53 Amendments of Aurore LALUCQ related to 2023/0112(COD)
Amendment 33 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 1 a (new)
Recital 1 a (new)
(1a) At present, the banking union rests on just two of its intended three pillars, namely, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). It therefore remains incomplete, due to the absence of its third pillar, the European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS). The completion of the banking union forms an integral part of economic and monetary union and of financial stability, most notably by mitigating the risks of so-called ‘doom loop’ that arise as a result of the bank-sovereign nexus.
Amendment 40 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 2
Recital 2
(2) Several years into its implementation, the Union resolution framework as currently applicable does not deliver as intended with respect of some of those objectives. In particular, while institutions and entities have made significant progress towards resolvability and have dedicated significant resources to that end, in particular through the build-up of the loss absorption and recapitalisation capacity and the filling-up of resolution financing arrangements, the Union resolution framework is seldom resorted to. Failures of certain smaller and medium- sized institutions and entities are instead mostly addressed through unharmonised national measures. TRegrettably, taxpayer money is still used rather than industry- funded safety nets, including resolution financing arrangements. That situation appears to arise from inadequate incentives. Those inadequate incentives result from the interplay of the Union resolution framework with national rules, whereby the broad discretion in the public interest assessment is not always exercised in a way that reflects how the Union resolution framework was intended to apply. At the same time, the Union resolution framework saw little use due to the risks for depositors of deposit-funded institutions to bear losses to ensure that those institutions can access external funding in resolution, in particular in the absence of other bail-inable liabilities. Finally, the fact that there are less stringent rules on access to funding outside resolution than in resolution has discouraged the application of the Union resolution framework in favour of other solutions, which often entail the use of taxpayers’ money instead of the own resources of the institution and entity or industry-funded safety nets. That situation, in turn, generates risks of fragmentation, risks of suboptimal outcomes in managing institutions and entities’ failures, in particular in the case of smaller and medium-sized institutions and entities, and opportunity costs from unused financial resources. It is therefore necessary to ensure a more effective and coherent application of the Union resolution framework and to ensure that it can be applied whenever that is in the public interest, including for certain smaller and medium- sized institutions primarily funded through deposits and witfalling shourt of the sufficient otheramount of bail-inable liabilities.
Amendment 43 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 2 a (new)
Recital 2 a (new)
(2a) The current legislative review seeks to reinforce the conditions for an orderly bank resolution that provides more protection for depositors. It firmly upholds the insurance to covered deposits, while reinforcing the policy toolbox for resolution, thus allowing for smoother alternatives that provide additional safeguards to depositors and financial stability.
Amendment 44 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 3
Recital 3
(3) The intensity, and level of detail, of the resolution planning work needed with respect to subsidiaries that have not been identified as resolution entities varies depending on the size and risk profile of the institutions and entities concerned, the presence of critical functions, and the group resolution strategy. Resolution authorities should therefore be able to consider those factors when identifying the measures to be taken in respect of such subsidiaries and follow a simplified approach where appropriate, as long as the simplified approach does not, under any circumstances, result in a reduction of required standards.
Amendment 45 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 8
Recital 8
(8) It is necessary to ensure timely action and early coordination between the competent authority and the resolution authority, when an institution or entity is still a going concern, but where there is a material risk that the institution or entity may fail. The competent authority should therefore notify the resolution authority as early as possible of such risk. That notification should contain the reasons for the competent authority’s assessment and an overview of the alternative private sector measures, supervisory action or early intervention measures that are available to prevent the failure of the institution or entity within a reasonable timeframe. Such early notification should not prejudice the procedures to determine whether the conditions for resolution are met. The prior notification by the competent authority to the resolution authority of a material risk that an institution or entity is failing or likely to fail, or the end of the defined timeframe for the implementation of the measures to address such material risk of failure of the institution or entity should not be a condition for, nor imply, a subsequent determination that an institution or entity is actually failing or likely to fail. Moreover, if at a later stage the institution or entity is assessed to be failing or likely to fail and there are no alternative solutions to prevent such failure within a reasonable timeframe, the resolution authority has to take a decision whether to take resolution action. In such a case, the timeliness of the decision to apply resolution action to an institution or entity can be fundamental to the successful implementation of the resolution strategy, in particular because an earlier intervention in the institution or entity can contribute to ensuring sufficient levels of loss absorption capacity and liquidity to execute that strategy. It is therefore appropriate to enable the resolution authority to assess, in close cooperation with the competent authority, what constitutes a reasonable timeframe to implement alternative measures to avoid the failure of the institution or entity. To ensure a timely outcome and to enable the resolution authority to prepare properly for the potential resolution of the institution or entity, the resolution authority and the competent authority should meet regularly, and the resolution authority should decide on frequency of those meetings considering the circumstances of the case.
