2023/2104(INL) Permanent system for the allocation of seats in the European Parliament
Lead committee dossier:
Progress: Awaiting committee decision
| Role | Committee | Rapporteur | Shadows |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lead | AFCO |
COLLADO JIMÉNEZ Ana ( EPP),
NIENASS Niklas ( Verts/ALE)
|
DURAND Pascal ( S&D),
GOERENS Charles ( Renew),
ANNEMANS Gerolf ( ID),
SARYUSZ-WOLSKI Jacek ( ECR),
SCHOLZ Helmut ( GUE/NGL)
|
Lead committee dossier:
Legal Basis:
RoP 46
Legal Basis:
RoP 46Subjects
Events
2024/02/21
EP - Amendments tabled in committee
Documents
2024/01/22
EP - Committee draft report
Documents
2023/10/25
EP - COLLADO JIMÉNEZ Ana (EPP) appointed as rapporteur in AFCO
2023/10/25
EP - NIENASS Niklas (Verts/ALE) appointed as rapporteur in AFCO
2023/07/12
EP - Committee referral announced in Parliament
Documents
| Amendments | Dossier |
| 268 |
2023/2104(INL)
2024/02/21
AFCO
268 amendments...
Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 6 Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 6 Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas Article 14(2) TEU states that the European Parliament shall be composed of representatives of the Union’s citizens; whereas according to this paragraph the seats of the Parliament are to be distributed among Member States with a minimum and maximum number of seats per Member State; whereas Article 14 does not refer to any alternative distribution of seats to that among Member States;
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution Recital B B. whereas Article 14(2) TEU states that the European Parliament shall be composed of representatives of the Union’s citizens; whereas according to this paragraph the seats of the Parliament are to be distributed among Member States with a minimum and maximum number of seats per Member State; whereas Article 14 does not refer to any alternative distribution of seats to that among Member States;
Amendment 100 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Stresses the need for any
Amendment 100 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Stresses the need for any
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Stresses the need for any method chosen to maintain the advantages of the known formulas, while minimising their disadvantages; points out that ‘base seat’ elements of the seat allocation system can be used to ensure the democratic representation of citizens from smaller Member States, while the proportional elements ensure that the larger a Member State’s population , the greater the number of seats allocated to it;
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Stresses the need for any method chosen to maintain the advantages of the known formulas, while minimising their disadvantages; points out that ‘base seat’ elements of the seat allocation system can be used to ensure the democratic representation of citizens from smaller Member States, while the proportional elements ensure that the larger a Member State’s population , the greater the number of seats allocated to it;
Amendment 102 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Stresses the need for any method chosen to maintain the advantages of the known formulas, while minimising their disadvantages; points out that ‘base seat’ elements of the seat allocation system can be used to ensure the democratic representation of citizens from smaller Member States, while the proportional elements ensure that the larger a Member State’s population , the greater the number of seats allocated to it; highlights that seats allocated in proportion to the square root of the population of Member States contribute to ensuring that degressive proportionality is achieved and the citizens of small and medium-sized Member States are democratically represented;
Amendment 102 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Stresses the need for any method chosen to maintain the advantages of the known formulas, while minimising their disadvantages; points out that ‘base seat’ elements of the seat allocation system can be used to ensure the democratic representation of citizens from smaller Member States, while the proportional elements ensure that the larger a Member State’s population , the greater the number of seats allocated to it; highlights that seats allocated in proportion to the square root of the population of Member States contribute to ensuring that degressive proportionality is achieved and the citizens of small and medium-sized Member States are democratically represented;
Amendment 103 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Stresses the need for any method chosen in the future to maintain the advantages of the known formulas, while minimising their disadvantages; points out that ‘base seat’ elements of the seat allocation system can be used to ensure the democratic representation of citizens from smaller Member States, while the proportional elements ensure that the larger a Member State’s population
Amendment 103 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 17. Stresses the need for any method chosen in the future to maintain the advantages of the known formulas, while minimising their disadvantages; points out that ‘base seat’ elements of the seat allocation system can be used to ensure the democratic representation of citizens from smaller Member States, while the proportional elements ensure that the larger a Member State’s population
Amendment 104 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 a (new) 17a. Recalls the European Council decision of December 2023 to formally open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, to grant candidate status to Georgia, calling for the acceleration of the accession process of Western Balkans, of North Macedonia, other than to monitor the compliance with the membership criteria of Bosnia Herzegovina; recalls that the perspective of enlargement imposes an in-depth reform of the Union’s institutional architecture and policies;
Amendment 104 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 a (new) 17a. Recalls the European Council decision of December 2023 to formally open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, to grant candidate status to Georgia, calling for the acceleration of the accession process of Western Balkans, of North Macedonia, other than to monitor the compliance with the membership criteria of Bosnia Herzegovina; recalls that the perspective of enlargement imposes an in-depth reform of the Union’s institutional architecture and policies;
Amendment 105 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 a (new) 17a. Highlights as well the benefits of the “Power compromise” or "Power law" model, comprising of a number of base seats attributed equally to all Member States; of a divisor ensuring that the sum of seats does not exceed a pre-established number; and of a power parameter, which yields a degressively proportional allocation of seats;
Amendment 105 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 a (new) 17a. Highlights as well the benefits of the “Power compromise” or "Power law" model, comprising of a number of base seats attributed equally to all Member States; of a divisor ensuring that the sum of seats does not exceed a pre-established number; and of a power parameter, which yields a degressively proportional allocation of seats;
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 b (new) 17b. Stresses that, irrespectively of the identification of a permanent mechanism of allocation of seats for the composition of the European Parliament 2029-2034, any reassessment of the number of seats of the European Parliament, and of the requirements necessary to ensure a representative and democratic composition in an enlarged Union, shall be carefully reviewed in the context of the upcoming process of revision of the Treaties, triggered by Parliament through its report of 23 November 2023;
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 b (new) 17b. Stresses that, irrespectively of the identification of a permanent mechanism of allocation of seats for the composition of the European Parliament 2029-2034, any reassessment of the number of seats of the European Parliament, and of the requirements necessary to ensure a representative and democratic composition in an enlarged Union, shall be carefully reviewed in the context of the upcoming process of revision of the Treaties, triggered by Parliament through its report of 23 November 2023;
Amendment 107 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 b (new) 17b. Underlines that the “Power Compromise” ensures that the resulting composition respects the minimum and maximum allocation of seats established by the Treaties, the representativeness of medium-sized countries, and the principle of degressive proportionality;
Amendment 107 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 b (new) 17b. Underlines that the “Power Compromise” ensures that the resulting composition respects the minimum and maximum allocation of seats established by the Treaties, the representativeness of medium-sized countries, and the principle of degressive proportionality;
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 c (new) 17c. Is of the view that the adoption of any allocation system should be part of a package deal including the proposal for a reform of the European Electoral law of May 2022;
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 c (new) 17c. Is of the view that the adoption of any allocation system should be part of a package deal including the proposal for a reform of the European Electoral law of May 2022;
Amendment 109 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 d (new) 17d. Highlights that maintaining the number of seats of the European Parliament at 751 in an enlarged Union of potentially more than thirty Member States would dramatically broaden electoral inequality and cause distortions in the representation of Union citizens; Believes that the number of seats should be increased in the context of future enlargements, while ensuring that the European Parliament remains at a workable size;
Amendment 109 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 17 d (new) 17d. Highlights that maintaining the number of seats of the European Parliament at 751 in an enlarged Union of potentially more than thirty Member States would dramatically broaden electoral inequality and cause distortions in the representation of Union citizens; Believes that the number of seats should be increased in the context of future enlargements, while ensuring that the European Parliament remains at a workable size;
Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas the composition of the European Parliament must respect the criteria laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 14(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), namely no more than seven hundred and fifty representatives of the Union's citizens, plus the President, representation being degressively proportional, with a minimum threshold of six members per Member State and no Member State being allocated more than ninety-six seats; whereas these are the only criteria foreseen and allowed by the Treaties;
Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D D. whereas the composition of the European Parliament must respect the criteria laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 14(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), namely no more than seven hundred and fifty representatives of the Union's citizens, plus the President, representation being degressively proportional, with a minimum threshold of six members per Member State and no Member State being allocated more than ninety-six seats; whereas these are the only criteria foreseen and allowed by the Treaties;
Amendment 110 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 Amendment 110 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 Amendment 111 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Proposes that the new seat allocation system should be applied for the allocation of seats among Member States for
Amendment 111 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18. Proposes that the new seat allocation system should be applied for the allocation of seats among Member States for
Amendment 112 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18.
