Progress: Awaiting Council's 1st reading position
Role | Committee | Rapporteur | Shadows |
---|---|---|---|
Lead | ECON | TINAGLI Irene ( S&D) | NIEDERMAYER Luděk ( EPP), MARTÍN FRÍAS Jorge ( PfE), ZĪLE Roberts ( ECR), BOYER Gilles ( Renew), PETER-HANSEN Kira Marie ( Greens/EFA), SCHIRDEWAN Martin ( The Left) |
Former Responsible Committee | ECON | MARQUES Pedro ( S&D) | |
Former Committee Opinion | JURI |
Lead committee dossier:
Legal Basis:
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Legal Basis:
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Events
The European Parliament adopted by 352 votes to 213, with 67 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and funding of resolution action.
The European Parliament adopted its position at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure.
The proposed Regulation seeks to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the recovery and resolution framework for institutions and entities .
The proposal amends Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism, the SRMR, in particular as regards the improved application of the tools that are already available in the bank resolution framework, clarifying the conditions for resolution, facilitating access to safety nets the event of bank failure and improving the clarity and consistency of funding rules.
The proposed amendments are part of the Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) legislative package, which also includes amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD) and Directive 2014/49/EU (Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive or DSGD).
Th e proposal will allow authorities to organise the orderly exit of a failing bank, regardless of its size and business model, using a wide range of tools. It will further safeguard financial stability, protect taxpayers and depositors and support the real economy and its competitiveness . The proposed rules will allow authorities to fully exploit the many benefits of resolution as a key element of the crisis management toolbox.
The amendments cover a range of policy aspects:
- expanding the scope of resolution by reviewing the public interest assessment, when this achieves the objectives of the framework, e.g. protecting financial stability, taxpayer money and depositor confidence better than national insolvency proceedings;
- strengthening the funding in resolution by complementing the internal loss-absorbing capacity of institutions, which remains the first line of defence, with the use of DGS funds in resolution to help access resolution funds without imposing losses on depositors where appropriate, subject to conditions and safeguards;
- clarifying the early intervention framework by removing overlaps between early intervention and supervisory measures, providing legal certainty on the applicable conditions and facilitating cooperation between competent and resolution authorities;
- ensuring a timely triggering of resolution.
The amended text stipulates that the resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business model with a positive public interest assessment. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified. In that respect, it is necessary to clarify that, depending on the specific circumstances, certain functions of the institution or entity can be considered critical if their discontinuance would impact financial stability or critical services at regional level.
The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or deposit guarantee schemes) and, on the other hand, funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline, and should be considered only under extraordinary circumstances.
Where national insolvency and resolution frameworks achieve effectively the objectives of the framework to the same extent, preference should be given to the option that minimises the risk for taxpayers and the economy . That approach ensures a prudent and responsible course of action, aligned with the overarching goal of safeguarding both the interests of taxpayers and broader economic stability.
Taxpayer-funded extraordinary financial support to institutions and entities should be granted, if at all, only to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of an exceptional and systemic nature, as it imposes a significant burden on public finances and disrupts the level playing field in the internal market.
Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
PURPOSE: to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the recovery and resolution framework for institutions and entities.
PROPOSED ACT: Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council.
ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: the European Parliament decides in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and on an equal footing with the Council.
BACKGROUND: the Union resolution framework consists of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRMR) and a Single Resolution Fund. It was established in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis and aims to deal in an orderly manner with the failure of institutions and entities by preserving institutions and entities’ critical functions and avoiding threats to financial stability, and at the same time protecting depositors and public funds. In addition, the Union resolution framework intends to foster the development of the internal market in banking by creating a harmonised regime to address cross-border crises in a coordinated way and by avoiding level playing field issues.
However, experience over the past years has shown that when medium-sized and smaller banks fail in the EU, authorities have found solutions outside the EU's harmonised resolution framework. This has often involved the use of taxpayers' money instead of the bank's required internal resources or private, industry-funded safety nets.
While the existing rules already enable authorities to deal with failing banks in an effective manner, further progress is needed to make the rules even more effective in ensuring that European banks keep supporting Europe's economy and do not burden public finances when they fail.
CONTENT: the proposal amends an existing regulation, the SRMR, in particular as regards the improved application of the tools that are already available in the bank resolution framework, clarifying the conditions for resolution, facilitating access to safety nets the event of bank failure and improving the clarity and consistency of funding rules.
The proposed amendments are part of the Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) legislative package , which also includes amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD) and Directive 2014/49/EU (Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive or DSGD).
By establishing harmonised requirements for applying the CMDI framework to banks in the internal market, the proposal considerably reduces the risk of divergent national rules in Member States, which could distort competition in the internal market.
The proposal will allow authorities to organise the orderly exit of a failing bank, regardless of its size and business model, using a wide range of tools. It will further safeguard financial stability, protect taxpayers and depositors and support the real economy and its competitiveness. The proposed rules will allow authorities to fully exploit the many benefits of resolution as a key element of the crisis management toolbox.
The amendments included in the CMDI package cover a range of policy aspects:
- expanding the scope of resolution by reviewing the public interest assessment, when this achieves the objectives of the framework, e.g. protecting financial stability, taxpayer money and depositor confidence better than national insolvency proceedings;
- strengthening the funding in resolution by complementing the internal loss-absorbing capacity of institutions, which remains the first line of defence, with the use of DGS funds in resolution to help access resolution funds without imposing losses on depositors where appropriate, subject to conditions and safeguards;
- clarifying the early intervention framework by removing overlaps between early intervention and supervisory measures, providing legal certainty on the applicable conditions and facilitating cooperation between competent and resolution authorities;
- ensuring a timely triggering of resolution.
Legislative proposal
PURPOSE: to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the recovery and resolution framework for institutions and entities.
PROPOSED ACT: Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council.
ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: the European Parliament decides in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and on an equal footing with the Council.
BACKGROUND: the Union resolution framework consists of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRMR) and a Single Resolution Fund. It was established in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis and aims to deal in an orderly manner with the failure of institutions and entities by preserving institutions and entities’ critical functions and avoiding threats to financial stability, and at the same time protecting depositors and public funds. In addition, the Union resolution framework intends to foster the development of the internal market in banking by creating a harmonised regime to address cross-border crises in a coordinated way and by avoiding level playing field issues.
However, experience over the past years has shown that when medium-sized and smaller banks fail in the EU, authorities have found solutions outside the EU's harmonised resolution framework. This has often involved the use of taxpayers' money instead of the bank's required internal resources or private, industry-funded safety nets.
While the existing rules already enable authorities to deal with failing banks in an effective manner, further progress is needed to make the rules even more effective in ensuring that European banks keep supporting Europe's economy and do not burden public finances when they fail.
CONTENT: the proposal amends an existing regulation, the SRMR, in particular as regards the improved application of the tools that are already available in the bank resolution framework, clarifying the conditions for resolution, facilitating access to safety nets the event of bank failure and improving the clarity and consistency of funding rules.
The proposed amendments are part of the Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) legislative package , which also includes amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD) and Directive 2014/49/EU (Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive or DSGD).
By establishing harmonised requirements for applying the CMDI framework to banks in the internal market, the proposal considerably reduces the risk of divergent national rules in Member States, which could distort competition in the internal market.
The proposal will allow authorities to organise the orderly exit of a failing bank, regardless of its size and business model, using a wide range of tools. It will further safeguard financial stability, protect taxpayers and depositors and support the real economy and its competitiveness. The proposed rules will allow authorities to fully exploit the many benefits of resolution as a key element of the crisis management toolbox.
The amendments included in the CMDI package cover a range of policy aspects:
- expanding the scope of resolution by reviewing the public interest assessment, when this achieves the objectives of the framework, e.g. protecting financial stability, taxpayer money and depositor confidence better than national insolvency proceedings;
- strengthening the funding in resolution by complementing the internal loss-absorbing capacity of institutions, which remains the first line of defence, with the use of DGS funds in resolution to help access resolution funds without imposing losses on depositors where appropriate, subject to conditions and safeguards;
- clarifying the early intervention framework by removing overlaps between early intervention and supervisory measures, providing legal certainty on the applicable conditions and facilitating cooperation between competent and resolution authorities;
- ensuring a timely triggering of resolution.