Amendment 52 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 9
Recital 9
(9) The resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentiallymanage the failure of any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business model, if that has a positive public interest assessment, in particular when the tools available under national law are not adequate to manage its failure. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to any failing institution or entity should be specified. In particular, it is necessary to clarify that, depending on the specific circumstances, certain functions of the institution or entity can be considered critical even if their discontinuance would impact financial stability or critical services only at regional level.
Amendment 57 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 10
Recital 10
(10) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should reflect, among other factors, the consideration that depositors are better protected when deposit guarantee scheme (‘DGS’) funds are used more efficiently and the losses for those funds are minimised. Therefore, in the public interest assessment, the resolution objective of protectingprotection of depositors should be considered better achieved in resolution if opting for insolvency would be more or equally costly for the DGS.
Amendment 63 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 11
Recital 11
(11) The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through the prioritisation of using industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or DGSs) and, on the other hand,deposit guarantee schemes) instead of funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline. Therefore, when assessing the objective of minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, the Single Resolution Board or the resolution authorities should find funding through the resolution financing arrangements or the DGSdeposit guarantee scheme, preferable to funding through an equal amount of resources from the budget of Member States. For these purposes, funds provided by industry-funded safety nets shall not be considered as funds provided from the budget of a Member State.
Amendment 70 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 12
Recital 12
(12) To ensure that the resolution objectives are attained in the most effective way, the outcome of the public interest assessment should be negative only whereconsider whether the winding up of the failing institution or entity under normal insolvency proceedings would achieve the resolution objectives more effectively than resolution, and not only to the same extent as resolution. . The assessment should include costs related to DGS payouts, such as the duration required for asset recovery and the income lost during the process.
Amendment 82 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 18
Recital 18
(18) To preserve market discipline, protect public funds and avoid distortions of competition, precautionary measures should remain the exception and only be applied to address situations of serious disturbance in the market or to preserve financial stability, in particular in the event of a systemic crisis. Moreover, precautionary measures should not be used to address incurred or likely losses. The most reliable instrument to identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses is an asset quality review by the ECB, the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (EBA), established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council34 or national competent authorities. Competent authorities should use such a review to identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses where such review can be carried out within a reasonable timeframe. Where that is not possible, competent authorities should identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses in the most reliable way possible under the prevailing circumstances, based on on-site inspections where appropriate. __________________ 34 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12).
Amendment 84 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 19
Recital 19
(19) Precautionary recapitalisation is aimed at supporting viable institutions and entities identified as likely to encounter temporary difficulties in the near future and to prevent their situation from deteriorating further. To avoid that public subsidies are granted to businesses that are already unprofitable when the support is granted, precautionary measures granted in the form of acquisition of own funds instruments or other capital instruments or through impaired asset measures should not exceed the amount necessary to cover capital shortfalls as identified in the adverse scenario of a stress test or equivalent exercise. To ensure that public financing is ultimately discontinued, those precautionary measures should also be limited in time and contain a clear timeline for their termination (exit strategy). Perpetual instruments, including Common Equity Tier 1 capital, should only be used in exceptional circumstances and be subject to certain quantitative limits because by their nature they are not well suited for compliance with the condition of temporarinesswhen strictly necessary.
Amendment 86 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 20
Recital 20
(20) Precautionary measures should be limited to the amount that the institution or entity would need to maintain its solvency in the case of an adverse scenario event as determined in a stress test or equivalent exercise. In the case of precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures, the receiving institution or entity should be able to use that amount to cover losses on the transferred assets or in combination with an acquisition of capital instruments, provided that the overall amount of the shortfall identified is not exceeded. It is also necessary to ensure that such precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures comply with existing State aid rules and best practices, that they restore the institution or entity's long-term viability, that State aid is limited to the minimum necessary and that distortions of competition are avoided. For those reasons, the authorities concerned should in case of precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures take into account the specific guidance, including the AMC Blueprint35 and the Communication on Tackling Non- Performing Loans36 . Those precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures should always be subject to the overriding condition of temporariness. Public guarantees granted for a specified period in relation to the impaired assets of the institution or entity concerned are expected to ensure better compliance with the temporariness condition than transfers of such assets to a publicly supported entity. To ensure the market exit of institutions and entities that prove not to be viable, despite the support received, it is necessary to lay down that non- comat institutions receiving support comply with terms of the support measure, competent authorities should request a remediation pliance by the from institution or entity concerned with the terms of the support measures specified at the time such measures were granted is to result in the institution or entity concerned being considereds that failed to fulfil their commitments. Where a competent authority is of the opinion that the measures in the remediation plan are not capable of achieving the institution’s long-term viability or where the institution failed to comply with the remediation plan, relevant authorities shall carry out an assessment of whether the institution is failing or is likely to fail, in accordance with Article 32 of Directive 2014/59/EU. __________________ 35 COM(2018) 133 final. 36 COM(2020) 822 final.
