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9 Amendments of Daniel CASPARY related to 2021/0114(COD)

Amendment 74 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
(9) There should be a financial contribution provided, directly or indirectly, by the public authorities of a third country. The financial contribution may be granted through public or private entities. Whether a public entity provides a financial contribution should be determined on a case-by-case basis with due regard to elements such as the characteristics of the relevant entity and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the economy. Financial contributions may also be granted through a private entity if its actions can be attributed to the third country. Special or exclusive rights that are not adequately remunerated, could also be considered as a financial contribution.
2022/02/11
Committee: INTA
Amendment 82 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11 a (new)
(11 a) A foreign subsidy is considered granted from the moment the beneficiary has an entitlement to receive the subsidy. The actual payment of the subsidy is not a necessary condition for bringing a subsidy within the scope of this Regulation.
2022/02/11
Committee: INTA
Amendment 85 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
(14) When applying these indicators, the Commission could take into account different elements such as the size of the subsidy in absolute terms or in relation to the size of the market or to the value of the investment. For instance, a concentration, in the context of which a foreign subsidy covers a substantial part of the purchase price of the target, is likely to be distortive. Similarly, foreign subsidies covering a substantial part of the estimated value of a contract to be awarded in a public procurement procedure are likely to cause distortions. If a foreign subsidy is granted for operating costs, it seems more likely to cause distortions than if it is granted for investment costs. Foreign subsidies to small and medium- sized undertakings may be considered less likely to cause distortions than foreign subsidies to large undertakings. Furthermore, the characteristics of the market, and in particular the competitive conditions on the market, such as barriers to entry, should be taken into account. Foreign subsidies leading to overcapacity by sustaining uneconomic assets or by encouraging investment in capacity expansions that would otherwise not have been built or bought are likely to cause distortions. A foreign subsidy to a beneficiary that shows a low degree of activity in the internal market, measured for instance in terms of turnover achieved in the Union, is less likely to cause distortions than a foreign subsidy to a beneficiary that has a more significant level of activity in the internal market. Finally, foreign subsidies not exceeding EUR 5 million should be deemed, as a general rule, unlikely to distort the internal market within the meaning of this Regulation. The evolution of the economic activity can also be taken into account to enable the Commission to take action when an undertaking's level of activity is small, but is expected to grow strongly. The Commission may consider in its assessment of a distortion whether a third country has in place an effective system for the control of subsidies which is at least equivalent to the system in the Union and which would make subsidies granted by such a third country less likely to distort the internal market within the meaning of this Regulation. The Commission should therefore encourage third countries to develop such systems of subsidy control, including by concluding and enforcing bilateral agreements which include substantive level playing field provisions and by encouraging third countries to comply with international subsidy obligations and align with the Union on initiatives with regard to improving international rules on subsidies and competitive neutrality, notably within the WTO. Foreign subsidies not exceeding EUR 5 million should be deemed, as a general rule, unlikely to distort the internal market within the meaning of this Regulation. The Commission should draft and publish guidelines with further details for assessing the distortive nature of a subsidy in order to provide legal certainty for all market participants. The guidelines should also provide examples and typical cases of distortive and non- distortive subsidies.
2022/02/11
Committee: INTA
Amendment 132 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 32 a (new)
(32 a) In the context of the ex ante review mechanism for concentrations, concerned undertakings may request pre-notification consultations with the Commission based on good faith, with the exclusive aim of receiving guidance on whether or not the formal thresholds for notification are met.
2022/02/11
Committee: INTA
Amendment 137 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 34
(34) When a foreign financial contribution is notified in the context of a public procurement procedure, the assessment should be limited to that procedure and only foreign subsidies granted in the three years prior to the notification should be considered in the assessment.
2022/02/11
Committee: INTA
Amendment 151 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 43 a (new)
(43 a) In order to encourage the development of multilateral rules to address distortive subsidies and their root causes, it is necessary to set up a third country dialogue. When the Commission discovers or suspects the existence of systemic distortive foreign subsidies, it should be able to engage in a dialogue with the third country in question to explore options aimed at obtaining the cessation or modification of the distortive subsidies with a view to eliminating their distortive effects in the internal market. Where a bilateral agreement between the Union and a third country provides for a consultation mechanism that covers systemic distortive foreign subsidies falling within the scope of this Regulation, this mechanism should be used to facilitate the third country dialogue. The Commission should also be able to endeavour to obtain the cessation or modification of the distortive foreign subsidies by raising the matter in any relevant international forum or through cooperation with any other third country affected by the same systemic distortive subsidies, or with any interested third country. This dialogue should not preclude the Commission from opening or continuing investigations under this Regulation, nor should it constitute an alternative to redressive measures. The Commission should, without undue delay, inform the European Parliament and the Council of relevant developments.
2022/02/11
Committee: INTA
Amendment 396 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 5
(5) The Commission may request the prior notification of any concentration which is not a notifiable concentration within the meaning of Article 18 at any time prior to its implementation where the Commission suspects that the undertakings concerned may have benefitted fromen granted foreign subsidies in the three years prior to the concentration. That concentration shall be deemed to be a notifiable concentration for the purposes of this Regulation.
2022/02/11
Committee: INTA
Amendment 447 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 6
(6) Where the Commission suspects that an undertaking may have benefitted fromen granted foreign subsidies in the three years prior to the submission of the tender or request to participate in the public procurement procedure, it may request the notification of the foreign financial contributions received by that undertaking in any public procurement procedure which are not notifiable under Article 27(2) or fall within the scope of paragraph 5 of this Article, at any time before the award of the contract. Once the Commission has requested the notification of such a financial contribution, it is deemed to be a notifiable foreign financial contribution in a public procurement procedure.
2022/02/11
Committee: INTA
Amendment 492 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 34 a (new)
Article 34 a Third country dialogue 1. Where, following a market investigation pursuant to article 34, the Commission discovers the existence of systemic distortive foreign subsidies, or where other information available substantiates a reasonable suspicion as to the existence of such subsidies, the Commission, on behalf of the Union, may engage in a dialogue with the third country in question to explore options aimed at obtaining the cessation or modification of the subsidies with a view to eliminating their distortive effects on the internal market. 2. That dialogue shall not prevent the Commission from opening or continuing investigations under this Regulation nor constitute an alternative to redressive measures pursuant to article 6. 3. The Commission may seek to obtain the cessation or modification of the systemic distortive subsidies also by raising the matter in any relevant international forum. 4. The Commission may enter into consultations or cooperation, on behalf of the Union, with any other third country affected by the same systemic distortive subsidies or with any interested third country, with a view to obtaining the cessation or modification of the subsidies. This may involve, where appropriate, coordination in relevant international fora and coordination in response to the systemic distortive subsidies. 5. The Commission shall, without undue delay, inform the European Parliament and the Council of relevant developments.
2022/02/11
Committee: INTA