BETA


2023/0111(COD) Early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and funding of resolution action

Progress: Awaiting Council's 1st reading position

RoleCommitteeRapporteurShadows
Lead ECON MARQUES Pedro (icon: S&D S&D) NIEDERMAYER Luděk (icon: EPP EPP), BOYER Gilles (icon: Renew Renew), PETER-HANSEN Kira Marie (icon: Verts/ALE Verts/ALE), ZANNI Marco (icon: ID ID), ZĪLE Roberts (icon: ECR ECR), SCHIRDEWAN Martin (icon: GUE/NGL GUE/NGL)
Committee Opinion JURI
Lead committee dossier:
Legal Basis:
TFEU 114

Events

2024/04/24
   EP - Decision by Parliament, 1st reading
Details

The European Parliament adopted by 352 votes to 213, with 67 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and funding of resolution action.

The European Parliament adopted its position at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure.

The proposed Regulation seeks to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the recovery and resolution framework for institutions and entities .

The proposal amends Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism, the SRMR, in particular as regards the improved application of the tools that are already available in the bank resolution framework, clarifying the conditions for resolution, facilitating access to safety nets the event of bank failure and improving the clarity and consistency of funding rules.

The proposed amendments are part of the Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) legislative package, which also includes amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD) and Directive 2014/49/EU (Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive or DSGD).

Th e proposal will allow authorities to organise the orderly exit of a failing bank, regardless of its size and business model, using a wide range of tools. It will further safeguard financial stability, protect taxpayers and depositors and support the real economy and its competitiveness . The proposed rules will allow authorities to fully exploit the many benefits of resolution as a key element of the crisis management toolbox.

The amendments cover a range of policy aspects:

- expanding the scope of resolution by reviewing the public interest assessment, when this achieves the objectives of the framework, e.g. protecting financial stability, taxpayer money and depositor confidence better than national insolvency proceedings;

- strengthening the funding in resolution by complementing the internal loss-absorbing capacity of institutions, which remains the first line of defence, with the use of DGS funds in resolution to help access resolution funds without imposing losses on depositors where appropriate, subject to conditions and safeguards;

- clarifying the early intervention framework by removing overlaps between early intervention and supervisory measures, providing legal certainty on the applicable conditions and facilitating cooperation between competent and resolution authorities;

- ensuring a timely triggering of resolution.

The amended text stipulates that the resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business model with a positive public interest assessment. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified. In that respect, it is necessary to clarify that, depending on the specific circumstances, certain functions of the institution or entity can be considered critical if their discontinuance would impact financial stability or critical services at regional level.

The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or deposit guarantee schemes) and, on the other hand, funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline, and should be considered only under extraordinary circumstances.

Where national insolvency and resolution frameworks achieve effectively the objectives of the framework to the same extent, preference should be given to the option that minimises the risk for taxpayers and the economy . That approach ensures a prudent and responsible course of action, aligned with the overarching goal of safeguarding both the interests of taxpayers and broader economic stability.

Taxpayer-funded extraordinary financial support to institutions and entities should be granted, if at all, only to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of an exceptional and systemic nature, as it imposes a significant burden on public finances and disrupts the level playing field in the internal market.

Documents
2024/03/25
   EP - Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading/single reading
Documents
2024/03/25
   EP - Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading
Documents
2024/03/20
   EP - Vote in committee, 1st reading
2023/11/06
   EP - Amendments tabled in committee
Documents
2023/10/03
   EP - Committee draft report
Documents
2023/07/13
   ESC - Economic and Social Committee: opinion, report
Documents
2023/07/10
   EP - Committee referral announced in Parliament, 1st reading
2023/07/05
   ECB - European Central Bank: opinion, guideline, report
2023/05/30
   EP - MARQUES Pedro (S&D) appointed as rapporteur in ECON
2023/04/19
   EC - Document attached to the procedure
2023/04/19
   EC - Document attached to the procedure
2023/04/19
   EC - Document attached to the procedure
2023/04/18
   EC - Legislative proposal published
Details

PURPOSE: to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the recovery and resolution framework for institutions and entities.

PROPOSED ACT: Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council.

ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: the European Parliament decides in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and on an equal footing with the Council.

BACKGROUND: the Union resolution framework consists of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRMR) and a Single Resolution Fund. It was established in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis and aims to deal in an orderly manner with the failure of institutions and entities by preserving institutions and entities’ critical functions and avoiding threats to financial stability, and at the same time protecting depositors and public funds. In addition, the Union resolution framework intends to foster the development of the internal market in banking by creating a harmonised regime to address cross-border crises in a coordinated way and by avoiding level playing field issues.

However, experience over the past years has shown that when medium-sized and smaller banks fail in the EU, authorities have found solutions outside the EU's harmonised resolution framework. This has often involved the use of taxpayers' money instead of the bank's required internal resources or private, industry-funded safety nets.