Amendment 112 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 18.
Amendment 113 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 a (new) 18a. Suggests that the body in charge of applying the mathematical formula should be the statistical office of the European Union, Eurostat;
Amendment 113 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 a (new) 18a. Suggests that the body in charge of applying the mathematical formula should be the statistical office of the European Union, Eurostat;
Amendment 114 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 b (new) 18b. Proposes that the European Parliament should commit to propose to the European Council the results of the formula as applied by Eurostat;
Amendment 114 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 b (new) 18b. Proposes that the European Parliament should commit to propose to the European Council the results of the formula as applied by Eurostat;
Amendment 115 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 c (new) 18c. Calls to adopt an interinstitutional agreement between Parliament and the European Council so that the European Council agrees to accept Parliament's proposal on the basis of the results of the formula for the allocation of seats applied by Eurostat;
Amendment 115 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18 c (new) 18c. Calls to adopt an interinstitutional agreement between Parliament and the European Council so that the European Council agrees to accept Parliament's proposal on the basis of the results of the formula for the allocation of seats applied by Eurostat;
Amendment 116 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 Amendment 116 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 Amendment 117 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Believes that the seat allocation system will
Amendment 117 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Believes that the seat allocation system will
Amendment 118 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Believes that the seat allocation system will make it easier for the European Parliament to swiftly adopt its proposal to the European Council concerning the composition of the European Parliament;
Amendment 118 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Believes that the seat allocation system will make it easier for the European Parliament to swiftly adopt its proposal to the European Council concerning the composition of the European Parliament;
Amendment 119 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Believes that the seat allocation system
Amendment 119 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 19. Believes that the seat allocation system
Amendment 12 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D a (new) Da. whereas in order to ensure comparability of population figures necessary to distribute seats, the same reference population data and period should be used;
Amendment 12 #
Motion for a resolution Recital D a (new) Da. whereas in order to ensure comparability of population figures necessary to distribute seats, the same reference population data and period should be used;
Amendment 120 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 a (new) 19a. Considers it democratically legitimate for the next European Parliament legislature to decide on the use of a particular formula based on the considerations from this resolution;
Amendment 120 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 a (new) 19a. Considers it democratically legitimate for the next European Parliament legislature to decide on the use of a particular formula based on the considerations from this resolution;
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 b (new) 19b. Commits itself to discuss its proposals for a seat distribution formula with the Council, the EU institution responsible with the adoption of the decision on the European Parliament's composition;
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 19 b (new) 19b. Commits itself to discuss its proposals for a seat distribution formula with the Council, the EU institution responsible with the adoption of the decision on the European Parliament's composition;
Amendment 122 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Instructs its President to forward this
Amendment 122 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Instructs its President to forward this
Amendment 123 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Instructs its President to forward this legislative resolution
Amendment 123 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 20 20. Instructs its President to forward this legislative resolution
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution Annex I – title establishing a permanent seat allocation method for the composition of the European Parliament
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution Annex I – title establishing a permanent seat allocation method for the composition of the European Parliament
Amendment 128 #
Motion for a resolution Annex I – Article 2 – paragraph 1 Amendment 128 #
Motion for a resolution Annex I – Article 2 – paragraph 1 Amendment 129 #
Motion for a resolution Annex I – Article 3 – point 1 – introductory part 1. The number of representatives in the European Parliament elected from the parliamentary term following the next parliamentary term after the adoption of this decision onwards is to be calculated as follows: A "power law" is used, then rounded up to the next whole number, ensuring that the minimum number of seats is 6 and the maximum number of seats is 96. Between these two values, a power law with exponent c is used to arrive at the desired total number of seats. The main "power law" calculation is carried out first (1), then, if necessary, the calculation with adjustment to satisfy degressive proportionality (2), and finally the calculation with adjustment to satisfy the "retained seats" principle (3). If the result of calculation (3) satisfies the degressive proportionality principle, it is retained. Otherwise, the result of calculation (2) is used [or that of calculation (1) when calculation (2) is not necessary or impossible]. (1) Main calculation using the "power law" formula: It is necessary to adjust the value of parameter c to find the desired allocation. States are ranked by increasing population from i = 0 to i = M, the most populous state. The weight of the least populated state is set to q0 = 5 + ε, where ε is a very small positive number, intended so that rounding up results in 6. To determine ε, we consider that a country with one less inhabitant than the least populated country should have exactly 5 seats. If we note p0 the population of the least populated state, then q0 = 5 × p0 / (p0 - 1). The weight of the most populous state M, whose population is pM, is set at qM = 96. Between these two values, the weight qi of each member state whose population is pi is set according to a power law with exponent c. qi = q0 + [(pi-p0)/(pN-p0)]c × (qM-q0) Based on the weights qi of the member states, the number of seats is given by si = [qi] where [.] denotes the function rounded up to the next integer. This method guarantees a regular progression in the number of seats with the population, with a minimum at 6 and a maximum at 96, with only one parameter to adjust: the power law c, which sets the degree of concavity to be given to the distribution of seats to satisfy the constraint of the total number of seats sought. However, this method does not necessarily guarantee strict compliance with degressive proportionality, due to rounding. This situation arises when rounding effects lead to two countries with similar populations not having the same number of seats. If we note Δs the difference in the number of seats between two states and Δp the difference in population, degressive proportionality implies that the number of seats grows proportionally less quickly than the population, i.e. Δs < s × Δp / p. If the relative difference in population between two states Δp / p is small, this may mean that the two states have exactly the same number of seats. (2) Adjustment to the "power law" formula to satisfy degressive proportionality : If the result of the main calculation with the "power law" formula leads to degressive proportionality not being strictly respected, i.e. the population per seat pi / si decreases as the population of the states increases, an algorithm for adjusting the number of seats per member state is applied. Starting with the least populated member state, the number of seats of the country with the next highest population is determined using either the result of the power law, if it respects degressive proportionality, or the maximum number of seats allowed respecting degressive proportionality, if it does not. If we denote si the number of seats obtained by gross application of the power law, the adjusted number of seats verifying degressive proportionality siPD is given by : siPD = min[si , rounded down(si-1 × pi /pi-1)] This algorithm guarantees that degressive proportionality is respected. However, it is not always possible to arrive at any total number of seats, even by adjusting the parameter c of the power law [in this case, the result taken into account is that of the main calculation (1), which remains the result closest possible to degressive proportionality with the number of seats chosen]. (3) Adjustment to the "Power Law" formula to satisfy the "retained seats" principle: The aim of this adjustment method is to apply the formula while seeking to maintain at least the same number of seats for each member state compared with the current situation. The number of seats allocated is the current number, replaced by the result of applying the power law, with the correction to satisfy degressive proportionality only if the latter result is higher. This method of application may sometimes be impossible to achieve, and the result obtained may not respect degressive proportionality. In such cases, the result of calculation (2) or calculation (1) is used.
