37 Amendments of Miriam LEXMANN related to 2023/2072(INI)
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 a (new)
Citation 6 a (new)
– having regard to the Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union,
Amendment 6 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 b (new)
Citation 6 b (new)
– having regard to the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries COM/2021/775 final,
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 c (new)
Citation 6 c (new)
– having regard to the Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market,
Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 9 a (new)
Citation 9 a (new)
– having regard to the Final Assessment Report of the NATO-EU Task Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure of 29 June 2023,
Amendment 12 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 9 b (new)
Citation 9 b (new)
– having regard to the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/102,
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 10 a (new)
Citation 10 a (new)
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 on the update of the EU Maritime Security Strategy and its Action Plan entitled ‘An enhanced EU Maritime Security Strategy for evolving maritime threats’ (JOIN(2023)0008),
Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 11 a (new)
Citation 11 a (new)
– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN/2021/0030),
Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the recent joint communication on a European economic security strategy focuses on minimising the risks arising from certain economic flows and the Union's dependency on authoritarian and totalitarian regimes such as the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the context of increased geopolitical tensions and accelerated technological shifts, while protecting free market principles from distortion by such regimes and, thereby, preserving maximum economic openness and dynamism;
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas disruptions to critical infrastructure can have significant negative consequences for vital government functions, essential services to the population, economic activity as well as security and defence of the Union;
Amendment 26 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the coercive policies and the growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including its increasingly aggressive stance towards Taiwan, as well as the social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine have exposed the EU’s vulnerabilities and reaffirmed the need to ‘de-risk’ its relations vis-à-vis the PRC and other non- democratic third countries;
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas China’s acquisition of critical infrastructure, especially within the EU’ and in its neighbourhood, including the Western Balkans, poses an increasing multi-dimensional risk to the trade-Union's security nexus;
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the Sino-Russian strategic partnership continues to grow, including in the areas of technology and military capability transfers, posing an increasing threat to European security;
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
Fa. whereas the spread of China’s digital authoritarianism and mass surveillance continues to intensify both within China and beyond, targeting democratic institutions and societies;
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F b (new)
Recital F b (new)
Fb. whereas totalitarian China’s rapidly rising technological, economic and military power risks establishing a new international order that would endanger freedom and democracy around the world;
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F c (new)
Recital F c (new)
Fc. whereas Chinese ambitions are growing in strategic areas such as AI, cloud computing, semiconductors, or hardware; whereas these instruments, particularly AI, could be developed for military purposes, driving the next revolution in military affairs;
Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Underlines that China’s military- civil fusion (MCF) strategy is a state-led, state-directed programme and plan to instrumentalise all levers of state and commercial power to strengthen and support the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), particularly by acquiring and diverting the world’s cutting-edge technologies, with the objective of strengthening the totalitarian regime and achieving military dominance;
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Believes that MCF must be understood in a larger political and strategic context, taking into account its interconnections with other initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (including the Digital Silk Road), subversion activities and China's increasing assertiveness and aggressive posturing abroad; believes that the ultimate aim of MCF is to advance China’the party-state's long- term strategic goal to increase asymmetrical interdependence of third countries vis-a-vis China and become the world’s leading power under the rule of the CCP;
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Warns of the risk of Chinese companies having any involvement with EU strategic assets, especially those companies that have direct or indirect links to China’s political-military system; underlines, in this regard, its concern that technology and technological expertise willused in civilian activities, particularly in the economic sphere, continues to be transferred to China’s military, increasing the PLA’s ability to develop the next generation of military technology, which may be used to coerce partners in Asia and around the world;