While the existing rules already enable authorities to deal with failing banks in an effective manner, further progress is needed to make the rules even more effective in ensuring that European banks keep supporting Europe's economy and do not burden public finances when they fail.

CONTENT: the proposal amends an existing regulation, the SRMR, in particular as regards the improved application of the tools that are already available in the bank resolution framework, clarifying the conditions for resolution, facilitating access to safety nets the event of bank failure and improving the clarity and consistency of funding rules.

The proposed amendments are part of the Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) legislative package , which also includes amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD) and Directive 2014/49/EU (Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive or DSGD).

By establishing harmonised requirements for applying the CMDI framework to banks in the internal market, the proposal considerably reduces the risk of divergent national rules in Member States, which could distort competition in the internal market.

The proposal will allow authorities to organise the orderly exit of a failing bank, regardless of its size and business model, using a wide range of tools. It will further safeguard financial stability, protect taxpayers and depositors and support the real economy and its competitiveness. The proposed rules will allow authorities to fully exploit the many benefits of resolution as a key element of the crisis management toolbox.

The amendments included in the CMDI package cover a range of policy aspects:

- expanding the scope of resolution by reviewing the public interest assessment, when this achieves the objectives of the framework, e.g. protecting financial stability, taxpayer money and depositor confidence better than national insolvency proceedings;

- strengthening the funding in resolution by complementing the internal loss-absorbing capacity of institutions, which remains the first line of defence, with the use of DGS funds in resolution to help access resolution funds without imposing losses on depositors where appropriate, subject to conditions and safeguards;

- clarifying the early intervention framework by removing overlaps between early intervention and supervisory measures, providing legal certainty on the applicable conditions and facilitating cooperation between competent and resolution authorities;

- ensuring a timely triggering of resolution.

Documents

  • Decision by Parliament, 1st reading: T9-0326/2024
  • Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading/single reading: A9-0155/2024
  • Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading: A9-0155/2024
  • Amendments tabled in committee: PE754.694
  • Committee draft report: PE753.695
  • Economic and Social Committee: opinion, report: CES6298/2022
  • European Central Bank: opinion, guideline, report: CON/2023/0019
  • European Central Bank: opinion, guideline, report: OJ C 307 31.08.2023, p. 0019
  • Document attached to the procedure: EUR-Lex
  • Document attached to the procedure: SEC(2023)0230
  • Document attached to the procedure: EUR-Lex
  • Document attached to the procedure: SWD(2023)0225
  • Document attached to the procedure: EUR-Lex
  • Document attached to the procedure: SWD(2023)0226
  • Legislative proposal published: COM(2023)0226
  • Legislative proposal published: EUR-Lex
  • Document attached to the procedure: EUR-Lex SEC(2023)0230
  • Document attached to the procedure: EUR-Lex SWD(2023)0225
  • Document attached to the procedure: EUR-Lex SWD(2023)0226
  • European Central Bank: opinion, guideline, report: CON/2023/0019 OJ C 307 31.08.2023, p. 0019
  • Economic and Social Committee: opinion, report: CES6298/2022
  • Committee draft report: PE753.695
  • Amendments tabled in committee: PE754.694
  • Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading/single reading: A9-0155/2024

Votes

A9-0155/2024 – Pedro Marques – Commission proposal #

2024/04/24 Outcome: +: 352, -: 213, 0: 67
ES RO NL PL HU BG PT SK HR SI SE CZ LT DK LV AT EE MT LU EL FI BE IE FR IT DE
Total
58
28
28
44
16
16
21
13
12
8
21
21
10
14
8
17
7
4
6
14
14
20
12
75
57
88
icon: PPE PPE
159

Hungary PPE

1

Slovenia PPE

Abstain (1)

4

Denmark PPE

For (1)

1

Estonia PPE

For (1)

1

Malta PPE

For (1)

1

Luxembourg PPE

2
icon: S&D S&D
127

Slovakia S&D

For (1)

1

Slovenia S&D

2

Czechia S&D

For (1)

1

Lithuania S&D

2

Latvia S&D

2

Estonia S&D

2

Luxembourg S&D

For (1)

1

Greece S&D

1

Belgium S&D

Against (1)

2
icon: Renew Renew
98

Poland Renew

1

Hungary Renew

For (1)

1

Bulgaria Renew

2

Croatia Renew

For (1)

1

Slovenia Renew

2
3

Lithuania Renew

1

Latvia Renew

For (1)

1

Austria Renew

For (1)

1

Estonia Renew

3

Luxembourg Renew

2

Greece Renew

1

Finland Renew

3

Ireland Renew

2
icon: NI NI
37

Romania NI

Abstain (1)

1

Netherlands NI

Against (1)

1

Croatia NI

Against (1)

Abstain (1)

2

Czechia NI

Against (1)

1

Latvia NI

Against (1)

1

Greece NI

Against (1)

3

Germany NI

Abstain (1)

3
icon: ECR ECR
61

Romania ECR

Abstain (1)

1

Netherlands ECR

Against (1)

5

Bulgaria ECR

2

Slovakia ECR

For (1)

1

Croatia ECR

Abstain (1)

1

Sweden ECR

3

Lithuania ECR

Abstain (1)

1

Latvia ECR

Abstain (1)

1

Greece ECR

Against (1)

1

Finland ECR

2

France ECR

Against (1)

1

Germany ECR

Abstain (1)

1
icon: The Left The Left
32

Sweden The Left

Against (1)

1

Czechia The Left

Against (1)

1

Denmark The Left

Against (1)

1

Greece The Left

2

Finland The Left

Against (1)

1

Belgium The Left

Against (1)

1

Ireland The Left

4
icon: ID ID
50

Czechia ID

Against (1)

1

Denmark ID

Against (1)

1

Austria ID

3

Estonia ID

Against (1)

1
icon: Verts/ALE Verts/ALE
68

Spain Verts/ALE

3

Romania Verts/ALE

Against (1)

1

Netherlands Verts/ALE

3

Poland Verts/ALE

Against (1)

1

Portugal Verts/ALE

Against (1)

1

Sweden Verts/ALE

3

Czechia Verts/ALE

3

Lithuania Verts/ALE

Against (1)

Abstain (1)

2

Denmark Verts/ALE

2

Austria Verts/ALE

3

Luxembourg Verts/ALE

Against (1)

1

Greece Verts/ALE

Against (1)

1

Finland Verts/ALE

3

Belgium Verts/ALE

3

Ireland Verts/ALE

2

Italy Verts/ALE

Against (1)

1
AmendmentsDossier
271 2023/0111(COD)
2023/11/06 ECON 271 amendments...
source: 754.694

History

(these mark the time of scraping, not the official date of the change)

docs/8
date
2024-04-24T00:00:00
docs
url: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0326_EN.html title: T9-0326/2024
type
Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
body
EP
events/4/summary
  • The European Parliament adopted by 352 votes to 213, with 67 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and funding of resolution action.
  • The European Parliament adopted its position at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure.
  • The proposed Regulation seeks to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the recovery and resolution framework for institutions and entities .
  • The proposal amends Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism, the SRMR, in particular as regards the improved application of the tools that are already available in the bank resolution framework, clarifying the conditions for resolution, facilitating access to safety nets the event of bank failure and improving the clarity and consistency of funding rules.
  • The proposed amendments are part of the Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) legislative package, which also includes amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD) and Directive 2014/49/EU (Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive or DSGD).
  • Th e proposal will allow authorities to organise the orderly exit of a failing bank, regardless of its size and business model, using a wide range of tools. It will further safeguard financial stability, protect taxpayers and depositors and support the real economy and its competitiveness . The proposed rules will allow authorities to fully exploit the many benefits of resolution as a key element of the crisis management toolbox.
  • The amendments cover a range of policy aspects:
  • - expanding the scope of resolution by reviewing the public interest assessment, when this achieves the objectives of the framework, e.g. protecting financial stability, taxpayer money and depositor confidence better than national insolvency proceedings;
  • - strengthening the funding in resolution by complementing the internal loss-absorbing capacity of institutions, which remains the first line of defence, with the use of DGS funds in resolution to help access resolution funds without imposing losses on depositors where appropriate, subject to conditions and safeguards;
  • - clarifying the early intervention framework by removing overlaps between early intervention and supervisory measures, providing legal certainty on the applicable conditions and facilitating cooperation between competent and resolution authorities;
  • - ensuring a timely triggering of resolution.
  • The amended text stipulates that the resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business model with a positive public interest assessment. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified. In that respect, it is necessary to clarify that, depending on the specific circumstances, certain functions of the institution or entity can be considered critical if their discontinuance would impact financial stability or critical services at regional level.
  • The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or deposit guarantee schemes) and, on the other hand, funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline, and should be considered only under extraordinary circumstances.
  • Where national insolvency and resolution frameworks achieve effectively the objectives of the framework to the same extent, preference should be given to the option that minimises the risk for taxpayers and the economy . That approach ensures a prudent and responsible course of action, aligned with the overarching goal of safeguarding both the interests of taxpayers and broader economic stability.
  • Taxpayer-funded extraordinary financial support to institutions and entities should be granted, if at all, only to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of an exceptional and systemic nature, as it imposes a significant burden on public finances and disrupts the level playing field in the internal market.
links
Research document
docs/8
date
2024-04-24T00:00:00
docs
url: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0326_EN.html title: T9-0326/2024
type
Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
body
EP
events/4/summary
  • The European Parliament adopted by 352 votes to 213, with 67 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and funding of resolution action.
  • The European Parliament adopted its position at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure.
  • The proposed Regulation seeks to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the recovery and resolution framework for institutions and entities .
  • The proposal amends Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism, the SRMR, in particular as regards the improved application of the tools that are already available in the bank resolution framework, clarifying the conditions for resolution, facilitating access to safety nets the event of bank failure and improving the clarity and consistency of funding rules.
  • The proposed amendments are part of the Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) legislative package, which also includes amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD) and Directive 2014/49/EU (Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive or DSGD).
  • Th e proposal will allow authorities to organise the orderly exit of a failing bank, regardless of its size and business model, using a wide range of tools. It will further safeguard financial stability, protect taxpayers and depositors and support the real economy and its competitiveness . The proposed rules will allow authorities to fully exploit the many benefits of resolution as a key element of the crisis management toolbox.
  • The amendments cover a range of policy aspects:
  • - expanding the scope of resolution by reviewing the public interest assessment, when this achieves the objectives of the framework, e.g. protecting financial stability, taxpayer money and depositor confidence better than national insolvency proceedings;
  • - strengthening the funding in resolution by complementing the internal loss-absorbing capacity of institutions, which remains the first line of defence, with the use of DGS funds in resolution to help access resolution funds without imposing losses on depositors where appropriate, subject to conditions and safeguards;
  • - clarifying the early intervention framework by removing overlaps between early intervention and supervisory measures, providing legal certainty on the applicable conditions and facilitating cooperation between competent and resolution authorities;
  • - ensuring a timely triggering of resolution.
  • The amended text stipulates that the resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business model with a positive public interest assessment. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified. In that respect, it is necessary to clarify that, depending on the specific circumstances, certain functions of the institution or entity can be considered critical if their discontinuance would impact financial stability or critical services at regional level.
  • The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or deposit guarantee schemes) and, on the other hand, funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline, and should be considered only under extraordinary circumstances.
  • Where national insolvency and resolution frameworks achieve effectively the objectives of the framework to the same extent, preference should be given to the option that minimises the risk for taxpayers and the economy . That approach ensures a prudent and responsible course of action, aligned with the overarching goal of safeguarding both the interests of taxpayers and broader economic stability.
  • Taxpayer-funded extraordinary financial support to institutions and entities should be granted, if at all, only to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of an exceptional and systemic nature, as it imposes a significant burden on public finances and disrupts the level playing field in the internal market.
links
Research document
docs/8
date
2024-04-24T00:00:00
docs
url: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0326_EN.html title: T9-0326/2024
type
Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
body
EP
events/4/summary
  • The European Parliament adopted by 352 votes to 213, with 67 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and funding of resolution action.
  • The European Parliament adopted its position at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure.
  • The proposed Regulation seeks to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the recovery and resolution framework for institutions and entities .
  • The proposal amends Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism, the SRMR, in particular as regards the improved application of the tools that are already available in the bank resolution framework, clarifying the conditions for resolution, facilitating access to safety nets the event of bank failure and improving the clarity and consistency of funding rules.
  • The proposed amendments are part of the Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) legislative package, which also includes amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD) and Directive 2014/49/EU (Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive or DSGD).
  • Th e proposal will allow authorities to organise the orderly exit of a failing bank, regardless of its size and business model, using a wide range of tools. It will further safeguard financial stability, protect taxpayers and depositors and support the real economy and its competitiveness . The proposed rules will allow authorities to fully exploit the many benefits of resolution as a key element of the crisis management toolbox.
  • The amendments cover a range of policy aspects:
  • - expanding the scope of resolution by reviewing the public interest assessment, when this achieves the objectives of the framework, e.g. protecting financial stability, taxpayer money and depositor confidence better than national insolvency proceedings;
  • - strengthening the funding in resolution by complementing the internal loss-absorbing capacity of institutions, which remains the first line of defence, with the use of DGS funds in resolution to help access resolution funds without imposing losses on depositors where appropriate, subject to conditions and safeguards;
  • - clarifying the early intervention framework by removing overlaps between early intervention and supervisory measures, providing legal certainty on the applicable conditions and facilitating cooperation between competent and resolution authorities;
  • - ensuring a timely triggering of resolution.
  • The amended text stipulates that the resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business model with a positive public interest assessment. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified. In that respect, it is necessary to clarify that, depending on the specific circumstances, certain functions of the institution or entity can be considered critical if their discontinuance would impact financial stability or critical services at regional level.
  • The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or deposit guarantee schemes) and, on the other hand, funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline, and should be considered only under extraordinary circumstances.
  • Where national insolvency and resolution frameworks achieve effectively the objectives of the framework to the same extent, preference should be given to the option that minimises the risk for taxpayers and the economy . That approach ensures a prudent and responsible course of action, aligned with the overarching goal of safeguarding both the interests of taxpayers and broader economic stability.
  • Taxpayer-funded extraordinary financial support to institutions and entities should be granted, if at all, only to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of an exceptional and systemic nature, as it imposes a significant burden on public finances and disrupts the level playing field in the internal market.
links
Research document
docs/8
date
2024-04-24T00:00:00
docs
url: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0326_EN.html title: T9-0326/2024
type
Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
body
EP
events/4/summary
  • The European Parliament adopted by 352 votes to 213, with 67 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and funding of resolution action.
  • The European Parliament adopted its position at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure.
  • The proposed Regulation seeks to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the recovery and resolution framework for institutions and entities .
  • The proposal amends Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism, the SRMR, in particular as regards the improved application of the tools that are already available in the bank resolution framework, clarifying the conditions for resolution, facilitating access to safety nets the event of bank failure and improving the clarity and consistency of funding rules.
  • The proposed amendments are part of the Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) legislative package, which also includes amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD) and Directive 2014/49/EU (Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive or DSGD).
  • Th e proposal will allow authorities to organise the orderly exit of a failing bank, regardless of its size and business model, using a wide range of tools. It will further safeguard financial stability, protect taxpayers and depositors and support the real economy and its competitiveness . The proposed rules will allow authorities to fully exploit the many benefits of resolution as a key element of the crisis management toolbox.
  • The amendments cover a range of policy aspects:
  • - expanding the scope of resolution by reviewing the public interest assessment, when this achieves the objectives of the framework, e.g. protecting financial stability, taxpayer money and depositor confidence better than national insolvency proceedings;
  • - strengthening the funding in resolution by complementing the internal loss-absorbing capacity of institutions, which remains the first line of defence, with the use of DGS funds in resolution to help access resolution funds without imposing losses on depositors where appropriate, subject to conditions and safeguards;
  • - clarifying the early intervention framework by removing overlaps between early intervention and supervisory measures, providing legal certainty on the applicable conditions and facilitating cooperation between competent and resolution authorities;
  • - ensuring a timely triggering of resolution.
  • The amended text stipulates that the resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business model with a positive public interest assessment. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified. In that respect, it is necessary to clarify that, depending on the specific circumstances, certain functions of the institution or entity can be considered critical if their discontinuance would impact financial stability or critical services at regional level.
  • The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or deposit guarantee schemes) and, on the other hand, funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline, and should be considered only under extraordinary circumstances.
  • Where national insolvency and resolution frameworks achieve effectively the objectives of the framework to the same extent, preference should be given to the option that minimises the risk for taxpayers and the economy . That approach ensures a prudent and responsible course of action, aligned with the overarching goal of safeguarding both the interests of taxpayers and broader economic stability.
  • Taxpayer-funded extraordinary financial support to institutions and entities should be granted, if at all, only to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of an exceptional and systemic nature, as it imposes a significant burden on public finances and disrupts the level playing field in the internal market.
links
Research document
docs/8
date
2024-04-24T00:00:00
docs
url: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0326_EN.html title: T9-0326/2024
type
Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
body
EP
events/4/summary
  • The European Parliament adopted by 352 votes to 213, with 67 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and funding of resolution action.
  • The European Parliament adopted its position at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure.
  • The proposed Regulation seeks to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the recovery and resolution framework for institutions and entities .
  • The proposal amends Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism, the SRMR, in particular as regards the improved application of the tools that are already available in the bank resolution framework, clarifying the conditions for resolution, facilitating access to safety nets the event of bank failure and improving the clarity and consistency of funding rules.
  • The proposed amendments are part of the Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) legislative package, which also includes amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD) and Directive 2014/49/EU (Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive or DSGD).
  • Th e proposal will allow authorities to organise the orderly exit of a failing bank, regardless of its size and business model, using a wide range of tools. It will further safeguard financial stability, protect taxpayers and depositors and support the real economy and its competitiveness . The proposed rules will allow authorities to fully exploit the many benefits of resolution as a key element of the crisis management toolbox.
  • The amendments cover a range of policy aspects:
  • - expanding the scope of resolution by reviewing the public interest assessment, when this achieves the objectives of the framework, e.g. protecting financial stability, taxpayer money and depositor confidence better than national insolvency proceedings;
  • - strengthening the funding in resolution by complementing the internal loss-absorbing capacity of institutions, which remains the first line of defence, with the use of DGS funds in resolution to help access resolution funds without imposing losses on depositors where appropriate, subject to conditions and safeguards;
  • - clarifying the early intervention framework by removing overlaps between early intervention and supervisory measures, providing legal certainty on the applicable conditions and facilitating cooperation between competent and resolution authorities;
  • - ensuring a timely triggering of resolution.
  • The amended text stipulates that the resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business model with a positive public interest assessment. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified. In that respect, it is necessary to clarify that, depending on the specific circumstances, certain functions of the institution or entity can be considered critical if their discontinuance would impact financial stability or critical services at regional level.
  • The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or deposit guarantee schemes) and, on the other hand, funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline, and should be considered only under extraordinary circumstances.
  • Where national insolvency and resolution frameworks achieve effectively the objectives of the framework to the same extent, preference should be given to the option that minimises the risk for taxpayers and the economy . That approach ensures a prudent and responsible course of action, aligned with the overarching goal of safeguarding both the interests of taxpayers and broader economic stability.
  • Taxpayer-funded extraordinary financial support to institutions and entities should be granted, if at all, only to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of an exceptional and systemic nature, as it imposes a significant burden on public finances and disrupts the level playing field in the internal market.
links
Research document
docs/8
date
2024-04-24T00:00:00
docs
url: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0326_EN.html title: T9-0326/2024
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  • The European Parliament adopted by 352 votes to 213, with 67 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and funding of resolution action.
  • The European Parliament adopted its position at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure.
  • The proposed Regulation seeks to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the recovery and resolution framework for institutions and entities .
  • The proposal amends Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism, the SRMR, in particular as regards the improved application of the tools that are already available in the bank resolution framework, clarifying the conditions for resolution, facilitating access to safety nets the event of bank failure and improving the clarity and consistency of funding rules.
  • The proposed amendments are part of the Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) legislative package, which also includes amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD) and Directive 2014/49/EU (Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive or DSGD).
  • Th e proposal will allow authorities to organise the orderly exit of a failing bank, regardless of its size and business model, using a wide range of tools. It will further safeguard financial stability, protect taxpayers and depositors and support the real economy and its competitiveness . The proposed rules will allow authorities to fully exploit the many benefits of resolution as a key element of the crisis management toolbox.
  • The amendments cover a range of policy aspects:
  • - expanding the scope of resolution by reviewing the public interest assessment, when this achieves the objectives of the framework, e.g. protecting financial stability, taxpayer money and depositor confidence better than national insolvency proceedings;
  • - strengthening the funding in resolution by complementing the internal loss-absorbing capacity of institutions, which remains the first line of defence, with the use of DGS funds in resolution to help access resolution funds without imposing losses on depositors where appropriate, subject to conditions and safeguards;
  • - clarifying the early intervention framework by removing overlaps between early intervention and supervisory measures, providing legal certainty on the applicable conditions and facilitating cooperation between competent and resolution authorities;
  • - ensuring a timely triggering of resolution.
  • The amended text stipulates that the resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business model with a positive public interest assessment. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified. In that respect, it is necessary to clarify that, depending on the specific circumstances, certain functions of the institution or entity can be considered critical if their discontinuance would impact financial stability or critical services at regional level.
  • The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or deposit guarantee schemes) and, on the other hand, funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline, and should be considered only under extraordinary circumstances.
  • Where national insolvency and resolution frameworks achieve effectively the objectives of the framework to the same extent, preference should be given to the option that minimises the risk for taxpayers and the economy . That approach ensures a prudent and responsible course of action, aligned with the overarching goal of safeguarding both the interests of taxpayers and broader economic stability.
  • Taxpayer-funded extraordinary financial support to institutions and entities should be granted, if at all, only to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of an exceptional and systemic nature, as it imposes a significant burden on public finances and disrupts the level playing field in the internal market.
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docs/8
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  • The European Parliament adopted by 352 votes to 213, with 67 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and funding of resolution action.
  • The European Parliament adopted its position at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure.
  • The proposed Regulation seeks to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the recovery and resolution framework for institutions and entities .
  • The proposal amends Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism, the SRMR, in particular as regards the improved application of the tools that are already available in the bank resolution framework, clarifying the conditions for resolution, facilitating access to safety nets the event of bank failure and improving the clarity and consistency of funding rules.
  • The proposed amendments are part of the Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) legislative package, which also includes amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD) and Directive 2014/49/EU (Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive or DSGD).
  • Th e proposal will allow authorities to organise the orderly exit of a failing bank, regardless of its size and business model, using a wide range of tools. It will further safeguard financial stability, protect taxpayers and depositors and support the real economy and its competitiveness . The proposed rules will allow authorities to fully exploit the many benefits of resolution as a key element of the crisis management toolbox.
  • The amendments cover a range of policy aspects:
  • - expanding the scope of resolution by reviewing the public interest assessment, when this achieves the objectives of the framework, e.g. protecting financial stability, taxpayer money and depositor confidence better than national insolvency proceedings;
  • - strengthening the funding in resolution by complementing the internal loss-absorbing capacity of institutions, which remains the first line of defence, with the use of DGS funds in resolution to help access resolution funds without imposing losses on depositors where appropriate, subject to conditions and safeguards;
  • - clarifying the early intervention framework by removing overlaps between early intervention and supervisory measures, providing legal certainty on the applicable conditions and facilitating cooperation between competent and resolution authorities;
  • - ensuring a timely triggering of resolution.
  • The amended text stipulates that the resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business model with a positive public interest assessment. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified. In that respect, it is necessary to clarify that, depending on the specific circumstances, certain functions of the institution or entity can be considered critical if their discontinuance would impact financial stability or critical services at regional level.
  • The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or deposit guarantee schemes) and, on the other hand, funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline, and should be considered only under extraordinary circumstances.
  • Where national insolvency and resolution frameworks achieve effectively the objectives of the framework to the same extent, preference should be given to the option that minimises the risk for taxpayers and the economy . That approach ensures a prudent and responsible course of action, aligned with the overarching goal of safeguarding both the interests of taxpayers and broader economic stability.
  • Taxpayer-funded extraordinary financial support to institutions and entities should be granted, if at all, only to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of an exceptional and systemic nature, as it imposes a significant burden on public finances and disrupts the level playing field in the internal market.
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  • The European Parliament adopted by 352 votes to 213, with 67 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and funding of resolution action.
  • The European Parliament adopted its position at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure.
  • The proposed Regulation seeks to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the recovery and resolution framework for institutions and entities .
  • The proposal amends Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism, the SRMR, in particular as regards the improved application of the tools that are already available in the bank resolution framework, clarifying the conditions for resolution, facilitating access to safety nets the event of bank failure and improving the clarity and consistency of funding rules.
  • The proposed amendments are part of the Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) legislative package, which also includes amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD) and Directive 2014/49/EU (Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive or DSGD).
  • Th e proposal will allow authorities to organise the orderly exit of a failing bank, regardless of its size and business model, using a wide range of tools. It will further safeguard financial stability, protect taxpayers and depositors and support the real economy and its competitiveness . The proposed rules will allow authorities to fully exploit the many benefits of resolution as a key element of the crisis management toolbox.
  • The amendments cover a range of policy aspects:
  • - expanding the scope of resolution by reviewing the public interest assessment, when this achieves the objectives of the framework, e.g. protecting financial stability, taxpayer money and depositor confidence better than national insolvency proceedings;
  • - strengthening the funding in resolution by complementing the internal loss-absorbing capacity of institutions, which remains the first line of defence, with the use of DGS funds in resolution to help access resolution funds without imposing losses on depositors where appropriate, subject to conditions and safeguards;
  • - clarifying the early intervention framework by removing overlaps between early intervention and supervisory measures, providing legal certainty on the applicable conditions and facilitating cooperation between competent and resolution authorities;
  • - ensuring a timely triggering of resolution.
  • The amended text stipulates that the resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business model with a positive public interest assessment. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified. In that respect, it is necessary to clarify that, depending on the specific circumstances, certain functions of the institution or entity can be considered critical if their discontinuance would impact financial stability or critical services at regional level.
  • The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or deposit guarantee schemes) and, on the other hand, funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline, and should be considered only under extraordinary circumstances.
  • Where national insolvency and resolution frameworks achieve effectively the objectives of the framework to the same extent, preference should be given to the option that minimises the risk for taxpayers and the economy . That approach ensures a prudent and responsible course of action, aligned with the overarching goal of safeguarding both the interests of taxpayers and broader economic stability.
  • Taxpayer-funded extraordinary financial support to institutions and entities should be granted, if at all, only to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of an exceptional and systemic nature, as it imposes a significant burden on public finances and disrupts the level playing field in the internal market.
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  • The European Parliament adopted by 352 votes to 213, with 67 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and funding of resolution action.
  • The European Parliament adopted its position at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure.
  • The proposed Regulation seeks to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the recovery and resolution framework for institutions and entities .
  • The proposal amends Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism, the SRMR, in particular as regards the improved application of the tools that are already available in the bank resolution framework, clarifying the conditions for resolution, facilitating access to safety nets the event of bank failure and improving the clarity and consistency of funding rules.
  • The proposed amendments are part of the Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) legislative package, which also includes amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD) and Directive 2014/49/EU (Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive or DSGD).
