BETA

12 Amendments of Irene TINAGLI related to 2023/0111(COD)

Amendment 70 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
(11) Where the resolution strategy envisages the use of resolution tools other than bail-in, the recapitalisation needs of the entity concerned will generally be smaller after resolution than in case of open bank bail-in. The calibration of the MREL in such a case should take that aspect into account when estimating the recapitalisation requirement. Therefore, when adjusting the level of the MREL for resolution entities the resolution plan of which envisages the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the Board should take into account the features of those tools, including the expected perimeter of the transfer to the private purchaser or to the bridge institution, the types of instruments to be transferred, the expected value and marketability of those instruments, and the design of the preferred resolution strategy, including the complementary use of the asset separation tool. Since the resolution authority has to decide on a case by case basis on any possible use in resolution of funds from the deposit guarantee scheme and since such decision cannot be assumed with certainty ex ante, the Board should not consider the potential contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme (in resolution when calibrating the level of the MREL.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 75 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
(12) It is necessary to ensure equal incentives to build sufficient amounts of MREL for institutions and entities that would be subject to transfer strategies both in and outside resolution. The setting of the level of the MREL for institutions and entities that may be subject to measures in the context of national insolvency proceedings pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council32 should therefore follow the same rules as those applicable to the setting of the MREL for resolution entities whose preferred resolution strategy provides for the sale of business or transfer to a bridge institution leading to its exit from the market. __________________ 32 Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149).deleted
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 82 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
(18) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should reflect the consideration that depositors are better protected when deposit guarantee scheme funds are used more efficiently and the losses for those funds are minimised. Therefore, in the public interest assessment, the resolution objective of protecting depositors should be considered better achieved in resolution if opting for insolvency would be more costly for the deposit guarantee scheme.deleted
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 93 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20
(20) To ensure that the resolution objectives are attained in the most effective way, the outcome of the public interest assessment should be negative only where the winding up of the failing institution or entity under normal insolvency proceedings would achieve the resolution objectives more effectively and not only to the same extent as resolution.deleted
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 100 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
(21) In light of the experience acquired in the implementation of Directive 2014/59/EU, Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 and Directive 2014/49/EU, it is necessary to specify further the conditions under which measures of a precautionary nature that qualify as extraordinary public financial support may exceptionally be granted. To minimise distortions of competition arising from differences in nature of deposit guarantee schemes in the Union, interventions of such schemes in the context of preventive measures complying with the requirements laid down in Directive 2014/49/EU that qualify as extraordinary public financial support should exceptionally be allowed where the beneficiary institution or entity does not meet any of the conditions for being deemed ashas been not declared failing or likely to fail. It should be ensured that precautionary measures are taken sufficiently early. The ECB currently bases its consideration that an institution or entity is solvent, for the purposes of precautionary recapitalisation, on a forward-looking assessment for the following 12 months of whether the institution or entity can comply with the own funds requirements set out in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or in Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, and the additional own funds requirement laid down in Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive (EU) 2019/2034. That practice should be laid downrevised in Regulation (EU) No 806/2014. Moreover, measures to provide relief for impaired assets, including asset management vehicles or asset guarantee schemes, can prove effective and efficient in addressing causes of possible financial distress faced by institutions and entities and preventing their failure and could therefore constitute relevant precautionary measures. It should therefore be specified that such precautionary measures can take the form of impaired asset measures.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 147 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile, and the depth of the market in which the resolution entity operatability to access the capital markets for eligible liabilities;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 156 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
(ea) whether any contribution by a deposit guarantee scheme is expected to be made pursuant to Article 79.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 162 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12da – paragraph 2
2. Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures and envisages the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU, the Board shall also take into account paragraph 1 of this Article when carrying out the assessment referred to in Article 12d(2a), second subparagraph, of this Regulation.deleted
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 211 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1
For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where, pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 14(3), that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in that Article 1431, and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives more effectivelyto the same extent.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 223 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2
When carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the Board, based on thepursuant to Articles 8(2), 9(2) and 12d(2), the Board, inf ormation available to it at the time of that assessment, shall consider and compare all extraordinary public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the entity, both in the event of resolution and inder to assess the appropriateness of the resolution for the institution, shall consider the following elements: (a) the prevalence of deposits and the absence of debt instruments in the funding model; (b) the access to the capital markets for eligible liabilities; (c) the evxtent of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.;to which the institution relies on Common Equity Tier 1 capital to meet its capital requirements.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 323 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 43 a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 94 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
(43a) in Article 94(1), the following point is added: (aa) the interplay between the existing framework and the establishment of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 326 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 a (new)
Article 2a Transitional period 1. Institutions or entities referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU whose preferred resolution strategy will change depending on the entry into force of this Regulation should comply with the requirements referred to in Articles 45e or 45f of Directive 2014/59/EU or with requirements that result from the application of Article 45b(4), (5) or (7) of that Directive, as appropriate, within five years as from the date of the approval of the resolution plan including the new preferred resolution strategy. 2. During the transitional period referred to in paragraph 1, in the cases referred to in point (b), of the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 of Article 109 of Directive 2014/59/EU, where the transfer to the recipient includes deposits that are not covered deposits or other bail-inable liabilities, by way of derogation from the second subparagraph of that paragraph, the deposit guarantee scheme shall contribute to the amount necessary to cover the difference between the value of deposits, including deposits that are not covered, of senior bail-inable liabilities held by retail clients, as defined in point 11 of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU, and of the liabilities with the same or higher priority ranking than deposits and the value of the assets of the institution under resolution which are to be transferred to the recipient.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON