9 Amendments of Isabel SANTOS related to 2023/2072(INI)
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the coercive policies and the growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including its aggressive stance towards Taiwan, as well as the social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine have exposed the EU’s vulnerabilities and reaffirmed the need to ‘de-risk’ its relations vis-à-vis the PRC and other unon- democratic third countries;
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas China’s acquisition of critical infrastructure, especially in the EU’s neighbourhood, including the Western Balkans, and in Africa, poses an increasing risk to the trade-security nexus;
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Considers that China’s party-driven political system and economy often require private companies to align their commercial interests with the CCP’s military, repression and political interference activities; highlights that, consequentially, Chinese companies’ international activities helpsupport the CCP to’s goals of expanding its influence over foreign countries and, undermineing geopolitical rivals and increase Chinese’s influence;
Amendment 55 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Believes that MCF must be understood in a larger political and strategic context, taking into account its interconnections with other initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (including the Digital Silk Road); believes that the ultimate aim of MCF is to advance China’s long-term strategic goal to become the world’s leading power and to undermine the rules-based international order;
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Recalls that both diplomatic and military communication travels through privately owned undersea cables provided by Chinese companies, such as HMN Technologies, a PLA cyber intelligence– affiliated entity; expresses its grave concern over the undersea data cable systems operated by Chinese company HMN Technologies, which connect EU Member States’ territories and the Indo- Pacific region, including Member State and NATO military bases in the region, creating security vulnerabilities as regards to cyber security, underwater surveillance and the collection of intelligence;
Amendment 81 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. In this regard, is concern with the sale of a Dutch company, the backbone of Estonia’s internet infrastructure, to a Chinese company linked to the PLA; highlights the need for a joint effort among the Member States to prevent similar cases;
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. NoteHighlights that the screening of stakeholders with access to critical infrastructure cannot be limited to direct investment; calls for the current instruments that address foreign direct investment and foreign subsidies to be expanded to include generalised screening procedures for all stakeholders involved in EU critical infrastructure projects; calls on the Commission, with the support of the Member States, to map, track and assess China’s access to critical infrastructure in the EU; stresses that the Member States are ultimately responsible for infrastructure protection, but have not consistently implemented current guidelines on foreign direct investment or set up national-level investment-screening mechanisms;
Amendment 116 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Welcomes the potential of the Commission’s proposal for a European economic security strategy to expand the EU toolkit to exports or outward investments in a narrow set of key enabling technologies with military applications, inter alia, in the areas of quantum computing, advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence; calls for the swift adoption of the Commission’s proposals and for the Member States to fully implement the EU’s expanded regulatory framework to exclude entities that could contribute to MCF;
Amendment 138 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Is cognisant ofExpresses concerned regarding the PRC’s penetration of the EU market and its wider neighbourhood; calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to ensure that the measures taken to strengthen the resilience of the EU in the face of Chinese influence are also extended to the EU’s closest partners, in particular accession countries and those part of the EUs neighbourhood policy;