Legislative proposal
Documents
- Commission response to text adopted in plenary: SP(2024)394
- Decision by Parliament, 1st reading: T9-0326/2024
- Results of vote in Parliament: Results of vote in Parliament
- Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading/single reading: A9-0155/2024
- Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading: A9-0155/2024
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE754.694
- Committee draft report: PE753.695
- ESC: CES6298/2022
- ECB: CON/2023/0019
- ECB: OJ C 307 31.08.2023, p. 0019
- Document attached to the procedure: Go to the pageEur-Lex
- Document attached to the procedure: SWD(2023)0226
- Document attached to the procedure: Go to the pageEur-Lex
- Document attached to the procedure: SWD(2023)0225
- Document attached to the procedure: Go to the pageEur-Lex
- Document attached to the procedure: SEC(2023)0230
- Legislative proposal: COM(2023)0226
- Legislative proposal: Go to the pageEur-Lex
- Legislative proposal published: COM(2023)0226
- Legislative proposal published: Go to the page Eur-Lex
- Committee draft report: PE753.695
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE754.694
- Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading/single reading: A9-0155/2024
- Legislative proposal: COM(2023)0226 Go to the pageEur-Lex
- Document attached to the procedure: Go to the pageEur-Lex SWD(2023)0226
- Document attached to the procedure: Go to the pageEur-Lex SWD(2023)0225
- Document attached to the procedure: Go to the pageEur-Lex SEC(2023)0230
- Commission response to text adopted in plenary: SP(2024)394
- ECB: CON/2023/0019 OJ C 307 31.08.2023, p. 0019
- ESC: CES6298/2022
Votes
A9-0155/2024 – Pedro Marques – Commission proposal #
ES | RO | NL | PL | HU | BG | PT | SK | HR | SI | SE | CZ | LT | DK | LV | AT | EE | MT | LU | EL | FI | BE | IE | FR | IT | DE | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Total |
58
|
28
|
28
|
44
|
16
|
16
|
21
|
13
|
12
|
8
|
21
|
21
|
10
|
14
|
8
|
17
|
7
|
4
|
6
|
14
|
14
|
20
|
12
|
75
|
57
|
88
|
|
PPE |
159
|
Spain PPEFor (11)Against (1) |
Netherlands PPEFor (6) |
1
|
Bulgaria PPEFor (7) |
Portugal PPEFor (7) |
4
|
4
|
4
|
Sweden PPE |
Czechia PPE |
4
|
1
|
3
|
5
|
1
|
1
|
2
|
3
|
4
|
4
|
France PPEAgainst (7)Abstain (1) |
Italy PPEFor (7)Against (1) |
Germany PPEFor (11)Against (17) |
|||
S&D |
127
|
Spain S&DFor (21)Alicia HOMS GINEL, Clara AGUILERA, Cristina MAESTRE, César LUENA, Domènec RUIZ DEVESA, Eider GARDIAZABAL RUBIAL, Estrella DURÁ FERRANDIS, Ibán GARCÍA DEL BLANCO, Inma RODRÍGUEZ-PIÑERO, Iratxe GARCÍA PÉREZ, Isabel GARCÍA MUÑOZ, Javi LÓPEZ, Javier MORENO SÁNCHEZ, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ, Juan Fernando LÓPEZ AGUILAR, Laura BALLARÍN CEREZA, Lina GÁLVEZ, Marcos ROS SEMPERE, Mónica Silvana GONZÁLEZ, Nacho SÁNCHEZ AMOR, Nicolás GONZÁLEZ CASARES
|
5
|
Netherlands S&DFor (6) |
Poland S&DFor (6) |
5
|
Bulgaria S&D |
Portugal S&DFor (9) |
1
|
4
|
2
|
5
|
1
|
2
|
3
|
2
|
5
|
2
|
3
|
1
|
1
|
2
|
2
|
France S&DFor (6)Abstain (1) |
Germany S&DAgainst (12)Abstain (1) |
||
Renew |
98
|
Romania RenewFor (7) |
Netherlands RenewFor (7) |
1
|
1
|
2
|
4
|
1
|
2
|
3
|
Czechia RenewFor (2)Abstain (3) |
1
|
Denmark RenewFor (6) |
1
|
1
|
3
|
2
|
1
|
3
|
4
|
2
|
France RenewFor (22)Bernard GUETTA, Catherine AMALRIC, Catherine CHABAUD, Christophe GRUDLER, Dominique RIQUET, Fabienne KELLER, Gilles BOYER, Guy LAVOCAT, Irène TOLLERET, Jérémy DECERLE, Laurence FARRENG, Marie-Pierre VEDRENNE, Max ORVILLE, Nathalie LOISEAU, Pascal CANFIN, Pierre KARLESKIND, Salima YENBOU, Sandro GOZI, Stéphane BIJOUX, Stéphanie YON-COURTIN, Sylvie BRUNET, Valérie HAYER
|
3
|
Germany RenewAgainst (7) |
|||
NI |
37
|
3
|
1
|
1
|
Hungary NIFor (9) |
3
|
2
|
1
|
1
|
3
|
3
|
Italy NIAgainst (7) |
3
|
||||||||||||||
ECR |
61
|
Spain ECR |
1
|
Netherlands ECRAgainst (1)Abstain (4) |
Poland ECRAbstain (23)
Andżelika Anna MOŻDŻANOWSKA,
Anna FOTYGA,
Anna ZALEWSKA,
Beata KEMPA,
Beata MAZUREK,
Beata SZYDŁO,
Bogdan RZOŃCA,
Dominik TARCZYŃSKI,
Elżbieta KRUK,
Elżbieta RAFALSKA,
Grzegorz TOBISZOWSKI,
Izabela-Helena KLOC,
Jacek SARYUSZ-WOLSKI,
Jadwiga WIŚNIEWSKA,
Joanna KOPCIŃSKA,
Kosma ZŁOTOWSKI,
Krzysztof JURGIEL,
Patryk JAKI,
Ryszard Antoni LEGUTKO,
Ryszard CZARNECKI,
Tomasz Piotr PORĘBA,
Witold Jan WASZCZYKOWSKI,
Zdzisław KRASNODĘBSKI
|
2
|
1
|
1
|
3
|
4
|
1
|
1
|
1
|
2
|
3
|
1
|
Italy ECRAgainst (7) |
1
|
|||||||||
The Left |
32
|
Spain The LeftAgainst (6) |
4
|
1
|
1
|
1
|
2
|
1
|
1
|
4
|
France The LeftAgainst (5)Abstain (1) |
Germany The LeftAgainst (5) |
|||||||||||||||
ID |
50
|
1
|
1
|
3
|
1
|
3
|
Italy IDAgainst (17) |
Germany IDAgainst (8) |
|||||||||||||||||||
Verts/ALE |
68
|
3
|
1
|
3
|
1
|
1
|
3
|
3
|
2
|
2
|
3
|
1
|
1
|
3
|
3
|
2
|
France Verts/ALEAgainst (12) |
1
|
Germany Verts/ALEAgainst (23)
Alexandra GEESE,
Anna CAVAZZINI,
Anna DEPARNAY-GRUNENBERG,
Damian BOESELAGER,
Daniel FREUND,
Erik MARQUARDT,
Hannah NEUMANN,
Henrike HAHN,
Jan OVELGÖNNE,
Jutta PAULUS,
Katrin LANGENSIEPEN,
Manuela RIPA,
Martin HÄUSLING,
Michael BLOSS,
Niklas NIENASS,
Patrick BREYER,
Pierrette HERZBERGER-FOFANA,
Rasmus ANDRESEN,
Reinhard BÜTIKOFER,
Sergey LAGODINSKY,
Ska KELLER,
Terry REINTKE,
Viola VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL
|
Amendments | Dossier |
271 |
2023/0111(COD)
2023/11/06
ECON
271 amendments...
Amendment 100 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 (21) In light of the experience acquired in the implementation of Directive 2014/59/EU, Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 and Directive 2014/49/EU, it is necessary to specify further the conditions under which measures of a precautionary nature that qualify as extraordinary public financial support may exceptionally be granted. To minimise distortions of
Amendment 101 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 22 (22) To preserve market discipline, protect public funds and avoid distortions of competition, precautionary measures should remain the exception and only be applied to address serious disturbances in the market or to preserve financial stability and only use funds available in industry funded safety nets. Moreover, precautionary measures should not be used to address incurred or likely losses. The most reliable instrument to identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses is an asset quality review by the ECB, the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (EBA), established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council
Amendment 102 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 23 (23) Precautionary recapitalisation is aimed at supporting viable institutions and entities identified as likely to encounter temporary difficulties in the near future and to prevent their situation from deteriorating further. To avoid that public subsidies are granted to businesses that are already unprofitable when the support is granted, precautionary measures granted in the form of acquisition of own funds instruments or other capital instruments or through impaired asset measures should not exceed the amount necessary to cover capital shortfalls as identified in the adverse scenario of a stress test or equivalent exercise. To ensure that public financing is ultimately discontinued, those precautionary measures should also be limited in time and contain a clear timeline for their termination (exit strategy).
Amendment 103 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 23 (23) Precautionary recapitalisation is aimed at supporting viable institutions and
Amendment 104 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 24 (24) Precautionary measures should be limited to the amount that the institution or entity would need to maintain its solvency in case of an adverse scenario event as determined in a stress test or equivalent exercise. In the case of precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures, the receiving institution or entity should be able to use that amount to cover losses on the transferred assets or in combination with an acquisition of capital
Amendment 105 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 31 Amendment 106 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 31 (31) In certain circumstances, after the Single Resolution Fund has provided a contribution up to the maximum of 5 % of the institution or entity’s total liabilities including own funds, the Board may use additional sources of funding to further support their resolution action.
Amendment 107 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 35 Amendment 108 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 35 Amendment 109 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 37 (37) After the initial build-up period of the Single Resolution Fund referred to in Article 69(1) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014,
Amendment 110 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 37 (37) After the initial build-up period of the Single Resolution Fund referred to in Article 69(1) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014,
Amendment 111 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 38 (38) Irrevocable payment commitments are one of the components of the available financial means of the Single Resolution Fund. It is therefore necessary to specify the circumstances in which those payment commitments may be called, and the applicable procedure when terminating the commitments in case an institution or entity ceases to be subject to the obligation to pay contributions to the Single Resolution Fund. In addition, to provide more transparency and certainty with respect to the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of ex ante contributions to be raised, the Board should
Amendment 112 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 40 Amendment 113 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 40 a (new) (40a) Given the creditor hierarchy review, market conditions might not be as favourable to deposit guarantee schemes that seek such alternative funding arrangements. Therefore, to prevent temporary financing by the Member States, and to ensure that it remains a last resort, the Board should be able to provide either a credit line or a guarantee based on the Single Resolution Fund to a deposit guarantee scheme in order to facilitate its access to markets at favourable financing conditions. The Single Resolution Fund's support should be provided when the deposit guarantee scheme is required to intervene in resolution, yet available financial means are insufficient to satisfy the needs of such action.