Amendment 129 #
Motion for a resolution Annex I – Article 3 – point 1 – introductory part 1. The number of representatives in the European Parliament elected from the parliamentary term following the next parliamentary term after the adoption of this decision onwards is to be calculated as follows: A "power law" is used, then rounded up to the next whole number, ensuring that the minimum number of seats is 6 and the maximum number of seats is 96. Between these two values, a power law with exponent c is used to arrive at the desired total number of seats. The main "power law" calculation is carried out first (1), then, if necessary, the calculation with adjustment to satisfy degressive proportionality (2), and finally the calculation with adjustment to satisfy the "retained seats" principle (3). If the result of calculation (3) satisfies the degressive proportionality principle, it is retained. Otherwise, the result of calculation (2) is used [or that of calculation (1) when calculation (2) is not necessary or impossible]. (1) Main calculation using the "power law" formula: It is necessary to adjust the value of parameter c to find the desired allocation. States are ranked by increasing population from i = 0 to i = M, the most populous state. The weight of the least populated state is set to q0 = 5 + ε, where ε is a very small positive number, intended so that rounding up results in 6. To determine ε, we consider that a country with one less inhabitant than the least populated country should have exactly 5 seats. If we note p0 the population of the least populated state, then q0 = 5 × p0 / (p0 - 1). The weight of the most populous state M, whose population is pM, is set at qM = 96. Between these two values, the weight qi of each member state whose population is pi is set according to a power law with exponent c. qi = q0 + [(pi-p0)/(pN-p0)]c × (qM-q0) Based on the weights qi of the member states, the number of seats is given by si = [qi] where [.] denotes the function rounded up to the next integer. This method guarantees a regular progression in the number of seats with the population, with a minimum at 6 and a maximum at 96, with only one parameter to adjust: the power law c, which sets the degree of concavity to be given to the distribution of seats to satisfy the constraint of the total number of seats sought. However, this method does not necessarily guarantee strict compliance with degressive proportionality, due to rounding. This situation arises when rounding effects lead to two countries with similar populations not having the same number of seats. If we note Δs the difference in the number of seats between two states and Δp the difference in population, degressive proportionality implies that the number of seats grows proportionally less quickly than the population, i.e. Δs < s × Δp / p. If the relative difference in population between two states Δp / p is small, this may mean that the two states have exactly the same number of seats. (2) Adjustment to the "power law" formula to satisfy degressive proportionality : If the result of the main calculation with the "power law" formula leads to degressive proportionality not being strictly respected, i.e. the population per seat pi / si decreases as the population of the states increases, an algorithm for adjusting the number of seats per member state is applied. Starting with the least populated member state, the number of seats of the country with the next highest population is determined using either the result of the power law, if it respects degressive proportionality, or the maximum number of seats allowed respecting degressive proportionality, if it does not. If we denote si the number of seats obtained by gross application of the power law, the adjusted number of seats verifying degressive proportionality siPD is given by : siPD = min[si , rounded down(si-1 × pi /pi-1)] This algorithm guarantees that degressive proportionality is respected. However, it is not always possible to arrive at any total number of seats, even by adjusting the parameter c of the power law [in this case, the result taken into account is that of the main calculation (1), which remains the result closest possible to degressive proportionality with the number of seats chosen]. (3) Adjustment to the "Power Law" formula to satisfy the "retained seats" principle: The aim of this adjustment method is to apply the formula while seeking to maintain at least the same number of seats for each member state compared with the current situation. The number of seats allocated is the current number, replaced by the result of applying the power law, with the correction to satisfy degressive proportionality only if the latter result is higher. This method of application may sometimes be impossible to achieve, and the result obtained may not respect degressive proportionality. In such cases, the result of calculation (2) or calculation (1) is used.
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E E. whereas
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E E. whereas
Amendment 130 #
Motion for a resolution Annex I – Article 3 – point 1 - paragraph 1 𝟎,𝟏∗∑𝐄𝐏 𝟎,𝟓∗∑𝐄𝐏 𝟎,𝟒∗∑𝐄𝐏 𝒇= ∑𝐌 + ∑𝐩𝐢 ∗ 𝐩𝐢+ ∑√𝐩𝐢 ∗ 𝐩𝐢=𝐒 Whereas - ∑𝑬𝑷 represents the total number of seats in the European Parliament, - ∑𝑴 represents the total number of Member States in the Union, - 𝒑𝒊 represents the population of Member State i, - ∑𝒑𝒊 represents the sum of all Member States’ population, - 𝒑𝒊 represents the square root of the population of Member State i, - ∑√𝒑𝒊 represents the sum of square roots of all Member States’ population, - “S” represents the total allocated seats for a Member State.
Amendment 130 #
Motion for a resolution Annex I – Article 3 – point 1 - paragraph 1 𝟎,𝟏∗∑𝐄𝐏 𝟎,𝟓∗∑𝐄𝐏 𝟎,𝟒∗∑𝐄𝐏 𝒇= ∑𝐌 + ∑𝐩𝐢 ∗ 𝐩𝐢+ ∑√𝐩𝐢 ∗ 𝐩𝐢=𝐒 Whereas - ∑𝑬𝑷 represents the total number of seats in the European Parliament, - ∑𝑴 represents the total number of Member States in the Union, - 𝒑𝒊 represents the population of Member State i, - ∑𝒑𝒊 represents the sum of all Member States’ population, - 𝒑𝒊 represents the square root of the population of Member State i, - ∑√𝒑𝒊 represents the sum of square roots of all Member States’ population, - “S” represents the total allocated seats for a Member State.
Amendment 131 #
Motion for a resolution Annex I – Article 3 – point 1 – introductory part 1. The number of representatives in the European Parliament elected for
Amendment 131 #
Motion for a resolution Annex I – Article 3 – point 1 – introductory part 1. The number of representatives in the European Parliament elected for
Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution Annex I – Article 3 – point 1 a (new) 1a. In addition, subject to the entry into force of Council Regulation (xx/yy) on the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, repealing Council Decision (76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom) and the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage annexed to that Decision, in the first elections following that event, 28 representatives in the European Parliament are elected in a Union-wide constituency, as provided for in that Regulation
Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution Annex I – Article 3 – point 1 a (new) 1a. In addition, subject to the entry into force of Council Regulation (xx/yy) on the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, repealing Council Decision (76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom) and the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage annexed to that Decision, in the first elections following that event, 28 representatives in the European Parliament are elected in a Union-wide constituency, as provided for in that Regulation
Amendment 133 #
Motion for a resolution Annex I – Article 4 – paragraph 1 Sufficiently far in advance of the beginning of the parliamentary term following the next parliamentary term after the adoption of this decision, the European Parliament shall submit to the European Council, in accordance with Article 14(2) TEU, a proposal for an updated allocation of seats in the European Parliament calculated in accordance with the formula laid down in Article 3. In order to provide the European Parliament and the European Council with a tool to aid political decision- making, Eurostat sends them, 18 months before the end of the legislature, the calculations and simulations carried out on the basis of the mathematical formula.
