Progress: Procedure completed
Role | Committee | Rapporteur | Shadows |
---|---|---|---|
Lead | INTA | HANSEN Christophe ( EPP) | RODRÍGUEZ-PIÑERO Inma ( S&D), RINZEMA Catharina ( Renew), BÜTIKOFER Reinhard ( Verts/ALE), CAMPOMENOSI Marco ( ID), BOURGEOIS Geert ( ECR), MAUREL Emmanuel ( GUE/NGL) |
Committee Opinion | DEVE | ||
Committee Opinion | EMPL | ||
Committee Opinion | IMCO | DOLESCHAL Christian ( EPP) | Clara AGUILERA ( S&D), Anne-Sophie PELLETIER ( GUE/NGL), Eugen JURZYCA ( ECR), Claude GRUFFAT ( Verts/ALE) |
Committee Opinion | ECON | YON-COURTIN Stéphanie ( Renew) | Alfred SANT ( S&D), Gunnar BECK ( ID), Claude GRUFFAT ( Verts/ALE), Chris MACMANUS ( GUE/NGL), Michiel HOOGEVEEN ( ECR) |
Committee Opinion | JURI | LEBRETON Gilles ( ID) | Stéphane SÉJOURNÉ ( RE) |
Lead committee dossier:
Legal Basis:
RoP 57, TFEU 114, TFEU 207
Legal Basis:
RoP 57, TFEU 114, TFEU 207Subjects
Events
PURPOSE: to remedy the distortions created by subsidies granted by non-EU countries to companies operating in the EU’s single market.
LEGISLATIVE ACT: Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market.
CONTENT: this Regulation aims to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market by establishing a harmonised framework to address distortions caused, directly or indirectly, by foreign subsidies, with a view to ensuring a level playing field.
This Regulation lays down rules and procedures for investigating foreign subsidies that distort the internal market and for redressing such distortions. Such distortions can arise with respect to any economic activity, and in particular in concentrations and public procurement procedures.
Balancing test
The Commission may, on the basis of the information received, balance the negative and positive effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion in the internal market. If the negative effects outweigh the positive effects, the Commission will be empowered to impose redressive measures or to accept commitments from the undertakings concerned that remedy the distortion.
Investigation of financial contributions
The Commission will be empowered to investigate the financial contributions granted by the public authorities of a non-EU country to undertakings engaging in an economic activity in the EU by means of three tools: (i) two prior authorisation tools - to ensure a level playing field for the largest mergers and bids in large-scale public procurement; (ii) a general market investigation tool to investigate all other market situations and lower-value mergers and public procurement procedures.
Ex officio review of foreign subsidies
The Commission may, on its own initiative , examine information from any source, including Member States, a natural or legal person or an association, concerning alleged foreign subsidies distorting the internal market.
In order to investigate possible foreign subsidies and determine whether they distort the internal market and to remedy such distortions, the Regulation establishes a two-step procedure, namely a preliminary examination and an in-depth investigation . The Commission will have to conclude the in-depth investigation by adopting a decision. It should, as far as possible, endeavour to conclude the in-depth investigation within 18 months.
The Commission will have the power to request information from any undertaking or association of undertakings throughout the proceedings. In addition, the Commission may impose fines or periodic penalty payments for failure to provide the requested information in a timely manner or for providing incomplete, inaccurate or misleading information.
Furthermore, where necessary to prevent irreparable damage to competition in the internal market, the Commission will have the power to adopt interim measures.
Governance
In order to ensure uniform application of the regulation throughout the EU, the Commission will be exclusively competent to enforce the regulation. During this centralised implementation, Member States will be kept regularly informed and will be involved, through the advisory procedure, in decisions adopted under the regulation.
Notification thresholds
Under the new rules, companies will notify the Commission of planned mergers and acquisitions if at least one of the merging parties has a turnover of at least EUR 500 million in the EU and if there is a foreign financial contribution of at least EUR 50 million. The Commission will also investigate public procurement tenders if the value of a contract is at least EUR 250 million .
If a company fails to comply with the obligation to notify a subsidised concentration or financial contribution in public procurement contracts meeting the thresholds, the Commission may impose fines and examine the transaction as if it had been notified.
Guidelines
In order to foster the predictability of this Regulation, the Commission will publish and regularly update guidelines regarding the criteria for determining the existence of a distortion caused by a foreign subsidy on the internal market, the application of the balancing test, the application of its power to request a prior notification of any concentration or foreign financial contributions received by an economic operator in a public procurement procedure, and the assessment of a distortion in a public procurement procedure.
ENTRY INTO FORCE: 12.1.2023. The Regulation will apply from 12.7.2023.
The European Parliament adopted by 598 votes to 5, with 9 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market.
The European Parliament's first reading position under the ordinary legislative procedure amends the proposal as follows:
Subject matter and scope
The purpose of this Regulation is to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market by establishing a harmonised framework to address distortions caused, directly or indirectly, by foreign subsidies, with a view to ensuring a level playing field.
The Regulation:
- lays down rules and procedures for investigating foreign subsidies that distort the internal market and for redressing such distortions. Such distortions can arise with respect to any economic activity, and in particular in concentrations and public procurement procedures;
- addresses foreign subsidies granted to an undertaking, including a public undertaking which is directly or indirectly controlled by the State, engaging in an economic activity in the internal market.
Distortions of competition
Where the total amount of a foreign subsidy to an undertaking does not exceed EUR 4 million over any consecutive period of three years , that foreign subsidy shall be considered unlikely to distort the internal market. In addition, a foreign subsidy may be considered not to distort the internal market to the extent that it is aimed at making good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences.
Investigation of financial contributions
The Commission will be empowered to investigate the financial contributions granted by the public authorities of a non-EU country to undertakings engaging in an economic activity in the EU by means of two prior authorisation tools : (i) to ensure a level playing field for the largest mergers and bids in large-scale public procurement; (ii) a general market investigation tool to investigate all other market situations and lower-value mergers and public procurement procedures.
Balancing test
The Commission may, on the basis of the information received, balance the negative and positive effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion in the internal market. If the negative effects outweigh the positive effects, the Commission will be empowered to impose redressive measures or to accept commitments from the undertakings concerned that remedy the distortion.
Ex officio review of foreign subsidies
The Commission may, on its own initiative, examine information from any source, including Member States, a natural or legal person or an association, concerning alleged foreign subsidies distorting the internal market.
Where the Commission considers that the information indicates the possible existence of a foreign subsidy distorting the internal market, it will seek all information it deems necessary to make a preliminary review of whether the financial contribution distorts the internal market. For this purpose, the Commission may request information and conduct inspections inside and outside the Union.
Where the Commission, in the course of a preliminary review, concludes that there are insufficient indications to initiate an in-depth investigation, either because there is no foreign subsidy or because there are insufficient indications of an actual or potential distortion in the internal market, it shall close the preliminary review, inform the undertaking under investigation and Member States that were informed, as well as the contracting authority or contracting entity concerned.
During the in-depth investigation , the Commission will further assess the foreign subsidy in the decision to initiate the in-depth investigation and will seek all information it deems necessary. If it finds that a foreign subsidy distorts the internal market, the Commission may adopt an implementing act in the form of a decision imposing remedial measures. The Commission will endeavour to adopt a decision within 18 months of the initiation of the in-depth investigation.
Member States will be regularly informed and involved in the decisions adopted under the Regulation via the advisory procedure.
Notification thresholds
Under the new rules, companies should notify the Commission of planned mergers and acquisitions if at least one of the merging parties has a turnover of at least EUR 500 million in the EU and if there is a foreign financial contribution of at least EUR 50 million. The Commission should also investigate public procurement tenders if the value of a contract is at least EUR 250 million .
If a company fails to comply with the obligation to notify a subsidised concentration or financial contribution in public procurement contracts meeting the thresholds, the Commission may impose fines and examine the transaction as if it had been notified.
In the context of the ex ante review mechanism for concentrations, undertakings should be able to request pre-notification consultations with the Commission based on good faith, with the aim of receiving guidance on whether the thresholds for notification are met.
Third-country dialogue
Where, following a market investigation, the Commission suspects the existence of repeated foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, the Commission may engage in a dialogue with the third country concerned, to explore options aimed at obtaining the cessation or modification of such subsidies with a view to eliminating their distortive effects on the internal market. The Commission should inform the European Parliament and the Council of any relevant developments.
Guidelines
In order to foster the predictability of this Regulation, the Commission should publish and regularly update guidelines regarding the criteria for determining the existence of a distortion caused by a foreign subsidy on the internal market, the application of the balancing test, the application of its power to request a prior notification of any concentration or foreign financial contributions received by an economic operator in a public procurement procedure, and the assessment of a distortion in a public procurement procedure.
The European Parliament adopted by 627 votes to 8, with 11 abstentions, amendments to the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market.
The matter was referred back to the competent committee for inter-institutional negotiations.
The proposed regulation lays down rules and procedures for investigating foreign subsidies that distort the internal market and for redressing such distortions, with a view to ensuring a level-playing field.
The main amendments adopted in plenary relate to the following issues.
Distortions in the internal market
Members clarified that a foreign subsidy would be unlikely to distort the internal market if its total amount is less than EUR 4 million (EUR 5 million according to the original proposal) over a period of three consecutive years.
The Commission should be able to consider in its assessment of a distortion whether a third country has an effective system for the control of subsidies in place which is at least equivalent to the system in the Union and which would make subsidies granted by such a third country less likely to distort the internal market within the meaning of this Regulation.
In the interests of efficiency and transparency, the Commission should publish guidelines within 2 years of the entry into force of the Regulation, including explanations and examples of how each indicator is to be applied. The Commission, in close cooperation with the Member States, should regularly update these guidelines and keep the European Parliament and the Council informed.
Categories of foreign subsidies most likely to distort the internal market
These categories should also include: (i) export financing subsidy granted by a third country which is not a signatory to the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits; (ii) foreign subsidies to an undertaking active in a sector characterised by structural excess capacity.
Balancing
Where warranted, the Commission could balance the negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion of the internal market against its positive effects on the development of the relevant economic activity in the internal market. No later than 24 months after the entry into force of the Regulation, the Commission should publish guidelines on the application of the balancing test , including the criteria used in the balancing.
Undertakings and redress
The Commission should impose redressive measures to address the actual or potential distortion of the internal market caused by a foreign subsidy, unless it has accepted commitments offered by the undertaking concerned.
The Commission could accept commitments offered by the undertaking concerned, where such commitments fully and effectively remedy the distortion on the internal market. By accepting such commitments, the Commission should make them binding on the undertaking in a decision with commitments. The Commission should monitor the undertaking’s compliance with the commitments agreed upon.
Commitments or redressive measures could take, inter alia , the following forms: (i) a reduction in capacity or market presence, including by means of a temporary restriction of commercial activity in the internal market; (ii) an obligation on the undertakings concerned to notify the Commission of any participation in future public procurement procedures in the Union for an appropriate period of time where the estimated value of the public contract is below certain thresholds; (iii) an obligation on the undertakings concerned to adapt their governance structure. The Commission should impose information and transparency obligations.
Ex officio examination of foreign subsidies
The Commission could, on its own initiative, examine information from any source, including from Member States and companies or EU-wide social partners , concerning alleged distortive foreign subsidies. The Commission should establish a contact point through which such information can be provided on a confidential basis. The competent public authorities should collect and exchange data with the Commission.
Interim measures
The Commission could take interim measures, including during the preliminary review period. Interim measures would be limited in time and could be prolonged where an indication of distortive effects or a serious risk of substantial and irreparable damage to competition on the internal market continues to exist.
In order to carry out its tasks under the Regulation, the Commission would have to carry out inspections of undertakings where necessary.
Fines and periodic penalty payments
The Commission would, by decision, impose fines and periodic penalty payments where an undertaking or association of undertakings concerned, intentionally or negligently, supplies incomplete, incorrect or misleading information.
Definition and thresholds for notification of concentrations
A ‘notifiable concentration’ would be deemed to arise where, in the context of a concentration, the acquired undertaking or at least one of the merging undertakings is established in the Union and generates an aggregate turnover of at least EUR 400 million (EUR 500 million under the proposal).
A notifiable foreign financial contribution in an EU public procurement procedure should be deemed to arise where the estimated total value of that public procurement is equal to or greater than EUR 200 million (instead of EUR 250 million).
Third-country dialogue
Where, following a market investigation, the Commission discovers the existence of systemic distortive foreign subsidies, or where other information available substantiates a reasonable suspicion as to the existence of such subsidies, the Commission, on behalf of the Union, may engage in a dialogue with the third country in question to explore options aimed at obtaining the cessation or modification of the subsidies with a view to eliminating their distortive effects on the internal market.
That dialogue should not prevent the Commission from taking further action, including the opening or continuation of investigations or the application of interim or redressive measures.
The Commission could also seek to obtain the cessation or modification of the systemic distortive subsidies also by raising the matter in any relevant international forum. The Commission should inform the European Parliament and the Council of relevant developments.
PURPOSE: to propose a new instrument to address the potentially distorting effects of foreign subsidies in the single market.
PROPOSED ACT: Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council.
ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: the European Parliament decides in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and on an equal footing with the Council.
BACKGROUND: a strong, open and competitive single market allows both European and foreign companies to compete on the basis of merit, provided that a level playing field in the market is guaranteed.
In recent years, there have been cases where foreign subsidies have been found to have distorting effects on the EU's internal market, creating an uneven playing field. These foreign subsidies can take different forms, such as zero interest loans, unlimited state guarantees, tax exemptions or reductions for foreign investment or trade, or dedicated State funding.
EU rules on competition, public procurement and trade defence instruments play an important role in ensuring a level playing field for companies operating in the single market. However, none of these tools apply to foreign subsidies that give their beneficiaries an unfair advantage when acquiring EU companies, participating in public procurement in the EU or doing other business in the EU.
There are currently no specific EU rules to address the distorting effects that foreign subsidies can have on the internal market. It is therefore necessary to complement the existing EU instruments with a new instrument to effectively combat distortions in the internal market caused by foreign subsidies and to ensure a level playing field
The legislative proposal aims to fill a regulatory gap in the Single Market. It is in line with the new Industrial Strategy for Europe presented by the Commission in March 2020 and follows the adoption of the White Paper on foreign subsidies in June 2020.
CONTENT: the proposed regulation establishes rules and procedures for investigating foreign subsidies that distort the internal market and for remedying the distortions they cause. Such distortions may affect all economic activities, in particular in the case of mergers and public procurement procedures.
Under the proposed Regulation, the Commission will have the power to investigate financial contributions granted by public authorities of a non-EU country which benefit companies engaging in an economic activity in the EU and redress their distortive effects, as relevant. In this context, the Regulation proposes the introduction of three tools:
- Component 1 : a notification-based tool to investigate concentrations involving a financial contribution by a non-EU government, where the EU turnover of the company to be acquired (or of at least one of the merging parties) is EUR 500 million or more and the foreign financial contribution is at least EUR 50 million;
- Component 2 : a notification-based tool to investigate bids in public procurements involving a financial contribution by a non-EU government, where the estimated value of the procurement is EUR 250 million or more; and
- Component 3 : a tool to investigate all other market situations and smaller concentrations and public procurement procedures, which the Commission can start on its own initiative (ex-officio) and may request ad-hoc notifications.
Ex officio examination of subsidies .
The proposal provides that the Commission could, on its own initiative, examine information from any source concerning alleged distortive foreign subsidies, either as a preliminary examination or as a full investigation. It would be able to conduct on-site inspections in the EU and elsewhere.
The Commission should take into account the positive effects of the foreign subsidy on the development of the subsidised economic activity in question. It should balance these positive effects against the negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion in the internal market.
If the negative effects outweigh the positive effects, the Commission could impose remedial measures or accept undertakings from the companies concerned to remedy the distortions. The proposal foresees a range of structural or behavioural remedies, such as divestment of certain assets or prohibition of a certain market behaviour.
The Commission could impose fines and periodic penalty payments for procedural infringements, such as the supply of incorrect or incomplete information in an investigation, and for non-compliance with a Commission decision imposing redressive, interim measures or commitments.
Concentration and bids in public procurement
As regards mergers and public procurement, the proposal involves a system of ex ante notification of the largest and potentially most distortive case. It sets out the conditions under which a foreign subsidy is considered to distort the internal market.
The Commission would have the power, upon notification, to examine information on foreign financial contributions in the context of a proposed merger. Companies should not be allowed to implement the concentration before the conclusion of the Commission's review. The proposal specifies when a concentration should be suspended and sets out the relevant time limits.
The proposed Regulation provides that if an undertaking fails to comply with the obligation to notify a subsidised concentration or a financial contribution in the context of public procurement contracts meeting the thresholds, the Commission could impose fines and periodic penalty payments. Fines and periodic penalty payments could also be imposed in the case of notifications containing incorrect information or in the case of failure to notify.
In case of notified transactions, the Commission should also have the power to prohibit the subsidised acquisition or the award of the public procurement contract to the subsidised bidder.
Budgetary impact
The total administrative expenditure for the implementation of the proposal in 2021-2027 will thus amount to EUR 90.340 million, part of which will be financed from the single market programme.
Documents
- Commission response to text adopted in plenary: SP(2022)688
- Final act published in Official Journal: Regulation 2022/2560
- Final act published in Official Journal: OJ L 330 23.12.2022, p. 0001
- Draft final act: 00046/2022/LEX
- Results of vote in Parliament: Results of vote in Parliament
- Decision by Parliament, 1st reading: T9-0379/2022
- Coreper letter confirming interinstitutional agreement: GEDA/A/(2022)008224
- Approval in committee of the text agreed at 1st reading interinstitutional negotiations: GEDA/A/(2022)008224
- Decision by Parliament, 1st reading: T9-0143/2022
- Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading/single reading: A9-0135/2022
- Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading: A9-0135/2022
- Committee opinion: PE704.679
- Committee opinion: PE700.661
- Committee opinion: PE703.070
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE719.563
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE719.564
- Committee draft report: PE703.002
- Contribution: COM(2021)0223
- Economic and Social Committee: opinion, report: CES3401/2021
- Contribution: COM(2021)0223
- Contribution: COM(2021)0223
- Document attached to the procedure: EUR-Lex
- Document attached to the procedure: SEC(2021)0182
- Document attached to the procedure: EUR-Lex
- Document attached to the procedure: SWD(2021)0099
- Document attached to the procedure: EUR-Lex
- Document attached to the procedure: SWD(2021)0100
- Legislative proposal published: COM(2021)0223
- Legislative proposal published: EUR-Lex
- Document attached to the procedure: EUR-Lex SEC(2021)0182
- Document attached to the procedure: EUR-Lex SWD(2021)0099
- Document attached to the procedure: EUR-Lex SWD(2021)0100
- Economic and Social Committee: opinion, report: CES3401/2021
- Committee draft report: PE703.002
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE719.563
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE719.564
- Committee opinion: PE703.070
- Committee opinion: PE700.661
- Committee opinion: PE704.679
- Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading/single reading: A9-0135/2022
- Coreper letter confirming interinstitutional agreement: GEDA/A/(2022)008224
- Draft final act: 00046/2022/LEX
- Commission response to text adopted in plenary: SP(2022)688
- Contribution: COM(2021)0223
- Contribution: COM(2021)0223
- Contribution: COM(2021)0223
Activities
- Christophe HANSEN
Plenary Speeches (3)
Votes
Subventions étrangères génératrices de distorsions - Distortive foreign subsidies - Den Binnenmarkt verzerrende drittstaatliche Subventionen - A9-0135/2022 - Christophe Hansen - Proposition de la Commission #
Subventions étrangères génératrices de distorsions - Distortive foreign subsidies - Den Binnenmarkt verzerrende drittstaatliche Subventionen - A9-0135/2022 - Christophe Hansen - Accord provisoire - Am 96 #
Amendments | Dossier |
1064 |
2021/0114(COD)
2022/02/02
IMCO
175 amendments...
Amendment 100 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 – point e (e) publication of a summary of results of research and development
Amendment 101 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 – point h a (new) (ha) excluding the undertaking from procurement procedures for a certain period of time when it is demonstrated that the undertaking has received distortive foreign subsidies or an advantage that is economically equivalent to a financial contribution that results in submission of abnormally low tenders.
Amendment 102 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 – point h a (new) (ha) restraining to participate, directly or indirectly, in new public procurement or concession contract procedures in the internal market;
Amendment 103 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 – point h a (new) (ha) compliance with the environmental, social and labour standards applicable to them
Amendment 104 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 4 (4) The Commission
Amendment 105 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 5 Amendment 106 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 5 (5) If an undertaking offers commitments which fully and effectively remedy the distortion on the internal market, the Commission
Amendment 107 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 5 (5)
Amendment 108 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 6 Amendment 109 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 6 (6) Where the undertaking concerned proposes to repay the foreign subsidy including an appropriate interest rate, the Commission shall accept such repayment as commitment if it can ascertain that the repayment is transparent and effective, while taking into account the risk of circumvention. The Commission shall only accept the repayment on the condition that the repayment will fully remedy the distortion caused to the internal market, but never more than the cost of the distortion.
Amendment 110 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 6 (6) Where the undertaking concerned proposes to repay the foreign subsidy including an appropriate interest rate, the Commission shall accept such repayment, provided that it fully remedies the distortion caused. It should be ascertain that the repayment as commitment if it can ascertain that the repayment is transparent and effective, while taking into account the risk of circumvention.
Amendment 111 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 6 (6) Where the undertaking concerned proposes to repay the foreign subsidy including an appropriate interest rate, the Commission shall accept such repayment as commitment
Amendment 112 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 6 a (new) (6a) The Commission shall thoroughly consult affected Union industries on the choice of redressive measures, taking account of sectoral specificities, and on the assessment of whether or not commitments should be accepted, and which commitments should be accepted.