Amendment 114 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 40 a (new) (40a) Given the creditor hierarchy review, market conditions might not be as favourable to deposit guarantee schemes that seek such alternative funding arrangements. Therefore, to prevent temporary financing by the Member States, and to ensure that it remains a last resort, the Board should be able to provide either a credit line or a guarantee based on the Single Resolution Fund to a deposit guarantee scheme in order to facilitate its access to markets at favourable financing conditions. The Single Resolution Fund's support should be provided when the deposit guarantee scheme is required to intervene in resolution, yet available financial means are insufficient to satisfy the needs of such action.
Amendment 115 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 40 a (new) (40a) Despite an agreement having been reached on the introduction by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) of a backstop to the Single Resolution Fund, its implementation has not yet been achieved. The additional function of the Single Resolution Fund to provide guarantees to deposit guarantee schemes thus warrants additional safeguards to the former, such as the ratification of the ESM backstop to the Single Resolution Fund.
Amendment 116 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 41 Amendment 117 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 41 a (new) (41a) As deposit guarantee schemes are vested with additional tasks and responsibilities and considering that one direct implication of this review of the EU crisis management and deposit insurance framework, is to make DGS funds more available for resolution, their risks of being totally or partially depleted is increased. It is therefore now time to move toward a more Europeanised model, whereby a deposit insurance fund is established, financed by transfer from national DGS and managed by the Board in order to provide loans to depleted or almost depleted national DGS. The contributions to this fund should be computed according to a risk-based methodology. National DGS should inform early the Board if it anticipates that it will need to recourse to the EU credit line offered by the DIF.
Amendment 118 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 41 b (new) (41b) Two years after the entry into force of this amending Regulation, the Commission should prepare a report to the European Parliament and the Council to assess whether and under which modalities the Deposit Insurance Fund shall also cover losses incurred by national DGS.
Amendment 119 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 42 a (new) (42a) The Fund should guarantee high levels of transparency to duly safeguard the public interest, particularly when public resources are deployed for the application of resolution tools, and should therefore endeavour to publish regular reports on the resolution processes for which those resources were deployed, mentioning the total amount, the amounts repaid and the timeframe for future repayments.
Amendment 120 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point - a(new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 24 Amendment 121 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point c a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 3 – paragraph 1 – points 55a– 55c (new) Amendment 122 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point c a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 55 a (new) Amendment 123 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point c a (new)Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 55 a (new) (ca) the following point is added: ‘(55a) ‘critical functions’ means activities, services or operations the discontinuance of which is likely, in one or more Member States, to lead to the disruption of services that are essential to the real economy or to disrupt financial stability at national or regional level on a significant scale, due to the size, market share, external and internal interconnectedness, complexity or cross-border activities of an institution or group, with particular regard to the substitutability of those activities, services or operations;’.
Amendment 124 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 8 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 a Amendment 125 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 8 – paragraph 6 –subparagraph 3 (aa) in paragraph 6, the third subparagraph is replaced by the following: When drawing up and updating the resolution plan, the Board shall identify any material impediments to resolvability and, where
Amendment 126 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a a (new) (aa) in paragraph 6, fifth subparagraph, the following point is inserted: ‘(ca) any use of deposit guarantee schemes’;
Amendment 127 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a b(new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 8 – paragraph 7 (ab) paragraph 7 is replaced by the following: 7. The resolution plan shall include an analysis of how and when an institution may apply, in the conditions addressed by the plan, for the use of central bank facilities and shall identify those assets which would be expected to qualify as collateral while providing a prudent estimation of its average yearly value in aggregate for central bank liquidity purposes taking due account of relevant haircuts.
Amendment 128 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a c (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 8 – paragraph 9 (ac) paragraph 9 is replaced by the following 9. The resolution plan for each entity shall include, quantified where appropriate and possible: (a) a summary of the key elements of the plan; (aa) where applicable, a detailed description of the reasons for determining that an institution is to be qualified as a liquidation entity; (b)a summary of the material changes to the institution that have occurred after the latest resolution information was filed; (c)a demonstration of how critical functions and core business lines could be legally and economically separated, to the extent necessary, from other functions so as to ensure continuity upon the failure of the institution; (d)an estimation of the timeframe for executing each material aspect of the plan; (e)a detailed description of the assessment of resolvability carried out in accordance with Article 10; (f)a description of any measures required pursuant to Article 10(7) to address or remove impediments to resolvability identified as a result of the assessment carried out in accordance with Article 10; (g)a description of the processes for determining the value and marketability of
Amendment 129 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 8 – paragraph 9 – point fa (new) (aa) in paragraph 9, the following point is inserted: (fa) a detailed description of the reasons for determining that an institution is to be qualified as a liquidation entity, including explaining how the resolution authority came to the conclusion that the institution lacks critical functions;
Amendment 130 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 8 – paragraph 10 (b)
Amendment 131 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 8 – paragraph 10 – subparagraph 3 The identification of the measures to be taken in respect of the subsidiaries referred to in the first subparagraph, point (b), that are not resolution entities may be subject to a simplified approach by the Board, after consulting with the relevant national resolution authority, and if such approach would not negatively affect the resolvability of the group, taking into account the size of the subsidiary, its risk profile, the absence of critical functions and the group resolution strategy.;
Amendment 132 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b a(new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 8 – paragraph 11 – point - a a (new) (ba) in paragraph 11, the following point is inserted: (-aa) a detailed description of the reasons for determining that a group entity is to be qualified as a liquidation entity, including explaining how the resolution authority came to the conclusion that the institution lacks critical functions, and how the ratio of its total risk exposure amount and operating income in the group’s total risk exposure amount and operating income, as well as the leverage ratio of the group entity in the context of the group have been taken into account;
Amendment 133 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point b a(new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 8 – paragraph 11 (ba) paragraph 11 is replaced by the following 11. The group resolution plan shall: (a)set out the resolution actions to be taken in relation to group entities, both through resolution actions in respect of the entities referred to in Article 2(b) and subsidiary institutions and through coordinated resolution actions in respect of subsidiary institutions, in the scenarios provided for in paragraph 6; (aa) where a group referred to in paragraph 1 comprises more than one resolution group, set out the resolution actions that are to be taken for the resolution entities of each resolution group and the implications of those actions on both of the following: (i)other group entities that belong to the same resolution group; (ii)other resolution groups; (ab) a detailed description of the reasons for determining that a group entity referred to in points (a) to (d) of paragraph 1 is to be qualified as a liquidation entity, (b)examine the extent to which the resolution tools and powers could be applied and exercised in a coordinated way to group entities established in the Union, including measures to facilitate the purchase by a third party of the group as a whole, or separate business lines or activities that are delivered by a number of group entities, or particular group entities, and identify any potential impediments to a coordinated resolution; (c)include a detailed description of the assessment of resolvability carried out in accordance with Article 10; (d)where a group includes entities incorporated in third countries, identify appropriate arrangements for cooperation and coordination with the relevant authorities of those third countries and the implications for resolution within the Union; (e)identify measures, including the legal and economic separation of particular functions or business lines, that are necessary to facilitate group resolution where the conditions for resolution are met; (f)identify how the group resolution actions could be financed and, where the Fund and the financing arrangements from non- participating Member States established in accordance with Article 100 of Directive 2014/59/EU would be required, set out
Amendment 134 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point c Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 8 – paragraph 14 14. The Board shall
Amendment 135 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point - a a(new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 10 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 (-aa) in paragraph 4, the first subparagraph is replaced by the following: "A group shall be deemed to be resolvable if it is feasible and credible for the Board either to wind up group entities under normal insolvency proceedings or to resolve them by applying resolution tools to, and exercising resolution powers with respect to, resolution entities of that group while avoiding, to the maximum extent possible, any significant adverse consequences for the financial systems of the Member States in which group entities are located or of other Member States or the Union, including broader financial instability or system wide events, with a view to ensuring the continuity of critical functions carried out by those group entities, where they can be easily separated in a timely manner, or by other means.
Amendment 136 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point c Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 10 – paragraph 10 (c) paragraph 10 is
Amendment 137 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 10a – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Where an entity is in a situation where it meets the combined buffer requirement when considered in addition to each of the requirements referred to in Article 141a(1), points (a), (b) and (c), of Directive 2013/36/EU, but it fails to meet the combined buffer requirement when considered in addition to the requirements referred to in Articles 12d and 12e of this Regulation, when calculated in accordance with Article 12a(2), point (a), of this Regulation, or where an entity is in a situation where it breaches its requirements referred to in Articles 12d and 12e of this Regulation when calculated in accordance with Article 12a(2), point (b), the Board shall
Amendment 138 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12 – paragraph 4 a (new) Amendment 139 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8 a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12a – paragraph 1 a (new) (8a) in Article 12a, the following paragraph is inserted: 1a. Within a resolution group, subsidiaries that are institutions or entities referred to in Article 2(1) but are not resolution entities, whose total assets do not exceed EUR 5 billion and that do not reach a 2% threshold of the resolution group’s total risk exposure amount, or leverage exposure, shall not be subject to the requirement referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.
