Article 32(1), point (a) of this Directive, after having consulted the resolution authority.
Amendment 242 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 31 – paragraph 2 – point d
Article 31 – paragraph 2 – point d
(d) to protect depositorcovered deposits, and to the extent possible also that uncovered part of eligible deposits from natural persons and micro, small and medium- sized enterprises, while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemes, and to protect investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;
Amendment 269 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1a (new)
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1a (new)
Resolution action shall be presumed not to be in the public interest for the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), of this Article where the institution qualifies as a small and non-complex institution as defined in Article 4(1), point 145, of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. In case the resolution authority assesses that one or more of those resolution objectives would be at risk, the presumption shall not apply.
Amendment 270 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1b (new)
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1b (new)
Resolution action shall be presumed to be in the public interest for the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), of this Article where the institution qualifies as a large institution as defined in Article 4(1), point (146) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. In case the resolution authority assesses that no resolution objective would be at risk, the presumption shall not apply.
Amendment 278 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2a (new)
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2a (new)
Moreover, in the resolution plan, the resolution authority shall include its reasoning as regards the procedure best achieving resolution objectives for each of the resolution objectives laid down in Article 31. In order to ensure effective and consistent application of this Article, the EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards. The EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by …[OP – please insert the date= 12 months after the date of entry into force of this Directive]. Power is delegated to the Commission to supplement this Directive by adopting the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. By [48 months after the entry into force of this directive], the EBA shall publish a report of the practices of resolution authorities as regards the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph. ’;
Amendment 283 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18
Conditions for resolution with regard to a central body and credit institutions permanently affiliateds to a central body
Amendment 284 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32a – paragraph 1
Article 32a – paragraph 1
When a resolution action is deemed necessary in the public interest, Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities mayshall take a resolution action in relation to a central body and all credit institutions permanently affiliateds to it that are part of the same resolution group where the central body and all credit institutions permanently affiliateds to it, or the resolution group to which they belong, comply as a whole with the conditions established in Article 32(1). The assessment of the conditions refered to in Article 32(1) shall be made exclusively for the central body and its permanent affiliates as a whole.
Amendment 315 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
The support measures referred to in paragraph 1, points (a) and (b), shall fulfil all of the following conditions:
Amendment 324 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (d), the relevant competent authority shall quantify the losses that the institution or entity has incurred or is likely to incur. That quantification shall be based, as a minimum, on asset quality reviews conducted by the European Central Bank, EBA or national authorities, or, where appropriate, on on-site inspections conducted by the competent authority. Where such exercises cannot be undertaken in due time, the competent authority can base its evaluation on the institution or entity’s balance sheet, provided that the balance sheet complies with the applicable accounting rules and standards, as confirmed by an independent external auditor, and, where available, on asset quality reviews conducted by the European Central Bank, EBA or national authorities, or, where appropriate, on on- site inspections conducted by the competent authority. The competent authority should make its best efforts to ensure that the quantification is based on the market value of the institution or entity’s assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items.
Amendment 332 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6
In case any of the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a) and (b), is not redeemed, repaid or otherwise terminated in accordance with the terms of the exit strategy established at the time of granting such measure, the competent authority shall conclude that the condition laid down in Article 32(1), point (a), is met in relation to the institution or entity which has received those support measures, and shall communicate that assessment to the resolution authority concerned.
Amendment 343 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 23 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 23 a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 37 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
Article 37 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
(23 a) in Article 37(4), the following subparagraph is added: ‘The resolution plan shall consider the combination of resolution tools which is the best suited to achieve resolution objectives.’
Amendment 350 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point b
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 44 – paragraph 5 – point a
Article 44 – paragraph 5 – point a
(a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 36, has been made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write down or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) and Article 60(1), and by the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 109 where relevantapplicable;
Amendment 351 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point c
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point c
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 44 – paragraph 7
Article 44 – paragraph 7
Amendment 355 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 29a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 29a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45 – paragraph 1a (new)
Article 45 – paragraph 1a (new)
(29a) in Article 45, the following paragraph 1a is inserted: 1a. Within a resolution group, subsidiaries that are institutions or entities referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) but are not resolution entities, whose total assets do not exceed EUR 5 billion and that do not reach a 2% threshold of the resolution group’s total risk exposure amount, or leverage exposure, shall not be subject to the requirement referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.