Amendment 98 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 31
Recital 31
(31) It is necessary to ensure equalstablish incentives to build sufficient amounts of MREL for institutions and entities that would be subject to transfer strategies both in and outside resolution. The setting of level of the MREL for institutions or entities that may be subject to of measures in the context of national insolvency proceedings pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU should therefore follow the same rules asrules that are proportionate to those applicable to the setting of the MREL for resolution entities whose preferred resolution strategy provides for the sale of business or transfer to a bridge institution leading to its exit from the market.
Amendment 114 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 38
Recital 38
(38) The ranking of all deposits should be fully harmonised through the implementation of a general depositor preference with a singletwo-tiered approach, whereby all deposits benefit from a higher priority ranking over ordinary unsecured claims, without any differentiation between different types of deposits. At the same time, the use of the deposit guarantee schemes in resolution, insolvency and in preventive measures should always remain subject to compliance with the relevant conditionality, in particular the so-called ‘least cost test’.
Amendment 121 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 39
Recital 39
(39) A general depositor preference will contribute to reinforcing depositors’ confidence and to further prevent the risk of bank runs. Enhanced depositor protection is also aligned with the central role deposits play in the real economy, being the primary tool for savings and for payments, as well as in the banking activity, where the deposits represent an important source of funding and are a key driver of confidence in the banking system, which becomes of particular relevance in times of market stress. Moreover, a general depositor preference improves the resolvability of institutions and entities by increasing their ability to comply with the requirements to access the resolution financing arrangements and decreasing the amount of funding required from those arrangements, due to the lower risk of breaching the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle where bailing-in ordinary unsecured debt. In particular, the removal of deposits from the insolvency class of ordinary unsecured claims would increase the bail-inability of remaining ordinary unsecured claims by minimising the risk of breaches of the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle. By reducing the likelihood of deposits being written down or converted to ensure access to the resolution financing arrangements, the general depositor preference would contribute to making the bail-in tool more effective and credible and would lead to an increase of the transparency and legal certainty of the resolution framework. The general depositor preference would also contribute to the credibility of transfer strategies in resolution, as it would facilitate the inclusion of the entimore deposit contracts in the perimeter of liabilities to be transferred to a private purchaser or to a bridge institution, to the benefit of the customer relationship and the franchise value of the institution under resolution. Lastly, a full harmonisation of the insolvency ranking of depositors would be beneficial from the cross-border and level playing field perspective.
Amendment 126 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 40
Recital 40
(40) A singletwo-tiered approach for the priority ranking of deposits under national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings contributes to a more efficient and less costly protection of all deposits. For covered deposits, that approach facilitates the financing by the DGS of measures other than the payout of covered deposits, which can beimproves the use of DGS in the context of resolution, thus enabling a more effective and less disruptive inoption which protectings access to the deposited funds as they do not lead to an interruption of access to bank accounts and payment services. For the deposits that are not covered, that approach facilitates their protection where necessary for the protection of financial stability and depositor confidence. Finally, by introducing flexibility in the use of thoseBy introducing potentially less costly mechanisms for depositor protection, thatis approach minimises the immediate disbursement needs of the DGSs, thereby ensuring a better preservation of their available financing means in case other crises occur and decreasing the burden on the banking sector, who are called to replenish those funds.