Amendment 133 #
Motion for a resolution Annex I – Article 4 – paragraph 1 Sufficiently far in advance of the beginning of the parliamentary term following the next parliamentary term after the adoption of this decision, the European Parliament shall submit to the European Council, in accordance with Article 14(2) TEU, a proposal for an updated allocation of seats in the European Parliament calculated in accordance with the formula laid down in Article 3. In order to provide the European Parliament and the European Council with a tool to aid political decision- making, Eurostat sends them, 18 months before the end of the legislature, the calculations and simulations carried out on the basis of the mathematical formula.
Amendment 134 #
Motion for a resolution Annex I – Article 4 – paragraph 1 Sufficiently far in advance of the beginning of the parliamentary term following the next parliamentary term after the adoption of this decision, the European Parliament shall submit to the European Council, in accordance with Article 14(2) TEU, a proposal for an updated allocation of seats in the European Parliament calculated by Eurostat in accordance with the formula laid down in Article 3.
Amendment 134 #
Motion for a resolution Annex I – Article 4 – paragraph 1 Sufficiently far in advance of the beginning of the parliamentary term following the next parliamentary term after the adoption of this decision, the European Parliament shall submit to the European Council, in accordance with Article 14(2) TEU, a proposal for an updated allocation of seats in the European Parliament calculated by Eurostat in accordance with the formula laid down in Article 3.
Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E E. whereas the basis for the calculation of the number of seats per member states is to be based on Eurostat data on these member states’ resident population in accordance with a method established by means of Regulation (EU) No 1260/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council ; whereas the
Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution Recital E E. whereas the basis for the calculation of the number of seats per member states is to be based on Eurostat data on these member states’ resident population in accordance with a method established by means of Regulation (EU) No 1260/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council ; whereas the
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F F. whereas the European Council has repeatedly requested that Parliament propose an objective, fair, durable and transparent method to allocate the seats in the European Parliament ;
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F F. whereas the European Council has repeatedly requested that Parliament propose an objective, fair, durable and transparent method to allocate the seats in the European Parliament ;
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F F. whereas the European Council has
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F F. whereas the European Council has
Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F F. whereas the European Council has repeatedly requested that Parliament propose an objective, fair, durable and transparent method to allocate the seats in the European Parliament ; whereas, despite considering the issue , Parliament has not put forward a proposal for such an allocation method so far; whereas there is a renewed call for Parliament to present a proposal as European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the European Parliament requests that by the end of 2026 and in advance of the proposal on its composition, the European Parliament should propose an objective, fair
Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F F. whereas the European Council has repeatedly requested that Parliament propose an objective, fair, durable and transparent method to allocate the seats in the European Parliament ; whereas, despite considering the issue , Parliament has not put forward a proposal for such an allocation method so far; whereas there is a renewed call for Parliament to present a proposal as European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the European Parliament requests that by the end of 2026 and in advance of the proposal on its composition, the European Parliament should propose an objective, fair
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F a (new) Fa. whereas any seat allocation system in the European Parliament cannot ignore the institutional framework set out in the Treaties and therefore has to be considered together with the voting system in the Council;
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution Recital F a (new) Fa. whereas any seat allocation system in the European Parliament cannot ignore the institutional framework set out in the Treaties and therefore has to be considered together with the voting system in the Council;
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution Recital G G. whereas European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the European Parliament for the 2024-2029 legislative term increases the size of Parliament from 705 to 720 members; whereas the Treaty currently sets an upper limit of 751 members;
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution Recital G G. whereas European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the European Parliament for the 2024-2029 legislative term increases the size of Parliament from 705 to 720 members; whereas the Treaty currently sets an upper limit of 751 members;
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 6 Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 6 Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution Recital G G. whereas European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the European Parliament for the 2024-2029 legislative term increases the size of Parliament from 705 to 720 members; whereas the Treaty currently sets an upper limit of 751 members; whereas the current solution
Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution Recital G G. whereas European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the European Parliament for the 2024-2029 legislative term increases the size of Parliament from 705 to 720 members; whereas the Treaty currently sets an upper limit of 751 members; whereas the current solution
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution Recital G G. whereas European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the European Parliament for the 2024-2029 legislative term increases the size of Parliament from 705 to 720 members; whereas the Treaty currently sets an upper limit of 751 members; whereas the current solution used to avoid seat losses by individual member states of tapping into the remaining reserve of seats until the upper limit is reached is n
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution Recital G G. whereas European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the European Parliament for the 2024-2029 legislative term increases the size of Parliament from 705 to 720 members; whereas the Treaty currently sets an upper limit of 751 members; whereas the current solution used to avoid seat losses by individual member states of tapping into the remaining reserve of seats until the upper limit is reached is n
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution Recital G G. whereas European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the European Parliament for the 2024-2029 legislative term increases the size of Parliament from 705 to 720 members; whereas the Treaty currently sets an upper limit of 751 members; whereas the
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution Recital G G. whereas European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the European Parliament for the 2024-2029 legislative term increases the size of Parliament from 705 to 720 members; whereas the Treaty currently sets an upper limit of 751 members; whereas the
Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution Recital G a (new) Ga. whereas the seats in the European Parliament left by the United Kingdom after Brexit have been partly redistributed among the Member States; whereas in the interest of the European tax payers it would have been preferable not to redistribute part of the seats left by the United Kingdom, but to deduct them from the total number provided for by the Treaty;
Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution Recital G a (new) Ga. whereas the seats in the European Parliament left by the United Kingdom after Brexit have been partly redistributed among the Member States; whereas in the interest of the European tax payers it would have been preferable not to redistribute part of the seats left by the United Kingdom, but to deduct them from the total number provided for by the Treaty;
Amendment 24 #
Motion for a resolution Recital H – indent 4 – when allocating seats in the European Parliament, consideration is to be given to demographic developments in the Member States, as well as to factors such as contribution to the EU budget.
Amendment 24 #
Motion for a resolution Recital H – indent 4 – when allocating seats in the European Parliament, consideration is to be given to demographic developments in the Member States, as well as to factors such as contribution to the EU budget.
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas further to these principles,
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas further to these principles,
Amendment 26 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas further to these principles, a future seat allocation method should be objective, and
Amendment 26 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas further to these principles, a future seat allocation method should be objective, and
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas further to these principles, a future seat allocation method should be objective and transparent in terms of procedural application and data used, fair in terms of the equality of votes, and
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution Recital I I. whereas further to these principles, a future seat allocation method should be objective and transparent in terms of procedural application and data used, fair in terms of the equality of votes, and
Amendment 28 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J J. whereas it is necessary to ensure that the allocation method is flexible enough to accommodate future EU enlargements and possible changes to applicable Union
Amendment 28 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J J. whereas it is necessary to ensure that the allocation method is flexible enough to accommodate future EU enlargements and possible changes to applicable Union
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J J. whereas it is necessary to ensure that the allocation method is flexible enough to accommodate
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J J. whereas it is necessary to ensure that the allocation method is flexible enough to accommodate
Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 6 a (new) – having regard to its resolutions of 9 June 2022 on the call for a Convention for the revision of the Treaties, and of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties,
Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 6 a (new) – having regard to its resolutions of 9 June 2022 on the call for a Convention for the revision of the Treaties, and of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties,
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J J. whereas, i
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J J. whereas, i
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J a (new) Ja. Whereas compliance with the principle of sincere cooperation, as enshrined in Articles 4.3 and 13.2 TEU, involves mutual efforts towards the attainment of the Union’s objectives; whereas the call on Parliament to identify a permanent system of seat allocation is not matched by similar efforts on the Council side to pursue works on Parliament’s proposal for the reform of the Electoral Law;
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J a (new) Ja. Whereas compliance with the principle of sincere cooperation, as enshrined in Articles 4.3 and 13.2 TEU, involves mutual efforts towards the attainment of the Union’s objectives; whereas the call on Parliament to identify a permanent system of seat allocation is not matched by similar efforts on the Council side to pursue works on Parliament’s proposal for the reform of the Electoral Law;
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J a (new) Ja. whereas the establishment of a European constituency for the election of 28 members on transnational lists is not feasible, as it would alter the proportions between population and the number of seats allocated in the EP;
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J a (new) Ja. whereas the establishment of a European constituency for the election of 28 members on transnational lists is not feasible, as it would alter the proportions between population and the number of seats allocated in the EP;
Amendment 33 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J a (new) Ja. whereas the perspective of enlargement imposes an in-depth reform of the Union’s institutional architecture and policies that would affect the composition of the European Parliament;
Amendment 33 #
Motion for a resolution Recital J a (new) Ja. whereas the perspective of enlargement imposes an in-depth reform of the Union’s institutional architecture and policies that would affect the composition of the European Parliament;
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 35 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 35 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 36 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Welcomes that European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061
Amendment 36 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Welcomes that European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Welcomes that European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 has
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 2. Welcomes that European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 has
Amendment 38 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. Underlines that this discussion needs to take place at an inter- institutional level and should therefore involve the Council and the European Commission;
Amendment 38 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. Underlines that this discussion needs to take place at an inter- institutional level and should therefore involve the Council and the European Commission;
Amendment 39 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 Amendment 39 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 6 b (new) – having regard to the European Council Conclusions of 14 and 15 December 2023,
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 6 b (new) – having regard to the European Council Conclusions of 14 and 15 December 2023,
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Points out that Treaty requirements together with political realities have led to ad hoc negotiated agreements on the composition of the European Parliament every mandate; observes that the reason for the politicisation is the aim of every Member State to minimise seat losses and maximise seat gains in absolute or relative terms; deplores, in this context, antagonistic voting in plenary, which the countries concerned see as a loss of appreciation and which could be instrumentalised at domestic level for nationalist debates; emphasises that in the last two decisions concerning the allocation of seats, seats were allocated that became available after the United Kingdom left the EU; highlights that, in the long-term, this strategy is not sustainable, given the Treaty limitation of a maximum of 751 seats and the potentially distortive effects of a political solution, rendering an agreement on an equitable allocation in the future more difficult;
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Points out that Treaty requirements together with political realities have led to ad hoc negotiated agreements on the composition of the European Parliament every mandate; observes that the reason for the politicisation is the aim of every Member State to minimise seat losses and maximise seat gains in absolute or relative terms; deplores, in this context, antagonistic voting in plenary, which the countries concerned see as a loss of appreciation and which could be instrumentalised at domestic level for nationalist debates; emphasises that in the last two decisions concerning the allocation of seats, seats were allocated that became available after the United Kingdom left the EU; highlights that, in the long-term, this strategy is not sustainable, given the Treaty limitation of a maximum of 751 seats and the potentially distortive effects of a political solution, rendering an agreement on an equitable allocation in the future more difficult;
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Points out that Treaty requirements together with political realities have led to ad hoc negotiated agreements on the composition of the European Parliament every mandate; observes that the reason for the politic
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Points out that Treaty requirements together with political realities have led to ad hoc negotiated agreements on the composition of the European Parliament every mandate; observes that the reason for the politic
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Points out that
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 3. Points out that
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Whereas the proposal on the allocation of seats for the European Parliament composition for the 2029-2034 legislative term shall include a reserve of 28 additional seats for members elected in an Union-wide constituency in line with Parliament’s proposal on the Electoral Law as adopted on 3 May 2022; points out that, in line with that proposal, those seats can only be taken up after the elections following the entry into force of a revised Electoral Law including the necessary provisions for the Union-wide constituency;
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Whereas the proposal on the allocation of seats for the European Parliament composition for the 2029-2034 legislative term shall include a reserve of 28 additional seats for members elected in an Union-wide constituency in line with Parliament’s proposal on the Electoral Law as adopted on 3 May 2022; points out that, in line with that proposal, those seats can only be taken up after the elections following the entry into force of a revised Electoral Law including the necessary provisions for the Union-wide constituency;
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Recalls that, in its legislative resolution of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties, Parliament has proposed amendments to Article 14(2) underlines that these amendments aim at making the composition of the European Parliament Parliament’s competence, subject to the Council’s consent, and at overcoming unanimity voting in the procedures regulating the European Parliament's composition;
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Recalls that, in its legislative resolution of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties, Parliament has proposed amendments to Article 14(2) underlines that these amendments aim at making the composition of the European Parliament Parliament’s competence, subject to the Council’s consent, and at overcoming unanimity voting in the procedures regulating the European Parliament's composition;
Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Stresses that a seat allocation method offers great potential for providing in the future a permanent system to allocate the seats of the European Parliament in an objective, fair, durable and
Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Stresses that a seat allocation method offers great potential for providing in the future a permanent system to allocate the seats of the European Parliament in an objective, fair, durable and
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Stresses that a seat allocation method offers
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Stresses that a seat allocation method offers
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Stresses that
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Stresses that
Amendment 48 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Stresses that a permanent and stable seat allocation method offers great potential for providing in the future a permanent system to allocate the seats of the European Parliament in an objective, fair, durable and transparent way;
Amendment 48 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 4 4. Stresses that a permanent and stable seat allocation method offers great potential for providing in the future a permanent system to allocate the seats of the European Parliament in an objective, fair, durable and transparent way;
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 6 c (new) – having regard to the Enlargement Package adopted by the European Commission on 8 November 2023,
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 6 c (new) – having regard to the Enlargement Package adopted by the European Commission on 8 November 2023,
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Stresses that in choosing the most suitable formula, priority needs to be given to objective and
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Stresses that in choosing the most suitable formula, priority needs to be given to objective and
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Stresses that in choosing the most suitable formula, priority needs to be given to objective and evidence-based criteria and remains convinced that the calculation method and its underlying principles should be as simple as possible and easy for citizens to understand; further believes that changes to the relevant Treaty provisions can be considered;
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Stresses that in choosing the most suitable formula, priority needs to be given to objective and evidence-based criteria and remains convinced that the calculation method and its underlying principles should be as simple as possible and easy for citizens to understand; further believes that changes to the relevant Treaty provisions can be considered;
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Stresses that in choosing the most suitable formula, priority needs to be given to objective and evidence-based criteria, based on reliable data in terms of population, in order to ensure that the principle of degressive proportionality is applied in a sustainable and transparent way; further believes that changes to the relevant Treaty provisions can be considered;
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Stresses that in choosing the most suitable formula, priority needs to be given to objective and evidence-based criteria, based on reliable data in terms of population, in order to ensure that the principle of degressive proportionality is applied in a sustainable and transparent way; further believes that changes to the relevant Treaty provisions can be considered;
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Stresses that in choosing the most suitable formula, priority needs to be given to objective and evidence-based criteria
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Stresses that in choosing the most suitable formula, priority needs to be given to objective and evidence-based criteria
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Stresses that in choosing the most suitable
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 5. Stresses that in choosing the most suitable
Amendment 55 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. believes that changes to the relevant Treaty provisions can be considered;
Amendment 55 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. believes that changes to the relevant Treaty provisions can be considered;
Amendment 56 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6.
Amendment 56 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6.
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6.
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 6.