Amendment 140 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8 b (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12b (8b) Article 12b is replaced by the following: Article 12b Exemption from the minimum requirement
Amendment 141 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12d (10)
Amendment 142 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12da Amendment 143 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12da – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. When applying Article 12d to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the Board shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 12d(3) in a proportionate way that ensures that the resolution group can be resolved in all possible scenarios without the need for external funding on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:
Amendment 144 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12da – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. When applying Article 12d to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages
Amendment 145 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point a (a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile
Amendment 146 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point a (a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile
Amendment 147 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point a (a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile, and the
Amendment 148 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point a (a) the resolution entity’s size, business model, funding model and risk profile, and the
Amendment 149 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point b – point ii (ii) the liabilities excluded from bail-in pursuant to Article 27(3) or bail-inable liabilities where Article 27(5) is likely to apply with regard to these liabilities;
Amendment 150 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii a (new) (iiia) expected own funds requirements for any bridge institution that may be needed to implement the market exit strategy, to ensure its compliance with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Directive 2013/36/EU and Directive 2014/65/EU, as applicable;
Amendment 151 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii a (new) (iiia) any risks to successful implementation of the preferred resolution strategy, in particular a potentially adverse market environment at the time of resolution;
Amendment 152 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point a – point iii b (new) (iiib) expected demand by the recipient for the transaction to be capital neutral with regards to the requirements applicable to the acquiring entity.
Amendment 153 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point c – point i (i) any
Amendment 154 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point c – point ii a (new) (iia) a potentially adverse market environment at the time of resolution;
Amendment 155 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point e a (new) (ea) whether any contribution by a deposit guarantee scheme is expected to be made pursuant to Article 79.’
Amendment 156 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point e a (new) (ea) whether any contribution by a deposit guarantee scheme is expected to be made pursuant to Article 79.
Amendment 157 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12da – paragraph 1 – point e a (new) (ea) the potential recapitalisation amount required under an alternative resolution strategy.
Amendment 158 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12da – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. For resolution entities subject to the proportionalisation rules of paragraph 1 of this Article, the level of the requirement referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 12d shall be at least equal to: (a) 16 % when calculated in accordance with point (a) of Article 12a(2); and (b) 5,5 % when calculated in accordance with point (b) of Article 12a(2). Resolution entities that are part of a resolution group the total assets of which exceed EUR 5 billion and resolution entities with consolidated total assets in excess of EUR 5 billion shall meet a level of the requirement referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph that is equal to 4,5 % when calculated in accordance with point (a) of Article 12a(2) and to 1,5 % when calculated in accordance with point (b) of Article 12a(2), using Tier 2 instruments and eligible liabilities.’ In order to ensure effective and consistent application of this Article, the Board shall give guidance and address instructions to the national resolution authorities for the application of the RTSs referred to in Article 45ca(1b) of Directive 2014/59/EU.
Amendment 159 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12da – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to institutions that are designated as "small and non-complex institutions" in line with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
Amendment 160 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12da – paragraph 2 Amendment 161 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12da – paragraph 2 Amendment 162 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12da – paragraph 2 Amendment 163 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12da – paragraph 2 2. Where the resolution plan provides that the entity is to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures and envisages the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU,
Amendment 164 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12da – paragraph 3 3. The application of paragraph 1 shall not result in an amount that is
Amendment 165 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 – point a a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12k – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3 a (new) (aa) in paragraph 1, the following subparagraph is added: After 1 January 2024 or the transitional period ending after 1 January 2024 set by the Board pursuant to the third subparagraph, the Board, where duly justified and appropriate on the basis of the criteria referred to in paragraph 7, and taking into consideration the elements referred to in the third subparagraph, may determine an appropriate transitional period within which to comply with the requirements in Articles 12f or 12g or the requirements that result from the application of Article 12c(4), (5) or (7).
Amendment 166 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14 – point a a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 12k – paragraph 1a (new) (aa) the following paragraph is inserted: ‘1a. Regarding entities that were not part of a resolution group prior to the [date of application of this amending Regulation], the Board shall determine appropriate transitional periods for institutions or entities referred to in Article 2(1) to comply with the requirements of Articles 12f or 12g, or with requirements that result from the application of Article 12c(4), (5) or (7), as appropriate. These transitional periods shall not extend beyond 1 January 2030.’
Amendment 167 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 13 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. The ECB
Amendment 168 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 13 – paragraph 1 –point a –point ii (ii) the ECB deems that remedial actions other than early intervention measures are insufficient to address the problems
Amendment 169 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point a – point ii (ii) the ECB deems that remedial actions other than early intervention measures are
Amendment 170 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 13 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) the entity infringes or is likely to infringe in the 12 months following the assessment of the ECB the requirements laid down in Title II of Directive 2014/65/EU, in Articles 3 to 7, 14 to 17, or 24, 25 and 26 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014
Amendment 171 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a (new) Where appropriate to characterize the infringement referred to in point (b), the ECB shall ensure that the Board and the relevant national resolution authorities inform the competent authorities without delay.
Amendment 172 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15 The ECB may determine, where there is a rapid deterioration of conditions, adverse circumstances or new information about an entity is obtained, that the condition referred to in the first subparagraph, point (a)(ii), is met without having previously taken other remedial actions, including the exercise of the powers referred to in Article 104 of Directive 2013/36/EU or in Article 16(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.
Amendment 173 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 13 – paragraph 2 – point c (c) the requirement for the management body of the entity to draw up an action plan, in accordance with the recovery plan where applicable, for negotiation on restructuring of debt with some or all of its creditors;
Amendment 174 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point f a (new) (fa) the requirement for the management body of the entity to draw up a plan that the entity can implement in case the relevant corporate body decides to initiate the voluntary winding down of the entity.
Amendment 175 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 a (new) After having received the notification referred to in the first subparagraph, the Board shall assess, in close cooperation with the ECB or the relevant national competent authority, what constitutes a reasonable timeframe for the purposes of the assessment of the condition referred to in Article 18(1), point (b), taking into account the speed of the deterioration of the conditions of the entity, the need to implement effectively the resolution strategy and any other relevant considerations. The Board shall communicate that assessment to the ECB or to the relevant national competent authority as early as possible. The notification referred to in the first subparagraph does not impact the ability of institutional protection schemes to implement any measures. Any decisions relating to measures by an institutional protection scheme are within the sole discretion of the institutional protection scheme.
Amendment 176 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 13 – paragraph 3 3. The ECB shall choose the appropriate and timely early intervention measures based on what is proportionate to the objectives pursued, having regard to the seriousness of the infringement or likely infringement and the speed of the deterioration in the financial situation of the entity, among other relevant information.
Amendment 177 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 13 – paragraph 4 4. For each of the measures referred to in paragraph 2, the ECB shall set a deadline that is appropriate for completion of that measure and that enables the ECB to evaluate its effectiveness. The evaluation of the measure should be carried out immediately after the deadline is reached and shared with the Board and relevant national resolution authorities. Should the evaluation conclude that the measures have not been fully implemented or are not effective, the ECB or the relevant national competent authority shall make an assessment of the condition referred to in paragraph 1, point (a) of Article 18 of this Regulation, after having consulted the Board and the relevant national resolution authority.
Amendment 178 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 13 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 Where a group includes entities established in participating Member States and subsidiaries established, or significant branches located, in non-participating Member States, the ECB shall communicate any decisions or measures referred to in Articles 13 to 13c relevant to the group to the competent authorities or the resolution authorities of the non- participating Member States, as appropriate in a timely manner.;
Amendment 179 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16 The ECB shall make public the appointment of any temporary administrator, except where the temporary administrator does not have the power to represent or make decisions on behalf of the entity.
Amendment 180 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 13b – paragraph 2 2. The ECB shall specify the powers of the temporary administrator at the time of his or her appointment, based on what is proportionate in the circumstances. Such powers may include some or all of the powers of the management body of the entity, under the statutes of the entity and under national law, including the power to exercise some or all of the administrative functions of the management body of the entity. The powers of the temporary administrator in relation to the entity shall comply with the applicable company law. Such powers may be adjusted upon the change in circumstances by the ECB.
Amendment 181 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 13b – paragraph 6 6. At the request of the ECB, the temporary administrator shall draw up reports on the financial position of the entity and on the acts performed in the course of his or her appointment, at intervals set by the ECB, at least once after the first six months , and in any case at the end of his or her mandate.
Amendment 182 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 13b – paragraph 7 7. The temporary administrator shall be appointed for maximum 1 year. That period may be exceptionally renewed once, if the conditions for appointing the temporary administrator continue to be met. The ECB shall determine those conditions and shall justify any renewal of the appointment of the temporary administrator to the shareholders.