Amendment 139 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 44
Recital 44
(44) The contribution of the DGS in resolution should be subject to certain limits. First, it should be ensured that any loss which the DGS may bear as a result of an intervention in resolution does not exceed the loss that the DGS would bear in insolvency if it paid out covered depositors and subrogated to their claims over the institution’s assets. That amount should be determined on the basis of the least cost test, in accordance with the criteria and methodology set out in Directive 2014/49/EU. Those criteria and methodology should also be used when determining the treatment that the DGS would have received had the institution entered normal insolvency proceedings when carrying out the ex-post valuation for the purposes of assessing compliance with the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle and determining any compensation owed to the DGS. Second, the amount of the DGS’s contribution aimed at covering the difference between the assets and liabilities to be transferred to a purchaser or to a bridge institution should not exceed the difference between the transferred assets and the transferred deposits and liabilities with the same or a higher priority ranking in insolvency than those deposits. That would ensure that the contribution of the DGS is only used for the purposes of avoiding the imposition of losses on depositors, where appropriate, and not for the protection of creditors that rank below deposits in insolvency. Nevertheless, the sum of the contribution of the DGS to cover the difference between assets and liabilities with the contribution of the DGS towards the own funds of the recipient entity should not exceed the cost of repaying covered depositors as calculated under the least cost test.
Amendment 176 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – introductory part
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – introductory part
(3) in Article 6, paragraph 5, the first subparagraph is replaced by the following:
Amendment 210 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 27 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point a – point ii
Article 27 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point a – point ii
(ii) the competent authority deems that remedial actions other than early intervention measures are insufficient to address the problems due inter alia to a rapid and significant deterioration of the financial condition of the institution or entity;
Amendment 215 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 27 – paragraph 1 a – point f a (new)
Article 27 – paragraph 1 a – point f a (new)
(fa) the requirement for the management body of the entity to draw up a plan that the entity can implement in case the relevant corporate body decides to initiate the voluntary wind-down of the entity; the plan shall include at least analyses of the necessary capital and liquidity support for winding down and of the concrete relevant strategic options for a possible market exit.
Amendment 219 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point a
Article 30 a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point a
(a) any of the measures referred to in Article 104(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU they require an institution or an entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), of this Directive to take that aim to address a deterioration in the situation of those entities and groups;
Amendment 220 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Article 30 a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Competent authorities shall closely monitor, in close cooperation with the resolution authorities, the situation of the institution or entity and their compliance with the measures referred to in the first subparagraph, point (a), that aim to address a deterioration in the situation of that institution or entity and with the early intervention measures referred to in the first subparagraph, point (c).
Amendment 231 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
Article 30 a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
Following the notification referred to in the first subparagraph, competent authorities and resolution authorities shall, in close cooperation with resolution authorities, monitor the situation of the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), the implementation of the any relevant measures within their expected timeframe and any other relevant developments. For that purpose, resolution authorities and competent authorities shall meet regularly, with a frequency set by resolution authorities considering the circumstances of the case. Competent authorities and resolution authorities shall provide each other with any relevant information without delay.
Amendment 235 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 4 a (new)
Article 30 a – paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Where, in the use of the power referred to in paragraph 4, the resolution authority decides to directly market to potential purchasers, it shall have due regard to the circumstances of the case and the potential impact that the exercise of that power might have on the entity's overall position;
Amendment 236 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 5
Article 30 a – paragraph 5
Amendment 243 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 31 –paragraph 2 – point d
Article 31 –paragraph 2 – point d
(d) to protect depositors, while minimising losses for deposit guarantee schemes, and to protect investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;;
Amendment 275 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2
Article 32 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2
Member States shall ensure that when carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, the resolution authority, based on the information available to it at the time of that assessment, considers and compares all extraordinary public financial support that can reasonably be expected to be granted to the institution, both in the event of resolution and in the event of winding up in accordance with the applicable national law, including costs related to the reimbursement of depositors, where applicable.;
Amendment 282 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point c a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 5 a (new)
Article 32 – paragraph 5 a (new)
(c a) The following paragraph 5a is added: 5a. EBA shall contribute to monitoring and promoting the effective and consistent application of the public interest assessment referred to in paragraph 5. By ... [two years after the date of entry into force of this amending Directive], EBA shall publish a report on the scope and application of paragraph 5 across the Union in order to assess the effectiveness of the measures outlined in paragraph 5 and their impact on the level playing field. Based on the outcomes of the review, the EBA may develop draft regulatory technical standards with the aim of converging practices and levelling the playing field among Member States.