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Calls on the European Council to also consult COSAC before deciding on a new seat allocation system; underlines the importance of ensuring full transparency as well as compatibility with the Member states' constitutional frameworks;
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Calls on the European Council to also consult COSAC before deciding on a new seat allocation system; underlines the importance of ensuring full transparency as well as compatibility with the Member states' constitutional frameworks;
Amendment 59 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Notes that the Treaty on European Union Art. 14 (2) lays down a number of
Amendment 59 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 7 7. Notes that the Treaty on European Union Art. 14 (2) lays down a number of
Amendment 6 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 6 d (new) – having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement,
Amendment 6 #
Motion for a resolution Citation 6 d (new) – having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement,
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Underlines that any method chosen should be transparent;
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Underlines that any method chosen should be transparent;
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Underlines that any method chosen should be transparent; continues. therefore. to support using Eurostat data as the official source of population figures for the calculations, which is publicly available;
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Underlines that any method chosen should be transparent; continues. therefore. to support using Eurostat data as the official source of population figures for the calculations, which is publicly available;
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Underlines that any method chosen should
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Underlines that any method chosen should
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Underlines that any method chosen should be transparent; continues. therefore. to support using Eurostat data as the official source of population figures for the calculations, which is publicly available;
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8. Underlines that any method chosen should be transparent; continues. therefore. to support using Eurostat data as the official source of population figures for the calculations, which is publicly available;
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8.
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 8.
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 a (new) 8a. Points out that the reference population data to be used for the purposes of distribution of seats in the European Parliament is not established in secondary EU legislation but that for consistency reasons, historically the same reference data was chosen to be used as for calculating the qualified majority voting in the Council, which is enshrined in Regulation (EU) No 1260/2013;
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 a (new) 8a. Points out that the reference population data to be used for the purposes of distribution of seats in the European Parliament is not established in secondary EU legislation but that for consistency reasons, historically the same reference data was chosen to be used as for calculating the qualified majority voting in the Council, which is enshrined in Regulation (EU) No 1260/2013;
Amendment 66 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 b (new) 8b. Points out that Regulation (EU) No 1260/2013 also includes third country residents - whom in line with article 14 (2) TEU are not represented in the European Parliament - but also EU mobile citizens - who habitually are counted in the member state of residence as citizens and included on electoral rolls for the European Parliament elections; considers that for the purposes of calculating the number of seats per member State and in order to ensure consistency with the Treaties and avoid double counting of mobile citizens, the EU should rely on the number of citizens of a given country;
Amendment 66 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 b (new) 8b. Points out that Regulation (EU) No 1260/2013 also includes third country residents - whom in line with article 14 (2) TEU are not represented in the European Parliament - but also EU mobile citizens - who habitually are counted in the member state of residence as citizens and included on electoral rolls for the European Parliament elections; considers that for the purposes of calculating the number of seats per member State and in order to ensure consistency with the Treaties and avoid double counting of mobile citizens, the EU should rely on the number of citizens of a given country;
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 c (new) 8c. Points out that in the recent past reference Eurostat data has been used both 2 and 3 years prior to the elections; considers that there should be consistency in choosing the reference period; considers that in view of allowing Member States sufficient time to prepare for elections, the reference date should be the 1st of January 2 years prior to the year of elections;
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 8 c (new) 8c. Points out that in the recent past reference Eurostat data has been used both 2 and 3 years prior to the elections; considers that there should be consistency in choosing the reference period; considers that in view of allowing Member States sufficient time to prepare for elections, the reference date should be the 1st of January 2 years prior to the year of elections;
Amendment 68 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Points out that
Amendment 68 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Points out that
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Points out that the method chosen should be understandable, avoiding a level of complexity that citizens cannot understand, or else a new kind of ‘democratic deficit’ could arise;
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Points out that the method chosen should be understandable, avoiding a level of complexity that citizens cannot understand, or else a new kind of ‘democratic deficit’ could arise;
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas the European Parliament is the only institution of the Union where citizens are directly represented; whereas the citizens’ well founded expectation to be fairly represented in this institution is a matter of democratic legitimacy; whereas, in any event, the European Parliament cannot be compared to a national parliament in terms of representativeness;
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A A. whereas the European Parliament is the only institution of the Union where citizens are directly represented; whereas the citizens’ well founded expectation to be fairly represented in this institution is a matter of democratic legitimacy; whereas, in any event, the European Parliament cannot be compared to a national parliament in terms of representativeness;
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Points out that the method chosen should be understandable
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Points out that the method chosen should be understandable
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Points out that
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Points out that
Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Points out that the method chosen should be
Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 9 9. Points out that the method chosen should be
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Notes that degressive proportionality is assessed on the basis of the representation ratio of the citizens of a given Member State, meaning the ratio of the population of a Member State relative to its number of seats before rounding; observes that degressive proportionality entails that the ratio varies for the various Member States; further notes that the larger the population, the higher the entitlement to a number of seats for a specific Member State, while the ratio population to MEP also increases; notes and accepts that degressive proportionality entails an underrepresentation of citizens from Member States with a larger population and an overrepresentation of citizens of Member States with a smaller population; believes that this principle is justified given the current EU institutional framework; stresses that under the current EU institutional framework the risk of increased electoral inequality could increase with enlargement; stresses that such a development could undermine the Parliament's democratic legitimacy; points out that decoupling the representation of Member states from the representation of European political parties through the introduction of an additional Union-wide constituency could provide a solution to this dilemma; notes that such a solution could include calculating the total seat entitlement of each European political party based on its EU-wide vote share and subsequently allocating overhang mandates so that the total seat number of each European political party equals the calculated entitlement; notes that ensuring full proportional completion would require a substantive share of Parliament's seats to be reserved for the Union-wide constituency; notes that such an overhaul of the electoral framework would require changes to the Treaties and therefore urges the Member states to consider such a solution during the upcoming Convention for the revision of the Treaties in accordance with Article 48 TEU;
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Notes that degressive proportionality is assessed on the basis of the representation ratio of the citizens of a given Member State, meaning the ratio of the population of a Member State relative to its number of seats before rounding; observes that degressive proportionality entails that the ratio varies for the various Member States; further notes that the larger the population, the higher the entitlement to a number of seats for a specific Member State, while the ratio population to MEP also increases; notes and accepts that degressive proportionality entails an underrepresentation of citizens from Member States with a larger population and an overrepresentation of citizens of Member States with a smaller population; believes that this principle is justified given the current EU institutional framework; stresses that under the current EU institutional framework the risk of increased electoral inequality could increase with enlargement; stresses that such a development could undermine the Parliament's democratic legitimacy; points out that decoupling the representation of Member states from the representation of European political parties through the introduction of an additional Union-wide constituency could provide a solution to this dilemma; notes that such a solution could include calculating the total seat entitlement of each European political party based on its EU-wide vote share and subsequently allocating overhang mandates so that the total seat number of each European political party equals the calculated entitlement; notes that ensuring full proportional completion would require a substantive share of Parliament's seats to be reserved for the Union-wide constituency; notes that such an overhaul of the electoral framework would require changes to the Treaties and therefore urges the Member states to consider such a solution during the upcoming Convention for the revision of the Treaties in accordance with Article 48 TEU;
Amendment 74 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Notes that degressive proportionality is assessed on the basis of the representation ratio of the citizens of a given Member State, meaning the ratio of the population of a Member State relative to its number of seats before rounding; observes that degressive proportionality entails that the ratio varies for the various Member States; further notes that the larger the population, the higher the entitlement to a number of seats for a specific Member State, while the ratio population to MEP also increases; notes
Amendment 74 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Notes that degressive proportionality is assessed on the basis of the representation ratio of the citizens of a given Member State, meaning the ratio of the population of a Member State relative to its number of seats before rounding; observes that degressive proportionality entails that the ratio varies for the various Member States; further notes that the larger the population, the higher the entitlement to a number of seats for a specific Member State, while the ratio population to MEP also increases; notes
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Notes that degressive proportionality is assessed on the basis of the representation ratio of the citizens of a given Member State, meaning the ratio of the population of a Member State relative to its number of seats before rounding; observes that degressive proportionality entails that the ratio varies for the various Member States; further notes that the larger the population, the higher the entitlement to a number of seats for a specific Member State, while the ratio population to MEP also increases; notes and accepts that degressive proportionality entails an underrepresentation of citizens from Member States with a larger population and an overrepresentation of citizens of Member States with a smaller population; recognises, however, that through rounding and with the distribution of the last seats in the system, smaller fractions can occur owing to the laws of mathematics; believes that this principle is justified given the current EU institutional framework;
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Notes that degressive proportionality is assessed on the basis of the representation ratio of the citizens of a given Member State, meaning the ratio of the population of a Member State relative to its number of seats before rounding; observes that degressive proportionality entails that the ratio varies for the various Member States; further notes that the larger the population, the higher the entitlement to a number of seats for a specific Member State, while the ratio population to MEP also increases; notes and accepts that degressive proportionality entails an underrepresentation of citizens from Member States with a larger population and an overrepresentation of citizens of Member States with a smaller population; recognises, however, that through rounding and with the distribution of the last seats in the system, smaller fractions can occur owing to the laws of mathematics; believes that this principle is justified given the current EU institutional framework;
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Notes that degressive proportionality is assessed on the basis of the representation ratio of the citizens of a given Member State, meaning the ratio of the population of a Member State relative to its number of seats before rounding; observes that degressive proportionality entails that the ratio varies for the various Member States; further notes that the larger the population, the higher the entitlement to a number of seats for a specific Member State, while the ratio population to MEP also increases; notes and accepts that degressive proportionality entails an underrepresentation of citizens from Member States with a larger population and an overrepresentation of citizens of Member States with a smaller population;
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Notes that degressive proportionality is assessed on the basis of the representation ratio of the citizens of a given Member State, meaning the ratio of the population of a Member State relative to its number of seats before rounding; observes that degressive proportionality entails that the ratio varies for the various Member States; further notes that the larger the population, the higher the entitlement to a number of seats for a specific Member State, while the ratio population to MEP also increases; notes and accepts that degressive proportionality entails an underrepresentation of citizens from Member States with a larger population and an overrepresentation of citizens of Member States with a smaller population;
Amendment 77 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Notes that degressive proportionality is assessed on the basis of the representation ratio of the citizens of a given Member State, meaning the ratio of the population of a Member State relative to its number of seats before rounding; observes that degressive proportionality entails that the ratio varies for the various Member States; further notes that the larger the population, the higher the entitlement to a number of seats for a specific Member State, while the ratio population to MEP also increases; notes and accepts that degressive proportionality entails an underrepresentation of citizens from Member States with a larger population and an overrepresentation of citizens of Member States with a smaller population; believes that this principle is justified given the current EU institutional framework;
Amendment 77 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 10. Notes that degressive proportionality is assessed on the basis of the representation ratio of the citizens of a given Member State, meaning the ratio of the population of a Member State relative to its number of seats before rounding; observes that degressive proportionality entails that the ratio varies for the various Member States; further notes that the larger the population, the higher the entitlement to a number of seats for a specific Member State, while the ratio population to MEP also increases; notes and accepts that degressive proportionality entails an underrepresentation of citizens from Member States with a larger population and an overrepresentation of citizens of Member States with a smaller population; believes that this principle is justified given the current EU institutional framework;
Amendment 78 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 a (new) 10a. Underlines that the establishment of a European constituency for the election of 28 members on transnational lists is not feasible, as it would alter the proportions between population and the number of seats allocated in the EP, undermining the determination of an objective, fair, durable and transparent method of seat allocation and its effectiveness; expresses therefore its opposition to this proposal;
Amendment 78 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10 a (new) 10a. Underlines that the establishment of a European constituency for the election of 28 members on transnational lists is not feasible, as it would alter the proportions between population and the number of seats allocated in the EP, undermining the determination of an objective, fair, durable and transparent method of seat allocation and its effectiveness; expresses therefore its opposition to this proposal;
Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Is of the opinion that a permanent system based on a formula needs to be durable and therefore flexible enough to account for changes in population figures, for future enlargements and for possible changes of applicable legislative provisions, such as the electoral law or treaty changes; outlines that in case of an agreement on transnational lists, the seats allocated through transnational lists will be distributed additionally to those allocated through the proposed formula, while adaptations of the formula can be made to enable the integration of allocated seats through transnational lists;
Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Is of the opinion that a permanent system based on a formula needs to be durable and therefore flexible enough to account for changes in population figures, for future enlargements and for possible changes of applicable legislative provisions, such as the electoral law or treaty changes; outlines that in case of an agreement on transnational lists, the seats allocated through transnational lists will be distributed additionally to those allocated through the proposed formula, while adaptations of the formula can be made to enable the integration of allocated seats through transnational lists;
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A a (new) Aa. whereas representation of the interests of citizens from the Member States concerns both indirect representation in the Council of the European Union and direct representation in the European Parliament; whereas the voting system in the Council already takes into account population in the calculation for qualified majority voting; whereas this needs to be considered when deciding on the allocation of seats in the European Parliament;
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A a (new) Aa. whereas representation of the interests of citizens from the Member States concerns both indirect representation in the Council of the European Union and direct representation in the European Parliament; whereas the voting system in the Council already takes into account population in the calculation for qualified majority voting; whereas this needs to be considered when deciding on the allocation of seats in the European Parliament;
Amendment 80 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Is of the opinion that a permanent system based on a formula needs to be durable and therefore flexible enough to account for changes in population figures, for future enlargements and for possible changes of applicable legislative provisions, such as the electoral law or treaty changes; points out that when new countries have joined the EU in the past, the current upper limit of 751 members has been exceeded for a limited period of time;
Amendment 80 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Is of the opinion that a permanent system based on a formula needs to be durable and therefore flexible enough to account for changes in population figures, for future enlargements and for possible changes of applicable legislative provisions, such as the electoral law or treaty changes; points out that when new countries have joined the EU in the past, the current upper limit of 751 members has been exceeded for a limited period of time;
Amendment 81 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Is of the opinion that a permanent system based on a formula needs to be durable and therefore flexible enough to account for changes in population figures, for future enlargements
Amendment 81 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Is of the opinion that a permanent system based on a formula needs to be durable and therefore flexible enough to account for changes in population figures, for future enlargements
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Is of the opinion that a permanent
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Is of the opinion that a permanent
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Is of the opinion that a permanent system based on a formula
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 11. Is of the opinion that a permanent system based on a formula
Amendment 84 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 a (new) 11a. Considers that, pending possible enlargement, the number of seats provided for in the Treaties should be used to its full, whatever the formula chosen, in order to preserve as much as possible the current seats per Member State;