Amendment 113 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 6 a (new) (6a) The Commission shall always consider any voluntary commitments offered by the undertaking in question with reference to Article 6 (point 3, 5 and 6), before gradually imposing structural remedies.
Amendment 114 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 6 a (new) (6a) If an undertaking does not make commitments or take redressive measures, this may lead to exclusion from the market.
Amendment 115 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission may conduct the necessary inspections of undertakings when a distortion is clearly identified.
Amendment 116 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission
Amendment 117 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 1 a (new) (1a) A court order authorising the Commission, and other involved officials, shall be issued before an inspection can be carried out at the premise of the undertaking concerned within the Union.
Amendment 118 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 2 – point a (a) to enter any premises
Amendment 119 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 2 – point a (a) to enter relevan
Amendment 120 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 2 – point d Amendment 121 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 3 – introductory part (3) The undertaking concerned shall submit to inspections ordered by decision of the Commission. The officials and other accompanying persons authorised by the Commission to conduct an inspection shall exercise their powers upon production of a Commission decision to the undertaking concerned:
Amendment 122 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 3 – point a (a) specifying the subject matter
Amendment 123 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 7 (7) Upon request of the Commission,
Amendment 124 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 7 (7) Upon
Amendment 125 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 7 (7) Upon request of the Commission, a Member State
Amendment 126 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 Foreign subsidies or an advantage that is economically equivalent to a financial contribution that cause or risk causing a distortion in a public procurement procedure shall be understood as foreign subsidies that enable an undertaking to submit a tender that is unduly advantageous or abnormally low in relation to the works, supplies or services concerned.
Amendment 127 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 Foreign subsidies that cause or risk causing a distortion in a public procurement procedure shall be understood as foreign subsidies that enable an undertaking to submit a tender that is unduly advantageous in relation to the works, supplies or services concerned. The assessment of whether there is a distortion on the internal market pursuant to Article 3 and whether a tender is unduly advantageous or abnormally low in relation to the works, supplies or services concerned shall be limited to the public procurement procedure at stake. Only foreign subsidies granted during the
Amendment 128 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 Foreign subsidies that cause or very likely risk causing a distortion in a public procurement procedure shall be understood as foreign subsidies that enable an undertaking to submit a tender that is unduly advantageous in relation to the works, supplies or services concerned. The
Amendment 129 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 Foreign subsidies that cause or risk causing a distortion in a public procurement procedure shall be understood as foreign subsidies that enable an undertaking to submit a tender that is unduly advantageous in relation to the works, supplies or services concerned. The assessment of whether there is a distortion on the internal market pursuant to Article 3 and whether a tender is unduly advantageous in relation to the works, supplies or services concerned shall be limited to the public procurement procedure at stake. Only foreign subsidies granted during the
Amendment 130 #
(2) For the purpose of Article 28, a notifiable foreign financial contribution in an EU public procurement procedure shall be deemed to arise where the estimated value of that public procurement is equal or greater than EUR
Amendment 131 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 (2) For the purpose of Article 28, a notifiable foreign financial contribution in an EU public procurement procedure shall be deemed to arise where: (a) the estimated
Amendment 132 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 (2) For the purpose of Article 28, a notifiable foreign financial contribution in an EU public procurement procedure shall be deemed to arise where the estimated value of that public procurement is equal or greater than EUR
Amendment 133 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 (2) For the purpose of Article 28, a notifiable foreign financial contribution in an EU public procurement procedure shall be deemed to arise where the estimated value of that public procurement is equal or greater than EUR
Amendment 134 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 (2) For the purpose of Article 28, a notifiable foreign financial contribution in an EU public procurement procedure shall be deemed to arise where the estimated value of that public procurement is equal or greater than EUR
Amendment 135 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 (2) For the purpose of Article 28, a notifiable foreign financial contribution in an EU public procurement procedure shall be deemed to arise where the estimated value of that public procurement is equal or greater than EUR
Amendment 136 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 (2) For the purpose of Article 28, a notifiable foreign financial contribution in an EU public procurement procedure shall be deemed to arise where the estimated value of that public procurement is equal or greater than EUR
Amendment 137 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 (2) For the purpose of Article 28, a notifiable foreign financial contribution in an EU public procurement procedure shall be deemed to arise where the estimated value of that public procurement is equal or greater than EUR
Amendment 138 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 a (new) Amendment 139 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 1 (1) When submitting a tender or a request to participate in a public procurement procedure, undertakings, main subcontractors and main suppliers shall either notify to the contracting authority or the contracting entity all foreign
Amendment 140 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 1 (1) When submitting a tender or a request to participate in a public procurement procedure, undertakings shall either notify to the contracting authority or the contracting entity all foreign financial contributions received in the three years preceding that notification or
Amendment 141 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 1 (1) When submitting a tender or a request to participate in a public procurement procedure, undertakings shall either notify to the contracting authority or the contracting entity either by indicating all foreign financial contributions received in the three years preceding that notification or
Amendment 142 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 2 (2) The obligation to notify foreign financial contributions under this paragraph shall extend to economic operators, groups of economic operators referred to in Article 26(2) of Directive 2014/23/EU, Article 19(2) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 37(2) of Directive 2014/25/EU, main subcontractors and main suppliers. A subcontractor or supplier shall be deemed to be main where
Amendment 143 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 2 (2) The obligation to notify foreign financial contributions under this paragraph shall extend to economic operators, groups of economic operators referred to in Article 26(2) of Directive 2014/23/EU, Article 19(2) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 37(2) of Directive 2014/25/EU, main subcontractors and main suppliers. A subcontractor or supplier shall be deemed to be main where their participation ensures key elements of the contract performance and in any case where the economic share of their
Amendment 144 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 2 (2) The obligation to notify foreign financial contributions under this paragraph shall extend to economic operators, groups of economic operators referred to in Article 26(2) of Directive 2014/23/EU, Article 19(2) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 37(2) of Directive 2014/25/EU, main subcontractors and main suppliers. A subcontractor or supplier shall be deemed to be main where their participation ensures key elements of the contract performance and in any case where the economic share of their contribution exceeds
Amendment 145 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 2 (2) The obligation to notify foreign financial contributions under this paragraph shall extend to economic operators, groups of economic operators
Amendment 146 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 2 (2) The obligation to notify foreign financial contributions under this paragraph shall extend to economic operators, groups of economic operators referred to in Article 26(2) of Directive 2014/23/EU, Article 19(2) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 37(2) of Directive 2014/25/EU, main subcontractors and main suppliers. A subcontractor or supplier shall be deemed to be main where their participation ensures key elements of the contract performance and in any case where the economic share of their contribution exceeds
Amendment 147 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 3 (3)
Amendment 148 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 6 (6) Where the Commission suspects that an undertaking may have benefitted from foreign subsidies of total value of EUR 1,5 million or more in the three years prior to the submission of the tender or request to participate in the public procurement procedure, it may request the notification of the foreign financial contributions received by that undertaking
Amendment 149 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 6 (6) Where the Commission suspects that an undertaking may have benefitted from foreign subsidies in the
Amendment 150 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 6 (6) Where the Commission suspects that an undertaking may have benefitted from foreign subsidies in the three years prior to the submission of the tender or request to participate in the public procurement procedure or known future subsidies to be effective during the performance of the contract, it may request the notification of the foreign financial contributions received by that undertaking in any public procurement procedure which are not notifiable under Article 27(2) or fall within the scope of paragraph 5 of this Article, at any time before the award of the contract. Once the Commission has requested the notification of such a financial contribution, it is deemed to be a notifiable foreign financial contribution in a public procurement procedure
Amendment 151 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 6 (6) Where the Commission suspects that an undertaking may have benefitted from foreign subsidies in the
Amendment 152 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 6 (6) Where the Commission suspects that an undertaking may have be
Amendment 153 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 6 a (new) (6a) For the purpose of this Regulation, the Commission shall establish a communication channel presenting strict confidentiality guarantees to receive comments from interested parties and Member states which suspect that an undertaking may have benefitted from foreign subsidies in the three years prior to the submission of the tender or request to participate in the public procurement procedure. The Commission shall duly take into account the information reported and may request information and the notification of the foreign financial contributions received by that undertaking in any public procurement procedure. In any case, the Commission shall inform in good time the Member States or the interested parties about its decision to initiate or not a preliminary investigation.
Amendment 154 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 6 a (new) (6a) In the case of large procedures with different calls for tender, the Commission will have the possibility to group these tenders in one lot in order to be able to carry out a joint notification procedure and avoid administrative overload
Amendment 155 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 a (new) Article 28a Own initiative request for the assessment of foreign subsidies 1. The Commission shall carry out the assessment of foreign subsidies upon own initiative request of the undertaking, which plans to apply for the public procurement. 2. The Commission shall carry out the assessment based on rules set in this Regulation. The undertaking concerned may withdraw from the request for the assessment. 3. By 30 June 2023, the Commission shall publish the Guidelines providing details and procedure on how to request the assessment of foreign subsidies, including possible fees.
Amendment 156 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission shall carry out a preliminary review no later than
Amendment 157 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission shall carry out a preliminary review no later than
Amendment 158 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission shall carry out a preliminary review no later than
Amendment 159 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 3 (3) The Commission shall decide whether to initiate an in-depth investigation within the time limit for completing the preliminary review and inform the undertaking concerned and the contracting authority or the contracting entity without delay. Where the Commission has not taken a decision to initiate an in-depth investigation within 20 days, the foreign subsidies shall be deemed as not distorting the internal market.
Amendment 160 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 4 (4) The Commission may adopt a decision closing the in-depth investigation no later than 12
Amendment 161 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 4 (4) The Commission may adopt a decision closing the in-depth investigation no later than
Amendment 162 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 4 (4) The Commission may adopt a decision closing the in-depth investigation no later than
Amendment 163 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 4 (4) The Commission may adopt a decision closing the in-depth investigation no later than 200 days after it received the notification. In exceptional circumstances, this time limit may be extended for 60 days after consultation with the concerned contracting authority or contracting entity.
Amendment 164 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 4 (4) The Commission may adopt a decision closing the in-depth investigation
Amendment 165 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 4 (4) The Commission may adopt a decision closing the in-depth investigation no later than 12
Amendment 166 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 30 – paragraph 1 (1) Where, after an in-depth investigation, the Commission finds that an undertaking benefits from a foreign subsidy which distorts the internal market
Amendment 167 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 30 – paragraph 1 (1) Where, after an in-depth investigation, the Commission finds that an undertaking benefits from a foreign subsidy or an advantage economically equivalent to a financial contribution which distorts the internal market pursuant to Articles 3 to 5, and where the undertaking concerned offers commitments that fully and effectively remove the distortion on the internal market, it shall adopt a decision with commitments pursuant to Article 9(3). The assessment under Article 5 shall not result in a modification of the initial tender submitted by the undertaking that is incompatible with Union law.
Amendment 168 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 30 – paragraph 2 (2) Where the undertaking concerned does not offer commitments or where the Commission considers that the commitments referred to in paragraph 1 are neither appropriate nor sufficient to fully and effectively remove the distortion it shall adopt a decision prohibiting the award of the contract to the undertaking concerned (“decision prohibiting the award of the contract”). The adoption of a decision prohibiting the award of the contract results in the exclusion of the undertaking concerned from participation in the public procurement procedure.
Amendment 169 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 30 – paragraph 3 a (new) (3a) The Commission shall publish the decisions, which shall indicate inter alia the thorough explanation of the decision, quantified indicators on which the decision is based and the right and the time limit of the undertaking to have the decision reviewed by the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Amendment 170 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 30 – paragraph 3 a (new) (3a) For cases where the Commission adopts at least two decisions vis-à-vis an undertaking in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article, it may adopt a decision prohibiting for a certain period of time an award of contract in any public procurement procedures.
Amendment 171 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 31 – paragraph 3 Amendment 172 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 31 – paragraph 3 (3) The contract may be awarded to an undertaking submitting a declaration under Article 28 before the Commission takes any of the decisions referred to in Article 30 or before the time limit laid down in Article 29(4) elapses only if the tender evaluation has established that the undertaking in question has in any case submitted the most economically advantageous tender. By 30 June 2023, the Commission shall publish the guidelines providing the criteria and procedure for the assessment of the most economically advantageous tender.
Amendment 173 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 31 – paragraph 3 a (new) (3a) The relevant authority shall carry out the assessment of the most economically advantageous tender no later than 20 days after submitting a declaration under Article 28.
Amendment 174 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 31 a (new) Article 31a Cooperation with contracting authorities and Member States 1. Where a Member State suspects that a financial contribution or an advantage economically equivalent to a financial contribution may have a distortive effect in the internal market with regard to access to public procurement procedures, it shall inform the Commission with a view to requesting the opening of an investigation. It shall submit evidence to support this request. The Commission may decide not to open an investigation and inform the relevant national competent authority of its decision. 2. Where a contracting authority or contracting entity suspects that an undertaking has submitted an abnormally low tender, it shall require the undertaking to provide explanations with regard to price and costs proposed in relation to works, supplies or services in accordance with Article69 of Directive 2014/24/EU. Where the contracting authority or contracting entity has established that the abnormally low tender is caused by a foreign subsidy or non- compliance with environmental, social and labour requirements as ratified under international conventions, it shall exclude the undertaking from the public procurement procedure and notify it to the Commission.
Amendment 175 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 32 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission may impose fines and periodic penalty payments as set out in Article 15 as well as excluding the undertaking concerned for a limited period of time from the new public procurement procedures.
Amendment 176 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 32 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission
Amendment 177 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 32 – paragraph 1 a (new) (1a) In case of deliberate non- compliance with the notification requirement for foreign subsidies, the Commission may exclude the company from future procurement procedures for a limited period of time across the EU.
Amendment 178 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 32 – paragraph 2 (2) In addition, the Commission may impose by decision on the undertakings concerned fines not exceeding 1 % of their aggregate turnover in the preceding business year, or 3 % of their aggregate turnover in the preceding business year if they have failed to comply with a previous decision of the Commission in the last three years, where they intentionally or negligently supply incorrect or misleading information in a notification and declarations pursuant to Article 28 or supplement thereto;
Amendment 179 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 32 – paragraph 2 (2) In addition, the Commission
Amendment 180 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 32 – paragraph 2 (2) In addition, the Commission may impose by decision on the undertakings concerned fines not exceeding 1 % of their aggregate turnover in the preceding business year, where they intentionally
Amendment 181 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 32 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2a) In both procedures under Articles 19 and 28, the Commission shall involve the Member States in the examination procedure and shall maintain a regular exchange of information with them.
Amendment 182 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 32 – paragraph 2 b (new) Amendment 183 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 32 – paragraph 3 (3) The Commission may impose by decision on the undertakings concerned fines not exceeding 10 % of their aggregate turnover in the preceding business year or 15 % of their aggregate turnover in the preceding business year if they failed to comply with a previous decision of the Commission in the last three years, where they, intentionally or negligently, fail to notify a subsidy in accordance with Article 28 during the public procurement procedure.
Amendment 184 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 32 – paragraph 3 (3) The Commission
Amendment 185 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 32 – paragraph 3 (3) The Commission may impose by decision on the undertakings concerned fines not exceeding 10 % of their aggregate turnover in the preceding business year where they, intentionally
Amendment 186 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 33 a (new) Amendment 187 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 34 Amendment 188 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 34 – paragraph 1 (1) Where the information available substantiates a reasonable suspicion that foreign subsidies in a particular sector, for a particular type of economic activity or
Amendment 189 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 34 – paragraph 1 (1) Where the information available substantiates a reasonable suspicion that foreign subsidies in a particular sector, for a particular type of economic activity or based on a particular subsidy instrument may distort the internal market, the Commission
Amendment 190 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 34 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission
Amendment 191 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 34 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission
Amendment 192 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 34 – paragraph 4 (4) Articles 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 of this
Amendment 193 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) amending the thresholds for notifications as set out in Articles 18 and 27, in the light of the practice of the Commission during the first
Amendment 194 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) exempting certain categories of undertakings concerned from the obligation to notify pursuant to Articles 19 and 28, in light of the practice of the Commission in the first
Amendment 195 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new) (ba) criteria to determine the specific commitments and regressive measures in Article 6 (5);
Amendment 196 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new) (ca) specifying the definition of "advantage economically equivalent to a financial contribution" as set out in Article 2;
Amendment 197 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new) (ca) defining specific indicators for balancing set out in the delegated act in Article 30(1).
Amendment 198 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point c b (new) (cb) supplementing the indicators as set out in Article 3.
Amendment 199 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 46 – paragraph 1 Within
Amendment 200 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 46 – paragraph 1 Within
Amendment 201 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 46 – paragraph 1 Within
Amendment 202 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 46 – paragraph 1 a (new) This regulation shall expire by 30 June 2029. However, it shall expire by 30 June 2023 if the delegated act stipulated in Article 30(1), and guidelines stipulated in articles 3(3), 28a(3) and 31(3) were not issued within that period.
Amendment 28 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 1 a (new) (1a) The European internal market should create a level playing field for economic activities in a market economy taking into account social progress.
Amendment 29 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 3 (3) Foreign subsidies can distort the internal market and undermine the level playing field for various economic activities in the Union. This could in particular occur in the context of concentrations entailing a change of control over Union undertakings, where such concentrations are fully or partially financed through foreign subsidies, or if undertakings benefiting from foreign subsidies are awarded public contracts in the Union in sectors with low competition level or high risk of distortion. The financial contributions provided by the signatories of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement should not be considered as distortive, and should therefore not trigger the notification obligation.
Amendment 30 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 3 a (new) (3a) Not only financial contributions should be considered as distortive subsidies, social or environmental dumping should also be taken into account as distorting elements of competition and of a level playing field.
Amendment 31 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 (5) It is therefore necessary to complement existing Union instruments with a new tool to effectively deal with distortions in the internal market caused by foreign subsidies
Amendment 32 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 7 (7) To ensure a level playing field throughout the internal market and consistency in the application of this Regulation, the Commission should be the sole authority competent to apply this Regulation. The Commission should have the power to examine any foreign subsidy to the extent it is in the scope of this Regulation in any sector of the economy on its own initiative relying on information from all available sources. The Commission could also, where necessary, set thresholds differentiated according to the type of contract. Member States should work with the Commission to provide it with the information they consider appropriate and relevant. To ensure effective control, in the specific case of large concentrations (mergers and acquisitions) and public procurement procedures above certain thresholds, the Commission should have the power to review foreign subsidies based on a prior notification by the undertaking to the Commission.
Amendment 33 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 8 (8) Foreign subsidy in the context of this Regulation should be understood as an intervention that meets
Amendment 34 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) There should be a financial contribution provided, directly or indirectly, by the public authorities of a third country. The financial contribution may be granted through public or private entities. Whether a public entity provides a financial contribution should be determined on a case-by-case basis with due regard to elements such as the characteristics of the relevant entity and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the economy. Financial contributions may also be granted through a private entity if its actions can be attributed to the third country. The financial contribution granted by the signatories of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement should not be considered as distorting the internal market, as those countries meet relevant standards of open rules-based economies.
Amendment 35 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) There should be a financial contribution, or any other advantage provided, directly or indirectly, by the public authorities of a third country. The financial contribution or advantage may be granted through public or private
Amendment 36 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 a (new) (9a) With the view to ensuring a fair level-playing field in the internal market, this Regulation should focus not only on financial contributions to the benefit of undertakings but also on receiving advantages that can be economically equivalent to a financial contribution. A wide-definition of foreign subsidy should therefore encompass cases where a third country fails to comply with minimum environmental, social and labour standards that are ratified under international conventions, thereby giving a competitive advantage to some undertakings;
Amendment 37 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 (10) Such a financial contribution or advantage should confer a benefit to an undertaking engaging in an economic activity in the internal market. A financial contribution or advantage that benefits an entity engaging in non-
Amendment 38 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 a (new) (11a) A foreign subsidy is considered granted from the moment the beneficiary has an entitlement to receive the subsidy. The actual payment of the subsidy is not a necessary condition for a subsidy being considered within the scope of this Regulation.
Amendment 39 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 12 (12) Once the existence of a foreign subsidy is established, the Commission should assess whether the foreign subsidy distorts the internal market. This assessment should balance the short and long- term negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market with positive effects on the development of the relevant economic activity including any positive environmental or social externalities in the third country providing the subsidy. Unlike State aid granted by a Member State, foreign subsidies are not generally prohibited. Subsidies in the form of export financing may be a cause of particular concern because of their distortive effects. This is not the case if such financing is provided in line with the OECD Arrangement on officially supported export credits. The Commission should assess on a case-by-
Amendment 40 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 12 (12) Once the existence of a foreign subsidy is established, the Commission should assess whether the foreign subsidy distorts the internal market. Unlike State
Amendment 41 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 12 (12) Once the existence of a foreign subsidy is established, the Commission should assess whether the foreign subsidy distorts the internal market. Unlike State aid granted by a Member State, foreign subsidies are not generally prohibited. Subsidies in the form of export financing may be a cause of particular concern because of their distortive effects. This is not the case if such financing is provided in line with the OECD Arrangement on officially supported export credits. The Commission should assess on a case-by- case basis whether a foreign subsidy distorts the internal market. The Commission should transparently publish the measurable indicators, which are considered in the assessment.
Amendment 42 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 (13) The lack of transparency concerning many foreign subsidies and the complexity of the commercial reality may make it difficult to unequivocally identify or quantify the impact of a given foreign subsidy on the internal market. To determine the distortion, it therefore appears necessary to use a non-exhaustive set of indicators. When assessing the extent to which a foreign subsidy can improve the competitive position of the undertaking concerned and, in doing so, actually or potentially negatively affects competition in the internal market, the Commission could have regard to certain indicators. The indicators should be quantifiable so that they provide reasonable evidence of distortion by foreign subsidies, including but not limited to the amount and nature of the subsidy, the purpose and conditions attached to the foreign subsidy as well as its use in the internal market.
