Activities of Jérôme RIVIÈRE related to 2020/2256(INI)
Plenary speeches (1)
State of EU cyber defence capabilities (debate)
Amendments (7)
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Recalls that the borderless nature of cyber space and the substantial number of cyber-attacks make them a threat requiring intensified EU-NATO cooperation between the Member States and a coordinated Union- level response, including common Member State support capabilities; stresses that individual States, frequently being subject to threats specifically directed at them, are each free to pursue an independent cyber defence strategy, while at the same time envisaging partnerships tailored to their particular concerns;
Amendment 84 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Notes the 2018 CDPF’s objective to set up an EU Military CERT-Network; calls on Member States to significantly increase classified information sharing, to develop a European rapid and secure network to counter cyber-attacks; stresses that each country has the right to protect its information for imperative reasons of national security;
Amendment 115 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Welcomes the Council’s June 2019 framework, which allows targeted restrictive measures to deter and respond to cyber-attacks that constitute a threat to the EU or its Member States, including cyber- attacks against third countries or international organisations; welcomes the imposition of such restrictive measures in July 2020 and October 2020 as a credible step in strengthening the EU’s cyber diplomacy toolbox; notes that digital freedom of expression must be an absolute imperative and be factored into cyber security initiatives accordingly;
Amendment 129 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Notes that the Strategic Compass will enhance and guide the implementation of the EU’s level of ambiPoints out that, with regard to cyber defence and defence in general, national in security and defterests must take precedence, and translate that ambition into capability needs, including in cyber defence, thereby increasing the ability of the EU andhat notions of European sovereignty extending into this domain must in no way induce a Member States to prevent, discourage, deter, respond to and recover from malicaccept provisiouns cyber activities by strengthening its posture, situational awareness, tools, procedures and partnershipsontrary to its fundamental interests regarding defence and national security;
Amendment 136 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Insists that the Strategic Compass should deepen the strategic culture in the cyber domain and remove any duplication of capabilities and mandates; stresses that it is essential to overcome, when it comes digital technology and cyber security in particular, each State has the right to possess its own language and codes, which the cEurrent fragmentation and complexity of the overall cyber architecture within the EUopean Union institutions cannot under any circumstances oblige them to disclose;
Amendment 182 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Welcomes the Commission’s Action Plan On Synergies between civil, defence and space industries, and recalls the close interdependence of these three sectors in cyber defence; notes that, differently from other military domains, cyber space is mainly owned by commercial entities based mostly outside the EU, which leads to industrial and technological dependencies on third parties; strongly believes that the EU needs to increase its technological sovereignty and innovation, investing in the use of new technologies in security and defence such as artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing; affirms that data protection is a legal must, particularly when it comes to defending not only the vital interests of the State but also individual freedom and security;
Amendment 214 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Considers that EU-NATO cyber cooperation is crucial, as it enables strong formal attribution and thus the imposition of restrictive sanctions; notes that functioning deterrence would be achieved if adversaries were aware of the catalogue of possible countermeasures (based on the severity, scale, and target of the cyber- attacks)should not form the basis of measures to combat cyber crime; warns of the risks of data transfers taking place solely for the benefit of the US and undermining the principles of personal data privacy;