Amendment 183 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16 Amendment 184 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 13 c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 After having received the notification referred to in the first subparagraph, the Board shall assess, in close cooperation with the ECB or the relevant national competent authority, what constitutes a reasonable timeframe for the purposes of the assessment of the condition referred to in Article 18(1), point (b), taking into account the speed of the deterioration of the conditions of the entity, the need to implement effectively the resolution strategy and any other relevant considerations. The Board shall
Amendment 185 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 13c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 After having received the notification referred to in the first subparagraph, the Board shall assess, in close cooperation with the ECB or the relevant national competent authority, what constitutes a reasonable timeframe for the purposes of the assessment of the condition referred to in Article 18(1), point (b), taking into account the speed of the deterioration of the conditions of the entity, the potential impact on the financial system and protection of depositors and client funds, the need to implement effectively the resolution strategy and any other relevant considerations. The Board shall communicate that assessment to the ECB or to the relevant national competent authority as early as possible.
Amendment 186 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 13c – paragraph 4 – introductory part 4.
Amendment 187 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 13c – paragraph 4 – introductory part 4. The Board shall have the power to market to potential purchasers, or make arrangements for such marketing, the entity referred to in Article 7(2), or the entity referred to in Article 7(4), point (b), and Article 7(5) where the conditions for the application of those provisions are met or require the entity to do so, for the
Amendment 188 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 13c – paragraph 4 – point a (a) to prepare for the highly likely resolution of that entity, subject to the conditions specified in Article 39(2) of Directive 2014/59/EU and the requirements of professional secrecy laid down in Article 88 of this Regulation;
Amendment 189 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 13c – paragraph 4 – point b Amendment 190 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 13c – paragraph 7 7. The Board shall inform the Commission, the ECB, the relevant national competent authorities and the relevant national resolution authorities and the relevant national ministries of any action taken pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 without delay.
Amendment 191 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16 The ECB, the national competent authorities, the Board and the relevant national resolution authorities and the relevant national ministries shall closely cooperate:
Amendment 192 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point c (c) to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support
Amendment 193 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point c (c) to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support
Amendment 194 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point c (c) to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support
Amendment 195 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point c (c) to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support
Amendment 196 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point d (d) to protect
Amendment 197 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point d (d) to protect depositors while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemes
Amendment 198 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point d (d) to protect depositors
Amendment 199 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point d (d) to protect depositors
Amendment 200 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point d (d) to protect depositors
Amendment 201 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point d (d) to protect depositors
Amendment 202 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point d (d) to protect depositors
Amendment 203 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 14 – paragraph 2a (new) (17a) in Article 14, the following paragraph 2a is inserted: "2a. Subject to different provisions of this Regulation, the resolution objectives are of equal significance, and resolution authorities shall balance them as appropriate to the nature and circumstances of each case. For the purposes of Article 18(5), the objectives of preserving financial stability and protecting depositors pursuant to points (b) and (d) of paragraph 2, respectively, shall be deemed to be more significant than other resolution objectives.’;
Amendment 204 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b (b) having regard to the timing
Amendment 205 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b (b) having regard to the timing
Amendment 206 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b (b) having regard to the timing,
Amendment 207 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3 Where the ECB
Amendment 208 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 1a 1a.
Amendment 209 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 210 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 2 2. Without prejudice to cases where the ECB has decided to exercise directly supervisory tasks relating to credit institutions pursuant to Article 6(5), point (b) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, in the event of receipt of a communication pursuant to paragraph 1 in relation to an entity or group as referred to in Article 7(3), the Board shall communicate its assessment as referred to paragraph 1, fourth subparagraph, to the ECB or the relevant national competent authority without any delay and in a timely manner.
Amendment 211 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where, pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 14(3), that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in that Article
Amendment 212 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 14 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives
Amendment 213 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where, pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 14(3), that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to,
Amendment 214 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 14 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives
Amendment 215 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 14 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings
Amendment 216 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1a (new) When carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, pursuant to Articles 8(2), 9(2) and 12d(2), the Board, in order to assess the appropriateness of the resolution for the institution, considers the following elements: (a) the prevalence of deposits and the absence of debt instruments in the funding model; (b) the access to the capital markets for eligible liabilities; (c) the extent to which the institution relies on Common Equity Tier 1 capital to meet its capital requirements.
Amendment 217 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c Resolution action shall be presumed not to be in the public interest for the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), where the institution qualifies as small and non- complex institution as defined in Article 4(1), point 145, of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. In case the Board assesses that one or more of those resolution objectives would be at risk, the presumption shall not apply.
Amendment 218 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 a (new) For entities designated as significant in accordance with Article 6(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 there shall be a presumption that the winding up under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet the resolution objectives to the same extent.
Amendment 219 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1b (new) Resolution action shall be presumed to be in the public interest for the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), of this Article where the institution qualifies as large institution as defined in Article 4(1), point (146) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. In case the Board assesses that no resolution objective would be at risk, the presumption shall not apply.
Amendment 220 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 221 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 222 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 When carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph,
Amendment 223 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 When carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph,
Amendment 224 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 When carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the Board, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, shall consider and compare all extraordinary public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the entity, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.; If liquidation aid is expected to be granted in winding up the institution according to the national law, the resolution action shall be assessed to be in the public interest.
Amendment 225 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 When carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the Board, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, shall
Amendment 226 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 When carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the Board, based on the information available to it at the time
Amendment 227 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 a (new) For the purposes of the second subparagraph, participating Member States, deposit guarantee schemes and, where necessary, the designated authority within the meaning of Article 2(1), point (18), of Directive 2014/49/EU shall keep the Board informed of any preparatory measures for the granting of the measures referred to in Article 18a(1), points (c) and (d), of this Regulation, including any pre-notification contacts with the Commission.
Amendment 228 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 a (new) Moreover, in the resolution plan, the Board shall include its reasoning as regards the procedure best achieving resolution objectives for each of the resolution objectives laid down in Article 14.
Amendment 229 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point e a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 11 a (new) (ea) the following paragraph is added: 11a. In order to ensure effective and consistent application of this Article, the Board shall give guidance and address instructions to national resolution authorities for the application of the RTSs referred to in Article 32(5) of Directive 2014/59/EU.
Amendment 230 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – title Extraordinary
Amendment 231 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. Extraordinary public financial support outside of resolution action may be granted to an entity as referred to in Article 2 on an exceptional basis only in one of the following cases and provided that the extraordinary public financial support complies with the conditions and requirements established in the Union State aid framework and such support is implemented in the legislation of the Member State:
Amendment 232 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 1. Extraordinary
Amendment 233 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 1 – point a Amendment 234 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 1 – point a – introductory part (a) where, to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State of an exceptional or systemic nature or to preserve financial stability, the extraordinary public financial support takes any of the following forms:
Amendment 235 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 1 – point a – introductory part (a) where, to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State
Amendment 236 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 1 – point b Amendment 237 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 1 – point b (b) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of a
Amendment 238 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 1 – point c (c) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of a
Amendment 239 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 1 – point d Amendment 240 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part The support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a) and (b), shall fulfil all of the following conditions:
Amendment 241 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part The support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (
Amendment 242 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b (b) the measures are of a precautionary and temporary nature and are based on a pre-defined exit strategy approved by the ECB or the relevant national competent authority
Amendment 243 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d (d) the measures are not used to offset losses that the entity has incurred or is likely to incur
Amendment 244 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d (d) the measures are not used to offset losses that the entity has incurred or is likely to incur in the ne
Amendment 245 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (a), an entity shall be deemed to be solvent where the ECB or the relevant national competent authority have concluded that under current economic conditions, no breach has occurred, or is
Amendment 246 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (a), an entity shall be deemed to be solvent where the ECB or the relevant national competent authority have concluded that no breach has occurred
Amendment 247 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 a (new) The ECB or the relevant national competent authority may deem an entity to be solvent where they determine that a breach of the requirements referred to in the second subparagraph is temporary in nature, taking into account the specific circumstances of each case, and provided that the entity can demonstrate a reasonable plan for the remedy of the breach within an appropriate timeframe, as determined by the ECB or the relevant national competent authority.
Amendment 248 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3 For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (d), the relevant competent authority shall quantify the losses that the entity has incurred or is likely to incur. That quantification shall be based, as a minimum, on
Amendment 249 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3 For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (d), the relevant competent authority shall quantify the losses that the entity has incurred or is likely to incur. That quantification shall be based, as a minimum, on
Amendment 250 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 4 Amendment 251 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5 Amendment 252 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5 By way of derogation from
Amendment 253 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 In case any of the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a) and (b), is not redeemed, repaid or otherwise terminated in accordance with the terms of the exit strategy established at the time of granting such measure, the ECB or the relevant national competent authority shall conclude that the condition laid down in Article 18(1), point (a), is met in relation to the institution or entity which has received those support measures and shall communicate that assessment to the Commission and to the Board, in accordance with Article 18(1), third subparagraph.;
Amendment 254 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6 In case any of the support measures
Amendment 255 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6 In case any of the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), is not redeemed, repaid or otherwise terminated in accordance with the terms of the exit strategy established at the time of granting such measure, the ECB or the relevant national competent authority shall
Amendment 256 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Where the ECB or the relevant national competent authority does not recognise the remediation plan as credible or feasible, or where the institution or entity fails to comply with the remediation plan, an assessment of whether the institution or entity is failing or likely to fail shall be conducted in accordance with Article 18.
Amendment 257 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6 a (new) Where the ECB or the relevant national competent authority does not recognise the remediation plan as credible or feasible, or where the institution or entity fails to comply with the remediation plan, an assessment of whether the institution or entity is failing or likely to fail shall be conducted in accordance with Article 18.