Amendment 300 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point a – point iii
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point a – point iii
(iii) an acquisition of own funds instruments other than Common Equity Tier 1 instruments, or of other capital instruments or a use of impaired assets measures, at prices, duration and other terms that do not confer an undue advantage upon the institution or entity concerned, where neitherr a use of impaired assets measures provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4), points (a), (b) or (c), nor the circumstances referred to in Article 59(3) are present at the time the public support is granted;
Amendment 305 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme to preserve the financial soundness and long-term viability of the credit institution in compliance with the conditions set out in Articles 11a and 11b of Directive 2014/49/EU, provided that none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) are present;
Amendment 309 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point c
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of an intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme in the context of the winding up of an credit institution pursuant to Article 32b and in accordance with the conditions set out in Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU;
Amendment 317 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) the measures are of a precautionary and temporary nature and are based on a pre-defined exit strategy approved by the competent authority, including a clearly specified termination date, sale date or repayment schedule for any of the measures provided;
Amendment 321 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
For the purposes of the first subparagraph, point (a), an institution or entity shall be deemed to be solvent where the competent authority has concluded that no breach has occurred, or is likely to occur in the 12 following months, of any of the requirements referred to in Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU, Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, Article 40 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 or the relevant applicable requirements under Union or national law.
Amendment 322 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2a (new)
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2a (new)
The competent authority may deem an institution or entity to be solvent where it determines that a breach of these requirements is temporary in nature, taking into account the specific circumstances of each case, and provided that the institution or entity can demonstrate a reasonable plan to remedy the breach within an appropriate timeframe as determined by the competent authority.
Amendment 327 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5
Amendment 331 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6
In case any of the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), is not redeemed, repaid or otherwise terminated in accordance with the terms of the exit strategy established at the time of granting such measure, the competent authority shall conclude that the condition laid down in Article 32(1), point (a), is met in relation to the institution or entity which has received those support measures, and shall communicate that assessment to the resolution authority concernedrequest the institution or entity to submit a remediation plan describing the steps to be taken in order to ensure or restore compliance with supervisory requirements, its long-term viability and to repay the amount provided, as well as the associated timeframe.
Amendment 334 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6a (new)
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6a (new)
Where the relevant national competent authority does not recognise the remediation plan as credible or feasible, or where the institution or entity fails to comply with the remediation plan, an assessment of whether the institution or entity is failing or likely to fail shall be conducted in accordance with Article 32.
Amendment 336 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21 – point -a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21 – point -a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 33a – paragraph 4
Article 33a – paragraph 4
(-a) paragraph 4 is replaced by the following: "The period of the suspension pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be as short as possible and shall not exceed the minimum period of time that the resolution authority considers necessary for the purposes indicated in points (c) and (d) of paragraph 1 and in any event shall not last longer than the period from the publication of a notice of suspension pursuant to paragraph 8 to midnight in the Member State of the resolution authority: (a) where the notice of suspension pursuant to paragraph 8 is published outside of normal trading hours, the period from the publication of the notice to midnight in the Member State of the institution or entity at the end of the second business day following the day of the publication; (b) where the notice of suspension pursuant to paragraph 8 is published on a business day during normal trading hours, the period from the publication of the notice to midnight in the Member State of the institution or entity at the end of the business day following the day of the publication. Exceptionally, where necessary to choose the appropriate resolution actions or to ensure the effective application of one or more resolution tools, the resolution authority may determine a longer period of suspension. In any event, this period of suspension shall not last longer than the period from the publication of the notice of suspension pursuant to paragraph 8 to midnight in the Member State of the institution or entity at the end of the third business day following the day of the publication. At the expiry of the period of suspension referred to in the first subparagraph, the suspension shall cease to have effect. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)
Amendment 338 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point b
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 35 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Article 35 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Amendment 339 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point b a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 – point b a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 35 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
Article 35 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
(b a) the following subparagraph is added at the end of paragraph 3: Member States shall ensure that the liability of the special manager for acts or omissions in the performance of his or her duties in accordance with this Article is limited to cases of wilful misconduct or gross negligence.