Amendment 43 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 (14) When applying these indicators, the Commission could take into account different elements such as the size of the
Amendment 44 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 15 (15) Like certain types of State aid, also certain categories of foreign subsidies, such as unlimited guarantees, are likely to create distortions in the internal market because of their nature.
Amendment 45 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 15 a (new) (15a) Goods and services from third countries should respect core labour and environmental standards in public procurement.
Amendment 46 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 (16) The Commission should take into account the positive effects of the foreign subsidy on the development of the relevant subsidised economic activity. The Commission should weigh these positive
Amendment 47 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 17 (17) Where the Commission examines a foreign subsidy on its own initiative, it should have the power to impose redressive measures on an undertaking to remedy any distortion caused by a foreign subsidy in the internal market. Redressive measures should be proportionate and suitable to remedy the distortion at stake. They should include behavioural or structural remedies or the repayment of the foreign subsidy. This process should be transparent for the public;
Amendment 48 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 18 (18) The undertaking concerned should have the possibility to offer commitments in order to remedy the distortion caused by the foreign subsidy. If the Commission considers that the commitments offered fully and effectively remedy the distortion, it could accept them and make them binding by public decision.
Amendment 49 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 19 a (new) (19a) The remedy should not, in any case, impose upon undertakings to provide, disclose or publish the business secret and intellectual property such as patents. The protection of such confidential information should be respected.
Amendment 50 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 Amendment 51 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 (21) The Commission should have the power, on its own initiative, to examine any information on foreign subsidies. To this end, it is necessary to establish a procedure consisting of two steps, namely a preliminary review and an in-depth investigation. The Commission should publish guidance on how to open such a procedure.
Amendment 52 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 25 (25) The Commission should close the in-depth investigation by adopting a publicly accessible decision.
Amendment 53 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 26 (26) The Commission should have appropriate instruments to ensure the effectiveness of commitments and redressive measures. If the undertaking concerned does not comply with a decision with commitments, a decision imposing redressive measures, or a decision ordering interim measures, the Commission should have the power to impose fines and periodic penalty payments. The Commission should review the effectiveness of the measures.
Amendment 54 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 31 (31) Below the notification thresholds, the Commission could require the notification of potentially subsidised concentrations that were not yet implemented or the notification of potentially subsidised bids prior to the
Amendment 55 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 31 (31) Below the notification thresholds, the Commission could require the notification of potentially subsidised concentrations that were not yet implemented or the notification of potentially subsidised bids prior to the award of a public contract, if it considers that the concentration or the bid would merit ex-ante review given their impact in the Union. The Commission should also have the possibility to carry out a review on its own initiative of already implemented concentrations
Amendment 56 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 33 (33) The need to address distortive foreign subsidies is especially salient in public procurement, given its economic significance in the internal market and the fact that it is financed by taxpayer funds. The Commission should have the power, upon notification prior to the award of a public contract or concession, to examine information on foreign financial contributions to the participating undertakings in the context of a public procurement procedure. Prior notifications should be mandatory above
Amendment 57 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 33 (33) The need to address distortive foreign subsidies is especially salient in public procurement, given its economic significance in the internal market and the fact that it is financed by taxpayer funds, it is therefore necessary to ensure a level playing field. The Commission should have the power, upon notification prior to the award of a public contract or concession, to examine information on foreign financial contributions to the participating undertakings in the context of a public procurement procedure. Prior notifications should be mandatory above a threshold set in this Regulation to capture economically significant cases while minimising the
Amendment 58 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 33 a (new) (33a) In order to ensure a level playing field in the internal market, the Commission should establish specific control conditions for subcontracting
Amendment 59 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 34 Amendment 60 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 34 a (new) (34a) In order to provide legal certainty and to streamline the public procurements, the undertaking should be able to request the assessment of foreign financial contributions on its own initiative.
Amendment 61 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 (36) Foreign subsidies that enable an undertaking to submit a tender which is unduly advantageous, i.e. abnormally low tenders pursuant to Directive 2014/24/EU, in relation to the works, supplies or services concerned should be deemed to actually or potentially create a distortion in a public procurement procedure. Those distortions should therefore be assessed on the basis of the non-exhaustive set of indicators described in recitals 13 and 14 as well as the notion of unduly advantageous tender. The indicators should allow to determine how the foreign subsidy distorts competition by improving the competitive position of an undertaking and enabling it to submit an unduly advantageous tender. The opportunity should be given to undertakings to justify that the tender is not unduly advantageous, including by adducing the elements referred to in Article 69(2) of Directive 2014/24/EU.
Amendment 62 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 (36) Foreign subsidies that enable an undertaking to submit a tender which is unduly advantageous in relation to the works, supplies or services concerned should be deemed to actually or potentially create a distortion in a public procurement procedure. Those distortions should therefore be assessed on the basis of the
Amendment 63 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 a (new) (36a) Foreign subsidies should also be controlled with regard to unduly advantageous offers in relation to works and services. Since it is necessary for the tenderer to be able to justify or explain those costs sufficiently, otherwise, the contracting authority would have the right to reject the tender.
Amendment 64 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 44 (44) Restrictions to Articles
Amendment 65 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 48 (48) In order to ensure a level playing field on the internal market also in the long term, with a view to ensuring adequate coverage of cases investigated
Amendment 66 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 (1) This Regulation lays down rules and procedures for investigating foreign subsidies that distort the internal market and for redressing such distortions. Such distortions may arise with respect to any economic activity, and in particular in concentrations and public procurement procedures. This legislation also intends to ensure a level playing field in the public procurement market and to improve the access of Union economic operators, goods and services to the public procurement and concessions markets of third countries.
Amendment 67 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 (1) This Regulation lays down rules and procedures for investigating foreign subsidies that distort the internal market and for redressing such distortions with a view to ensuring a fair level-playing field in the internal market. Such distortions may arise with respect to any economic activity, and in particular in concentrations and public procurement procedures.
Amendment 68 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 2 (2) This Regulation addresses foreign subsidies granted to an undertaking engaging in an economic activity in the internal market. An undertaking acquiring control or merging with an undertaking established in the Union or an undertaking participating in a public procurement procedure is considered to be engaging in an economic activity in the internal market. The application of this Regulation shall be without prejudice to the international obligations of the Union as well as to measures that Member States and contracting entities may take in accordance with Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU
Amendment 69 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 2 (2) This Regulation addresses foreign subsidies
Amendment 70 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 2 (2) This Regulation addresses distortive foreign subsidies granted to an undertaking engaging in an economic activity in the internal market. An undertaking acquiring control or merging with an undertaking established in the Union or an undertaking participating in a public procurement procedure is considered to be engaging in an economic activity in the internal market.
Amendment 71 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2a) This Regulation applies with respect to restrictive or discriminatory procurement measures or practices applied by a third country in relation to purchases of goods and services not covered by public procurement.
Amendment 72 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 – introductory part (1) A distortion on the internal market shall be deemed to exist where a direct causal link between the distortion identified and the subsidies received exists and where a foreign subsidy is liable to improve the competitive position of the undertaking concerned in the internal market and where, in doing so, the investigation provides evidence that it actually or potentially negatively affects competition on the internal market. Whether there is a distortion on the internal market shall be determined on the basis of indicators, which may include the following:
Amendment 73 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) the nature of the subsidy, including an advantage that is economically equivalent to a financial contribution;
Amendment 74 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point d Amendment 75 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point e a (new) (ea) with reference to point (b), an advantage that is economically equivalent to financial contribution shall include policy measures enacted in a third country such as inadequately remunerated special or exclusive rights or a failure to comply with relevant minimum binding international environmental, social and labour requirements that are ratified in the legal international order.
Amendment 76 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point e a (new) (ea) market concentration in the market concerned, including short and medium-term trends; (eb) the frequency of economic activity or public procurement tenders in the internal markets;
Amendment 77 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point e a (new) (ea) compliance with conventions of the International Labour Organization and European environmental standards.
Amendment 78 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point e a (new) (ea) strategic autonomy
Amendment 79 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 (2) A foreign subsidy is unlikely to distort the internal market if: (a) its total amount is below EUR 5 million over any consecutive period of three fiscal years, or (aa) the market concentration on the relevant market is low or the market is contestable and the trend over the last 5 years does not indicate worsening the level of concentration; or (ab) the foreign subsidy is granted by the third country, which has in place a legislative measure for the review of subsidies that guarantee the equivalent level of competition protection. By 30 June 2023, the Commission shall publish the list of such countries. This list shall be regularly reviewed.
Amendment 80 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 (2) A foreign subsidy is unlikely to distort the internal market if its total amount is below
Amendment 81 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 (2) A foreign subsidy is unlikely to distort the internal market if its total amount is below EUR
Amendment 82 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 (2) A foreign subsidy is unlikely to distort the internal market if its total amount is below EUR
Amendment 83 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2a) The European Commission´s findings of subsidies benefitting third country producers in a given sector made in relevant and recent Trade Defence Instruments (TDIs) investigations, or subsidies documented in reports published by international intergovernmental organizations shall constitute sufficient evidence of distortive subsidies to operators in the countries and sectors concerned having met the relevant threshold.
Amendment 84 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2a) By 30 June 2023, the Commission shall publish the Guidelines providing further examples and clarification on how each indicator of distortion will be applied, including the types and purposes of subsidies that cause distortion in the internal market. The Guidelines shall be regularly updated.
Amendment 85 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2a) The Commission is empowered to adopt a delegated act to update the indicators referred to in paragraph 1.
Amendment 86 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 b (new) Amendment 87 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 4 (4) a foreign subsidy enabling an undertaking to submit an unduly advantageous tender, on the basis of which the undertaking would be awarded the public contract. (4a) a foreign subsidy in the form of export support measures such as export credit guarantees, breaching the OECD Arrangement on officially supported export credits; (4b) all foreign subsidy to beneficiaries active in sectors characterized by structural excess capacity; (4c) foreign subsidies to operators which have privileged and/or protected access to a significant non-EU market, especially if the non-EU market is the operator's domestic market;
Amendment 88 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 4 (4) a foreign subsidy enabling an undertaking to submit an unduly advantageous tender with the evidence based negative effect on the internal market, on the basis of which
Amendment 89 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 4 (4) a foreign subsidy or an advantage economically equivalent to a financial contribution enabling an undertaking to submit an unduly advantageous tender or abnormally low tender pursuant to Directive2014/24/EU, on the basis of which the undertaking would be awarded the public contract
Amendment 90 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 4 (4) a foreign subsidy enabling an undertaking to submit an unduly advantageous or abnormally low tender, on the basis of which the undertaking would be awarded the public contract.
Amendment 91 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 4 a (new) (4a) all export finance subsidies granted by countries that are not signatories to the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits.
Amendment 92 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 4 a (new) (4a) a foreign subsidy through lower social or environmental dumping practices, standards or weaker enforcement
Amendment 93 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 4 b (new) (4b) foreign subsidies to operators that have privileged or protected access to a significant non-EU market, especially if the non-EU market is the operator’s domestic market.
Amendment 94 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 (1) To remedy the distortion on the internal market actually or potentially caused by a foreign subsidy, the Commission
Amendment 95 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 (1) To remedy the distortion on the internal market actually or potentially caused by a foreign subsidy, the Commission may impose redressive measures based on an analysis of the impact of the subsidy on the internal market. The undertaking concerned may also offer commitments.
Amendment 96 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 2 (2) Commitments or redressive measures shall fully and effectively remedy the distortion caused by the foreign subsidy in the internal market. Redressive measures shall exclusively remedy the distortion caused by the foreign subsidy.
Amendment 97 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 2 (2) Commitments or redressive measures shall fully and effectively remedy the distortion actually or potentially caused by the foreign subsidy in the internal market.
Amendment 98 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 – introductory part (3) Commitments or redressive measures may consist of the following non-exhaustive list :
Amendment 99 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 – point b (b) reducing capacity or market presence notably by means of temporary market access restrictions, temporary restrictions in the supply of goods or services in the internal market where the related economic activity is distorted as a result of foreign subsidies, taking account of sectorial specificities;
source: 704.698
2022/02/03
ECON
289 amendments...
Amendment 100 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 31 (31) Below the notification thresholds, the
Amendment 101 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 31 (31) Below the notification thresholds, the Commission could require the notification of potentially subsidised concentrations that were not yet implemented or the notification of potentially subsidised bids prior to the award of a public contract, if it considers that the concentration or the bid would merit ex-ante review given their impact in the Union. The Commission should also have the possibility to carry out a review on its own initiative of already implemented concentrations or awarded public contracts. The Commission should publish a guidance on the criteria to require such a notification.
Amendment 102 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 32 a (new) (32 a) Notwithstanding any potential pre- notifications contacts, if undertakings that generated and aggregated turnover in the Union of at least EUR 500 million and received from third countries an aggregate financial contribution in the three years prior to notification of more than EUR 50 million, and where there are no special circumstances, the Commission should have the possibility to carry out a simplified procedure under which the Commission treats certain concentrations on the basis that they do not raise competition concerns and adopts and publishes a short-form decision declaring a concentration compatible with the internal market.
Amendment 103 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 32 a (new) (32 a) In the context of the ex-ante review mechanism for concentrations, concerned undertakings should have the possibility to request pre-notification consultations with the Commission based on good faith, with a view to avoiding over-compliance and excessive administrative burden for both the Commission and potentially concerned undertakings. The aim of those consultations should be to receive guidance on whether or not the formal thresholds for notification have been met. The Commission should ensure that undertakings are informed of this possibility to the broadest extent possible.
Amendment 104 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 33 (33) The need to address
Amendment 105 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 33 (33) The need to address distortive foreign subsidies is especially salient in public procurement, given its economic significance in the internal market and the fact that it is financed by taxpayer funds. The
Amendment 106 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 35 Amendment 107 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 37 (37) Taking into account the nature of the ex ante review mechanism for concentrations and public procurement awards, and the need for legal certainty regarding these specific transactions, a concentration or public procurement tender notified and assessed under the respective procedures cannot be reviewed again by the
Amendment 108 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 39 (39) In the interest of transparency and
Amendment 109 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 40 (40)
Amendment 110 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 41 (41) In cases where information marked by the undertaking as confidential or business secret does not seem to be covered by obligations of professional secrecy, it is appropriate to have a mechanism in place according to which the
Amendment 111 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 43 (43) The implementation of this Regulation by the Union should comply with Union law, the WTO Agreement and be consistent with commitments made under other trade and investment agreements to which the Union or the Member States are parties. This Regulation should be without prejudice to the development of multilateral rules to address distortive subsidies.
Amendment 112 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 46 (46) Where the
Amendment 113 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 48 (48) In order to ensure a level playing field on the internal market also in the long term, with a view to ensuring adequate coverage of cases investigated
Amendment 114 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 (1) This Regulation lays down rules and procedures for investigating foreign subsidies that distort the internal market and for redressing such distortions with a view to ensuring a fair level-playing field. Such distortions may arise with respect to any economic activity, and in particular in concentrations and public procurement procedures.
Amendment 115 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 (1) This Regulation lays down rules and procedures for investigating foreign subsidies that distort the internal market and for eventually redressing such distortions where detected. Such distortions may arise with respect to any economic activity, and in particular in concentrations and public procurement procedures.
Amendment 116 #
Proposal for a regulation Article premier – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 (new) This Regulation should also make it possible to check whether foreign subsidies pose a threat to Member State sovereignty, to gauge the impact of such subsidies on the proper functioning of democracy and on the plurality of information, and to prevent a harmful level of economic leverage from being obtained.
Amendment 117 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 2 (2) This Regulation addresses foreign subsidies
Amendment 118 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 2 (2) This Regulation addresses foreign subsidies
Amendment 119 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 2 (2) This Regulation addresses foreign subsidies granted to an undertaking engaging in an economic activity in the EU's internal market.
Amendment 120 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) The competent authority having the power to investigate and redress foreign subsidies that have a Union dimension and thereby distort the internal market is the European Commission. A Union dimension is established when a clear impact on the internal market has been recognised, as based on the notification thresholds listed in this Regulation.
Amendment 121 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) Foreign subsidies to undertakings supplying energy to Member States shall be exempt from this Regulation;
Amendment 122 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 2 b (new) (2 b) A national competent authority shall have the same powers where the investigated foreign subsidy has a distortive effect on the internal market but falls below the notification thresholds, or if the subsidy involves only one specific Member State, or where a Union dimension has not been established. In this Regulation the reference to the competent authority will be the investigative authority unless otherwise specifically indicated.
Amendment 123 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 2 c (new) (2 c) A structured communication network between investigative authorities shall be established.
Amendment 124 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 (1) For the purpose of this Regulation, a foreign subsidy shall be deemed to exist where a third country provides a financial contribution or an economically equivalent support which confers a benefit to an undertaking engaging in an economic activity in the internal market and which is limited, in law or in fact, to an individual undertaking or industry or to several undertakings or industries.
Amendment 125 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point a – introductory part (a) a financial contribution shall include inter alia:
Amendment 126 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point a – point i (i) the transfer of funds or liabilities, such as capital injections, grants, loans, loan guarantees, tailored lending conditions, fiscal incentives, setting off of operating losses, compensation for financial burdens imposed by public
Amendment 127 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point a – point iii a (new) (iii a) any regulatory intervention which favours certain undertakings or the production of certain goods and affects the profitability of some actors on their domestic markets.
Amendment 128 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point b – introductory part (b) the financial contribution or any other economically equivalent support provided by the third country shall include the financial contribution or any other economically equivalent support provided by:
Amendment 129 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point b – point ii (ii) foreign public entities, whose actions can be attributed to the third country, taking into account elements such as the characteristics of the entity, the legal and economic environment prevailing in the State in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the economy, such as central banks or public investment banks; or
Amendment 130 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point b a (new) (b a) support that is economically equivalent to financial contribution shall : i) refer to a policy action or non-action in a third country including inadequately remunerated special or exclusive rights as well as any selective exemption from or failure to ensure compliance with applicable rules, such as obligations relating to applicable environmental, social and labour law and standards;and ii) result in a benefit to an undertaking engaging in an economic activity in the internal market that is economically equivalent to the benefit conferred by a financial contribution referred to under point b).
Amendment 131 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point b a (new) (b a) The undertaking(s) concerned received from third countries an aggregate financial contribution in the three calendar years prior to notification of more than EUR50 million.
Amendment 132 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) The Commission is empowered to adopt a delegated act for the purpose of specifying the definition of economically equivalent support referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2(ba).
Amendment 133 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 a (new) Amendment 134 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – title Distortions on the internal market and the threat to Member State sovereignty
Amendment 135 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 – introductory part (1) A distortion on the internal market shall be deemed to exist where a foreign subsidy is liable to improve the competitive position of the undertaking concerned in the internal market and where, in doing so, it actually or potentially negatively affects competition on the internal market. Whether there is a distortion on the internal market shall be determined on the basis of indicators, which may include, inter alia, the following:
Amendment 136 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new) (c a) the sector concerned;
Amendment 137 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point d (d) the level and evolution of economic activity of the undertaking concerned on the internal market;
Amendment 138 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new) (d a) the level of economic activity of the undertaking concerned on the domestic market;
Amendment 139 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 a (new) (1a) A breach of Member State sovereignty shall be determined where: (a) one of the Member States reports to the Commission that a foreign subsidy is threatening its sovereignty; (b) a foreign subsidy, through the beneficial entity, is intended to restrict the quantity and quality of information, thereby undermining plurality; (c) that subsidy is likely to create or foster the creation of an entity capable solely by economic power of undermining the free exercise of democracy.
Amendment 140 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 (2) A foreign subsidy is unlikely to distort the internal market if: (a) its total amount is below EUR 5 million over any consecutive period of three fiscal years; or (b) the Commission has ascertained that the third country granting the foreign subsidy has in place a system for the review of subsidies that guarantees in law and in practice a level of protection against undue state intervention into market forces and unfair competition which is at least equivalent to the level within the Union and which effectively protects not only the market of the third country but also the internal market of the Union. A Commission decision ascertaining equivalence under point (b) of the first subparagraph shall be valid for three years and may be prolonged, if appropriate.
Amendment 141 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 (2) A foreign subsidy is unlikely to distort the internal market if its total amount is below
Amendment 142 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 (2) A foreign subsidy is unlikely to distort the internal market if
Amendment 143 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point a (new) (a) its total amount is below EUR 5 million over any consecutive period of three fiscal years;
Amendment 144 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point b (new) (b) the Commission has ascertained that the third country granting the foreign subsidy has in place a system for the review of subsidies that guarantees in law and in practice a level of protection against undue state intervention into market forces and unfair competition which is at least equivalent to the level within the Union and which effectively protects not only the market of the third country but also the internal market of the Union. A Commission decision ascertaining equivalence under point (b) of the first subparagraph shall be valid for three years and may be prolonged, if appropriate.
Amendment 145 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) The Commission shall publish guidelines on the application of this Article. Those guidelines shall be regularly updated, in close cooperation with the Member States, while keeping the European Parliament and the Council informed.
Amendment 146 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) The Commission shall publish guidelines on the application of this Article. Those guidelines shall be regularly updated, in close cooperation with the Member States, while keeping the European Parliament and the Council informed.
Amendment 147 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) The Commission is empowered to adopt a delegated act for the purpose of specifying and supplementing the indicators referred to in paragraph 1.
Amendment 148 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 a (new) Article 3 a The European Commission’s findings of subsidies benefitting third country producers in a given sector made in relevant and recent Trade Defence Instruments (TDIs) investigations, or subsidies documented in reports published by international intergovernmental organizations shall constitute sufficient evidence of distortive subsidies to operators in the countries and sectors concerned having met the relevant threshold.