Amendment 258 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18a – paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. The ECB or the relevant national competent authority shall inform the Board of its assessment whether the conditions referred to in paragraph 2, points (a), (b) and (d), with respect to the entities and groups referred to in Article 7(2), and to the entities and groups referred to in Article 7(4), point (b), and Article 7(5) are met.
Amendment 259 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 18 – paragraph 2 b (new) 2b. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, point (d), the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a) can be used to offset losses that the institution or entity is likely to incur in the near future where an exception to the burden-sharing requirement is made under Union State aid framework.
Amendment 260 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 Where resolution action involves the granting of State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU or of Fund aid in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article, the resolution scheme referred to in Article 18(6) of this Regulation shall not enter into force until such time when the Commission adopts a positive or conditional decision, or a decision not to raise objections, concerning the compatibility of the use of such aid with the internal market, while taking into consideration the need for timely execution of the resolution scheme by the Board. The Commission shall take the decision concerning the compatibility of the use of State aid or of Fund aid with the internal market at the latest when it endorses or objects to the resolution scheme pursuant to Article 18(7), second subparagraph, or when the period of 24 hours referred to in Article 18(7), fifth subparagraph, expires, whichever is earlier. In the absence of such decision within 24 hours from the transmission of the resolution scheme by the Board, the resolution scheme shall be deemed authorised by the Commission and shall enter into force in accordance with Article 18(7), fifth subparagraph.
Amendment 261 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21 – point b Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 19 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 7 The Commission
Amendment 262 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 20 – paragraph 1 1. Before determining whether the conditions for resolution, or the conditions for write down or conversion of capital instruments and eligible liabilities as referred to in Article 21(1) are met, the Board shall ensure that a fair, prudent and realistic valuation of the assets and liabilities of an entity as referred to in Article 2 is carried out by a person with appropriate expertise that is independent from any public authority, including the Board and the national resolution authority, and from the entity concerned.
Amendment 263 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 20 – paragraph 1 1. Before
Amendment 264 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 20 – paragraph 1 1. Before
Amendment 265 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point c a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 20 – paragraph 18 a (new) (ca) the following paragraph is added: 18a. The independent valuer shall have no duty or responsibility to shareholders or creditors of the institution under resolution and shall have no liability to such shareholders or creditors for acts and omissions when carrying out the valuation, unless the act or omission implies gross negligence or wilful misconduct in accordance with national law which directly affects rights of such shareholders or creditors.
Amendment 266 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 23 – point c (b) having regard to timing
Amendment 267 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 23 – point c Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 21 – paragraph 3 – point b (b) having regard to timing
Amendment 268 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 23 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 22 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 a (new) (23a) in Article 22(4), the following subparagraph is added: "The resolution plan shall consider the combination of resolution tools which is the best suited to achieve resolution objectives.
Amendment 269 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 23 a (new) (23a) Article 23 is amended as follows: (a) the following third paragraph is added: The resolution scheme shall outline the resolution actions that should be taken by the Board in relation to the Union parent undertaking or particular group entities established in the Member States with regard to management decisions on awarding management bonuses, distributing dividends or purchasing own shares.
Amendment 270 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 27 – paragraph 7 – point a (a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 20(1) to (15), has been made by shareholders, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write-down, or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU and Article 21(10) of this Regulation
Amendment 271 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 27 – paragraph 7 – point a (a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 20(1) to (15), has been made by shareholders, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write-down, or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU and Article 21(10) of this Regulation
Amendment 272 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 27 – paragraph 7 – point a (a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 20(1) to (15), has been made by shareholders, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write-down, or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU and Article 21(10) of this Regulation, and by the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 79 of this Regulation
Amendment 273 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 27 – paragraph 7 – point a (a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 20(1) to (15), has been made by shareholders, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write-down, or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU and Article 21(10) of this Regulation, and by the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 79 of this Regulation and Article 109 of
Amendment 274 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point b Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 27 – paragraphs 9 and 10 Amendment 275 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point b Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 27 – paragraph 9 – point b (b) all liabilities ranking lower than covered and retail deposits, and not excluded from bail-in pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5, have been written down or converted in full.
Amendment 276 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point b Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 27 – paragraph 9 – point b (b) all
Amendment 277 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point b Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 27 – paragraph 9 – point b (b) all
Amendment 278 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 – point b Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 27 – paragraph 9 – point b (b) all
Amendment 279 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 24 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 29 a (new) (24a) the following Article 29a is inserted: (a) Article 29a (Transparency) The Fund shall publish regular reports on the repayment of public resources provided under a resolution instrument with clear, accessible information on the total amount provided, the amounts repaid and the timeframe for future repayments.
Amendment 280 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 26 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 31 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3 Amendment 281 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 30 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 45 – title and paragraph 3 a (new) Amendment 282 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 a (new) (31a) in Article 50(1), the following points are added: ‘(qa) adopt rules to ensure that national resolution authorities are consulted and are able to contribute to any policy or guidance adopted by the executive session that they will contribute to implementing. (qb) adopt rules for organising industry consultations where appropriate prior to any substantive decision by the plenary or the executive session of a broad or general nature.’
Amendment 283 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34 – point b Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 56 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 a A person who has served
Amendment 284 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34 – point c Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 56 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 – sentence 1a Amendment 285 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34 – point c a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 56 – paragraph 6 (ca) in Article 56, paragraph 6 is replaced by the following: "6. After hearing the Board, in its plenary session, the Commission shall provide to the European Parliament a gender- balanced shortlist of
Amendment 286 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34 – point d Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 56 – paragraph 6 a Amendment 287 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34 – point e a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 56 – paragraph 8 Amendment 288 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 35 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 69 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a (new) (35a) in Article 69(1), the following subparagraph is added: ‘When the available financial means have significantly exceeded the target level for a second consecutive year, the Commission shall assess the situation and report on the appropriateness of introducing a possibility to restitute part of available financial means.’
Amendment 289 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 36 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 69 – paragraph 4 4. If, after the initial period referred to in paragraph 1, the available financial means fall below the target level specified in that paragraph, the regular contributions calculated in accordance with Article 70 shall be raised until a level is reached that corresponds to the target level
Amendment 290 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 36 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 69 – paragraph 4 4.
Amendment 291 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 36 4. If, after the initial period referred to in paragraph 1, the available financial means fall below the target level specified in that paragraph, the regular contributions calculated in accordance with Article 70 shall be raised until the target level is reached. The Board may defer the collection of the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 70 for 1
Amendment 292 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 37 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 70 – paragraph 3 3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 69 may include irrevocable payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low-risk assets unencumbered by any third- party rights, at the free disposal of and
Amendment 293 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 37 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 70 – paragraph 3 3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article
Amendment 294 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 37 – point b Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 70 – paragraph 3a – subparagraph 2 Where an institution or entity stops being within the scope of
Amendment 295 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 37 – point b Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 70 – paragraph 3a – subparagraph 2 Where an institution or entity stops being within the scope of Article 2 and is no longer subject to the obligation to pay contributions in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, the Board shall
Amendment 296 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 40 – point -a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 76 – paragraph 1 – point ga (new) (-a) in paragraph 1, the following point is added: '(ga) where the deposit guarantee scheme makes a contribution pursuant to Article 79(1) and where applicable conditions are met, to contribute the amount needed to close the remaining funding gap after the DGS contribution towards the 8% TLOF; in this case, the contribution made by the Fund is to be repaid in full by the DGS within 6 years at the most;
Amendment 297 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 40 – point -a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 76 – paragraph 1 – point g a (new) (-a) in paragraph 1, the following point is added: '(ga) where the deposit guarantee scheme makes a contribution pursuant to Article 79(1) and where applicable conditions are met, to contribute the amount needed to close the remaining funding gap after the DGS contribution towards the 8% TLOF;
Amendment 298 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 40 – point b Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 76 – paragraph 5 Amendment 299 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 40 – point b Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 76 – paragraph 6 Amendment 300 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 40 – point b Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 76 – paragraph 6a (new) 6a. By 31 December 2026, the Commission shall report, to the European Parliament and to the Council, on the appropriateness of the rules governing the contributions to the Fund. The report shall take stock of the reforms to the crisis management framework, and assess whether these changes call for a review of the rules governing the contributions to the resolution financing arrangement in order to preserve the effectiveness of the incentives of a polluter-pay principle. Where appropriate, the Commission shall table a legislative proposal.’;
Amendment 301 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 79 Amendment 302 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 79 – paragraph 1 Amendment 303 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 79 – paragraph 1 Amendment 304 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 79 – paragraph 1 1. Participating Member States shall ensure that when the Board takes resolution action with respect to a credit institution, provided that such action ensures that
Amendment 305 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 79 – paragraph 2 Amendment 306 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 79 – paragraph 2 2. The Board shall determine the amount of the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme in accordance with paragraph 1 after having
Amendment 307 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 79 a (new) Amendment 308 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 79 a (new) (41a) the following article is inserted: Article 79a Reporting on liquidity resolution By 31 December 2024 the Commission shall report, to the European Parliament and to the Council, on the issue of “liquidity in resolution”. There might be situations where a resolved bank with insufficient remaining collateral temporarily struggles to access again the markets and/or to stabilise the outflow of deposits, and as a result keeps facing a liquidity shortfall although it has been properly recapitalised during the resolution weekend. In such a case, depending on the size of the concerned bank, the Fund, even in combination with the ESM backstop, might not have sufficient means to provide the adequate amount of temporary refinancing, since such safety nets have been calibrated in accordance with a recapitalisation need and not a refinancing need. The report shall therefore examine whether such situations correspond to a missing instrument in the resolution toolbox, and what the most efficient way to address this issue might be, taking into consideration what other jurisdictions do. The report shall present concrete policy options. In particular, the report shall explore an option that would combine liquidity provision by the ECB to ensure sufficient firepower, with a guarantee provided by the EU budget in order to meet the collateral criteria of the ECB, backed by a counter-guarantee provided by the Fund to ensure that any loss be ultimately borne by the banking sector.
