9 Amendments of Rainer WIELAND related to 2023/2104(INL)
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Points out that Treaty requirements together with political realities have led to ad hoc negotiated agreements on the composition of the European Parliament every mandate; observes that the reason for the politicisation is the aim of every Member State to minimise seat losses and maximise seat gains in absolute or relative terms; deplores, in this context, antagonistic voting in plenary, which the countries concerned see as a loss of appreciation and which could be instrumentalised at domestic level for nationalist debates; emphasises that in the last two decisions concerning the allocation of seats, seats were allocated that became available after the United Kingdom left the EU; highlights that, in the long-term, this strategy is not sustainable, given the Treaty limitation of a maximum of 751 seats and the potentially distortive effects of a political solution, rendering an agreement on an equitable allocation in the future more difficult;
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Stresses that in choosing the most suitable formula, priority needs to be given to objective and evidence-based criteria and remains convinced that the calculation method and its underlying principles should be as simple as possible and easy for citizens to understand; further believes that changes to the relevant Treaty provisions can be considered;
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Points out that the method chosen should be understandable, avoiding a level of complexity that citizens cannot understand, or else a new kind of ‘democratic deficit’ could arise;
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Notes that degressive proportionality is assessed on the basis of the representation ratio of the citizens of a given Member State, meaning the ratio of the population of a Member State relative to its number of seats before rounding; observes that degressive proportionality entails that the ratio varies for the various Member States; further notes that the larger the population, the higher the entitlement to a number of seats for a specific Member State, while the ratio population to MEP also increases; notes and accepts that degressive proportionality entails an underrepresentation of citizens from Member States with a larger population and an overrepresentation of citizens of Member States with a smaller population; recognises, however, that through rounding and with the distribution of the last seats in the system, smaller fractions can occur owing to the laws of mathematics; believes that this principle is justified given the current EU institutional framework;
Amendment 77 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Notes that degressive proportionality is assessed on the basis of the representation ratio of the citizens of a given Member State, meaning the ratio of the population of a Member State relative to its number of seats before rounding; observes that degressive proportionality entails that the ratio varies for the various Member States; further notes that the larger the population, the higher the entitlement to a number of seats for a specific Member State, while the ratio population to MEP also increases; notes and accepts that degressive proportionality entails an underrepresentation of citizens from Member States with a larger population and an overrepresentation of citizens of Member States with a smaller population; believes that this principle is justified given the current EU institutional framework;
Amendment 80 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Is of the opinion that a permanent system based on a formula needs to be durable and therefore flexible enough to account for changes in population figures, for future enlargements and for possible changes of applicable legislative provisions, such as the electoral law or treaty changes; points out that when new countries have joined the EU in the past, the current upper limit of 751 members has been exceeded for a limited period of time;
Amendment 92 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Observes that previous recommendations for seat allocation comprised several elements; notes that these included a fixed base number of seats for all Member States and an allocation of remaining seats in proportion to respective population figures with a cap of 96 seats; stresses that these recommendations, such as the so-called ‘Cambridge Compromise’, have been criticised for not respecting Treaty criteria, such as degressive proportionality, in certain circumstances, and can only be understood by a minority of citizens;
Amendment 94 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Stresses the need for any method chosen to maintain the advantages of the known formulas, while minimising their disadvantages; points out that ‘base seat’ elements of the seat allocation system can be used to ensure the democratic representation of citizens from smaller Member States, while the proportional elements ensure that the larger a Member State’s population , the greater the number of seats allocated to it; highlights that seats allocated in proportion to the square root of the population of Member States contribute to ensuring that degressive proportionality is achieved and the citizens of small and medium-sized Member States are democratically represented; believes that the combination of these elements can be converted into a mathematical formula and used as the basis of the most suitable allocation system; believes that such allocation system should be proposed and adopted in the form of a political decisionpoints out that a fair method could also be to use the Council’s ‘double majority’ principle as a key element for a formula for Parliament;