Amendment 149 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – title Categories of foreign subsidies most likely to distort the internal market or breach Member State sovereignty
Amendment 150 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 1 (1) a foreign subsidy granted to an ailing undertaking,
Amendment 151 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 4 (4) a foreign subsidy enabling an undertaking to submit an unduly advantageous tender or an abnormally low tender as defined in the Directive 2014/24/EU, on the basis of which the undertaking would be awarded the public contract.
Amendment 152 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 4 a (new) (4 a) export credits that are not in line with the OECD Arrangement on officially supported export credits;
Amendment 153 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 Amendment 154 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 (1) The
Amendment 155 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission shall, where warranted, balance the short and long- term negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market with positive effects on the development of the relevant economic activity including any positive environmental or social externalities.
Amendment 156 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission shall, where warranted, balance the negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market with positive effects on the development of the relevant economic activity, where this economic activity is in line with the EU's policy goals.
Amendment 157 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 (2) The
Amendment 158 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission shall take into account the balancing between the negative and positive effects when deciding whether to impose redressive measures or to accept commitments, and the nature and level of those redressive measures or commitments. The Commission shall base its analysis on the general principles applied when assessing the compatibility of state aid with the single market.
Amendment 159 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission shall take into account the balancing between the negative
Amendment 160 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission shall take into account the balancing between the negative and positive effects when deciding whether to adopt a decision to initiate an in-depth investigation as provided for in Article 9, impose redressive measures or to accept commitments, and the nature and level of those redressive measures or commitments.
Amendment 161 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) The assessment referred to in paragraph 1 shall be disclosed on a dedicated webpage of the Commission. The Commission shall also provide for a justification on the same webpage whenever a balancing test is not carried out pursuant to paragraph 1.
Amendment 162 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts under Article 44 of this Regulation to specify how an investigative authority should apply this Article.
Amendment 163 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 b (new) (2 b) The Commission is empowered to adopt a delegated act for the purpose of specifying the methodology underlying the balancing assessment and in particular for the determination of positive effects referred to in paragraph 1 as well as criteria for outweighing effects.
Amendment 164 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 (1) To remedy the distortion on the internal market actually or potentially caused by a foreign subsidy, the
Amendment 165 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 (1) To remedy the distortion on the internal market actually or potentially caused by a foreign subsidy, the Commission
Amendment 166 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 (1) To remedy the distortion on the internal market actually or potentially caused by a foreign subsidy, the Commission, together with the Member States, may impose redressive measures. The undertaking concerned may also offer commitments.
Amendment 167 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 2 (2) Commitments or redressive measures shall fully and effectively remedy the distortion or breach of Member State sovereignty caused by the foreign subsidy in the internal market.
Amendment 168 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 – point h Amendment 169 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 – point h a (new) (h a) restricting to participate, directly or indirectly, in new public procurement or concession contract procedures in the internal market.
Amendment 170 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 – point h a (new) (h a) requiring the undertakings concerned to adapt their governance structure
Amendment 171 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 – point h a (new) (h a) prohibition of the award of a public contract.
Amendment 172 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 4 (4) The
Amendment 173 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 5 (5) If an undertaking offers commitments which fully and effectively remedy the distortion on the internal market, the
Amendment 174 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 5 (5) If an undertaking offers commitments which fully and effectively remedy the distortion on the internal market, the Commission
Amendment 175 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 5 (5) If an undertaking offers
Amendment 176 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 6 (6) Where the undertaking concerned proposes to repay the foreign subsidy including an appropriate interest rate, the
Amendment 177 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 7 Amendment 178 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 7 – paragraph 1 The Commission may on its own initiative examine information from any source regarding alleged distortive foreign subsidies. The Commission shall examine information submitted by Member States and social partners. A Member State that is in possession of evidence of the existence of a potentially distortive subsidy, may provide such evidence to the Commission. Each Member State and the Commission shall establish a contact point for the implementation of this Regulation. A secure system shall be provided by the Commission to support direct cooperation and exchange of information between the contact points and the Commission.
Amendment 179 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 7 – paragraph 1 The Commission may on its own initiative examine information from any source regarding alleged distortive foreign subsidies. Where a Member State is in possession of sufficient evidence of a foreign subsidy distorting the internal market, it may request to the Commission to review that evidence. The evidence shall be communicated to the Commission. The Commission shall examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open an in-depth investigation.
Amendment 180 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 7 – paragraph 1 a (new) Any Member State may call on the Commission to conduct an investigation into a foreign subsidy
Amendment 181 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 Amendment 182 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 2 – introductory part (2) Where the Commission, based on
Amendment 183 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 2 – point c (c) publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union, which, while respecting confidential company information, invites interested parties, Member States and the third country concerned to express their views in writing within a prescribed period of time
Amendment 184 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 3 (3) Where the Commission, after a preliminary assessment, concludes that there are no sufficient grounds to initiate the in-depth investigation, either because there is no foreign subsidy or because there are no indications of an actual or potential distortion on the internal market, it shall close the preliminary review
Amendment 185 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 3 a (new) (3a) In the course of the investigation launched by the Commission or other national partner authorities and in the absence of a final verdict confirming such suspicions, the company shall be presumed innocent and shall carry on its business as usual without being prejudiced in any way by the ongoing investigation.
Amendment 186 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 3 a (new) (3 a) By [the date of application of this Regulation], the Commission will publish guidance on the criteria to open such a procedure.
Amendment 187 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 9 Amendment 188 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 9 – paragraph 2 (2) Where the Commission finds that a foreign subsidy distorts the internal market pursuant to Articles 3 to 5, it may impose redressive measures (‘decision with redressive measures’) or it may require the company to remedy the situation urgently under strict supervision, within a specified period of time and subject to certain conditions.
Amendment 189 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 9 – paragraph 2 (2) Where the Commission finds that a foreign subsidy distorts the internal market pursuant to Articles 3 to 5, it
Amendment 190 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 Amendment 191 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point 1 (1) there are indications that a financial contribution constitutes a foreign subsidy and distorts the internal market;
Amendment 192 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point 2 (2) there is a serious risk of substantial
Amendment 193 #
(2a) there is a risk for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in that it may unfairly affect their competitive position on the market or result in significant damage to their business.
Amendment 194 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point 2 a (new) (2 a) Interim measures shall be limited in time. They may be prolonged where the indication of distortive effects or the serious risk of substantial and irreparable damage to competition on the internal market continue to exist.
Amendment 195 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point 2 a (new) (2a) if a foreign subsidy if likely to breach the sovereignty of a Member State
Amendment 196 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 Amendment 197 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission
Amendment 198 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point c a (new) (c a) respect the the principle of proportionality;
Amendment 199 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 5 a (new) Amendment 200 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 Amendment 201 #
(1)
Amendment 202 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission, systematically together with the authorities of the Member States concerned, may conduct the necessary inspections of undertakings.
Amendment 203 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission
Amendment 204 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 2 – introductory part (2)
Amendment 205 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 3 – introductory part (3) The undertaking concerned shall submit to inspections ordered by decision of the Commission. T
Amendment 206 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 5 Amendment 207 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 6 (6)
Amendment 208 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 7 Amendment 209 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 7 (7) Upon
Amendment 210 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 7 a (new) (7a) Where a Member State has reasons to suspect distortion of the internal market within its territory through the granting of foreign subsidies and does not have the necessary infrastructure, mechanisms and instruments to launch a thorough investigation, it may request the assistance of the European Commission.
Amendment 211 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 Amendment 212 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 1 In order to carry out the duties assigned to it by this Regulation, the Commission may conduct inspections in the territory of a third country, provided that the
Amendment 213 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 Amendment 214 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 1 – introductory part (1) The Commission
Amendment 215 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 2 (2) Where an undertaking or association of undertakings, a Member State or the third country has supplied incorrect or misleading information to the Commission, that information shall be disregarded and the appropriate penalties applied.
Amendment 217 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 1 – introductory part (1) The Commission, together with the Member States, may impose by decision fines and periodic penalty payments where an undertaking concerned or an association of undertakings, intentionally or negligently:
Amendment 218 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 1 – introductory part (1) The Commission
Amendment 219 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 2 (2) Fines imposed in the cases referred to in paragraph 1 shall not exceed
Amendment 220 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 3 (3) Periodic penalty payments imposed in the cases referred to in paragraph 1 shall not exceed
Amendment 221 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 5 – point a (a) fines not exceeding 10 % of the
Amendment 222 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 5 – point b (b) periodic penalty payments not exceeding 5% of the average daily
Amendment 223 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 16 Amendment 224 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 16 – paragraph 1 – introductory part The Commission
Amendment 225 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 17 – title Distortions on the internal market or breaches of Member State sovereignty by foreign subsidies in concentrations
Amendment 226 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 17 – paragraph 1 In a concentration, the assessment whether there is a distortion on the internal market within the meaning of Articles 3 or 4 shall be limited to the concentration at stake. Only foreign subsidies granted in the three calendar years prior to the conclusion of the agreement, the announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition of a
Amendment 227 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 17 – paragraph 1 In a concentration, the assessment whether there is a distortion on the internal market within the meaning of Articles 3 or 4 shall be limited to the concentration at stake. Only foreign subsidies granted in the
Amendment 228 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 – point a (a) the acquired undertaking or at least one of the merging undertakings is established in the Union and each generates an aggregate turnover in the Union of at least EUR 500 million; and
Amendment 229 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 – point a (a) the acquired undertaking or at least one of the merging undertakings is established in the Union and generates an aggregate turnover in the Union of at least EUR
Amendment 230 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 – point a (a) the acquired undertaking or at least one of the merging undertakings is established in the Union and generates an aggregate turnover in the Union of at least EUR 25
Amendment 231 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 – point a (a) the acquired undertaking or at least one of the merging undertakings is established in the Union and generates an aggregate turnover in the Union of at least
Amendment 232 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 – point b (b) all the undertakings concerned received from third countries an aggregate financial contribution in the three calendar years prior to notification of more than EUR 50 million.
Amendment 233 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 – point b (b) the undertakings concerned received
Amendment 234 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 – point b (b) the undertakings concerned received from third countries an aggregate financial contribution in the three calendar years prior to notification of more than EUR 25
Amendment 235 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 – point b (b) the undertakings concerned received from third countries an aggregate financial contribution in the three calendar years prior to notification of more than EUR 25
Amendment 236 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 – point b (b) the undertakings concerned received from third countries an aggregate financial contribution in the three calendar years prior to notification of more than EUR 25
Amendment 237 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 4 – point a (a) the joint venture itself or one of its parent undertakings is established in the Union and generates an aggregate turnover in the Union of at least EUR 25
Amendment 238 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 4 – point b (b) the joint venture
Amendment 239 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 4 – point b (b) the joint venture itself and its parent undertakings received from third countries an aggregate financial contribution in the three calendar years prior to notification of more than EUR 25
Amendment 240 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 4 – point b (b) the joint venture itself and its parent undertakings received from third countries an aggregate financial contribution in the three calendar years prior to notification of more than EUR 25
Amendment 241 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 4 a (new) (4 a) By way of derogation from paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article, sector- specific aggregate turnovers in the Union are taken into account for a “notifiable concentration” to be deemed to arise in the field of emerging technologies.
Amendment 242 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 (1) Notifiable concentrations above the thresholds outlined in Article 18 shall be notified to the Commission prior to their
Amendment 243 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 a (new) (1 a) Undertakings may request pre- notification consultations with the Commission based on good faith, the exclusive aim of which shall be to establish whether or not the formal thresholds for notification have been met.
Amendment 244 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 a (new) (1 a) Undertakings may request pre- notification consultations with the Commission based on good faith, the exclusive aim of which shall be to establish whether or not the formal thresholds for notification have been met.
Amendment 245 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 2 (2) The undertakings concerned may also notify the proposed concentration when they demonstrate
Amendment 246 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 3 a (new) (3 a) Prior to the notification of a concentration within the meaning of paragraph 1, the persons or undertakings referred to in paragraph 2 may inform the Commission, by means of a reasoned submission, that the concentration may significantly affect competition in a market within a Member State which presents all the characteristics of a distinct market and should therefore be examined, in whole or in part, by that Member State. The Commission shall transmit this submission to all Member States without delay.The Member State referred to in the reasoned submission shall, within 15 working days of receiving the submission, express its agreement or disagreement as regards the request to refer the case.Where that Member State takes no such decision within this period, it shall be deemed to have agreed. Unless that Member State disagrees, the Commission, where it considers that such a distinct market exists, and that competition in that market may be significantly affected by the concentration, may decide to refer the whole or part of the case to the competent authorities of that Member State with a view to the application of that State's national competition law. The decision whether or not to refer the case in accordance with the third subparagraph shall be taken within 25 working days starting from the receipt of the reasoned submission by the Commission.The Commission shall inform the other Member States and the persons or undertakings concerned of its decision.If the Commission does not take a decision within this period, it shall be deemed to have adopted a decision to refer the case in accordance with the submission made by the persons or undertakings concerned. If the Commission decides, or is deemed to have decided, pursuant to the third and fourth subparagraphs, to refer the whole of the case, no notification shall be made pursuant toparagraph1 and national competition law shall apply. Article 23a (6) to (9) shall apply mutatis mutandis.
Amendment 247 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 4 Amendment 248 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 4 (4) If the undertakings concerned fail to meet their obligation to notify, the Commission
Amendment 249 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 4 (4) If the undertakings concerned fail to meet their obligation to notify, the Commission
Amendment 250 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 5 (5) The Commission may request the prior notification of any concentration which is not a notifiable concentration within the meaning of Article 18 at any time prior to its implementation where the Commission suspects that the undertakings concerned may have benefitted from foreign subsidies in the three years prior to the concentration or where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that an undertaking will benefit from foreign subsidies in the year following the concentration. That concentration shall be deemed to be a notifiable concentration for the purposes of this Regulation.
Amendment 251 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 5 (5) The Commission may request the prior notification of any concentration which is not a notifiable concentration within the meaning of Article 18 at any time prior to its implementation where the Commission suspects that the undertakings concerned may have benefitted from foreign subsidies in the three years prior to the concentration. That concentration shall be deemed to be a notifiable concentration for the purposes of this Regulation. By [the date of application of this Regulation], the Commission shall publish guidance on the criteria to require such a notification.
Amendment 252 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 22 – paragraph 1 The aggregate financial contribution to an undertaking concerned shall be calculated by adding together the respective financial contributions in the form of distortive State aid received from third countries by all undertakings referred to in Article 21(4), points (a) to (e).
Amendment 253 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 22 – paragraph 1 The aggregate f
Amendment 254 #
(8 a) Each preliminary review or in- depth investigation is communicated to the Member States that may be concerned
Amendment 255 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 23 a (new) Amendment 256 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 25 – paragraph 2 (2) In addition, the Commission may impose fines by decision on undertakings
Amendment 257 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 25 – paragraph 2 (2) In addition, the Commission may impose by decision on undertakings concerned fines not exceeding 1 % of the
Amendment 258 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 25 – paragraph 3 – introductory part (3) The Commission may impose by decision on undertakings concerned fines not exceeding 10 % of the
Amendment 259 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – title Distortions on the internal market by foreign subsidies or breaches of Member State sovereignty in public procurement procedures
Amendment 260 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 (2) For the purpose of Article 28, a notifiable foreign financial contribution in an EU public procurement procedure shall be deemed to arise where the estimated value of that public procurement is equal or greater than EUR 250 million and the undertaking concerned received from third countries an aggregate financial contribution in the three calendar years prior to notification of more than EUR 50 million.
Amendment 261 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 (2) For the purpose of Article 28, a notifiable foreign financial contribution in an EU public procurement procedure shall be deemed to arise where the estimated value of that public procurement is equal or greater than EUR
Amendment 262 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 (2) For the purpose of Article 28, a notifiable foreign financial contribution in an EU public procurement procedure shall be deemed to arise where the estimated value of that public procurement is equal or greater than EUR
Amendment 263 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 1 (1) When submitting a tender or a request to participate in a public procurement procedure, undertakings shall either notify to the contracting authority or the contracting entity all foreign financial contributions received
Amendment 264 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 2 (2) The obligation to notify foreign financial contributions under this paragraph shall extend to economic operators, groups of economic operators referred to in Article 26(2) of Directive 2014/23/EU, Article 19(2) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 37(2) of Directive 2014/25/EU, main subcontractors and main suppliers. A subcontractor or supplier shall be deemed to be main where their participation ensures key elements of the contract performance and in any case where the economic share of their contribution exceeds 3
Amendment 265 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 4 (4) The contracting authority or the contracting entity shall transfer the notification to the
Amendment 266 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 5 (5) Where the undertaking, economic operators or groups of economic operators referred to in paragraph 1 fail to notify a foreign financial contribution,
Amendment 267 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 6 (6) Where the
Amendment 268 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 2 (2) The
Amendment 269 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission shall carry out a preliminary review no later than
Amendment 270 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) In both procedures under Articles 19 and 28, the Commission shall involve the Member States in the examination procedure and shall maintain a regular exchange of information with them.
Amendment 271 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 3 (3) The
Amendment 272 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 4 (4) The
Amendment 273 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 4 (4) The Commission may adopt a decision closing the in-depth investigation no later than
Amendment 274 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 30 – paragraph 1 (1) Where, after an in-depth investigation, the
Amendment 275 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 30 – paragraph 2 (2) Where the undertaking concerned does not offer commitments or where the
Amendment 276 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 30 – paragraph 3 (3) Where, after an in-depth investigation, the
Amendment 277 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 31 – paragraph 2 (2) If a decision to open an in-depth investigation is taken pursuant to Article 29(3), the contract shall not be awarded to an undertaking submitting a notification under Article 28 until the
Amendment 278 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 31 – paragraph 3 (3) The contract may be awarded to an undertaking submitting a declaration under Article 28 before the
Amendment 279 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 31 – paragraph 4 (4) Where the
Amendment 280 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 31 – paragraph 5 (5) Where the
Amendment 281 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 31 – paragraph 6 (6) In all cases, the contracting authority or the contracting entity shall inform the
Amendment 282 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 31 – paragraph 8 (8) Each time limit shall begin on the working day following that of the receipt of the notification or of the adoption of the relevant
Amendment 283 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 32 – paragraph 1 (1) The
Amendment 284 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 32 – paragraph 2 (2) In addition, the
Amendment 285 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 32 – paragraph 3 (3) The
Amendment 286 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 32 – paragraph 3 (3) The Commission may impose by decision on the undertakings concerned fines not exceeding 10 % of their aggregate turnover in the preceding business year where they
Amendment 287 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 33 – paragraph 1 (1) A financial contribution notified in the context of a concentration under Articles 18 and 19 may be relevant and assessed again in relation to another economic activity.
Amendment 288 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 33 – paragraph 1 (1) A
Amendment 289 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 33 – paragraph 2 (2) A financial contribution notified in the context of a public procurement procedure under Articles 27 and 28 may be relevant and assessed again in relation to another economic activity.
Amendment 290 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 34 – paragraph 1 (1) Where the information available substantiates a reasonable suspicion that foreign subsidies above the thresholds established in this regulation, in a particular sector, for a particular type of economic activity or based on a particular subsidy instrument may distort the internal market, the
Amendment 291 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 34 – paragraph 1 (1) Where the information available substantiates a reasonable suspicion that foreign subsidies in a particular sector, for a particular type of economic activity or based on a particular subsidy instrument may distort the internal market, the Commission
Amendment 292 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 34 – paragraph 2 (2) The
Amendment 293 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 34 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission
Amendment 294 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 34 – paragraph 3 (3) The
Amendment 295 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 34 – paragraph 3 (3) The Commission
Amendment 296 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 35 – paragraph 1 (1) The powers
Amendment 297 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 35 – paragraph 2 (2) The powers of the Commission to impose fines and periodic penalty payments under Articles 15, 25 and 32 shall be subject to a limitation period of
Amendment 298 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 35 – paragraph 2 (2) The powers
Amendment 299 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 35 – paragraph 3 (3) The powers of the
Amendment 300 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 36 – paragraph 1 (1)
Amendment 301 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 36 – paragraph 2 (2)
Amendment 302 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 36 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) The Commission shall publish either in full or in a summary form all decisions adopted by the different investigative authorities.
Amendment 303 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 36 – paragraph 3 (3) When publishing summary notices and decisions,
Amendment 304 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 37 – paragraph 1 (1) Decisions adopted pursuant to Articles 8, 9, 15, 24(3), 25, 30(1) and 32 shall be addressed to the undertakings or to the association of undertakings concerned. The
Amendment 305 #
(2) Decisions adopted pursuant to Article 30(2) and (3) shall be addressed to the contracting authority or the contracting entity concerned. The
Amendment 306 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 38 – paragraph 1 (1) The
Amendment 307 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 38 – paragraph 2 (2) The
Amendment 308 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 42 – paragraph 1 – point e Amendment 309 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 42 – paragraph 1 – point f Amendment 310 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 42 – paragraph 1 – point g Amendment 311 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point a Amendment 312 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new) (a a) specifying the methodologies and indicators referred to under Articles 2, 3 and 5;
Amendment 313 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point b Amendment 314 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point c Amendment 315 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new) (c a) specifying the methodologies and indicators referred to under Articles 2, 3 and 5.
Amendment 316 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new) (c a) determining the structure of a communication network between the different competent authorities;
Amendment 317 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point c b (new) (c b) establishing detailed rules on the calculation of time limits;
Amendment 318 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point c c (new) (c c) determining the conditions and time limits for proposing commitments under Article 30;
Amendment 319 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point c d (new) Amendment 320 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point c e (new) (c e) specifying the application of the balancing tool outlined in Article 5.