Amendment 357 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 29 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 29 a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45a
Article 45a
(29 a) Article 45a is replaced by the following: "Article 45a Exemption from the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities 1. Notwithstanding Article 45, resolution authorities shall exempt from the requirement laid down in Article 45(1) mortgage credit institutions financed by covered bonds which are not allowed to receive deposits under national law, provided that all of the following conditions are met: (a) those institutions will be wound up in national insolvency proceedings, or in other types of proceedings laid down for those institutions and implemented in accordance with Article 38, 40 or 42; and (b) the proceedings referred to in point (a), ensure that creditors of those institutions, including holders of covered bonds, where relevant, bear losses in a way that meets the resolution objectives. 2. Institutions exempted from the requirement laid down in Article 45(1) shall not be part of the consolidation referred to in Article 45e(1). from the requirement laid down in Article 45(1). " Or. en (DIRECTIVE 2014/59/EU)
Amendment 359 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point -a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point -a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 5
Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 5
(-a) in paragraph 3, the fifth subparagraph is replaced by the following : "When setting the recapitalisation amounts referred to in the previous subparagraphs, the resolution authority shall: (a) use the most recently reported values for the relevant total risk exposure amount or total exposure measure, adjusted for any changes resulting from resolution actions set out in the resolution plan; and, including the reduced size and risk profile of the resolution group resulting from resolution, in particular when the preferred resolution strategy includes the use of resolution tools referred to in Article 37(3), points (a), (b) or (c), as well as for any changes resulting from the recovery options included in the recovery plan that are expected to be implemented by the time of resolution or shortly thereafter; (b) after consulting the competent authority, adjust the amount corresponding to the current requirement referred to in Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU downwards or upwards to determine the requirement that is to apply to the resolution entity after the implementation of the preferred resolution strategy. , taking into account changes referred to in point (a) of this subparagraph; (b a) after consulting the competent authority, for resolution entities subject to the requirement of Article 131 of Directive 2013/36/EU, adjust the combined buffer requirement applicable to the resolution group, taking into account the changes referred to in point (a) of this subparagraph. . " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)
Amendment 360 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point -a a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point -a a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 6
Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 6
(-a a) in paragraph 3 the sixth subparagraph is replaced by the following : "The resolution authority shall be able to increase the requirement provided in point (a)(ii) of the first subparagraph by an appropriate amount necessary to ensure that, following resolution, the entity is able to sustain sufficient market confidence for an appropriate period, which shall not exceed one year. , except where its preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market. The resolution authority shall communicate to the resolution entity the rationale behind the adjustments mentioned in points (a), (b) and (c) of the fifth subparagraph. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the methodology to be used by resolution authorities to conduct the adjustments mentioned in this paragraph. EBA shall by… [PO please insert the date = 12 months from the date of entry into force of this amending Directive], submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the previous subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.’ . " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)
Amendment 361 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point a a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point a a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3a (new)
Article 45c – paragraph 3a (new)
(a a) the following paragraph is inserted: 3a. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the methodology to be used by resolution authorities to conduct the adjustments referred to in paragraph 3. EBA shall by… [PO please insert the date = 12 months from the date of entry into force of this amending Directive], submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.’ .
Amendment 375 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile, and the depth of the market in which the resolution entity operates;
Amendment 377 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point b – point ii
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point b – point ii
(ii) the liabilities excluded from bail-in pursuant to Article 44(2) or bail-inable liabilities where Article 44(3) is likely to apply with regard to these liabilities;
Amendment 378 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii a (new)
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii a (new)
(iii a) expected own funds requirements for any bridge institution that may be needed to implement the market exit strategy, to ensure its compliance with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Directive 2013/36/EU and Directive 2014/65/EU, as applicable;
Amendment 381 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii b (new)
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii b (new)
(iii b) expected demand by the recipient for the transaction to be capital neutral with regards to the requirements applicable to the acquiring entity.
Amendment 389 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraphs 1a and 1b (new)
Article 45ca – paragraphs 1a and 1b (new)
Amendment 396 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 2
Article 45ca – paragraph 2
2. Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures and envisages the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU, the resolution authority shall also take into account paragraph 1 of this Article when carrying outby way of derogation from Article 45c(2a), the resolution authority shall set a recapitalisation amount as provided in Article 45c(3) in a proportionate way on the bassessment referred to in Article 45c(2a), second subparagraph, of this Directiveis of the criteria referred to in paragraph 1.
Amendment 399 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 35 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 35 a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45m – paragraph 1a (new)
Article 45m – paragraph 1a (new)
(35 a) in Article 45m, the following paragraph 1a is inserted: ‘1a. Regarding entities that were not part of a resolution group prior to the [date of application of this Directive], resolution authorities shall determine appropriate transitional periods for institutions or entities referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) to comply with the requirements laid down in Article 45e or 45f, or with requirements that result from the application of Article 45b(4), (5) or (7), as appropriate. These transitional periods shall not extend beyond 1 January 2030.’
Amendment 413 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 50 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 50 a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 101 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 a (new)
Article 101 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 a (new)
(50a) in Article 101(1), the following subparagraph is added: ‘Where the deposit guarantee scheme makes a contribution pursuant to Article 109(1) and where applicable conditions are met, to contribute the amount needed to close the remaining funding gap after the DGS contribution towards the 8% TLOF, in this case, the contribution made by the resolution financing arrangement is to be repaid in full by the DGS wihin 6 years at the most.’
