29 Amendments of Irene TINAGLI related to 2023/0112(COD)
Amendment 55 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 10
Recital 10
Amendment 63 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 11
Recital 11
(11) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through the prioritisation of using industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or DGSs) and, on the other hand,deposit guarantee schemes) instead of funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline. Therefore, when assessing the objective of minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, the Single Resolution Board or the resolution authorities should find funding through the resolution financing arrangements or the DGSdeposit guarantee scheme, preferable to funding through an equal amount of resources from the budget of Member States. For these purposes, funds provided by industry-funded safety nets shall not be considered as funds provided from the budget of a Member State.
Amendment 67 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 12
Recital 12
Amendment 79 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 17
Recital 17
(17) In light of the experience acquired in the implementation of Directive 2014/59/EU, Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 and Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council31 , it is necessary to specify further the conditions under which measures of a preventive precautionary nature that qualify as extraordinary public financial support may exceptionally be granted. To minimise distortions of competition arising from differences in nature of DGSs in the Union, interventions of DGSs in the context of preventive measures complying with Directive 2014/49/EU that qualify as extraordinary public financial support should exceptionally be allowed where the beneficiary institution or entity does not meet any of the conditions for being deemed ashas been not declared failing or likely to fail. It should be ensured that precautionary measures are taken sufficiently early. The European Central Bank (ECB) currently bases its consideration that an institution or entity is solvent, for the purposes of precautionary recapitalisation, on a forward-looking assessment for following 12 months of whether the institution or entity can comply with the own funds requirements set out in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council32 or in Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 of the European Parliament and of the Council33 , and the additional own funds requirement laid down in Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive (EU) 2019/2034. That practice should be laid downrevised in Directive 2014/59/EU. Moreover, measures to provide relief for impaired assets, including asset management vehicles or asset guarantee schemes, can prove effective and efficient in addressing causes of possible financial distresses faced by institutions and entities and preventing their failure and could therefore constitute relevant precautionary measures. It should be therefore specified that such precautionary measures can take the form of impaired asset measures. __________________ 31 Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149). 32 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1). 33 Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on the prudential requirements of investment firms and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 575/2013, (EU) No 600/2014 and (EU) No 806/2014 (OJ L 314, 5.12.2019, p. 1).
Amendment 81 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 18
Recital 18
(18) To preserve market discipline, protect public funds and avoid distortions of competition, precautionary measures should remain the exception and only be applied to address situations of serious disturbance in the market or to preserve financial stability. Moreover, precautionary measures should not be used to address incurred or likely losses unless the Union State aid framework allows for an exception to the burden-sharing requirement. The most reliable instrument to identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses is an asset quality review by the ECB, the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (EBA), established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council34 or national competent authorities. Competent authorities should use such a review to identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses where such review can be carried out within a reasonable timeframe. Where that is not possible, competent authorities should identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses in the most reliable way possible under the prevailing circumstances, based on on-site inspections where appropriate. __________________ 34 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12).
Amendment 82 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 18
Recital 18
(18) To preserve market discipline, protect public funds and avoid distortions of competition, precautionary measures should remain the exception and only be applied to address situations of serious disturbance in the market or to preserve financial stability, in particular in the event of a systemic crisis. Moreover, precautionary measures should not be used to address incurred or likely losses. The most reliable instrument to identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses is an asset quality review by the ECB, the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (EBA), established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council34 or national competent authorities. Competent authorities should use such a review to identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses where such review can be carried out within a reasonable timeframe. Where that is not possible, competent authorities should identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses in the most reliable way possible under the prevailing circumstances, based on on-site inspections where appropriate. __________________ 34 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12).
Amendment 84 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 19
Recital 19
(19) Precautionary recapitalisation is aimed at supporting viable institutions and entities identified as likely to encounter temporary difficulties in the near future and to prevent their situation from deteriorating further. To avoid that public subsidies are granted to businesses that are already unprofitable when the support is granted, precautionary measures granted in the form of acquisition of own funds instruments or other capital instruments or through impaired asset measures should not exceed the amount necessary to cover capital shortfalls as identified in the adverse scenario of a stress test or equivalent exercise. To ensure that public financing is ultimately discontinued, those precautionary measures should also be limited in time and contain a clear timeline for their termination (exit strategy). Perpetual instruments, including Common Equity Tier 1 capital, should only be used in exceptional circumstances and be subject to certain quantitative limits because by their nature they are not well suited for compliance with the condition of temporarinesswhen strictly necessary.
Amendment 86 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 20
Recital 20
(20) Precautionary measures should be limited to the amount that the institution or entity would need to maintain its solvency in the case of an adverse scenario event as determined in a stress test or equivalent exercise. In the case of precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures, the receiving institution or entity should be able to use that amount to cover losses on the transferred assets or in combination with an acquisition of capital instruments, provided that the overall amount of the shortfall identified is not exceeded. It is also necessary to ensure that such precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures comply with existing State aid rules and best practices, that they restore the institution or entity's long-term viability, that State aid is limited to the minimum necessary and that distortions of competition are avoided. For those reasons, the authorities concerned should in case of precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures take into account the specific guidance, including the AMC Blueprint35 and the Communication on Tackling Non- Performing Loans36 . Those precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures should always be subject to the overriding condition of temporariness. Public guarantees granted for a specified period in relation to the impaired assets of the institution or entity concerned are expected to ensure better compliance with the temporariness condition than transfers of such assets to a publicly supported entity. To ensure the market exit of institutions and entities that prove not to be viable, despite the support received, it is necessary to lay down that non- comat institutions receiving support comply with terms of the support measure, competent authorities should request a remediation pliance by the from institution or entity concerned with the terms of the support measures specified at the time such measures were granted is to result in the institution or entity concerned being considereds that failed to fulfil their commitments. Where a competent authority is of the opinion that the measures in the remediation plan are not capable of achieving the institution’s long-term viability or where the institution failed to comply with the remediation plan, relevant authorities shall carry out an assessment of whether the institution is failing or is likely to fail, in accordance with Article 32 of Directive 2014/59/EU. __________________ 35 COM(2018) 133 final. 36 COM(2020) 822 final.
Amendment 95 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 31
Recital 31
Amendment 215 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 27 – paragraph 1 a – point f a (new)
Article 27 – paragraph 1 a – point f a (new)
(fa) the requirement for the management body of the entity to draw up a plan that the entity can implement in case the relevant corporate body decides to initiate the voluntary wind-down of the entity; the plan shall include at least analyses of the necessary capital and liquidity support for winding down and of the concrete relevant strategic options for a possible market exit.
Amendment 243 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 31 –paragraph 2 – point d
Article 31 –paragraph 2 – point d
(d) to protect depositors, while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemes, and to protect investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;
Amendment 266 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1
For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest where, pursuant to Article 31(3), that resolution action is necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31 and where winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives more effectivelyto the same extent.
Amendment 274 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2
Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the resolution authority, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, considers and compares all extraordinary public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the institution, both in the event of resolution and inpursuant to Article 10(1) and 45c(2), the resolution authority, in order to assess the appropriateness of the resolution for the institution, consider the following elements: (a) the prevalence of deposits and the absence of debt instruments in the funding model; (b) the access to the capital markets for eligible liabilities; (c) the evxtent of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law.;to which the institution relies on Common Equity Tier 1 capital to meet its capital requirements.
Amendment 300 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point a – point iii
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point a – point iii
(iii) an acquisition of own funds instruments other than Common Equity Tier 1 instruments, or of other capital instruments or a use of impaired assets measures, at prices, duration and other terms that do not confer an undue advantage upon the institution or entity concerned, where neitherr a use of impaired assets measures provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4), points (a), (b) or (c), nor the circumstances referred to in Article 59(3) are present at the time the public support is granted;
Amendment 305 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme to preserve the financial soundness and long-term viability of the credit institution in compliance with the conditions set out in Articles 11a and 11b of Directive 2014/49/EU, provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) are present;
Amendment 317 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) the measures are of a precautionary and temporary nature and are based on a pre-defined exit strategy approved by the competent authority, including a clearly specified termination date, sale date or repayment schedule for any of the measures provided;
Amendment 321 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (a), an institution or entity shall be deemed to be solvent where the competent authority has concluded that no breach has occurred, or is likely to occur in the 12 following months, of any of the requirements referred to in Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU, Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, Article 40 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 or the relevant applicable requirements under Union or national law.
Amendment 322 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2a (new)
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2a (new)
The competent authority may deem an institution or entity to be solvent where it determines that a breach of these requirements is temporary in nature, taking into account the specific circumstances of each case, and provided that the institution or entity can demonstrate a reasonable plan to remedy the breach within an appropriate timeframe as determined by the competent authority.
Amendment 327 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5
Amendment 331 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6
In case any of the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), is not redeemed, repaid or otherwise terminated in accordance with the terms of the exit strategy established at the time of granting such measure, the competent authority shall conclude that the condition laid down in Article 32(1), point (a), is met in relation to the institution or entity which has received those support measures, and shall communicate that assessment to the resolution authority concernedrequest the institution or entity to submit a remediation plan describing the steps to be taken in order to ensure or restore compliance with supervisory requirements, its long-term viability and to repay the amount provided, as well as the associated timeframe.
Amendment 334 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6a (new)
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6a (new)
Where the relevant national competent authority does not recognise the remediation plan as credible or feasible, or where the institution or entity fails to comply with the remediation plan, an assessment of whether the institution or entity is failing or likely to fail shall be conducted in accordance with Article 32.
Amendment 366 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. When applying Article 45c to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, and where its size and its ability to access the capital markets where it operates so justify in light of the princple of proportionality, the resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3) in a proportionate way on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:
Amendment 395 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 2
Article 45ca – paragraph 2
Amendment 423 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 53 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 53 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 103 – paragraph 3
Article 103 – paragraph 3
3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 102 may include irrevocable payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the resolution authorities for the purposes specified in Article 101(1). The share of irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed 530 % of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with this Article. Within that limit, the resolution authority shall determine annually the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of contributions to be raised in accordance with this Article.;
Amendment 433 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
1. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings the claims arising from the following have the same priority ranking, which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors:
Amendment 441 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) all deposits;
Amendment 449 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) deposits that were made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;
Amendment 455 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point c
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) deposit guarantee schemes when subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency.;
Amendment 489 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 2 a (new)
Article 2 a (new)
Article2a Transitional period 1. Institutions or entities referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU whose preferred resolution strategy will change depending on the entry into force of this amending Directive shall comply with the requirements referred to in Articles 45e or 45f of Directive 2014/59/EU or with requirements that result from the application of Article 45b(4), (5) or (7) of Directive 2014/59/EU, as appropriate, within five years as from the date of the approval of the resolution plan including the new preferred resolution strategy. 2. During the transitional period referred to in the first paragraph, in the cases referred to in point (b), of the first subparagraph of Article 109(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU, as amended by this amending Directive, where the transfer to the recipient includes deposits that are not covered deposits or other bail-inable liabilities, by way of derogation from the second subparagraph of that paragraph, the deposit guarantee scheme shall contribute to the amount necessary to cover the difference between the value of deposits, including deposits that are not covered, of senior bail-inable liabilities held by retail clients, as defined in point (11) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU, and of the liabilities with the same or higher priority ranking than deposits and the value of the assets of the institution under resolution which are to be transferred to the recipient.