Amendment 321 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 45 Amendment 322 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 46 – paragraph 1 Amendment 323 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 46 – paragraph 1 Amendment 324 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 46 – paragraph 1 Amendment 325 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 46 – paragraph 1 Amendment 326 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 46 – paragraph 1 a (new) Where the report referred to in paragraph 1 recommends amendments to this Regulation and where the Commission considers it appropriate in light of its practice during the application of this Regulation and taking into account the effectiveness of application, the report may be accompanied by relevant legislative proposals, including: a) to amend the thresholds for notifications as set out in Articles 18 and 27; b) to exempt certain categories of undertakings concerned from the obligation to notify pursuant to Articles 19 and 28, especially where the practice of the Commission enables the identification of economic activities in respect of which foreign subsidies are unlikely to distort the internal market; c) to establish specific thresholds for notifications for certain economic sectors, especially where the practice of the Commission enables the identification of economic activities in respect of which foreign subsidies are more likely to distort the internal market; d) to amend the timelines for review and in-depth investigations as set out in Articles 24 and 29; e) to repeal this Regulation if the Commission considers that multilateral rules to address distortive subsidies have rendered this Regulation fully redundant.
Amendment 327 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 47 – paragraph 1 (1) This Regulation shall apply to foreign subsidies granted in the
Amendment 328 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 47 – paragraph 3 (3)
Amendment 40 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 1 (1)
Amendment 41 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 1 (1) A strong, open and competitive internal market enables
Amendment 42 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2) At the same time, undertakings might receive subsidies from third countries, that provide public funds which are then used, for instance, to finance economic activities in the internal market in any sector of the economy, such as participation in public procurement tenders, or acquisitions of undertakings, including those with strategic assets such as critical infrastructure and innovative technologies. Such subsidies, including monetary financing of an economy to artificially lower the production costs, are currently not subject to Union State aid rules.
Amendment 43 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2) At the same time, undertakings might receive subsidies from third countries
Amendment 44 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2) At the same time, undertakings might receive subsidies from third countries, that provide public funds which are then used, for instance, to finance economic activities in the internal market in any sector of the economy, such as participation in public procurement tenders, or acquisitions of undertakings, including those with strategic assets such as critical infrastructure and innovative technologies. Such subsidies are currently not subject to Union State aid rules. Similar concerns apply in relation to state-owned enterprises.
Amendment 45 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 a (new) (2a) Points out that competition policies were originally intended to prevent foreign and domestic powers from being able to undermine national sovereignty or the democratic exercise of popular sovereignty.
Amendment 46 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 3 (3) Foreign subsidies can distort the internal market
Amendment 47 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 3 (3) Foreign subsidies can distort the internal market and undermine the level playing field for various economic activities in the Union. This could in particular occur in the context of concentrations entailing a change of control over Union undertakings, where such concentrations are fully or partially financed through foreign subsidies, or if undertakings benefiting from foreign subsidies are awarded public contracts in the Union.
Amendment 48 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 4 (4) No existing Union instruments address distortions or breaches of Member State sovereignty caused by foreign subsidies. Trade defence instruments enable the Commission to act when subsidised goods are imported into the Union, but not when foreign subsidies take the form of subsidised investments, or when services and financial flows are concerned. Under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the Union has the possibility to initiate State-to-State dispute settlement against certain foreign subsidies granted by WTO members and limited to goods.
Amendment 49 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 4 (4)
Amendment 50 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 (5) It is therefore necessary to
Amendment 51 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 (5) It is therefore necessary to complement existing Union instruments with a new tool to effectively deal with distortions in the internal market caused by foreign subsidies
Amendment 52 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 (5) It
Amendment 53 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 6 (6) Rules and procedures to investigate foreign subsidies that actually or
Amendment 54 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 7 Amendment 55 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 7 (7) To ensure a level playing field throughout the internal market and consistency in the application of this Regulation, the Commission should
Amendment 56 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 7 (7) To ensure a level playing field throughout the internal market and consistency in the application of this Regulation, the Commission should be the
Amendment 57 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 7 (7) To ensure a level playing field throughout the internal market and consistency in the application of this Regulation, the Commission should
Amendment 58 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 7 a (new) (7 a) The competent authority having the power to investigate and redress foreign subsidies that have a Union dimension, and thereby distort the internal market, is the European Commission. A Union dimension is established when a clear impact on the internal market has been recognised, as based on the notification thresholds listed in this Regulation. National competent authorities should be empowered to investigate and redress the foreign subsidies, if the subsidy has a distortive effect on the internal market without meeting the notification thresholds listed in this Regulation, or if the investigated foreign subsidy involves only one specific Member State. In the latter case, the Commission may also refer a notification to the competent authority of the Member State concerned. In this Regulation the reference to the competent authority will be the investigative authority unless otherwise specifically indicated.
Amendment 59 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 7 b (new) (7 b) A structured communication network between investigative authorities should be established.
Amendment 60 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) There should be a financial contribution or an economically equivalent support provided, directly or indirectly, by the public authorities of a third country. The financial contribution or the economically equivalent support may be granted through public or private entities. Whether a public entity provides a financial contribution should be determined on a case-by-case basis with due regard to elements such as the characteristics of the relevant entity and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the economy. Financial contribution
Amendment 61 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) There should be a financial contribution provided, directly or indirectly, by the public authorities of a third country. The financial contribution may be granted through public or private entities. Whether a public entity provides a financial contribution should be determined on a case-by-case basis with due regard to elements such as the characteristics of the relevant entity and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the economy. Financial contributions in the form of a foreign subsidy may also be granted through a private entity if its actions can be attributed to the third country.
Amendment 62 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) There should be a financial contribution, or loan, provided, directly or indirectly, by the public authorities of a third country. The financial contribution may be granted through public or private entities. Whether a public entity provides a financial contribution should be determined on a case-by-case basis with due regard to elements such as the characteristics of the relevant entity and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the economy. Financial contributions may also be granted through a private entity if its actions can be attributed to the third country.
Amendment 63 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) There should be a financial contribution provided, directly or indirectly, by the public authorities of a third country. The financial contribution may be granted through public or private entities. Whether a public entity provides a financial contribution should be determined on a case-by-case basis with due regard to elements such as the characteristics of the relevant entity and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the economy. Financial contributions may also be granted through a private entity if its actions can be attributed to the third country. Corporate bonds bought by a foreign central bank should also be considered as financial contributions.
Amendment 64 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 (10) Such a financial contribution or economically equivalent support should confer a benefit to an undertaking engaging in an economic activity in the internal market. A financial contribution or economically equivalent support that benefit
Amendment 65 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 (10) Such a financial contribution should confer a benefit to an undertaking engaging in an economic activity in the internal market.
Amendment 66 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 (10) Such a financial contribution, or loan, should confer a benefit to an undertaking engaging in an economic activity in the internal market. A financial contribution that benefits an entity engaging in non-
Amendment 67 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 a (new) (10 a) Such a financial contribution should also include a situation where the beneficiary has privileged access to its domestic market, for example through exclusive or special rights or equivalent measures, for the provision of goods or services in the third country conferred by national law or the benefit of a domestic captive market due to the prevailing legal and economic conditions. This could lead to a competitive advantage that could be leveraged in the EU internal market and thereby exacerbate the distortive effect of any subsidy.
Amendment 68 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 a (new) (11 a) Foreign subsidies to undertakings supplying energy to the Member States should be exempt from this Regulation;
Amendment 69 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 12 (12) Once the existence of a foreign subsidy is established, the Commission, together with the Member States, should assess whether the foreign subsidy distorts the internal market. Unlike State aid granted by a Member State, foreign subsidies are not generally prohibited. Subsidies in the form of export financing may be a cause of particular concern because of their distortive effects. This is not the case if such financing is provided in line with the OECD Arrangement on
Amendment 70 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 12 (12) Once the existence of a foreign subsidy is established, the Commission should assess whether the foreign subsidy distorts the internal market. Unlike State aid granted by a Member State, foreign subsidies are not generally prohibited. Subsidies in the form of export financing may be a cause of particular concern because of their distortive effects. This is not the case if such financing is provided in line with the OECD Arrangement on officially supported export credits. The Commission should assess on a case-by- case basis whether a foreign subsidy distorts the internal market. If the threshold for notification is not met, the case can be referred by the Commission to the national competition authorities of the relevant Member States.
Amendment 71 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 (13) The lack of transparency concerning many foreign subsidies and the complexity of the commercial reality may make it difficult to unequivocally identify or quantify the impact of a given foreign subsidy on the internal market and equally difficult for companies to identify all the relevant subsidies. To determine the distortion, it therefore appears necessary to use a non-exhaustive set of indicators. When assessing the extent to which a foreign subsidy can improve the competitive position of the undertaking concerned and, in doing so, actually or potentially negatively affects competition in the internal market, the
Amendment 72 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 (14) When applying these indicators, the Commission could take into account different elements such as the size of the subsidy in absolute terms or in relation to the size of the market or to the value of the investment. For instance, a concentration, in the context of which a foreign subsidy covers a substantial part of the purchase price of the target, is likely to be distortive. Similarly, foreign subsidies covering a substantial part of the estimated value of a contract to be awarded in a public procurement procedure are likely to cause distortions. If a foreign subsidy is granted for operating costs, it seems more likely to
Amendment 73 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 (14) When applying these indicators, the
Amendment 74 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 15 a (new) (15 a) Goods and services from third countries entering the internal market should respect core labour and environmental standards in public procurement.
Amendment 75 #
(16) The
Amendment 76 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 (16) The Commission should take into account the positive effects of the foreign subsidy on the development of the relevant subsidised economic activity, where the subsidised activity is in line with EU policy objectives. The Commission should weigh these positive effects against the negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market in order to determine, if
Amendment 77 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 (16) The Commission should take into account the positive effects of the foreign subsidy on the development of the relevant subsidised economic activity. The Commission should weigh these positive effects against the negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market in order to determine, if applicable, the appropriate redressive measure or to accept commitments. The balancing may also lead to the conclusion that no redressive measures should be imposed. Categories of foreign subsidies that are deemed most likely to distort the internal market
Amendment 78 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 (16) The Commission should take into account the positive effects of the foreign subsidy on the development of the relevant subsidised economic activity. The Commission should weigh these positive effects against the negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market in order to determine, if applicable, the appropriate redressive measure or accept commitments. The balancing may also lead to the conclusion that no redressive measures should be imposed. Categories of foreign subsidies that are deemed most likely to distort the internal market are less likely to have more positive than negative effects. The Commission should develop guidelines on the application of the balancing test.
Amendment 79 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 17 Amendment 80 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 17 (17) Where the Commission examines a foreign subsidy on its own initiative, it should have the power to impose redressive measures on an undertaking to remedy any distortion or breach of Member State sovereignty caused by a foreign subsidy in the internal market. Redressive measures should be proportionate and suitable to remedy the
Amendment 81 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 18 (18) The undertaking concerned should have the possibility to offer commitments in order to remedy the distortion or breach of Member State sovereignty caused by the foreign subsidy. If the Commission, together with the Member States, considers that the commitments offered fully and effectively remedy the distortion, it could accept them and make them binding by decision.
Amendment 82 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 18 (18) The undertaking concerned should have the possibility to offer commitments in order to remedy the distortion caused by the foreign subsidy. If the
Amendment 83 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 19 (19) The undertaking concerned could offer to repay the subsidy, together with appropriate interest. The
Amendment 84 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 20 (20) Unless the undertakings concerned offer commitments that would fully and effectively remedy the identified distortion or breach of Member State sovereignty, the Commission should have the power to prohibit a concentration or the award of a public contract before it takes place. Where the concentration has already been implemented, notably in cases where no prior notification was required because the notification thresholds were not reached, the distortion may nonetheless be so substantial that it cannot be remedied by behavioural or structural measures or by the repayment of the subsidy. In such cases, the Commission, together with the Member States, could decide to remedy the distortion by ordering the undertakings concerned to dissolve the concentration.
Amendment 85 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 20 (20) Unless the undertakings concerned offer commitments that would fully and effectively remedy the identified distortion, the
Amendment 86 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 (21) The
Amendment 87 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 (21) The Commission should have the power, on its own initiative, to examine any information on foreign subsidies. To this end, it is necessary to establish a procedure consisting of two steps, namely a preliminary review and an in-depth investigation. The Commission should publish guidance on the criteria to open such a procedure.
Amendment 88 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 22 (22) The
Amendment 89 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 22 (22) The Commission should be given adequate investigative powers to gather all necessary information. It should therefore have the power to request information from any undertaking or association of
Amendment 90 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 23 (23) Furthermore, where necessary to restore competition in the internal market immediately and to prevent irreparable harm, the
Amendment 91 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 24 (24) In all cases where, as a result of the preliminary review, the
Amendment 92 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 24 (24) In all cases where, as a result of the preliminary review, the Commission has sufficient indications of the existence of a foreign subsidy distorting the internal market, the Commission should have the power to launch an in-depth investigation to gather additional relevant information to assess the foreign subsidy, and to allow the interested parties to exercise their rights of defence. Such in-depth investigations should be concluded swiftly in order not to put on hold the underlying economic activities for too long.
Amendment 93 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 25 (25) The
Amendment 94 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 26 (26) The Commission should have appropriate instruments to ensure the effectiveness of commitments and redressive measures. If the undertaking concerned does not comply with a decision with commitments, a decision imposing redressive measures, or a decision ordering interim measures, the Commission, together with the Member States, should have the power to impose fines and periodic penalty payments.
Amendment 95 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 26 (26) The
Amendment 96 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 27 (27) In order to ensure the correct and effective application of this Regulation, the
Amendment 97 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 28 (28) Given the potentially significant impact of concentrations on the internal market and Member State sovereignty, the Commission should have the power, upon notification, to examine information on foreign financial contributions in the context of a proposed concentration. Undertakings should not be allowed to implement the concentration prior to the conclusion of the Commission’s review.
Amendment 98 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 28 (28) Given the potentially significant impact of concentrations on the internal market, the
Amendment 99 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 29 (29) This examination by the
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2022/02/11
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478 amendments...
Amendment 100 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 (21) The Commission should have the power, on its own initiative, to examine any information on foreign subsidies. To this end, it is necessary to establish a procedure consisting of two steps, namely a preliminary review and an in-depth investigation. The Commission should be able to act upon information received from any relevant source, including Member States and undertakings or their respective trade associations. If an EU wide trade association, representing 15 % or more of the sector concerned, is asking the Commission to launch an investigation, the Commission shall do so.
Amendment 101 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 (21) The Commission should have the power, on its own initiative, to examine any information on foreign subsidies. The Commission should be able to act on the basis of information received from all relevant sources, including Member States in particular but also companies, professional associations, local authorities, unions and non-governmental organisations. To this end, it is necessary to establish a procedure consisting of two steps, namely a preliminary review and an in-depth investigation.
Amendment 102 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 (21) The Commission should have the power, on its own initiative, to examine any information on foreign subsidies. To this end, it is necessary to establish a procedure consisting of two steps, namely a preliminary review and an in-depth investigation. Additionally, the Commission should act upon information received from any relevant source, including Member States, regions, undertakings, whistle-blowers within foreign undertakings, and civil society organisations.
Amendment 103 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 (21) The Commission should have the power, on its own initiative, to examine any information on foreign subsidies. The Commission should be able to act upon information received from any relevant source, including Member States, Member States’ trade associations and EU-wide social partners. To this end, it is necessary to establish a procedure consisting of two steps, namely a preliminary review and an in-depth investigation.
Amendment 104 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 (21) The Commission should have the power, on its own initiative, to examine any information on foreign subsidies. To this end, it is necessary to establish a procedure consisting of two steps, namely a preliminary review and an in-depth investigation. The Commission should be able to act upon information received from any relevant source, including Member States and trade associations.
Amendment 105 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 (21) The Commission should have the power, on its own initiative, to examine any information on foreign subsidies, received from any relevant source, including Member States.. To this end, it is necessary to establish a procedure consisting of two steps, namely a preliminary review and an in-depth investigation.
Amendment 106 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 (21) The Commission should have the power, on its own initiative, to examine any information on foreign subsidies. To this end, it is necessary to establish a procedure consisting of two steps, namely a preliminary review and an in-depth investigation. The Commission shall publish guidance on the criteria to open such a procedure.
Amendment 107 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 a (new) (21 a) A contact point should be established by the Commission so that Member States or interested parties such as undertakings or trade associations can share information regarding actual or potential cases of distortion on the internal market with the Commission. The Commission can use this information for the relevant procedures under this Regulation, including the ex officio review.
Amendment 108 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 22 (22) The Commission should be given
Amendment 109 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 22 (22) The Commission should be given adequate investigative powers to gather all necessary information. It should therefore have the power to request information from any undertaking or association of undertakings throughout the whole procedure. However, the obligation to provide information to the Commission should in no way jeopardize the essential national security interests of the Member States. In addition, the Commission should have the power to impose fines and periodic penalty payments for failure to timely supply the requested information or for supplying incomplete, incorrect or misleading information. The Commission could also address questions to Member States or to third countries. Furthermore, the Commission should have the power to make fact-finding visits at the Union premises of the undertaking, or, subject to agreement by the undertaking and the third country concerned, at the premises of the undertaking in the third country. The Commission should also have the power to take decisions on the basis of facts available if the undertaking in question does not cooperate.
Amendment 110 #
(22) The Commission should be given adequate investigative powers to gather all necessary information. It should therefore have the power to request information from any undertaking or association of undertakings throughout the whole procedure. The Commission should be able to use information from any available source, including from Member States and interested parties such as undertakings and trade associations. In addition, the Commission should have the power to impose fines and periodic penalty payments for failure to timely supply the requested information or for supplying incomplete, incorrect or misleading information. The Commission could also address questions to Member States or to third countries. Furthermore, the Commission should have the power to make fact-finding visits at the Union premises of the undertaking, or, subject to agreement by the
Amendment 111 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 22 (22) The Commission should be given adequate investigative powers and resources to gather all necessary information. It should therefore have the power to request information from any undertaking or association of
Amendment 112 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 25 a (new) (25 a) The Parliament should be invited to the in-depth investigation, with the provision that the members invited will not disclose any information during such investigation.
Amendment 113 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 26 (26) The Commission should have appropriate instruments to ensure the effectiveness of commitments and redressive measures.
Amendment 114 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 26 (26) The Commission should have appropriate instruments to ensure the effectiveness of commitments and redressive measures. If the undertaking concerned does not comply with a decision with commitments, a decision imposing redressive measures, or a decision ordering interim measures, the Commission should have the power to impose fines and periodic penalty payments of a value high enough to put a stop to the potential or actual distortion of the internal market, so that they have a deterrent effect.
Amendment 115 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 26 (26) The Commission should have appropriate instruments to ensure the effectiveness of commitments and redressive measures. If the undertaking concerned does not comply with a decision with commitments, a decision imposing redressive measures, or a decision ordering interim measures, the Commission should have the power to impose fines and periodic penalty payments. The Commission shall take into account cases of repeated non-compliance when imposing such fines and periodic penalty payments.
Amendment 116 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 26 (26) The Commission should have appropriate instruments to ensure the effectiveness of commitments and redressive measures. If the undertaking concerned does not comply with a decision with commitments, a decision imposing redressive measures, or a decision ordering interim measures, the Commission should have the power to impose fines and periodic penalty payments. The Commission should inform the Parliament accordingly.
Amendment 117 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 27 (27) In order to ensure the correct and effective application of this Regulation, the Commission should have the power to revoke a decision and adopt a new one, where the decision was based on incomplete, incorrect or misleading information, or where an undertaking acts contrary to its commitments or the redressive measures imposed. The Parliament should be duly informed of the whole procedure.
Amendment 118 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 28 (28) Given the potentially significant impact of concentrations on the internal market, the Commission should have the power, upon notification, to examine information on foreign
Amendment 119 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 28 (28) Given the potentially significant impact of concentrations on the internal market, the Commission should have the power, upon notification, to examine information on foreign
Amendment 120 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 30 (30) It is necessary to strike a balance between effective protection of the internal market and the need to limit the administrative burden on undertakings subject to this Regulation. Therefore, only concentrations meeting combined thresholds as defined in this Regulation based on the size of the turnover in the Union and the size of the subsidy should be subject to mandatory prior notification. The effectiveness of the threshold for the notification obligation for concentrations should be reviewed one year after the entry into force of this Regulation.
Amendment 121 #
(30) It is necessary to strike a balance between effective protection of the internal market and the need to limit the administrative burden on undertakings subject to this Regulation. Therefore, only concentrations meeting combined thresholds as defined in this Regulation based on the size of the turnover in the Union and the size of the subsidy should be subject to mandatory prior notification. SMEs shall be exempted from this prior notification requirement in all cases.
Amendment 122 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 31 (31) Below the notification thresholds, the Commission
Amendment 123 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 31 (31) Below the notification thresholds, the Commission
Amendment 124 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 31 (31) Below the notification thresholds, the Commission
Amendment 125 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 31 (31) Below the notification thresholds, the Commission itself or upon request from a Member State, could require the notification of potentially subsidised concentrations that were not yet implemented or the notification of potentially subsidised bids prior to the award of a public contract, if it considers that the concentration or the bid would merit ex-ante review given their impact in the Union. The Commission should also have the possibility to carry out a review on its own initiative of already implemented concentrations or awarded public contracts.