Amendment 309 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 79 a (new) (41a) the following article is inserted: Article 79a Safeguarding the financial capacity of deposit guarantee schemes 1. Where the intervention of a deposit guarantee scheme is necessary in the context of a resolution but its available financial means are insufficient to achieve the purposes of its intervention, the deposit guarantee scheme may request support from the Board. 2. The request shall include all relevant information, including: (i) the shortfall of the deposit guarantee scheme for the purposes of the specific intervention in the resolution; (ii) the conditions offered to the deposit guarantee scheme in other alternative funding arrangements; (iii) the expected length of the requested support. 3. Upon receiving the request referred to in paragraph 1, the Board may decide to establish temporary liquidity support to the requesting deposit guarantee scheme, through the provision of a credit line or a guarantee by the Single Resolution Fund. 4. The Board in its executive session, after consulting with the Board in its plenary session, shall provide the support to the deposit guarantee scheme and the terms applicable to its provision. 5. The guarantee shall be used by the deposit guarantee scheme as collateral for alternative funding arrangements as referred to in Article 10(9) of Directive 2014/49/EU, thus ensuring access to markets in more favourable conditions.'
Amendment 310 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 79 b (new) (41b) the following article is inserted: Article 79b Reporting on internal loss transfer mechanism By 31 December 2024, in the context of the resumption of Banking Union discussions, the Commission shall report, to the European Parliament and to the Council, on the effectiveness and scope of the internal loss transfer mechanism within resolution groups resulting from the reform of the crisis management framework. In particular, the report shall take stock of the expansion of the scope of resolution to smaller entities, the level of compliance with internal MREL targets, the implementation of the new deduction rules, and the changes in conditions to access the industry funded safety nets, in particular the single resolution fund. The Commission shall then assess whether this situation delivers sufficiently credible and efficient solidarity mechanisms within resolution groups, among entities earmarked for resolution, for granting more systematically material liquidity waivers to such entities, or whether further safeguards should be introduced.
Amendment 311 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Chapter 2 a – title (new) (41a) the following Chapter 2a is inserted: Chapter 2a CONSTITUTION OF THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND
Amendment 312 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Section 1 – title (new) Section 1 Establishment and use of the deposit insurance fund
Amendment 313 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 79 a (new) Amendment 314 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 79 b (new) Amendment 315 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Section 2 – title (new) Section 2 PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS
Amendment 316 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new) Article 79c Preliminary information Where a participating DGS has been informed by the competent authority about, or has otherwise become aware of, circumstances relating to a credit institution affiliated to that participating DGS that are likely to result in a payout event or its use in resolution proceedings, it shall inform the Board about such circumstances without delay if it intends to use the EU credit line. In this case the participating DGS shall also provide the Board with an estimate of the expected liquidity shortfall or liquidity need.
Amendment 317 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 79d (new) Amendment 318 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 79e (new) Amendment 319 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 i (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Section 3 – title (new) Section 3 Administration of the EU credit line
Amendment 320 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 79h (new) Article 79h Composition of the Board in deposit insurance fund composition 1. Decisions on the use of the EU credit line shall be adopted by the Board in its deposit insurance fund composition. 2. The Board in deposit insurance fund composition shall be composed of the members referred to in Article 43 and a member appointed by each participating Member State, representing their designated authority.
Amendment 321 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 79i (new) Article 79i Tasks of the Board in deposit insurance fund composition 1. The Board in deposit insurance fund composition shall: a) take the decisions referred to in Articles 79a, 79b and 79e of this Regulation; b) provide an annual report to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the use of the EU credit line and on the available financial means of the fund; c) prepare a report by [entry into force +18 months] on the feasibility and modalities of establishing a loss-coverage mechanism for participating DGS.
Amendment 322 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 43 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 93 (43a) Article 93 is replaced by the following: "Article 93 Exercise of the delegation 1. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article. 2. The delegation of power referred to in Article 19(8), Article 65(5), Article 69(5), Article 71(3) , Article 75(4) and Article 7
Amendment 323 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 43 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 94 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new) (43a) in Article 94(1), the following point is added: (aa) the interplay between the existing framework and the establishment of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme;
Amendment 324 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 43 b (new) Amendment 325 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 It shall apply from … [OP please insert the date =
Amendment 326 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 a (new) Article 2a Transitional period 1. Institutions or entities referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU whose preferred resolution strategy will change depending on the entry into force of this Regulation should comply with the requirements referred to in Articles 45e or 45f of Directive 2014/59/EU or with requirements that result from the application of Article 45b(4), (5) or (7) of that Directive, as appropriate, within five years as from the date of the approval of the resolution plan including the new preferred resolution strategy. 2. During the transitional period referred to in paragraph 1, in the cases referred to in point (b), of the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 of Article 109 of Directive 2014/59/EU, where the transfer to the recipient includes deposits that are not covered deposits or other bail-inable liabilities, by way of derogation from the second subparagraph of that paragraph, the deposit guarantee scheme shall contribute to the amount necessary to cover the difference between the value of deposits, including deposits that are not covered, of senior bail-inable liabilities held by retail clients, as defined in point 11 of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU, and of the liabilities with the same or higher priority ranking than deposits and the value of the assets of the institution under resolution which are to be transferred to the recipient.
Amendment 56 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 1 a (new) (1a) The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) is, along with the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the still missing European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) one of the pillars of the banking union. The ongoing review of the Union crisis management and deposit insurance framework is intended to pave the way towards the long-due completion of the banking union, including the establishment of a European deposit insurance scheme. A first step in that direction is the establishment of an EU credit line provided by a dedicated fund, managed by the Single Resolution Board (SRB), to depleted, or close to being depleted, national DGSs. This new fund should be financed through progressive transfer of banks’ contributions collected by participating DGSs.
Amendment 57 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 1 a (new) (1a) The Banking Union is a fundamental pillar of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and its development has been essential to guaranteeing the stability and resilience of the banking sector, including by way of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism. Unfortunately, the Banking Union is not yet complete, owing to the slow adoption of a European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS).
Amendment 58 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2) Several years into its implementation, the Union resolution framework as currently applicable does not deliver as intended with respect to some of those objectives. In particular, while institutions and entities have made significant progress towards resolvability and have dedicated significant resources to that end, in particular through the build-up of the loss absorption and recapitalisation capacity and the filling-up of resolution financing arrangements, the Union resolution framework is seldom resorted to.
Amendment 59 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2) Several years into its implementation, the Union resolution framework as currently applicable does not deliver as intended with respect to some of those objectives. In particular, while institutions and entities have made significant progress towards resolvability and have dedicated significant resources to that end, in particular through the build-up of the loss absorption and recapitalisation capacity and the filling-up of resolution financing arrangements, the Union resolution framework is seldom resorted to.
Amendment 60 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2) Several years into its implementation, the Union resolution framework as currently applicable does not deliver as intended with respect to some of those objectives. In particular, while institutions and entities have made significant progress towards resolvability and have dedicated significant resources to that end, in particular through the build-up of the loss absorption and recapitalisation capacity and the filling-up of resolution financing arrangements, the Union resolution framework is seldom resorted to. Failures of certain smaller and medium- sized institutions and entities are instead mostly addressed through unharmonised national measures. Taxpayer money is used rather than resolution financing arrangements. That situation appears to arise from inadequate incentives. Those inadequate incentives result from the interplay of the Union resolution framework with national rules, whereby the broad discretion in the public interest
Amendment 61 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2) Several years into its implementation, the Union resolution
Amendment 62 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 a (new) (2a) The current legislative review seeks to reinforce the conditions for an orderly bank resolution that provides more protection for depositors. It firmly upholds the insurance to covered deposits, while ameliorating the policy toolbox for resolution, thus allowing for smoother alternatives that provide additional safeguards to depositors and financial stability.
Amendment 63 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 a (new) (2a) The current legislative review seeks to reinforce the conditions for an orderly bank resolution that provides more protection for depositors. It firmly upholds the insurance to covered deposits, while reinforcing the policy toolbox for resolution, thus allowing for smoother alternatives that provide additional safeguards to depositors and financial stability.
Amendment 64 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 4 (4) The intensity, and level of detail, of the resolution planning work needed with respect to subsidiaries that have not been identified as resolution entities varies depending on the size and risk profile of the institutions and entities concerned, the presence of critical functions, and the group resolution strategy. The Single Resolution Board (the ‘Board’) should therefore be able to consider those factors when identifying the measures to be taken in respect of such subsidiaries and
Amendment 65 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 4 (4) The intensity, and level of detail, of
Amendment 66 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) The rules for determining the MREL are mostly focused on setting the appropriate level of the MREL with the assumption of the bail-in tool as the preferred resolution strategy. However, Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 allows the Board to use other resolution tools, namely those relying on the transfer of the business of the institution under resolution to a private purchaser or to a bridge institution, as a standalone tool or in combination with other tools including bail-in. It should therefore be further specified that, in case the resolution plan envisages the use of a combination of tools, or the sale of business tool or of the bridge institution tool and the resolution entity’s exit from the market, the Board should always determine the level of the MREL for the resolution entity concerned on the basis of the specificities of those resolution tools and of the different loss-absorbing and recapitalisation needs those tools entail, taking into consideration the reduction in size and complexity that result from the implementation of recovery options in the runup to resolution and from the resolution actions.