Amendment 66 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Stresses the repeated warnings by intelligence agencies against the risks of economic dependence, espionage and sabotage caused by the economic presence of entities from non-EU countries, in particular China, in critical infrastructure and strategic sectors across the EU;
Amendment 68 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Emphasises that China produces 70 % of the world’s batteries (hosting three of the top five battery manufacturing giants), accounts for 60 % of global aluminium production and 75 % of silicon production, is the leading refiner of 60 % of lithium and 70 % of copper processing and produces 84 % of the world’s nickel and 85 % of its cobalt; underlines that Chinese mining companies are active in the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), Indonesia (nickel) and Chile and Australia (lithium) and that its quasi-monopoly on the production and processing of these critical commodities presents not only an acute geopolitical challenge for the EU, but also a huge risk for Europe’s defence and other industrial sectors; welcomes, in this regard the Commission proposal for the Critical Raw Materials Act and calls for the speedy implementation of its goals in order strengthen the Union’s supply chain resilience;
Amendment 77 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Recalls that both diplomatic and military communication travels through privately owned undersea cables provided by Chinese companies, such as HMN Technologies, a PLA cyber intelligence– affiliated entity; expresses its grave concern over the undersea data cable systems operated by Chinese company HMN Technologies, which connect EU Member States’ territories and the Indo- Pacific region, including Member State and NATO military bases in the region, creating security vulnerabilities as regards underwater surveillance and the collection ofdata for intelligence purposes;
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Warns that the deterioration in the security environment in Europe and around the globe requires urgent reflection on how to strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy and reduce its dependencies on countries that pose a security threat to the Union like the PRC thatand are systemic rivals, not strategic partners; stresses the need to prevent sensitive emerging technologies and key dual-use items from being leaked to destinations of concern that pursue or collaborate in MCF strategies; calls on the EU institutions and the Member States to strengthen cooperation with the transatlantic and other like-minded partners in the protection of critical infrastructure, and to defend democracy and preserve our shared values, security and prosperity;
Amendment 91 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Welcomes the publication of the Final Assessment Report of the EU- NATO Task Force and calls for the full implementation of its recommendations;
Amendment 92 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)
Paragraph 7 b (new)
7b. Warns that large investments in seaports, railways and airports give Beijing the opportunity to monitor and control activities in key logistical nodes with a fundamental strategic dimension;
Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Remains concerned that European critical infrastructure is becoming increasingly vulnerable to external influence; commends, in this respect, recent legislative steps to enhance the resilience of critical entities in the EU; notes with concern, however, that such initiatives are largely limited to screening procedures for foreign direct investment, leaving other channels open for the CCP to gain access and influence over critical assets; is further concerned by the political pressure asserted in the approval of specific Chinese investments into critical infrastructure, as in the case of the German government's decision to agree to the acquisition of a stake at the port of Hamburg by COSCO, contrary to the assessment of the intelligence services;
Amendment 94 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Remains concerned that European critical infrastructure, from telecommunications networks to port facilities, is becoming increasingly vulnerable to external influence; commends, in this respect, recent legislative steps to enhance the resilience of critical entities in the EU; notes with concern, however, that such initiatives are largely limited to screening procedures for foreign direct investment, leaving other channels open for the CCP to gain access and influence over critical assets; notes that a framework introducing rules for cooperation and sharing of information on FDI between EU member states and the European Commission is a good first step, more must be done in this direction to ensure the protection of critical European infrastructure from Chinese interferences;
Amendment 96 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. welcomes the decision of EU institutions and those of several EU Member States to suspend the TikTok application on corporate devices, as well as personal devices enrolled in the institutions’ mobile device services; calls for implemention of the suspension across all EU and Member State institutions, as well as a thorough risk assessment of other such vendors with connections to authoritarian and totalitarian regimes;
Amendment 98 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)
Paragraph 8 b (new)
8b. Notes with concern that Huawei today controls just under 50% of the EU's 4G network and, in the case of 5G, 100% of the 5G RAN in Cyprus is composed of Chinese equipment, and 59% in the case of Germany; stresses that this runs counter to the EU's “5G security toolbox” guidelines to mitigate security risks in networks and calls on the Member States to remove equipment and services from Huawei, ZTE and other vendors in core network functions;