Amendment 84 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11 a (new) 11a. Considers that, pending possible enlargement, the number of seats provided for in the Treaties should be used to its full, whatever the formula chosen, in order to preserve as much as possible the current seats per Member State;
Amendment 85 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Stresses that any future fair method must include elements that balance the interests of citizens from all Member States, such as the contribution to the EU budget from each Member State, while also respecting the overall balance of the institutional system as laid down in the Treaties when it comes to the indirect decision-making power of Union citizens, represented by MEPs in the European Parliament and by their governments in the Council;
Amendment 85 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Stresses that any future fair method must include elements that balance the interests of citizens from all Member States, such as the contribution to the EU budget from each Member State, while also respecting the overall balance of the institutional system as laid down in the Treaties when it comes to the indirect decision-making power of Union citizens, represented by MEPs in the European Parliament and by their governments in the Council;
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Stresses that a fair method must
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 12. Stresses that a fair method must
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 a (new) 12a. Calls in the interest of the European tax payers for reflection on the need to maintain the current upper limit of 751 seats provided for by the Treaty; considers, in this regard, that it would have been preferable not to redistribute part of the seats left by the United Kingdom, but to deduct them from the total number provided for by the Treaty; calls for reducing the number of seats in the European Parliament;
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 a (new) 12a. Calls in the interest of the European tax payers for reflection on the need to maintain the current upper limit of 751 seats provided for by the Treaty; considers, in this regard, that it would have been preferable not to redistribute part of the seats left by the United Kingdom, but to deduct them from the total number provided for by the Treaty; calls for reducing the number of seats in the European Parliament;
Amendment 88 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 a (new) 12a. Recalls that the Treaties do not refer to any alternative distribution of seats than that among Member States; stresses therefore that any distribution based on other considerations, such as making an allocation for so-called transnational lists would go against the letter and the spirit of the Treaties;
Amendment 88 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 a (new) 12a. Recalls that the Treaties do not refer to any alternative distribution of seats than that among Member States; stresses therefore that any distribution based on other considerations, such as making an allocation for so-called transnational lists would go against the letter and the spirit of the Treaties;
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 a (new) 12a. Underlines that the overall balance of the institutional framework as laid down in the Treaties when it comes to the decision-making power does not allow for seat allocation in the European Parliament based on direct proportionality criteria;
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 12 a (new) 12a. Underlines that the overall balance of the institutional framework as laid down in the Treaties when it comes to the decision-making power does not allow for seat allocation in the European Parliament based on direct proportionality criteria;
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A b (new) Ab. whereas it essential that big and smaller Member States can effectively contribute to the decisions of the European Union;
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution Recital A b (new) Ab. whereas it essential that big and smaller Member States can effectively contribute to the decisions of the European Union;
Amendment 90 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Notes that the definition of degressive proportionality, as recognised by the European Parliament1 and the European Council2
Amendment 90 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 13 13. Notes that the definition of degressive proportionality, as recognised by the European Parliament1 and the European Council2
Amendment 91 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Points to the existence of a vast number3 of previous recommendations concerning
Amendment 91 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 14 14. Points to the existence of a vast number3 of previous recommendations concerning
Amendment 92 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Observes that previous recommendations for seat allocation comprised several elements; notes that these included a fixed base number of seats for all Member States and an allocation of remaining seats in proportion to respective population figures with a cap of 96 seats; stresses that these recommendations, such as the so-called ‘Cambridge Compromise’, have been criticised for not respecting Treaty criteria, such as degressive proportionality, in certain circumstances, and can only be understood by a minority of citizens;
Amendment 92 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Observes that previous recommendations for seat allocation comprised several elements; notes that these included a fixed base number of seats for all Member States and an allocation of remaining seats in proportion to respective population figures with a cap of 96 seats; stresses that these recommendations, such as the so-called ‘Cambridge Compromise’, have been criticised for not respecting Treaty criteria, such as degressive proportionality, in certain circumstances, and can only be understood by a minority of citizens;
Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Observes that previous recommendations for seat allocation comprised several elements; notes that these included a fixed base number of seats for all Member States, and an allocation of remaining seats in proportion to respective population figures with a minimum of six and a cap of 96 seats; stresses that these recommendations, such as the so-called ‘Cambridge Compromise’, have been criticised for
Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 15 15. Observes that previous recommendations for seat allocation comprised several elements; notes that these included a fixed base number of seats for all Member States, and an allocation of remaining seats in proportion to respective population figures with a minimum of six and a cap of 96 seats; stresses that these recommendations, such as the so-called ‘Cambridge Compromise’, have been criticised for
Amendment 94 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 Amendment 94 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 Amendment 95 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Further notes that the ‘Cambridge Compromise’ has been criticised for
Amendment 95 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Further notes that the ‘Cambridge Compromise’ has been criticised for
Amendment 96 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Further notes that the ‘Cambridge Compromise’ has been criticised for neglecting the interests of citizens of medium-sized Member States, entailing seat losses for these countries; recalls that in order to counterbalance this tendency of the ‘Cambridge Compromise”, an extensive reform of the qualified voting mechanism currently in force in the Council should be implemented; regretfully acknowledges that, , due to high political hurdles, such as Treaty change, these reforms were never pursued;
Amendment 96 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Further notes that the ‘Cambridge Compromise’ has been criticised for neglecting the interests of citizens of medium-sized Member States, entailing seat losses for these countries; recalls that in order to counterbalance this tendency of the ‘Cambridge Compromise”, an extensive reform of the qualified voting mechanism currently in force in the Council should be implemented; regretfully acknowledges that, , due to high political hurdles, such as Treaty change, these reforms were never pursued;
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Further notes that the ‘Cambridge Compromise’
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 16. Further notes that the ‘Cambridge Compromise’
Amendment 98 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 a (new) 16a. Notes that in terms of mathematical formulas studied, when comparing the "Cambridge compromise" with the "Power compromise" it could be said that the latter better compensates small and medium sized countries for the voting system in the Council and in terms of the curve is smoother across the entire range, in particular at the upper end; points out also that a distribution based on the power compromise is particularly close to the one that Parliament adopted for the 2024- 2029 legislature;
Amendment 98 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 a (new) 16a. Notes that in terms of mathematical formulas studied, when comparing the "Cambridge compromise" with the "Power compromise" it could be said that the latter better compensates small and medium sized countries for the voting system in the Council and in terms of the curve is smoother across the entire range, in particular at the upper end; points out also that a distribution based on the power compromise is particularly close to the one that Parliament adopted for the 2024- 2029 legislature;
Amendment 99 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 a (new) 16a. Acknowledges previous criticism regarding the D’Hondt method of allocation for highly prioritising majority formation and operability, instead of proportionality and fairness; 1a _________________ 1a https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ etudes/BRIE/2019/637966/EPRS_BRI(20 19)637966_EN.pdf
Amendment 99 #
Motion for a resolution Paragraph 16 a (new) 16a. Acknowledges previous criticism regarding the D’Hondt method of allocation for highly prioritising majority formation and operability, instead of proportionality and fairness; 1a _________________ 1a https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ etudes/BRIE/2019/637966/EPRS_BRI(20 19)637966_EN.pdf
source: 759.667
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History
(these mark the time of scraping, not the official date of the change)
2024-03-05Show (2) Changes | Timetravel
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2024-02-07Show (1) Changes | Timetravel
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2024-01-24Show (2) Changes | Timetravel
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2023-12-15Show (2) Changes | Timetravel
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2023-12-14Show (1) Changes | Timetravel
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2023-12-09Show (1) Changes | Timetravel
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2023-09-22Show (1) Changes | Timetravel
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2023-07-22Show (1) Changes | Timetravel
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2023-07-14Show (3) Changes
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Old
Preparatory phase in ParliamentNew
Awaiting committee decision |