Amendment 126 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 31 (31) Below the notification thresholds, the Commission could require the notification of potentially subsidised concentrations that were not yet implemented or the notification of potentially subsidised bids prior to the award of a public contract, at the request of the competent national authorities or if it considers that the concentration or the bid would merit ex-ante review given their impact in the Union. The Commission should also have the possibility to carry out a review on its own initiative of already
Amendment 127 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 31 (31) Below the notification thresholds, the Commission could require the notification of potentially subsidised concentrations that were not yet implemented or the notification of potentially subsidised bids prior to the award of a public contract, if it considers that the concentration or the bid would merit ex-ante review given their impact in the Union. The Commission should also have the possibility to carry out a review on its own initiative of already implemented concentrations or awarded public contracts. The Commission shall provide instructions on the requirements that must be met in order receive such a notification.
Amendment 128 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 32 (32) When reviewing a concentration, the assessment of whether there is a distortion in the internal market should be limited to the concentration at stake, and
Amendment 129 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 32 (32) When reviewing a concentration, the assessment of whether there is a distortion in the internal market should be limited to the concentration at stake, and only foreign subsidies granted in the three years prior to the concentration or known subsidies that have already been established and shall become effective following the concentration should be considered in the assessment.
Amendment 130 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 32 (32) When reviewing a concentration, the assessment of whether there is a distortion in the internal market should be limited to the concentration at stake, and
Amendment 131 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 32 (32) When reviewing a concentration, the assessment of whether there is a distortion in the internal market should be limited to the concentration at stake, and only foreign subsidies granted in the
Amendment 132 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 32 a (new) (32 a) In the context of the ex ante review mechanism for concentrations, concerned undertakings may request pre-notification consultations with the Commission based on good faith, with the exclusive aim of receiving guidance on whether or not the formal thresholds for notification are met.
Amendment 133 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 33 (33) The need to address distortive foreign subsidies is especially salient in public procurement, given its economic significance in the internal market and the fact that it is financed by taxpayer funds. The Commission should have the power, upon notification prior to the award of a public contract or concession, to examine information on
Amendment 134 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 33 (33) The need to address distortive foreign subsidies is especially salient in public procurement, given its economic significance in the internal market and the fact that it is financed by taxpayer funds. The Commission should have the power, upon notification prior to the award of a public contract or concession, to examine information on foreign
Amendment 135 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 34 (34) When a foreign financial contribution is notified in the context of a public procurement procedure, the assessment should be limited to that procedure. The assessment shall include foreign financial contributions in the three years prior to the notification and known subsidies that have already been established and shall become effective following the procurement procedure.
Amendment 136 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 34 (34) When a foreign financial contribution is notified in the context of a public procurement procedure, the assessment should be limited to that procedure, as well as to future subsidies that the Commission has been able to know, that have been already decided by the third country's government and that will be effective within one year following the concentration.
Amendment 137 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 34 (34) When a foreign financial contribution is notified in the context of a public procurement procedure, the assessment should be limited to that procedure and only foreign subsidies granted in the three years prior to the notification should be considered in the assessment.
Amendment 138 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 34 (34) When a foreign
Amendment 139 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 35 (35) It should be ensured that the principles governing public procurement, notably proportionality, non- discrimination, equal treatment, and transparency
Amendment 140 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 (36) Foreign subsidies or any other non-financial measure with an equivalent effect that enable an undertaking to submit a tender which is unduly advantageous in relation to the works, supplies or services concerned should be deemed to actually or potentially create a distortion in a public procurement
Amendment 141 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 a (new) (36 a) The effectiveness of the threshold for the notification obligation for procurement should be reviewed one year after the entry into force of this Regulation.
Amendment 142 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 37 (37) Taking into account the nature of the ex ante review mechanism for concentrations and public procurement awards, and the need for legal certainty regarding these specific transactions, a concentration or public procurement tender notified and assessed under the respective procedures cannot be reviewed again by the Commission on its own initiative.
Amendment 143 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 37 (37) Taking into account the nature of the ex ante review mechanism for concentrations and public procurement awards, and the need for legal certainty regarding these specific transactions, a concentration or public procurement tender notified and assessed under the respective procedures cannot be reviewed again by
Amendment 144 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 37 (37) Taking into account the nature of the ex ante review mechanism for concentrations and public procurement awards, and the need for legal certainty regarding these specific transactions, a concentration or public procurement tender notified and assessed under the respective procedures cannot be reviewed again by the Commission on its own initiative. Financial contributions or advantage of which the Commission was informed through the notification procedure may however also be relevant outside the concentration or procurement procedure. In order to gather information on foreign subsidies, the Commission should have the possibility to launch investigations regarding specific sectors of the economy, particular types of economic activity or the use of particular
Amendment 145 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 37 a (new) (37 a) Whereas this Regulation should cover all economic sectors of the internal market, the ex officio review could in particular take into account sectors that are of strategic interest to the Union, such as sectors related to national security or public order.
Amendment 146 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 37 b (new) (37 b) The Commission should be able to use information obtained from the market investigation for the relevant procedures under this Regulation, including the ex officio review.
Amendment 147 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 38 Amendment 148 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 39 (39) In the interest of transparency and legal certainty, it is appropriate to publish either in full or in a summary form all decisions adopted by the Commission, as well as in-depth investigations and balancing assessments.
Amendment 149 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 43 (43) The implementation of this Regulation by the Union should comply with Union law, be consistent with
Amendment 150 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 43 (43) The implementation of this Regulation by the Union should comply with Union law
Amendment 151 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 43 a (new) (43 a) In order to encourage the development of multilateral rules to address distortive subsidies and their root causes, it is necessary to set up a third country dialogue. When the Commission discovers or suspects the existence of systemic distortive foreign subsidies, it should be able to engage in a dialogue with the third country in question to explore options aimed at obtaining the cessation or modification of the distortive subsidies with a view to eliminating their distortive effects in the internal market. Where a bilateral agreement between the Union and a third country provides for a consultation mechanism that covers systemic distortive foreign subsidies falling within the scope of this Regulation, this mechanism should be used to facilitate the third country dialogue. The Commission should also be able to endeavour to obtain the cessation or modification of the distortive foreign subsidies by raising the matter in any relevant international forum or through cooperation with any other third country affected by the same systemic distortive subsidies, or with any interested third country. This dialogue should not preclude the Commission from opening or continuing investigations under this Regulation, nor should it constitute an alternative to redressive measures. The Commission should, without undue delay, inform the European Parliament and the Council of relevant developments.
Amendment 152 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 47 (47) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission in accordance with Article 291 of the Treaty. Those powers should be exercised to set out the form and content of notifications of concentrations as well as of financial contributions in the context of public procurement procedures, details of disclosure, form and content of transparency requirements, calculation of time-limits, conditions and time-limits for commitments and detailed rules on the procedural steps concerning investigations regarding public procurement procedures.
Amendment 153 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 47 (47) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission in accordance with Article 291 of the Treaty. Those powers should be exercised to set out the form and content of notifications of concentrations as well as of f
Amendment 154 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 48 (48) In order to ensure a level playing
Amendment 155 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 48 (48) In order to ensure a level playing field on the internal market also in the long term, with a view to ensuring adequate coverage of cases investigated both through notifications as well as ex officio, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty should be delegated to the Commission in respect of
Amendment 156 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 48 (48) In order to ensure a level playing field on the internal market also in the long term, with a view to ensuring adequate coverage of cases investigated both through notifications as well as ex officio, the Commission should review the functioning and effectiveness of this Regulation at the latest three years after its entry into force. The Commission should present its findings in a report to the European Parliament and the Council. The power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty should be delegated to the Commission in respect of amending the notification thresholds for concentrations and for public procurement procedures, including the use of different thresholds for certain sectors, exempting certain categories of undertakings from the notification obligations under this Regulation, as well as amending the time limits for the preliminary review and the in-depth investigations of notified concentrations or notified financial contributions in the context of a public procurement procedure.
Amendment 157 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 48 (48) In order to ensure a level playing field on the internal market also in the long term, with a view to ensuring adequate coverage of cases investigated both through notifications as well as ex officio, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty should be delegated to the Commission in respect of specifying economically equivalent support measure to a financial contribution, establishing criteria for identifying actions that can be plausibly attributed to third countries, specifying the methodology underlying the balancing assessment, adopting a methodology for determining that a serious risk of substantial and irreparable damage to competition arises on the internal market, amending the notification thresholds for concentrations and for public procurement procedures, exempting certain categories of undertakings from the notification obligations under this Regulation, as well as amending the time limits for the preliminary review and the in-depth investigations of notified concentrations or
Amendment 158 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 48 (48) In order to ensure a level playing field on the internal market also in the long term, with a view to ensuring adequate coverage of cases investigated both through notifications as well as ex officio, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty should be delegated to the Commission in respect of amending the notification thresholds for concentrations and for public procurement procedures, exempting certain categories of undertakings from the notification obligations under this Regulation, as well as amending the time limits for the preliminary review and the in-depth investigations of notified concentrations or notified financial contributions in the context of a public procurement procedure. In relation to financial contributions in the context of a public procurement procedure, the power to adopt such acts should be exercised in a way that takes into account the interests of SMEs. It is of particular importance that the Commission carries out analysis during the preparations of those acts, mainly including the quantified cost- benefit analysis and ex-ante analysis on impact on investments and consumers welfare. It is also of particular importance that the Commission carries out appropriate consultations during the preparations of those acts, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making47 . In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council should receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically should have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.
Amendment 159 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 48 (48) In order to ensure a level playing field on the internal market also in the long term, as well as the Union's strategic autonomy, with a view to ensuring adequate coverage of cases investigated both through notifications as well as ex officio, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty should be delegated to the Commission in respect of amending the notification thresholds for concentrations and for public procurement procedures, exempting certain categories of undertakings from the notification obligations under this Regulation, as well as amending the time limits for the preliminary review and the in-depth investigations of notified concentrations or notified financial contributions in the context of a public procurement procedure, after the Parliament has been duly informed. In relation to financial contributions in the context of a public procurement procedure, the power to adopt such acts should be exercised in a way that takes into account the interests of SMEs. It is of particular importance that the Commission carries out appropriate consultations during the preparations of those acts, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the
Amendment 160 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 48 (48) In order to ensure a level playing field on the internal market also in the long term, with a view to ensuring adequate coverage of cases investigated both through notifications as well as ex officio, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty should be delegated to the Commission in respect of amending the notification thresholds for concentrations and for public procurement procedures, exempting certain categories of undertakings from the notification obligations under this Regulation, as well
Amendment 161 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 48 a (new) (48 a) The Commission, taking into account the work undertaken by the Parliament and the Council, should evaluate the scope, functioning and effectiveness of this Regulation within three years after its entry into force. The Parliament could then ask a revision of this Regulation through its annual report on the implementation of the common commercial policy.
Amendment 162 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 49 (49) Where a concentration is notifiable pursuant to this Regulation, financial contributions to any of the parties to the concentration granted in the
Amendment 163 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 49 (49) Where a concentration is notifiable pursuant to this Regulation, f
Amendment 164 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 2 (2) This Regulation addresses foreign subsidies
Amendment 165 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 2 (2) This Regulation addresses foreign subsidies granted conferring an advantage to an undertaking engaging in an economic activity in the
Amendment 166 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 (1) For the purpose of this Regulation, a foreign subsidy shall be deemed to exist where a third country provides a financial contribution or any other advantage which confers a benefit to an undertaking engaging in an economic activity in the internal market
Amendment 167 #
(1) For the purpose of this Regulation, a foreign subsidy shall be deemed to exist where a third country provides a financial contribution or any other advantage which confers a benefit to any undertaking engaging in an economic activity in the internal market
Amendment 168 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 (1) For the purpose of this Regulation, a foreign subsidy or any other measure with an equivalent effect shall be deemed to exist where a third country provides a financial or non-financial contribution which confers a benefit to an undertaking engaging in an economic activity in the internal market and which is limited, in law or in fact, to an individual undertaking or industry or to several undertakings or industries.
Amendment 169 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 (1) For the purpose of this Regulation, a foreign subsidy shall be deemed to exist where a third country provides a financial contribution or an economically equivalent support measure which confer
Amendment 170 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 a (new) (1 a) other advantages shall include regulatory requirements which are lower than those set in the Union as well as all economic benefits that could not be obtained on normal market conditions, such as:
Amendment 171 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point a – introductory part (a) a financial contribution shall include, inter alia:
Amendment 172 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point a – introductory part (a) a financial contribution shall include, inter alia:
Amendment 173 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point a – introductory part (a) a financial contribution shall include, in a non-exhaustive manner:
Amendment 174 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point a – point i (i) the transfer of funds or liabilities, such as capital injections, grants, loans, loan guarantees, fiscal incentives, setting off of operating losses, compensation for financial burdens imposed by public authorities, debt forgiveness, debt to equity swaps or rescheduling, as well as price transfers from a parent company under the control of a foreign entity as referred to in points (i) and (ii) of paragraph 2(b);
Amendment 175 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point a – point i (i) the transfer of funds or liabilities, such as capital injections, grants, loans, loan guarantees, fiscal incentives, tax exemptions, setting off of operating losses, compensation for financial burdens imposed by public authorities, debt forgiveness, debt to equity swaps or rescheduling;
Amendment 176 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point a – point ii (ii) the foregoing of revenue that is otherwise due
Amendment 177 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point a – point iii (iii) the provision of goods or services or the purchase of goods and services; with the exception of the purchase of goods and services based on public procurement contracts awarded after a competitive tendering procedure abiding by the principles of WTO Agreement on Government Procurement; or
Amendment 178 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point a – point iii (iii) the provision of goods or services or the purchase of goods
Amendment 179 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point a – point iii a (new) (iii a) the full or partial exemption, remission, or deferral of charges or taxes paid or payable, including environmental or social welfare charges or taxes;
Amendment 180 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point a – point iii a (new) (iii a) any financial advantage in any form whatsoever funded directly or indirectly through state resources of the third country;
Amendment 181 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point a – point iii a (new) (iii a) (iii a) the benefit of a domestic captive market in the third country, such as a monopoly position
Amendment 182 #
(a a) A support measure that is economically equivalent to a financial contribution shall result in a benefit to an undertaking engaging in an economic activity in the internal market that is economically equivalent to the benefit conferred by a financial contribution referred to under point 2(a) and it shall refer to a policy action or non-action in a third country including: (i) inadequately remunerated special or exclusive rights; (ii) conditions in a domestic captive market in the third country that can be attributed to the legal and economic environment prevailing in that country and that result in the de jure or de facto exclusion of competitors originating in the EU; (iii) any selective exemption from or failure to ensure compliance with applicable rules, such as obligations relating to environmental, social and labour law and standards;
Amendment 183 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point a a (new) Amendment 184 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point b – introductory part (b) the financial contribution or an economically equivalent support measure provided by the third country shall include the financial contribution or an economically equivalent support measure provided by:
Amendment 185 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point b – introductory part (b) the financial contribution or any other advantage provided by the third country shall include the financial contribution or advantage provided by:
Amendment 186 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point b – introductory part (b) the financial contribution or any other advantage provided by the third country shall include the financial contribution or advantage provided by:
Amendment 187 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point b – point ii (ii) foreign public entities, whose actions can be plausibly attributed to the third country, taking into account elements such as the characteristics of the entity, the legal and economic environment prevailing in the State in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the economy and in particular whether the subsidy is provided by a non-market economy; or
Amendment 188 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point b – point iii (iii) any private entity whose actions can be attributed to the third country, taking into account all relevant circumstances, or whose actions cannot clearly be demonstrated to be independent of government policies.
Amendment 189 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point b – point iii (iii) any private entity whose actions can be plausibly attributed to the third country, taking into account all relevant circumstances.
Amendment 190 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point b a (new) (b a) The Commission shall also consider as a financial contribution any privileged access of an undertaking to its own domestic market, such as, but not only, exclusive rights of entry, or lower administrative barriers. The Commission shall assess this type of financial contribution on a case-by-case basis.
Amendment 191 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point b b (new) (b b) The Commission shall also assess whether the undertaking that has received a financial contribution from its third country of origin has a history of other distortive practices, such as dumping, or a history of violations on human rights, especially when it refers to forced labour and child labour. This history shall also be taken into account by the Commission as complementary indicators. The Parliament shall flag it through its annual report on the implementation of the common commercial policy.
Amendment 192 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) For the purpose of this Regulation, other financial and competitive advantages shall be deemed to exist when: (i) financial relations with public undertakings are not structured at arms’ length or are not in line with normal market conditions in the market concerned;or (ii) exclusive or special rights have been granted explicitly or de facto to one or more undertakings who subsequently leverage those exclusive or special rights by off-setting costs or losses incurred on the European internal market by increased turnover or profits on the captive markets where those exclusive or special rights apply.
Amendment 193 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) The Commission is empowered to adopt a delegated act for the purpose of specifying the definition of financial contribution, the definition of economically equivalent support measure, as well as for establishing criteria for identifying actions that can be plausibly attributed to third countries as referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article.
Amendment 194 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 b (new) (2 b) For the purpose of this Regulation, where the Commission has well-founded evidence of the existence of significant distortions in a third country or a sector in a third country, public undertakings from this country, which are directly or indirectly state owned or controlled, shall be presumed having received distortive foreign subsidies in the absence of proof of the contrary.
Amendment 195 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 b (new) (2 b) For the purpose of this Regulation, where the Commission has well-founded evidence of the existence of significant distortions in a third country or a sector in a third country, public undertakings from this country, which are directly or indirectly state owned or controlled, shall be presumed having received distortive foreign subsidies in the absence of proof of the contrary.
Amendment 196 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 a (new) Article 2 a For the purpose of this Regulation, where the Commission has well-founded evidence of the existence of significant distortions in a third country or a sector in a third country, public undertakings from this country, which are directly or indirectly state owned or controlled, shall be presumed having received distortive foreign subsidies in the absence of proof of the contrary.
Amendment 197 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 – introductory part (1) A distortion on the internal market shall be deemed to exist where a foreign subsidy is liable to improve the competitive position of the undertaking concerned in the internal market and where, in doing so, it actually or potentially negatively affects competition on the internal market. Whether there is a distortion on the internal market shall be determined on the basis of indicators, which may include, inter alia, the following:
Amendment 198 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 – introductory part (1) A distortion on the internal market shall be deemed to exist where a foreign subsidy is liable to improve the competitive position of the undertaking concerned in the internal market and where, in doing so, it actually or potentially negatively affects competition on the internal market. Whether there is a distortion on the internal market shall be determined on the basis of indicators, which
Amendment 199 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point c (c) the situation of the undertaking and the markets concerned. For a subsidiary of a foreign company established outside the Union, the situation of the parent company in its respective market;
Amendment 200 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point c (c) the situation of the undertaking, including its size, and the markets concerned;
Amendment 201 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point d (d) the level of economic activity of the undertaking concerned on the internal market, including of any subsidiaries of that undertaking on the internal market;
Amendment 202 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point d (d) the level and evolution of economic activity of the undertaking concerned on the internal market;
Amendment 203 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new) (d a) the level of economic activity of that undertaking on its domestic market;
Amendment 204 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point e a (new) (e a) a history of other distortive practices, such as dumping, or a history of violations on human rights, especially when it refers to forced labour and child labour.
Amendment 205 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 Amendment 206 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 (2) A foreign subsidy is unlikely to distort the internal market if: (a) its total amount is below EUR 5 million over any consecutive period of three fiscal years, or (b) the foreign subsidy is granted by the third country, which has in place a legislative measure for the review of subsidies that guarantee the equivalent level of competition protection. By 30 June 2023, the Commission shall publish the list of such countries. This list shall be regularly reviewed.
Amendment 207 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 (2) A foreign subsidy is unlikely to distort the internal market if its total amount is below EUR
Amendment 208 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 (2) A foreign subsidy is unlikely to distort the internal market if its total amount is below EUR
Amendment 209 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 (2) A foreign subsidy is unlikely to distort the internal market if its total amount is below
Amendment 210 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 (2) A foreign subsidy is unlikely to distort the internal market if its total amount is below EUR 5 million over any consecutive period of
Amendment 211 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) The European Commission's findings of subsidies benefitting third country producers in a given sector made in relevant and recent Trade Defence Instruments (TDIs) investigations, or subsidies documented in reports published by international intergovernmental organizations shall constitute sufficient evidence of distortive subsidies to operators in the countries and sectors concerned having met the relevant threshold.
Amendment 212 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) By 30 June 2023, the Commission shall publish guidelines providing further examples and clarification on how each indicator of distortion will be applied, including the types and purposes of subsidies that cause distortion in the internal market. The guidelines shall be regularly updated.
Amendment 213 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) To ensure efficiency and transparency, the Commission shall publish guidelines on the application of this Article. Those guidelines shall be regularly updated, in close cooperation with the Member States, while keeping the European Parliament informed.
Amendment 214 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) A foreign subsidy is unlikely to distort the internal market if its total amount is below EUR 5 million over any consecutive period of three fiscal years, and that undertaking is established in a third country.
Amendment 215 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) The Commission is empowered to adopt a delegated act for the purpose of supplementing the indicators referred to in paragraph 1.
Amendment 216 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 b (new) (2 b) By 30 June 2023 the Commission shall publish a report on the possibility of introduction of an online tool for the indicative assessment of foreign subsidies, stating the risk level which is expected based on the provided data for quantitative indicators.
Amendment 217 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 b (new) (2 b) The Commission shall make available guidelines on the application of this Article.
Amendment 218 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 2 (2) a foreign subsidy in the form of an unlimited guarantee for debts or liabilities of the undertaking, that is to say without any limitation as to the amount or the duration of such guarantee or a guarantee provided below market costs;
Amendment 219 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 4 (4) a foreign subsidy enabling an undertaking to submit an unduly advantageous tender, on the basis of which the undertaking would be awarded the public or private contract.
Amendment 220 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 4 a (new) (4 a) all export financing subsidies granted by countries which are not signatories to the OECD Arrangement on officially supported export credits where they cause a distortion in the internal market; all foreign subsidies to beneficiaries active in sectors: - characterized by structural excess capacity; - featuring high-tech and/or dual-use products to a significant extent;or - designated as strategic by the government providing the subsidies.