Amendment 414 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 50 b (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 50 b (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 101 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 a (new)
Article 101 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 a (new)
(50b) in Article 101(1), the following subparagraph is added: Where the deposit guarantee scheme makes a contribution pursuant to Article 109 (1) and where applicable conditions are met, to contribute the amount needed to close the remaining funding gap after the DGS contribution towards the 8% TLOF;
Amendment 415 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 51 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 51 a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 101 – paragraph 2a (new)
Article 101 – paragraph 2a (new)
(51 a) in Article 101, the following paragraph is added: ‘2a. By 31 December 2028, the Commission shall report, to the European Parliament and to the Council, on the appropriateness of the rules governing the contributions to the resolution financing arrangements both at Member State level and Banking Union level. That report shall take stock of the reforms to the crisis management framework, and assess whether these changes call for a review of the rules governing the contributions to the resolution financing arrangement in order to preserve the effectiveness of the incentives of a "polluter-pays" principle. Where appropriate, the Commission shall table a legislative proposal. ’
Amendment 416 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 51 b (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 51 b (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 102 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1a (new)
Article 102 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1a (new)
Amendment 417 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 52
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 52
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 102 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
Article 102 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
Amendment 425 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 53 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 53 – point b
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 103 – paragraph 3a – subparagraph 2
Article 103 – paragraph 3a – subparagraph 2
Where an entity stops being within the scope of Article 1 and is no longer subject to the obligation to pay contributions in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, the resolution authority shall call the irrevocable payment commitments made pursuant to paragraph 3 and still due. If the contribution linked to the irrevocable payment commitment is duly paid at first call, the resolution authority shall cancel the commitment and returnthis Directive the irrevocable payment commitments shall be cancelled and the collateral backing these commitments shall be returned at the collateral. If the contribution is not duly paid at first call, the resolution authorst two years after the entity shall seizes exited the scollateral and cancel the commitment.pe of this Directive;
Amendment 440 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) covered deposits;
Amendment 442 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point aa (new)
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point aa (new)
(a a) that part of eligible deposits from natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises which exceeds the coverage level provided for in Article 6 of Directive 2014/49/EU;
Amendment 443 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
(a b) deposits that would be eligible deposits from natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises were they not made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;
Amendment 444 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point b
Amendment 457 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
Article 108 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
(a a) The introductory part of paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: ‘2. Member States shall ensure that, for entities referred to in points (a) to (d) of the first subparagraph of Article 1(1), ordinary unsecured claims have, in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings, the same priority ranking as other deposits that are not mentioned ings, paragraph 1 of this Article, and a higher priority ranking than that of unsecured claims resulting from debt instruments that meet the following conditions:’ ;
Amendment 467 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
Article 109 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
Member States shall ensure that, where the resolution authorities take resolution action with respect to a credit institution, and provided that such action ensures that depositornatural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises continue to have access to their deposits, to prevent depositorsthem from bearing losses the deposit guarantee scheme to which that credit institution is affiliated shall contribute the following amounts:
Amendment 474 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 5
Article 109 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 5
Amendment 483 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraph 2b – subparagraph 2
Article 109 – paragraph 2b – subparagraph 2
Where the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, together with the contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities, allows for the use of the resolution financing arrangement, theand in case the DGS notifies the resolution authority that it anticipates a risk of facing a liquidity shortfall, the resolution authority may decide to limit the gross contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme shall be limited to the amount necessary to meet the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a). FIn such a case, following the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme, the resolution financing arrangement shall be used in accordance with the principles governing the use of the resolution financing arrangement set out in Articles 44 and 101, and any loss that the resolution financing arrangement thereby incurs as a result of its intervention shall be repaid to it by the DGS over a 6 year period at the most.
Amendment 484 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b
Where the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, together with the contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities, allows for the use of the resolution financing arrangement, the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme shall be limited toequal to the sum of the amount necessary to meet the thresholds laid down in Article 44(5), point (a), and in Article 44(8), point (a) and of the amount contributed by the resolution financing arrangement multiplied by the share of covered deposits as part of the total liabilities in the scope of the transfer. Following the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme, the resolution financing arrangement shall be used in accordance with the principles governing the use of the resolution financing arrangement set out in Articles 44 and 101.
Amendment 487 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraph 2b – subparagraph 3
Article 109 – paragraph 2b – subparagraph 3
However, the first and the second subparagraphs shall not apply to institutions that meet any of the following conditions: i) they have been identified as liquidation entities in the group resolution plan or in the resolution plan.; ii) they have never complied with their fully-loaded MREL requirements since being identified as resolution entities.