Amendment 104 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Notes that the screening of stakeholders with access to critical infrastructure cannot be limited to direct investment; calls for the current instruments that address foreign direct investment and foreign subsidies to be expanded to include generalised screening procedures for all stakeholders involved in EU critical infrastructure projects; calls on the Commission, with the support of the Member States, to map, track and assess China’s access to critical infrastructure in the EU; stresses that the Member States are ultimately responsible for infrastructure protection, but have not; urgently calls on the Member States to consistently implemented current guidelineslegislation related to the resilience of critical entities and on foreign direct investment or, and to set up national-level investment-screening mechanisms;
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Welcomes the decision of the Romanian government to terminate negotiations with China General Nuclear Power Corporation, GCNPC, on the construction of nuclear reactors 3 and 4 at Cernavoda and further welcomes the ratification of the 2020 intergovernmental agreement with the United States on cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, including construction of reactors 3 and 4 at Cernavoda;
Amendment 110 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Welcomes the potential of the Commission’s proposal for a European economic security strategy to expand the EU toolkit to exports or outward investments in a narrow set of key enabling technologies with military applications, inter alia, in the areas of quantum computing, advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence; calls for the swift adoption of the Commission’s proposals and for the Member States to fully implement the EU’s expanded regulatory framework to exclude entities that could contribute to MCF; through the development of a comprehensive approach on commonly identifying, assessing and managing risks to European economic security; commends the multilateral involvement of Commission and member states in cooperation with the High Representative, where appropriate, and the input from private sector as envisioned by the Strategy;
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Welcomes the adoption of the European Chips Act, which will increase the EU’s ability to produce semiconductors and create a strategic map of, inter alia, capability gaps in the semiconductor value chain in the EU, thereby limiting the EU’s dependence on third countries such as China; calls for further proposals to secure the production and supply chains of critical infrastructure and material within the EU; in this regard, further calls for closer economic and scientific ties with like- minded partners, in particular with Taiwan, which plays a significant role in the global supply chains, while in the meantime standing on the frontline defending against the expansion and assertivity of the PRC and its threats to the international rules-based order;
Amendment 125 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Notes that ports are gateways to the world and as such play a crucial role in the EU's economy; nots with concerning, however, that Chinese-owned or controlled entities have strategically increased their stakes in European ports and port infrastructure, including the Germany's Hamburg and Duisburg, Greek ports of Pireus and Thessaloniki, Belgium's Zeebrugge and Antwerp, the Neterlands' Rotterdam, Spain's Valencia, Bilbao and Barcelona, France's Montoir, Dunkirk, Le Havre and Fos, Sweden's Stockholm, Poland's Gdynia, Italy's Vado Ligure and Malta's Marsaloxlokk;
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 b (new)
Paragraph 12 b (new)
12b. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to urgently address the need to reduce the risks of espionage and sabotage in critical infrastructure, in particular those with a military function, such as ports that are used by NATO;
Amendment 128 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 c (new)
Paragraph 12 c (new)
12c. Calls on the Commission to present an EU strategic policy framework to reduce and limit influence and operational control by China and other regimes that a security threat to the Union in the EU’s ports and in their processes and hinterland operations;
Amendment 129 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 d (new)
Paragraph 12 d (new)
Amendment 143 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Notes that one third of all African infrastructure built since 2010 has been financed and constructed by Chinese state- owned enterprises; underlines that, over the past 20 years, China has increased its trade, investment and loan commitments with few or opaque contractual obligations; expresses concern that this Chinese model is clearly attractive to many countries that cannot satisfy EU requirements for accessing equivalent levels of finance, thereby expanding Chinese influence to the detriment of EU partnerships; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that the EU’s high standards for investment with partners do not compromise it security relationships and engagement as a reliable and strategic partner; calls on the Commission to effectively use the Global Gateway as an instrument to increase the EU’s presence and visibility worldwide by means of infrastructure investment that creates national value in partner countries, in line with the Sustainable Development Goals; calls on the Commission to strengthen its cooperation with international financial institutions and the private sector to mobilise the necessary funding;