Amendment 221 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 4 a (new) (4 a) all export financing subsidies granted by third countries which are not signatories to the OECD Arrangement on officially supported export credits where they cause a distortion in the internal market;
Amendment 222 #
(4 a) a foreign subsidy compensating for the operating costs of an undertaking, enabling that undertaking to offset its operating losses and provide goods and services at price levels that are not economically justifiable.
Amendment 223 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 4 a (new) (4a) Any non-financial measure with an equivalent effect to a subsidy for the beneficiary
Amendment 224 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 4 b (new) (4 b) all foreign subsidy to beneficiaries active in sectors which are characterized by structural excess capacity; featuring high-tech and/or dual-use products to a significant extent; or are designated as strategic by the government providing the subsidies.
Amendment 225 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 4 c (new) (4 c) foreign subsidies to operators which have privileged and/or protected access to a significant non-EU market, especially if the non-EU market is the operator's domestic market.
Amendment 226 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new) a foreign subsidy from countries which are not signatories to the OECD arrangement on officially supported export credits;
Amendment 227 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new) the transfer of a foreign subsidy to a subsidiary of the undertaking established in the internal market;
Amendment 228 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 b (new) a foreign subsidy in sectors with structural overcapacity;
Amendment 229 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 (1)
Amendment 230 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 (1)
Amendment 231 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission shall
Amendment 232 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission shall, where warranted, balance, both short and long- term, the negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market with positive effects on the development of the relevant economic activity, including positive environmental and social externalities providing a contribution to EU policy objectives.
Amendment 233 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission shall, where warranted, balance the negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market with positive effects on the development of the relevant economic activity, based on the contribution of a foreign subsidy to the fulfilment of the objectives of the EU policies in the field concerned.
Amendment 234 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission shall, where warranted, balance the negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market with positive effects on the development of the relevant economic activity, taking into account the contribution of a foreign subsidy to the objectives of Union policies in the field concerned.
Amendment 235 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission shall, where warranted, balance the negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market with positive effects on the development of the relevant economic activity. The positive effects shall contribute to the achievement of the objectives of Union policies.
Amendment 236 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission shall, where warranted, balance the negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market with positive effects on the development of the relevant economic activity and on other EU policy objectives.
Amendment 237 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission shall, where warranted, balance the negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market with positive effects on the development of the relevant economic activity. The Commission shall duly inform the Parliament and the Council.
Amendment 238 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission shall take into account the balancing between the negative and positive effects when deciding whether to impose redressive measures or to accept commitments, and the nature and level of those redressive measures or commitments. The general objective of tackling distortions created by foreign subsidies, in particular those which may endanger the preservation of a strong industrial base in the Union with sustainable and diversified supply chains, should be given special consideration.
Amendment 239 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission shall take into account the balancing between the negative and positive effects when deciding whether to impose redressive measures or to accept commitments, and the nature and level of those redressive measures or commitments.
Amendment 240 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission shall take into account the balancing between the negative and positive effects when deciding whether to impose redressive measures or to accept commitments, and the nature and level of those redressive measures or commitments. The Commission will publish guidance on how to perform the balancing exercise by the date of application of this Regulation.
Amendment 241 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission shall take into account the balancing between the negative and positive effects when deciding whether to adopt a decision to initiate an in-depth investigation as provided for in Article 9, to impose redressive measures or to accept commitments, and the nature and level of those redressive measures or commitments.
Amendment 242 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission shall take into account the balancing between the negative and positive effects when deciding whether to impose redressive measures or to accept commitments, and the nature and level of those redressive measures or commitments. The Commission shall duly inform the Parliament and the Council.
Amendment 243 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) The Commission shall carry out a full, thorough and timely consultation of relevant Union industries affected by the distortions. The Commission may - in close cooperation with Member States and relevant stakeholders and industries affected by the distortions - publish guidelines on the application of this article, in order to further specify what constitutes a negative effect and the indicators used in the before-mentioned evaluation. The Parliament and the Council shall regularly be informed.
Amendment 244 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) The balancing assessment referred to in paragraph 1 shall be disclosed on a dedicated webpage of the Commission. The Commission shall also provide for a justification on the same webpage whenever a balancing test is not carried out pursuant to paragraph 1 and shall carry out, where warranted, a consultation with Member States, Member States’ trade associations and EU-wide social partners.
Amendment 245 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) The Commission shall make available guidelines on the criteria that are used for the balancing between the negative and the positive effects of a foreign subsidy.
Amendment 246 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 a (new) Amendment 247 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) The Commission shall undertake such assessment in close cooperation with Member States and the European Parliament.
Amendment 248 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 b (new) (2 b) By … [the date of application of this Regulation], the Commission shall publish guidelines on the application of this Article. Those guidelines shall be developed jointly with the European Parliament and the Council. The guidelines shall be regularly updated in close cooperation with the Member States and the European Parliament.
Amendment 249 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 b (new) (2 b) The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated act for the purpose of specifying the methodology underlying the balancing assessment and in particular for the determination of positive effects referred to in paragraph 1 as well as criteria for outweighing effects.
Amendment 250 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 (1) To remedy the distortion on the internal market actually or potentially caused by a foreign subsidy, the Commission
Amendment 251 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 (1) To remedy the distortion on the internal market actually or potentially caused by a foreign subsidy, the Commission
Amendment 252 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 (1)
Amendment 253 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 (1) To remedy the distortion on the internal market actually or potentially caused by a foreign subsidy, the Commission may impose redressive measures. The undertaking concerned may also offer
Amendment 254 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 – introductory part (3) Commitments or redressive measures
Amendment 255 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 – introductory part (3) Commitments or redressive measures may consist of the following non-exhaustive list: :
Amendment 256 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 – introductory part (3) Commitments or redressive measures may consist of the following non-exhaustive list:
Amendment 257 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 – introductory part (3) Commitments or redressive measures may consist, inter alia, of the following:
Amendment 258 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 – introductory part (3) Commitments or redressive measures may, inter alia, consist of the following:
Amendment 259 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 – point a (a) offering access under fair and non- discriminatory conditions to an infrastructure or facility that was acquired or supported by the distortive foreign subsidies unless such fair and non- discriminatory access is already provided for by legislation in force in the Union;
Amendment 260 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 – point b (b) reducing capacity or market presence notably by means of temporary market access restrictions, temporary restrictions in the supply of goods or services in the internal market where the related economic activity is distorted as a result of foreign subsidies, taking into account sectorial specificities;
Amendment 261 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 – point h a (new) (h a) commit to redress its history of other distortive practices, such as dumping, or its history of violations on human rights, especially when it refers to forced labour and child labour;
Amendment 262 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 – point h a (new) Amendment 263 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 – point h a (new) (h a) exclusion from future procurement procedures;
Amendment 264 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 4 (4) The Commission
Amendment 265 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 4 (4) The Commission
Amendment 266 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 5 (5) If an undertaking offers commitments which fully and effectively remedy the distortion on the internal market, the Commission may accept them and
Amendment 267 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 5 (5) If an undertaking offers commitments which fully and effectively remedy the distortion on the internal market, the Commission
Amendment 268 #
(5) If an undertaking offers commitments which fully and effectively remedy the distortion on the internal market, the Commission
Amendment 269 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 5 (5) If an undertaking offers commitments which fully and effectively remedy the distortion on the internal market, the Commission
Amendment 270 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 6 (6) Where the undertaking concerned proposes to repay the foreign subsidy including an appropriate interest rate, the Commission
Amendment 271 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 6 (6) Where the undertaking concerned proposes to repay the foreign subsidy including an appropriate interest rate, the Commission
Amendment 272 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 6 (6) Where the undertaking concerned proposes to repay the foreign subsidy including an appropriate interest rate, the Commission
Amendment 273 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 6 (6) Where the undertaking concerned proposes to repay the foreign subsidy including an appropriate interest rate, the Commission
Amendment 274 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 6 (6) Where the undertaking concerned proposes to repay the foreign subsidy including an appropriate interest rate, the Commission shall accept such repayment as commitment if it can ascertain that the repayment is transparent and effective, while taking into account the risk of circumvention, provided that the Commission considers that the distortion caused in the internal market will be fully corrected by the repayment of the subsidy.
Amendment 275 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 6 a (new) (6 a) When choosing whether to accept commitments offered by the undertaking or which is the most appropriate and effective redressive measure to adopt, the Commission shall thoroughly consult affected Union industries, taking into account their sectoral specificities.
Amendment 276 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 7 – paragraph 1 1. The Commission may on its own initiative examine information from any source regarding alleged distortive foreign subsidies. 2.The Commission shall hand the ex officio procedure over to the competent authorities of the Member States if the company receiving the subsidy or other benefit with an equivalent effect has a turnover of under EUR 250 000 000. 3. The provisions of Articles 8, 9, 11 and 12 of this Regulation shall be devolved to the competent authorities of the Member States if the turnover of the companies receiving the subsidy or other benefit with an equivalent effect is under EUR 250 000 000.
Amendment 277 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 7 – paragraph 1 The Commission may on its own initiative examine information from any source
Amendment 278 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 7 – paragraph 1 The Commission may on its own initiative examine information from any source
Amendment 279 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 7 – paragraph 1 The Commission may on its own initiative or upon request examine information from any source
Amendment 280 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 7 – paragraph 1 The Commission may on its own initiative or upon request from a Member State or from the Union industry examine information from any source regarding alleged distortive foreign subsidies.
Amendment 281 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 7 – paragraph 1 The Commission may on its own initiative or at the request of the competent national authorities examine information from any source regarding alleged distortive foreign subsidies.
Amendment 282 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 7 – paragraph 1 The Commission
Amendment 283 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 7 – paragraph 1 The Commission may on its own initiative examine substantiated information from any source regarding alleged distortive foreign subsidies. The Commission shall examine substantiated information submitted by Member States, Member States’ trade associations and EU-wide social partners.
Amendment 284 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 7 – paragraph 1 The Commission may on its own initiative examine information from any source regarding alleged distortive foreign subsidies, including from Member States and interested parties such as undertakings and trade associations.
Amendment 285 #
The Commission may on its own initiative examine information from any source, including Member States and trade associations, regarding alleged distortive foreign subsidies.
Amendment 286 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 7 – paragraph 1 a (new) Additionally, the Commission should act upon information received from any relevant source, including Member States, regions, undertakings, whistle-blowers within foreign undertakings, and civil society organisations.
Amendment 287 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 1 – introductory part (1) The Commission shall seek all the information it considers necessary to assess, on a preliminary basis, whether the financial contribution or the economically equivalent support measure under examination constitutes a foreign subsidy and whether it distorts the internal market. To that end, the Commission may in particular:
Amendment 288 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 1 – introductory part (1) The Commission shall seek all the information it considers necessary to assess, on a preliminary basis, whether the financial contribution under examination constitutes a foreign subsidy and whether it distorts the internal market. To that end, the Commission
Amendment 289 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 1 – introductory part (1) The Commission shall seek all the information it considers necessary to assess, on a preliminary basis, whether the financial contribution or advantage under examination constitutes a foreign subsidy and whether it distorts the internal market. To that end, the Commission may in particular:
Amendment 290 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new) (aa) where applicable, use information provided by the national authorities in support of their request;
Amendment 291 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 2 – point b (b) inform the undertaking concerned and the competent authorities of the Member State in which it has its registered office; and
Amendment 292 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 2 – point b (b) inform the undertaking concerned and the competent authorities of the Member State in which it is registered; and
Amendment 293 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 2 – point b (b) inform the undertaking concerned, Member States and the European Parliament; and
Amendment 294 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 2 – point c a (new) (c a) hear the interested parties which have made a written request within the period prescribed in the notice published in the Official Journal of the European Union showing that they are an interested party likely to be affected by the result of the proceedings and that there are particular reasons why they should be heard.
Amendment 295 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 2 – point c a (new) (c a) Where appropriate, set interim measures in accordance with article 10
Amendment 296 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) The Parliament shall be invited to the in-depth investigation, with the provision that the Members of the European Parliament invited shall not disclose any information during such investigation.
Amendment 297 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 3 (3) Where the Commission, after a preliminary assessment, concludes that there are no sufficient grounds to initiate the in-depth investigation, either because there is no foreign subsidy or because there are no indications of an actual or potential distortion on the internal market, it shall close the preliminary review and inform the undertaking
Amendment 298 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 3 (3) Where the Commission, after a preliminary assessment, concludes that there are no sufficient grounds to initiate the in-depth investigation, either because there is no foreign subsidy or because there are no indications of an actual or potential distortion on the internal market, it shall close the preliminary review and inform the undertaking
Amendment 299 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 3 (3) Where the Commission, after a preliminary assessment, concludes that there are no sufficient grounds to initiate the in-depth investigation, either because there is no foreign subsidy or because there are no indications of an actual or potential distortion on the internal market, it shall close the preliminary review and inform the undertaking concerned and the competent national authorities.
Amendment 300 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 3 (3) Where the Commission, after a preliminary assessment, concludes that there are no sufficient grounds to initiate
Amendment 301 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 3 a (new) (3 a) The Commission will set out the criteria to open such a procedure by the date of application of this Regulation.
Amendment 302 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 9 – paragraph 1 (1) During the in-depth investigation, the Commission shall further assess the foreign subsidy distorting the internal market that has been identified in the decision to initiate the in-depth investigation, seeking all the information it considers necessary in accordance with Articles 11, 12 and 13. The Commission shall report to the Parliament and the Council on the results of the investigation.
Amendment 303 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 9 – paragraph 2 (2) Where the Commission finds that a foreign subsidy distorts the internal market pursuant to Articles 3 to 4 and without prejudice to Article 5, it
Amendment 304 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 9 – paragraph 2 (2) Where the Commission finds that a foreign subsidy distorts the internal market pursuant to Articles 3 to 5, it
Amendment 305 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 9 – paragraph 3 a (new) Amendment 306 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – introductory part The Commission
Amendment 307 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – introductory part The Commission or the Member State to which a referral is made by the Commission pursuant to Article 7(2) and (3) may take interim measures, where:
Amendment 308 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – introductory part The Commission may take interim measures, including during the preliminary review period, where:
Amendment 309 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – introductory part The Commission may take interim measures, including during the preliminary review period, where:
Amendment 310 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point 1 (1) there are indications that a financial contribution or economically equivalent support measure constitute
Amendment 311 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point 1 (1) there are firm indications that a financial contribution constitutes a foreign subsidy and distorts the internal market; and
Amendment 312 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point 1 (1) there are indications that a financial contribution or advantage constitutes a foreign subsidy and distorts the internal market; and
Amendment 313 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point 1 (1) there are indications that a financial contribution constitutes a foreign subsidy and distorts the internal market;
Amendment 314 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point 2 (2) there is a serious risk of substantial
Amendment 315 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point 2 (2) there is a serious risk of substantial and irreparable damage to competition on the internal market. Such serious risk is likely to occur in the case of subsidies operators in sectors which are targeted by national strategic plans in third countries or are otherwise considered strategic, affected by structural excess capacities, or dominated by the presence of State-owned enterprises in the country granting the subsidies.
Amendment 316 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point 2 (2) there is a serious and immediate risk of substantial and irreparable damage to competition on the internal market.
Amendment 317 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point 2 a (new) (2 a) Interim measures shall be limited in time. They may be prolonged where the indication of distortive effects or the serious risk of substantial and irreparable damage to competition on the internal market continue to exist.
Amendment 318 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point 2 b (new) (2 b) The Commission is empowered to adopt a delegated act for the purpose of supplementing paragraphs 1 and 2 with a methodology for determining that a serious risk of substantial and irreparable damage to competition arises on the internal market.
Amendment 319 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 a (new) Interim measures shall be limited in time.
Amendment 320 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission or the Member State to which a referral is made by the Commission pursuant to Article 7(2) and (3) may require an undertaking concerned to provide all necessary information.
Amendment 321 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission
Amendment 322 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission
Amendment 323 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) The Commission may also consult social partner organisations represented in the undertakings and sectors concerned to collect relevant information.
Amendment 324 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point b Amendment 325 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point c (c) contain a statement that
Amendment 326 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point c (c) contain a statement that, pursuant to Article 14, a lack of cooperation from the undertaking concerned
Amendment 327 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 4 (4) At the request of the Commission, Member States and, where applicable, regions shall provide it with all necessary information to carry out the duties assigned to it by this Regulation.
Amendment 328 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 4 a (new) (4 a) However, the obligation to provide information to the Commission should in no way jeopardize the essential national security interests of the Member States.
Amendment 329 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 4 a (new) (4a) However, the obligation to provide information to the Commission should not put at risk the Member States’ essential security interests.
Amendment 330 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 5 (5) The Commission
Amendment 331 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 5 a (new) (5 a) The Commission shall establish a contact point where Member States and interested parties such as undertakings and trade associations can share information with regard to actual or potential distortions of the internal market.
Amendment 332 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 1 (1)
Amendment 333 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission
Amendment 334 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission
Amendment 335 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission
Amendment 336 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 2 – introductory part (2) Where the Commission undertakes such an inspection, the officials authorised by the Commission to conduct an inspection shall be empowered in accordance with the national law of the Member State in which the undertaking is registered and its premises and land are located:
Amendment 337 #
Amendment 338 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 3 – point a (a) specifying the subject matter and purpose of the inspection; The subject matter and the scope of the inspection shall be proportionate and include minimum tasks necessary to confirm foreign subsidies and their distortive effect on the internal market.
Amendment 339 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 3 – point c Amendment 340 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 6 (6) Where officials or other accompanying persons authorised by the Commission find that an undertaking opposes an inspection within the meaning of this Article, the Member State concerned
Amendment 341 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 7 (7) Upon request of the Commission, a Member State
Amendment 342 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 7 (7) Upon
Amendment 343 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 7 (7) Upon request of the Commission, a Member State shall in its own territory carry out any inspection or other fact- finding measure under its national law in order to establish whether there is a foreign subsidy distorting the internal market. Where applicable, the Member State shall involve its regions.
Amendment 344 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 7 a (new) (7 a) The Commission shall duly inform the Parliament of the former's inspections of undertakings.
Amendment 345 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 1 In order to carry out the duties assigned to it by this Regulation, the Commission may conduct inspections in the territory of a third country, provided that the
Amendment 346 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 1 In order to carry out the duties assigned to it by this Regulation, the Commission
Amendment 347 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 1 In order to carry out the duties assigned to it by this Regulation, the Commission may conduct inspections in the territory of a third country, provided that the undertaking concerned has given its consent and the government of the third country has been officially notified
Amendment 348 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 1 – introductory part (1) The Commission
Amendment 349 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 1 – introductory part (1) The Commission
Amendment 350 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 3 (3) Where an undertaking concerned, including a public undertaking which is directly or indirectly controlled by the State, fails to provide the necessary information to determine whether a financial contribution confers a benefit to it, that undertaking
Amendment 351 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 3 (3) Where an undertaking concerned, including a public undertaking which is directly or indirectly controlled by the State, fails to provide the necessary information to determine whether a financial contribution or the economically equivalent support measure confers a benefit to it, that undertaking may be deemed to have received such benefit.
Amendment 352 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 3 (3) Where an undertaking concerned, including a public undertaking which is directly or indirectly controlled by the State, fails to provide the necessary information to determine whether a financial contribution or advantage confers a benefit to it, that undertaking may be deemed to have received such benefit.
Amendment 353 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 4 (4) When applying facts available, the result of the procedure
Amendment 354 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 4 a (new) Amendment 355 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 1 – introductory part (1) The Commission
Amendment 356 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 2 (2) Fines imposed in the cases referred to in paragraph 1 shall not exceed 10 % of the aggregate turnover of the undertaking or association of undertakings concerned in the preceding business year.
Amendment 357 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 2 (2) Fines imposed in the cases referred to in paragraph 1 shall not exceed
Amendment 358 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 3 (3) Periodic penalty payments imposed in the cases referred to in paragraph 1 shall not exceed 15% of the average daily aggregate turnover of the undertaking or association of undertakings concerned in the preceding business year for each working day of delay, calculated from the date established in the decision, until it submits complete and correct information as requested by the Commission.
Amendment 359 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 3 (3) Periodic penalty payments imposed in the cases referred to in paragraph 1 shall not exceed
Amendment 360 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 5 – introductory part (5) Where an undertaking concerned does not comply with a decision with commitments pursuant to Article 9(3), a decision ordering interim measures pursuant to Article 10 or a decision imposing redressive measures pursuant to Article 9(2), the Commission
Amendment 361 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 5 – point b (b) periodic penalty payments not exceeding
Amendment 362 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 6 a (new) (6 a) The Commission may consult the Member States concerned as well as Union industries affected, in order to assess whether a fine or periodic penalty payment -or a combination of both- is an appropriate measure.
Amendment 363 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 16 – paragraph 1 – introductory part The Commission
Amendment 364 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 16 – paragraph 1 – point 1 Amendment 365 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 16 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Amendment 366 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 17 – paragraph 1 In a concentration, the assessment whether there is a distortion on the internal market within the meaning of Articles 3 or 4 shall be limited to the concentration at stake. Only foreign subsidies granted in the three calendar years prior to the conclusion of the agreement, the announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest or known future subsidies that have been approved by the authorities concerned of the third country, and will become effective within one year following the concentration, shall be considered in the assessment.
Amendment 367 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 17 – paragraph 1 In a concentration, the assessment whether there is a distortion on the internal market within the meaning of Articles 3 or 4 shall be limited to the concentration at stake. Only foreign subsidies granted in the three calendar years prior to the conclusion of the agreement, the announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest, or known subsidies that have already been established and shall become effective following the concentration, shall be considered in the assessment.