Amendment 67 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 (10) The level of the MREL for resolution entities is the sum of the amount of the losses expected in resolution and the recapitalisation amount that enables the post-resolution entity to continue to comply with its conditions for authorisation and enabling it to pursue its activities for an appropriate period. Certain preferred resolution strategies entail the transfer of assets, rights and liabilities to a recipient and market exit, in particular the sale of business tool. In those cases, the objectives pursued by the recapitalisation component might not apply to the same extent as in the case of an open-bank bail- in strategy, because the Board will not be required to ensure that the resolution entity restores compliance with its own funds requirements after resolution action, although the acquirer might ask for the transaction to be capital neutral. Nevertheless, the losses in such cases are expected to exceed the resolution entity’s own funds requirements. It is therefore appropriate to lay down that the level of the MREL of those resolution entities
Amendment 68 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 (10) The level of the MREL for resolution entities is the sum of the amount of the losses expected in resolution and the recapitalisation amount that enables the resolution entity to continue to comply with its conditions for authorisation and enabling it to pursue its activities for an appropriate period. Certain preferred resolution strategies entail the transfer of assets, rights and liabilities to a recipient and market exit, in particular the sale of business tool. In those cases, the objectives pursued by the recapitalisation component might not apply to the same extent as in the case of an open-bank bail-in strategy, because the Board will not be required to ensure that the resolution entity restores compliance with its own funds requirements after resolution action.
Amendment 69 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 (10) The level of the MREL for resolution entities is the sum of the amount of the losses expected in resolution and the recapitalisation amount that enables the resolution entity to continue to comply with its conditions for authorisation and enabling it to pursue its activities for an appropriate period. Certain preferred resolution strategies entail the transfer of assets, rights and liabilities to a recipient and market exit, in particular the sale of business tool. In those cases, the objectives pursued by the recapitalisation component might not apply to the same extent as in the case of an open-bank bail-in strategy, because the Board will not be required to ensure that the resolution entity restores compliance with its own funds requirements after resolution action. Nevertheless, the losses in such cases are expected to exceed the resolution entity’s own funds requirements. It is therefore appropriate to lay down that the level of the MREL of those resolution entities continues to include a recapitalisation amount that is adjusted in a way which
Amendment 70 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 (11) Where the resolution strategy envisages the use of resolution tools other than bail-in, the recapitalisation needs of the entity concerned will generally be smaller after resolution than in case of open bank bail-in. The calibration of the MREL in such a case should take that aspect into account when estimating the recapitalisation requirement. Therefore, when adjusting the level of the MREL for resolution entities the resolution plan of which envisages the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the Board should take into account the features of those tools, including the expected perimeter of the transfer to the private purchaser or to the bridge institution, the types of instruments to be transferred, the expected value and marketability of those instruments, and the design of the preferred resolution strategy, including the complementary use of the asset separation tool.
Amendment 71 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 (11) Where the resolution strategy envisages the use of resolution tools other than bail-in, the recapitalisation needs of the entity concerned will generally be smaller after resolution than in case of open bank bail-in. The calibration of the MREL in such a case should take that aspect into account when estimating the recapitalisation requirement. Therefore, when adjusting the level of the MREL for resolution entities the resolution plan of which envisages the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool
Amendment 72 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 (11) Where the resolution strategy
Amendment 73 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 (11) Where the resolution strategy envisages the use of resolution tools other than bail-in, the recapitalisation needs of the entity concerned will generally be smaller after resolution than in case of open bank bail-in. The calibration of the MREL in such a case should take that aspect into account when estimating the recapitalisation requirement. Therefore, when adjusting the level of the MREL for resolution entities the resolution plan of which envisages the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and, optionally, its exit from the market, the Board should take into account the features of those tools, including the expected perimeter of the transfer to the private purchaser or to the bridge institution, the types of instruments to be transferred, the expected value and marketability of those instruments, and the design of the preferred resolution strategy, including the complementary use of the asset separation tool. Since the resolution authority has to decide on a case by case basis on any possible use in resolution of funds from the deposit guarantee scheme and since such decision cannot be assumed with certainty ex ante, the Board
Amendment 74 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 (11) Where the resolution strategy envisages the use of resolution tools other than bail-in or alongside bail-in, the recapitalisation needs of the entity concerned will generally be smaller after resolution than in case of the sole open bank bail-in strategy. The calibration of the MREL in such a case should take that aspect into account when estimating the recapitalisation requirement. Therefore, when adjusting the level of the MREL for such resolution entities
Amendment 75 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 12 Amendment 76 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 a (new) (14a) Where the Board requires information that is necessary for the purposes of updating resolution plans, preparing for the possible resolution of an entity or of carrying out a valuation, the ECB or the relevant national competent authorities should provide the Board with that information to the extent that it is available to them. Where the relevant information is not already available to the ECB or the relevant national competent authorities, the Board and the ECB or the relevant national competent authorities should cooperate and coordinate to collect the information considered necessary by the Board. In the context of such cooperation, the authorities should collect the necessary information having due regard to the principle of proportionality.
Amendment 77 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 17 (17) The resolution framework is meant to be applied to
Amendment 78 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 17 (17) The resolution framework is meant
Amendment 79 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 17 (17) The resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity,
Amendment 80 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 17 a (new) (17a) The resolution framework is meant to be applied to manage the failure of any institution or entity that has a positive public interest assessment, namely, when the tools available under national law are not adequate. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to any failing institution or entity should be specified.
Amendment 81 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 18 Amendment 82 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 18 Amendment 83 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 18 (18) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should reflect, among other factors, the consideration that depositors are better protected when deposit guarantee scheme funds are used more efficiently
Amendment 84 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 18 (18) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should reflect the
Amendment 85 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 18 (18) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should reflect, among other factors, the consideration that depositors are better protected when deposit guarantee scheme funds are used more efficiently
Amendment 86 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 18 (18) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should reflect the consideration that depositors are better protected when deposit guarantee scheme (‘DGS’) funds are used more efficiently and the losses for those funds are minimised. Therefore, in the public interest assessment, the resolution objective of protecting covered depositors should be considered better achieved in resolution if opting for insolvency would be more costly for the
Amendment 87 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 19 Amendment 88 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 19 (19) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or deposit guarantee schemes) and, on the other hand, funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money.
Amendment 89 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 19 (19) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect
Amendment 90 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 19 (19) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect
Amendment 91 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 19 (19) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or deposit guarantee schemes) and, on the other hand, funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money.
Amendment 92 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 20 Amendment 93 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 20 Amendment 94 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 20 (20) To ensure that the resolution objectives are attained in the most effective way,
Amendment 95 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 20 (20) To ensure that the resolution objectives are attained in the most effective way,
Amendment 96 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 20 (20) To ensure that the resolution objectives are attained in the most effective way,
Amendment 97 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 20 (20) To ensure that the resolution objectives are attained in the most effective way, the outcome of the public interest assessment should be negative
Amendment 98 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 (21) In light of the experience acquired in the implementation of Directive 2014/59/EU, Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 and Directive 2014/49/EU and without prejudice to the question whether a preventive measure constitutes extraordinary public financial support in the first place, it is necessary to specify further the conditions under which measures of a preventive precautionary nature that qualify as extraordinary public financial support may exceptionally be granted. To minimise distortions of competition arising from differences in nature of deposit guarantee schemes in the Union, interventions of such schemes in the context of preventive measures complying with the requirements laid down in Directive 2014/49/EU that qualify as extraordinary public financial support should exceptionally be allowed where the beneficiary institution or entity does not meet any of the conditions for being deemed as failing or likely to fail. It should be ensured that precautionary measures are taken sufficiently early. The ECB currently bases its consideration that an institution or entity is solvent, for the purposes of precautionary recapitalisation, on a forward-looking assessment for the following 12 months of whether the institution or entity can comply with the own funds requirements set out in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or in Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, and the additional own funds requirement laid down in Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive (EU) 2019/2034. That practice should be laid down in Regulation (EU) No 806/2014. Moreover, measures to provide relief for impaired assets, including asset management vehicles or asset guarantee schemes, can prove effective and efficient in addressing causes of possible financial distress faced by institutions and entities
Amendment 99 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 (21) In light of the experience acquired in the implementation of Directive 2014/59/EU, Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 and Directive 2014/49/EU, it is necessary to specify further the conditions under which measures of a precautionary nature that qualify as extraordinary public financial support may exceptionally be granted. To minimise distortions of competition arising from differences in nature of deposit guarantee schemes in the Union, interventions of such schemes in the context of preventive measures complying with the requirements laid down in Directive 2014/49/EU that qualify as extraordinary public financial support should exceptionally be allowed where the beneficiary institution or entity
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https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2024-0155_EN.html
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https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2024-0155_EN.html
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https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2024-0155_EN.html
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https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2024-0155_EN.html
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https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2024-0155_EN.html
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https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2024-0155_EN.html
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https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2024-0155_EN.html
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https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2024-0155_EN.html
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