  • Th e proposal will allow authorities to organise the orderly exit of a failing bank, regardless of its size and business model, using a wide range of tools. It will further safeguard financial stability, protect taxpayers and depositors and support the real economy and its competitiveness . The proposed rules will allow authorities to fully exploit the many benefits of resolution as a key element of the crisis management toolbox.
  • The amendments cover a range of policy aspects:
  • - expanding the scope of resolution by reviewing the public interest assessment, when this achieves the objectives of the framework, e.g. protecting financial stability, taxpayer money and depositor confidence better than national insolvency proceedings;
  • - strengthening the funding in resolution by complementing the internal loss-absorbing capacity of institutions, which remains the first line of defence, with the use of DGS funds in resolution to help access resolution funds without imposing losses on depositors where appropriate, subject to conditions and safeguards;
  • - clarifying the early intervention framework by removing overlaps between early intervention and supervisory measures, providing legal certainty on the applicable conditions and facilitating cooperation between competent and resolution authorities;
  • - ensuring a timely triggering of resolution.
  • The amended text stipulates that the resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business model with a positive public interest assessment. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified. In that respect, it is necessary to clarify that, depending on the specific circumstances, certain functions of the institution or entity can be considered critical if their discontinuance would impact financial stability or critical services at regional level.
  • The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or deposit guarantee schemes) and, on the other hand, funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline, and should be considered only under extraordinary circumstances.
  • Where national insolvency and resolution frameworks achieve effectively the objectives of the framework to the same extent, preference should be given to the option that minimises the risk for taxpayers and the economy . That approach ensures a prudent and responsible course of action, aligned with the overarching goal of safeguarding both the interests of taxpayers and broader economic stability.
  • Taxpayer-funded extraordinary financial support to institutions and entities should be granted, if at all, only to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of an exceptional and systemic nature, as it imposes a significant burden on public finances and disrupts the level playing field in the internal market.
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2023-07-10T00:00:00
type
Committee referral announced in Parliament, 1st reading
body
EP
procedure/dossier_of_the_committee
  • ECON/9/11834
procedure/stage_reached
Old
Preparatory phase in Parliament
New
Awaiting committee decision
committees/0/shadows/2
name
URTASUN Ernest
group
Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance
abbr
Verts/ALE
docs/0/docs/0
url
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=EN&type_doc=SECfinal&an_doc=2023&nu_doc=0230
title
EUR-Lex
committees/1/opinion
False
committees/0
type
Responsible Committee
body
EP
committee_full
Economic and Monetary Affairs
committee
ECON
associated
False
rapporteur
name: MARQUES Pedro date: 2023-05-30T00:00:00 group: Group of Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats abbr: S&D
shadows
committees/0
type
Responsible Committee
body
EP
committee_full
Economic and Monetary Affairs
committee
ECON
associated
False
shadows
committees/0/shadows/1
name
BOYER Gilles
group
Renew Europe group
abbr
Renew
committees/0
type
Responsible Committee
body
EP
committee_full
Economic and Monetary Affairs
committee
ECON
associated
False
shadows
committees/0
type
Responsible Committee
body
EP
committee_full
Economic and Monetary Affairs
committee
ECON
associated
False
shadows
name: ZANNI Marco group: Identity and Democracy abbr: ID
committees/0/shadows
  • name: ZANNI Marco group: Identity and Democracy abbr: ID
commission
  • body: EC dg: Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union commissioner: MCGUINNESS Mairead
docs/0
date
2023-04-18T00:00:00
docs
type
Legislative proposal
body
EC
events/0/summary
  • PURPOSE: to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the recovery and resolution framework for institutions and entities.
  • PROPOSED ACT: Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council.
  • ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: the European Parliament decides in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and on an equal footing with the Council.
  • BACKGROUND: the Union resolution framework consists of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRMR) and a Single Resolution Fund. It was established in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis and aims to deal in an orderly manner with the failure of institutions and entities by preserving institutions and entities’ critical functions and avoiding threats to financial stability, and at the same time protecting depositors and public funds. In addition, the Union resolution framework intends to foster the development of the internal market in banking by creating a harmonised regime to address cross-border crises in a coordinated way and by avoiding level playing field issues.
  • However, experience over the past years has shown that when medium-sized and smaller banks fail in the EU, authorities have found solutions outside the EU's harmonised resolution framework. This has often involved the use of taxpayers' money instead of the bank's required internal resources or private, industry-funded safety nets.
  • While the existing rules already enable authorities to deal with failing banks in an effective manner, further progress is needed to make the rules even more effective in ensuring that European banks keep supporting Europe's economy and do not burden public finances when they fail.
  • CONTENT: the proposal amends an existing regulation, the SRMR, in particular as regards the improved application of the tools that are already available in the bank resolution framework, clarifying the conditions for resolution, facilitating access to safety nets the event of bank failure and improving the clarity and consistency of funding rules.
  • The proposed amendments are part of the Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) legislative package , which also includes amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD) and Directive 2014/49/EU (Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive or DSGD).
  • By establishing harmonised requirements for applying the CMDI framework to banks in the internal market, the proposal considerably reduces the risk of divergent national rules in Member States, which could distort competition in the internal market.
  • The proposal will allow authorities to organise the orderly exit of a failing bank, regardless of its size and business model, using a wide range of tools. It will further safeguard financial stability, protect taxpayers and depositors and support the real economy and its competitiveness. The proposed rules will allow authorities to fully exploit the many benefits of resolution as a key element of the crisis management toolbox.
  • The amendments included in the CMDI package cover a range of policy aspects:
  • - expanding the scope of resolution by reviewing the public interest assessment, when this achieves the objectives of the framework, e.g. protecting financial stability, taxpayer money and depositor confidence better than national insolvency proceedings;
  • - strengthening the funding in resolution by complementing the internal loss-absorbing capacity of institutions, which remains the first line of defence, with the use of DGS funds in resolution to help access resolution funds without imposing losses on depositors where appropriate, subject to conditions and safeguards;
  • - clarifying the early intervention framework by removing overlaps between early intervention and supervisory measures, providing legal certainty on the applicable conditions and facilitating cooperation between competent and resolution authorities;
  • - ensuring a timely triggering of resolution.