Amendment 345 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 25 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 25 a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 41 – paragraph 2
Article 41 – paragraph 2
(25 a) Article 41(2) is replaced by the following: "Subject to any restrictions imposed in accordance with Union or national competition rules, the management of the bridge institution shall operate the bridge institution with a view to maintaining access to critical functions and sellallowing the institution or entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1)resolution authority to seek the sale of the bridge institution, its assets, rights or liabilities, to one or more private sector purchasers when conditions are appropriate and within the period specified in paragraph 45 of this Article or, where applicable, paragraph 6 of this Article. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)
Amendment 366 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. When applying Article 45c to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages primarily the use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, and where its size and its ability to access the capital markets where it operates so justify in light of the princple of proportionality, the resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3) in a proportionate way on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:
Amendment 400 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 55 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
Article 55 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
Amendment 402 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point a a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point a a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 55 – paragraph 1
Article 55 – paragraph 1
(a a) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: "1. Member States shall require institutions and entities referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) to include a contractual term by which the creditor or party to the agreement or instrument creating tha bail- inable liability recognises that that liability may be subject to the write down and conversion powers and agrees to be bound by any reduction of the principal or outstanding amount due, conversion or cancellation that is effected by the exercise of those powers by a resolution authority, provided that that liability complies with all of the following conditions: (a) the liability is not excluded under Article 44(2);[deleted] (b) the liability is not a deposit as referred to in Article 108(1), points (a) or (b); (c) the liability is governed by the law of a third country; (d) the liability is issued or entered into after the date on which a Member State applies the provisions adopted in order to transpose this Section. Resolution authorities may decide that the obligation in tThe first subparagraph of this paragraph shall not apply to institutions or entities in respect of which the requirement under Article 45(1) equals the loss-absorption amount as defined under point (a) of Article 45c(2)liquidation entities for which the resolution authority has not determined the requirement referred to in Article 45(1). Resolution authorities may decide that the obligation in the first subparagraph shall not apply to the following institutions or entities, provided that liabilities that meet the conditions referred to in the first subparagraph and which do not include the contractual term referred to in that subparagraph are not counted towards that requiremente requirement referred to in Article 45(1): (a) institutions or entities that are subsidiaries of a resolution entity or of a third-country entity, but are not themselves resolution entities; (b) liquidation entities for which the resolution authority has determined the requirement referred to in Article 45(1) in accordance with Article 45c(2a), second subparagraph. The first subparagraph shall not apply where the resolution authority of a Member State determines that the liabilities or instruments referred to in the first subparagraph can be subject to write down and conversion powers by the resolution authority of a Member State pursuant to the law of the third country or to a binding agreement concluded with that third country. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)
Amendment 403 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point b a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point b a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 55 – paragraph 2a (new)
Article 55 – paragraph 2a (new)
(b a) the following paragraph 2a is inserted: 2a. Institutions and entities referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), shall report to the resolution authority on an annual basis the following: (a) the total outstanding amounts of all liabilities governed by the law of a third country; (b) for the items referred in point (a): (i) their composition, including their maturity profile; (ii) their ranking in normal insolvency proceedings; (iii) whether the liability is excluded under Article 44(2); (iv) whether they include in the contractual provisions the term required by paragraph 1; (v) where a determination has been made that it is legally or otherwise impracticable to include the contractual recognition of bail-in clause in accordance with paragraph 2, the category of the liability pursuant to paragraph 7. Where institutions and entities are part of a resolution group, the report shall be done by the resolution entity concerning the resolution group, to the extent required by paragraph 1, second and third subparagraphs.
Amendment 405 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point b b (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point b b (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 55 – paragraph 8a (new)
Article 55 – paragraph 8a (new)
(b b) the following paragraph 8a is added: 8a. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify procedures and uniform formats and templates for the reporting to resolution authorities referred to in paragraph 2a. EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by [PO please insert the date = 1 year after the date of entry into force of this Directive]. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment 412 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 49
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 49
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 97 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
Article 97 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
Competent authorities shall conclude non- binding cooperation arrangements with the relevant third-country authorities referred to in paragraph 2 where appropriate. Those arrangements shall be in line with EBA framework arrangement and shall ensure that the information disclosed to the third- country authorities is subject to a guarantee that professional secrecy requirements at least equivalent to those referred to in Article 53(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU84 of this Directive are complied with.
Amendment 423 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 53 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 53 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 103 – paragraph 3
Article 103 – paragraph 3
3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 102 may include irrevocable payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the resolution authorities for the purposes specified in Article 101(1). The share of irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed 530 % of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with this Article. Within that limit, the resolution authority shall determine annually the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of contributions to be raised in accordance with this Article.;
Amendment 432 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings the following have the same priority ranking, which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditorstablish a general depositor preference, which grants all depositors a higher ranking than claims of ordinary unsecured creditors. Notwithstanding, the highest priority ranking shall be exclusively shared by the following deposits:
Amendment 438 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) depositscovered deposits, as defined in Directive 2014/49/EU;
Amendment 447 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) deposits made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Unioneligible deposits, as defined in Directive 2014/49/EU, of natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises;
Amendment 452 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point c
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point c
Amendment 462 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point b
Article 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 9
9. Member States shall ensure that the claims of the resolution financing arrangement referred to in paragraph 8 of this Article and in Article 37(7) have, in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings, a preferred priority ranking, which shall be higher thanequal to the ranking provided for the claims of deposits and of deposit guarantee schemes pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article.;