8 Amendments of Gunnar HÖKMARK related to 2012/2256(INI)
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the Commission forecasts for 2012 have been successively revised downwards from 1.8 % in spring 2011 to - 0.4 % in autumn 2012 for 2012; whereas in its autumn forecasts the Commission predicts a GDP growth of a mere 0.1 % for 2013; whereas there are ser calculatiouns doubts as to the accuracy of these 2013 forecasts, since they are likely to be based on an underestimated fiscal multiplier, thereby underestimatof the size of fiscal multipliers performed by the IMF in its World Economic Outlook for October 2012, which have been widely spread ing the negative effect of current fiscal contracdebate on budgetary consolidation oin economic growthEurope, proved to be severely flawed and insufficiently robust;
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas the size of fiscal multipliers in bad economic times can be 2 to 3 times higher than in normal economic times, when the output gap is close to zeros, in spite of some 70 years of attempts to quantify them, exceedingly uncertain, thus rendering them an insufficient basis for economic policy formulation;
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)
Recital G a (new)
Ga. whereas constant deficits impede economic growth in a detrimental way; and whereas fiscal discipline must be forcefully upheld in order to prevent deficits of the kind seen in Europe during the last decade from emerging, as these have had a disastrous effect regarding growth as well as employment in a number of Member States;
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas it is highly uncertain whether the simultaneous consolidation across most of the EU also increased the size of the fiscal multiplier in the eurozone as a whole, and its impacts were amplified by the high degree of openness of the European economies inside the internal marke or not;
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas this fiscal tightening strategy forces down demand, wages and prices while driving up unemployment; consolidation and structural reform are a necessity if individual Member States and the EU as a whole is to return to long-term growth and prosperity; whereas any uncertainty as regards Member States' commitment to the reform processes enacted would be detrimental for the propensity to invest in and economic opportunities of a Member State;
Amendment 156 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Believes that the recent debate on the size of the fiscal multiplier, notably following the IMF analysis on this matter in its latest World Economic Outlook, has been unduly downplayed by the Commission, while a broad consensus has been emergingCalls on the Commission to open its macroeconomic modelling and forecasting to serious and systematic scrutiny by independent institutes on a regular basis, while acknowledging that the estimations onf this matter from recent theoretical and empirical work in the existing economic literature; considers this matter to be of central importance to policy-making, as wrong fiscal multipliers can lead to massive policy mistakes; calls on the Commission, therefe size of fiscal multipliers provided by the IMF in its World Economic Outlook for October 2012 have proved to be severely flawed and insufficiently robust as the statistical test omitted to exclude the extreme outliers (Greece and Germany) and thus made fiscal multipliers seem more, rapidly to open its macroeconomic modelling and forecasting to serious and systematic scrutiny by independent institutes on a regular basiselevant for crisis management than when tested in accordance with established statistical methodology;
Amendment 258 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Underlines the importance of national ownership of and responsibility for the structural and budgetary reform processes undertaken by Member States; highlights that the long-term success of these processes is crucially dependent on national politicians' ability to anchor the necessary decisions among constituents and that such anchoring cannot be substituted by arrangements with community bodies, neither as regards the implementation thereof;
Amendment 261 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 b (new)
Paragraph 17 b (new)
17b. Remembers that the purpose of common legislation on Member States' fiscal frameworks is to make sure Member States stay committed to the rules commonly agreed upon and not to specify the policy choices of a Member State;