Amendment 368 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 – point a (a) the acquired undertaking or at least one of the merging undertakings is established in the Union and generates an aggregate turnover in the Union of at least EUR 25
Amendment 369 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 – point a (a) the acquired undertaking or at least one of the merging undertakings is established in the Union and generates an aggregate turnover in the Union of at least EUR 25
Amendment 370 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 – point a (a) the acquired undertaking or at least one of the merging undertakings is established in the Union and generates an aggregate turnover in the Union of at least EUR 25
Amendment 371 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 – point a (a) the acquired undertaking or at least one of the merging undertakings is established in the Union and generates an aggregate turnover in the Union of at least EUR 25
Amendment 372 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 – point a (a) the acquired undertaking or at least one of the merging undertakings is established in the Union and generates an aggregate turnover in the Union of at least EUR 500 million or represents 10% of the sector revenue in a Member State; and
Amendment 373 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 – point a (a) the acquired undertaking or at least one of the merging undertakings is established in the Union and each generates an aggregate turnover in the Union of at least EUR 500 million; and
Amendment 374 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 – point b (b) the undertakings concerned received from third countries an aggregate
Amendment 375 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 – point b (b) the undertakings concerned received from third countries an aggregate financial contribution in the three calendar years prior to notification of more than EUR 25
Amendment 376 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 – point b (b) all the undertakings concerned received from third countries an aggregate financial contribution in the three calendar years prior to notification of more than EUR 50 million.
Amendment 377 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 – point b (b) the undertakings concerned received from third countries an aggregate financial contribution in the three calendar years prior to notification of more than EUR 50 million or equal to 1% of the sector revenue in a Member State.
Amendment 378 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 – point b (b) the undertakings concerned received
Amendment 379 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 4 – point a (a) the joint venture itself or one of its parent undertakings is established in the Union and generates an aggregate turnover in the Union of at least EUR
Amendment 380 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 4 – point a (a) the joint venture itself or one of its parent undertakings is established in the Union and generates an aggregate turnover in the Union of at least EUR 25
Amendment 381 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 4 – point a (a) the joint venture itself or one of its parent undertakings is established in the Union and generates an aggregate turnover in the Union of at least EUR 25
Amendment 382 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 4 – point a (a) the joint venture itself or one of its parent undertakings is established in the Union and generates an aggregate turnover in the Union of at least EUR 25
Amendment 383 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 4 – point a (a) the joint venture is contemplated to be active in the Union and the joint venture itself or one of its parent undertakings
Amendment 384 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 4 – point a a (new) (aa) the joint venture itself or one of its parent undertakings is established in the Union and generates an aggregate turnover in the Union of at least EUR 250 million; and
Amendment 385 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 4 – point b (b) the joint venture itself and its parent undertakings received from third countries
Amendment 386 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 4 – point b (b) the joint venture itself and its parent undertakings received from third countries an aggregate financial contribution in the three calendar years prior to notification of more than EUR 25
Amendment 387 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 4 – point b (b) the joint venture itself and its parent undertakings received
Amendment 388 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 4 (4) If the undertakings concerned fail to meet their obligation to notify, the Commission
Amendment 389 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 4 (4) If the undertakings concerned fail to meet their obligation to notify, the Commission
Amendment 390 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 4 (4) If the undertakings concerned fail to meet their obligation to notify, the Commission
Amendment 391 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 5 Amendment 392 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 5 (5) The Commission may request the prior notification of any concentration which is not a notifiable concentration within the meaning of Article 18 at any time prior to its implementation where the Commission suspects that the undertakings concerned may have benefitted from foreign subsidies in the
Amendment 393 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 5 (5) The Commission may request the prior notification of any concentration which is not a notifiable concentration within the meaning of Article 18 at any time prior to its implementation where the Commission suspects that the undertakings concerned may have benefitted from foreign subsidies in the three years prior to the concentration or an undertaking will benefit from future subsidies that have been approved and will become effective within one year following the concentration. That concentration shall be deemed to be a notifiable concentration for the purposes of this Regulation.
Amendment 394 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 5 (5) The Commission may request the
Amendment 395 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 5 (5) The Commission
Amendment 396 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 5 (5) The Commission may request the prior notification of any concentration which is not a notifiable concentration within the meaning of Article 18 at any time prior to its implementation where the Commission suspects that the undertakings concerned may have be
Amendment 397 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 22 – title Aggregation of f
Amendment 398 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 22 – title Aggregation of f
Amendment 399 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 22 – paragraph 1 The aggregate f
Amendment 400 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 22 – paragraph 1 The aggregate f
Amendment 401 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 23 – paragraph 3 (3) The Commission
Amendment 402 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 23 – paragraph 6 – introductory part (6) The Commission
Amendment 403 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 23 – paragraph 6 a (new) (6 a) The Commission shall duly inform the Parliament regarding this decision.
Amendment 404 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 24 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission may initiate an in- depth investigation under Article 8(2) no later than 25 working days after receipt of the complete notification and shall publish a notice of formal investigation in the Official Journal of the European Union, which invites interested parties, Member States and the third country concerned to express their views in writing within a prescribed period of time. The interested parties which have made themselves known shall be heard if they have, within the period prescribed in the notice published in the Official Journal of the European Union, made a written request for a hearing showing that they are an interested party likely to be affected by the result of the proceedings and that there are particular reasons why they should be heard.
Amendment 405 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 24 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission may initiate an in- depth investigation under Article 8(2) no later than 25 working days after receipt of the complete notification, and shall publish a notice of initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union, which invites interested parties, Member States and the third country concerned to express their views in writing within a prescribed period of time. The interested parties which have made themselves known, shall be heard within the period prescribed in the latter published notice, making a written request for a hearing and showing that they are an interested party likely to be affected by the result of the proceedings. Opportunities shall, on request, be provided to interested parties so that opposing views may be presented and rebuttal arguments offered.
Amendment 406 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 24 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission
Amendment 407 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 24 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 (new) The Commission shall publish notification of the in-depth investigation in the Official Journal of the European Union and invite interested parties, including Member States and third countries, to submit any relevant information in writing within a fixed timeframe.
Amendment 408 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 24 – paragraph 6 – introductory part (6) The Commission
Amendment 409 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 24 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 2 The Commission
Amendment 410 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 24 – paragraph 7 – introductory part (7) The Commission
Amendment 411 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 25 Amendment 412 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 25 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission may impose fines and periodic penalty payments as set out in Article 15 and shall duly inform the Parliament.
Amendment 413 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 25 – paragraph 2 (2) In addition, the Commission may impose by decision on undertakings concerned fines not exceeding 1 % of the
Amendment 414 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 25 – paragraph 3 – introductory part (3) The Commission may impose by decision on undertakings concerned fines not exceeding 10 % of their aggregate turnover produced by the undertaking concerned in the preceding business year where they, intentionally or negligently:
Amendment 415 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 Foreign subsidies that cause or risk causing a distortion in a public procurement procedure shall be understood as foreign subsidies that enable an undertaking to submit a tender that is unduly advantageous in relation to the works, supplies or services concerned. The assessment of whether there is a distortion on the internal market pursuant to Article 3 and whether a tender is unduly advantageous in relation to the works, supplies or services concerned shall be limited to the public procurement procedure at stake. Only foreign subsidies granted during the three years prior to the notification, or known future subsidies that have been approved and will become effective within one year following the submission of the tender or request to participate in the public procurement procedure, shall be taken into account in the assessment.
Amendment 416 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 Foreign subsidies that cause or risk causing a distortion in a public procurement procedure shall be understood as foreign subsidies that enable an undertaking to submit a tender that is unduly advantageous in relation to the works, supplies or services concerned. The assessment of whether there is a distortion on the internal market pursuant to Article 3 and whether a tender is unduly advantageous in relation to the works, supplies or services concerned shall be limited to the public procurement procedure at stake. Only foreign subsidies granted during the three years prior to the notification or known subsidies that have already been established and shall become effective following the procurement procedure shall be taken into account in the assessment.
Amendment 417 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 Foreign subsidies that cause or risk causing a distortion in a public procurement procedure shall be understood as foreign subsidies that enable an undertaking to submit a tender that is unduly advantageous in relation to the works, supplies or services concerned. The assessment of whether there is a distortion on the internal market pursuant to Article 3 and whether a tender is unduly advantageous in relation to the works, supplies or services concerned shall be
Amendment 418 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 1 – point c Amendment 419 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 (2) For the purpose of Article 28, a notifiable foreign financial contribution in an EU public procurement procedure shall be deemed to arise where the estimated value of that public procurement is equal or greater than EUR
Amendment 420 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 (2) For the purpose of Article 28, a notifiable foreign financial contribution in an EU public procurement procedure shall be deemed to arise where the estimated value of that public procurement is equal or greater than EUR
Amendment 421 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 (2) For the purpose of Article 28, a notifiable foreign financial contribution in an EU public procurement procedure shall be deemed to arise where the estimated value of that public procurement is equal or greater than EUR 125
Amendment 422 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 (2) For the purpose of Article 28, a notifiable foreign financial contribution in an EU public procurement procedure shall be deemed to arise where the estimated
Amendment 423 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 (2) For the purpose of Article 28, a notifiable foreign financial contribution in an EU public procurement procedure shall be deemed to arise where the estimated value of that public procurement is equal or greater than EUR 125
Amendment 424 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 (2) For the purpose of Article 28, a notifiable foreign financial contribution in an EU public procurement procedure shall be deemed to arise where the estimated value of that public procurement is equal or greater than EUR
Amendment 425 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 (2) For the purpose of Article 28, a notifiable foreign financial contribution in an EU public procurement procedure shall be deemed to arise where the estimated value of that public procurement, calculated in accordance with the provisions laid down in Article 5 of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 16 of Directive 2014/25/EU, is equal or greater than EUR 250 million.
Amendment 426 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 (2) For the purpose of Article 28,
Amendment 427 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) For the purposes of Article 28, critical infrastructure means an asset, system or part thereof located in Member States which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those functions.
Amendment 428 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – title Prior notification of foreign
Amendment 429 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 1 (1) When submitting a tender or a request to participate in a public procurement procedure, undertakings shall either notify to the contracting authority or the contracting entity
Amendment 430 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 1 (1) When submitting a tender or a request to participate in a public procurement procedure, undertakings, main subcontractors and main suppliers shall either notify to the contracting authority or the contracting entity all foreign financial contributions received in the three years preceding that notification or confirm in a declaration that they did not receive any foreign financial contributions in the last three years. Undertakings which do not submit such information or declaration shall not be awarded the contract. Any subcontractor or main supplier selected or known after submitting a tender or a request to participate in a public procurement procedure shall notify foreign subsidies according to the first sentence without undue delay after their selection.
Amendment 431 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 1 (1) When submitting a tender or a request to participate in a public procurement procedure, undertakings shall either notify to the contracting authority or the contracting entity all foreign financial contributions received in the three calendar years preceding that notification or confirm in a declaration that they did not receive any foreign financial contributions in the last three
Amendment 432 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 1 (1) When submitting a
Amendment 433 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 1 (1) When submitting a tender or a request to participate in a public procurement procedure, undertakings shall either notify to the contracting authority or the contracting entity all foreign financial contributions
Amendment 434 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 2 (2) The obligation to notify foreign financial contributions under this paragraph shall extend to economic operators, groups of economic operators referred to in Article 26(2) of Directive 2014/23/EU, Article 19(2) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 37(2) of Directive 2014/25/EU, main subcontractors and main suppliers. A subcontractor or supplier shall be deemed to be main where
Amendment 435 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 2 (2) The obligation to notify foreign financial contributions under this paragraph shall extend to economic operators, groups of economic operators referred to in Article 26(2) of Directive 2014/23/EU, Article 19(2) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 37(2) of Directive 2014/25/EU, main subcontractors and main suppliers. A subcontractor or supplier shall be deemed to be main where their participation ensures key elements of the contract performance and in any case where the economic share of their contribution exceeds
Amendment 436 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 2 (2) The obligation to notify foreign financial contributions under this paragraph shall extend to economic operators, groups of economic operators referred to in Article 26(2) of Directive
Amendment 437 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 2 (2) The obligation to notify foreign financial contributions under this paragraph shall extend to economic operators, groups of economic operators referred to in Article 26(2) of Directive 2014/23/EU, Article 19(2) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 37(2) of Directive 2014/25/EU, main subcontractors and main suppliers. A subcontractor or supplier shall be deemed to be main where their participation ensures key elements of the contract performance and in any case where the economic share of their contribution exceeds
Amendment 438 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 2 (2) The obligation to notify foreign financial contributions under this paragraph shall extend to economic operators, groups of economic operators referred to in Article 26(2) of Directive 2014/23/EU, Article 19(2) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 37(2) of Directive 2014/25/EU, main subcontractors and main suppliers. A subcontractor or supplier shall be deemed to be main where their participation ensures key elements of the contract performance and in any case where the economic share of their contribution exceeds
Amendment 439 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 2 (2) The obligation to notify foreign financial contributions under this paragraph shall extend to economic operators
Amendment 440 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 2 (2) The obligation to notify foreign
Amendment 441 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 5 (5) Where the undertaking, economic
Amendment 442 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 5 a (new) (5 a) When the foreign subsidy was granted to a subcontractor who had not notified it to the lead operator, its substitution by the lead operator shall be sufficient to prevent the Commission’s review from being opened.
Amendment 443 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 6 (6) Where the Commission suspects that an undertaking may have benefitted from foreign subsidies in the three years prior to the submission of the tender or request to participate in the public procurement procedure,
Amendment 444 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 6 (6) Where the Commission suspects that an undertaking may have benefitted from foreign subsidies in the three years prior to the submission of the tender or request to participate in the public procurement procedure or may benefit from known subsidies that have already been established and shall become effective following the procurement procedure, it may request the notification of the foreign financial contributions received by that undertaking in any public procurement procedure which are not notifiable under Article 27(2) or fall within the scope of paragraph 5 of this Article, at any time before the award of the contract. Once the Commission has requested the notification of such a financial contribution, it is deemed to be a notifiable foreign financial contribution in a public procurement procedure.
Amendment 445 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 6 (6) Where the Commission suspects that an undertaking may have benefitted from foreign subsidies in the
Amendment 446 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 6 (6) Where the Commission suspects that an undertaking may have benefitted
Amendment 447 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 6 (6) Where the Commission suspects that an undertaking may have be
Amendment 448 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 a (new) Article 28 a Own initiative request for the assessment of foreign subsidies 1. The Commision shall carry out an assessment of foreign subsidies upon an own-initiative request of the undertaking which plans to apply for the public procurement. 2. The Commission shall carry out the assessment based on the rules set in this Regulation. The undertaking concerned may withdraw from the request for the assessment. 3. By 30 June 2023, the Commission shall publish guidelines providing details and procedure on how to request the assessment of foreign subsidies, including possible fees.
Amendment 449 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – title Procedural rules applicable to the preliminary review and the in-depth investigation of notified f
Amendment 450 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 1 (1) Articles 8, 9 (1), (3) and (4), 11, 12, 13, 14, 16 and 22 shall apply to notified f
Amendment 451 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission shall carry out a preliminary review no later than
Amendment 452 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission shall carry out a preliminary review no later than
Amendment 453 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission shall carry out a preliminary review no later than
Amendment 454 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission shall carry out a preliminary review no later than
Amendment 455 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission shall carry out a preliminary review no later than
Amendment 456 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 3 (3) The Commission shall decide whether to initiate an in-depth investigation within the time limit for completing the preliminary review and inform the undertaking concerned and the contracting authority or the contracting entity without delay. Where the Commission has not taken a decision to initiate an in-depth investigation within 40 days, the foreign subsidies shall be deemed as not distorting the internal market.
Amendment 457 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 4 (4) The Commission may adopt a decision closing the in-depth investigation no later than
Amendment 458 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 4 (4) The Commission may adopt a decision closing the in-depth investigation no later than
Amendment 459 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 4 (4) The Commission may adopt a decision closing the in-depth investigation no later than
Amendment 460 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 4 (4) The Commission may adopt a decision closing the in-depth investigation no later than
Amendment 461 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 4 (4) The Commission may adopt a decision closing the in-depth investigation no later than 12
Amendment 462 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 4 (4) The Commission may adopt a decision closing the in-depth investigation no later than 12
Amendment 463 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 4 (4) The Commission may adopt a decision closing the in-depth investigation no later than
Amendment 464 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 4 (4) The Commission may adopt a decision closing the in-depth investigation no later than
Amendment 465 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 4 a (new) (4 a) The Commission may request appropriate information from Member State authorities, if this is necessary under the procedures set out in paragraphs (2)- (4) of this article.
Amendment 466 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 a (new) Article 29 a Aggregation of financial contributions The aggregate financial contribution to an undertaking concerned shall be calculated by adding together the respective financial contributions received from third countries by all undertakings referred to in Article 21(4), points (a) to (e).
Amendment 467 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 30 – paragraph 2 (2) Where the undertaking concerned does not offer commitments or where the Commission considers that the commitments referred to in paragraph 1 are neither appropriate nor sufficient to fully and effectively remove the distortion it shall adopt a decision prohibiting the award of the contract to the undertaking concerned (“decision prohibiting the award of the contract”). Where circumstances so warrant, the Commission may exclude the undertaking concerned from participation in future public procurement procedures.
Amendment 468 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 30 – paragraph 2 (2) Where the undertaking concerned does not offer commitments or where the Commission considers that the commitments referred to in paragraph 1 are neither appropriate nor sufficient to fully and effectively remove the distortion it shall adopt a decision prohibiting the award of the contract to the undertaking concerned (“decision prohibiting the award of the contract”). The adoption of a decision prohibiting the award of the contract results in the exclusion of the undertaking concerned from participation in the public procurement procedure.
Amendment 469 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 30 – paragraph 3 a (new) (3 a) The Commission shall publish the decisions, which shall indicate inter alia the thorough explanation of the decision, quantified indicators on which the decision is based and the right and the time limit of the undertaking to have the decision reviewed by the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Amendment 470 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 30 – paragraph 3 a (new) (3 a) The Commission shall inform the Parliament regarding these decisions.
Amendment 471 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 31 – paragraph 1 (1) During the preliminary review and the in-depth investigation, the evaluation of tenders in a public procurement procedure may continue. The contract shall not be awarded to an undertaking subject to the preliminary investigation before the expiry of the time limit set in Article 29(2).
Amendment 472 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 31 – paragraph 3 Amendment 473 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 31 – paragraph 3 (3) The contract may be awarded to an undertaking submitting a declaration under Article 28 before the Commission takes any of the decisions referred to in Article 30 or before the time limit laid down in Article 29(4) elapses only if the tender evaluation has established that the undertaking in question has in any case submitted the most economically advantageous tender. By 30 June 2023, the Commission shall publish the guidelines providing the criteria and procedure for the assessment of the most economically advantageous tender.
Amendment 474 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 31 – paragraph 3 (3) The contract may be awarded to an undertaking submitting a declaration under Article 28 before the Commission takes any of the decisions referred to in Article 30 or before the time limit laid down in Article 29(2) or (4) elapses only if the tender evaluation has established that the undertaking in question has in any case submitted the most economically
Amendment 475 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 31 – paragraph 4 (4) Where the Commission issues a decision under Article 30(2) regarding the most
Amendment 476 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 31 – paragraph 5 (5) Where the Commission adopts a decision in accordance with Article 30(1) or (3), the contract may be awarded to any undertaking having submitted the most
Amendment 477 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 31 – paragraph 6 (6) In all cases, the contracting authority or the contracting entity shall inform the Commission of any decision relating to the outcome of the public procurement procedure, in the month after the procedure is concluded.
Amendment 478 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 31 – paragraph 6 a (new) (6 a) Whenever contracting authorities make use of qualification systems complying to Article 77 of Directive 2014/25/EU, the undertaking’s obligation to notify the foreign subsidy received is observed at the qualification stage with reference to the previous three calendar years with respect to the qualification system and has a temporary validity of three calendar years after which it is necessary to provide an update of the notification.
Amendment 479 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 31 – paragraph 7 (7) The principles governing public procurement, including proportionality, non-discrimination, equal treatment,
Amendment 480 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 32 Amendment 481 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 32 – title Fines and periodic penalty payments applicable to f
Amendment 482 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 32 – title Fines and periodic penalty payments applicable to f
Amendment 483 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 33 – paragraph 1 (1) A f
Amendment 484 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 33 – paragraph 2 (2) A f
Amendment 485 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 34 – paragraph 1 (1) Where the information available substantiates a reasonable suspicion that foreign subsidies in a particular sector, for a particular type of economic activity or based on a particular subsidy instrument may distort the internal market, the Commission
Amendment 486 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 34 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission
Amendment 487 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 34 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission
Amendment 488 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 34 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission
Amendment 489 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 34 – paragraph 3 (3) The Commission
Amendment 490 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 34 – paragraph 3 (3) The Commission may use the information obtained from such market investigations in the framework of procedures under this Regulation, including the ex officio review.
Amendment 491 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 34 – paragraph 4 a (new) (4 a) Following a market investigation, the Commission may engage in dialogue with the third country concerned, with the objective to end the distortive effects of a subsidy scheme. This dialogue shall not prevent the Commission from taking further action under the provisions of this Regulation, including the application of interim or redressive measures.
Amendment 492 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 34 a (new) Amendment 493 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 35 – paragraph 1 (1) The powers of the Commission under Article 9 shall be subject to a limitation period of ten years, starting
Amendment 494 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 35 – paragraph 1 (1) The powers of the Commission under Article 9 shall be subject to a limitation period of ten years, starting on the day on which a foreign subsidy is granted to the undertaking concerned. Any action taken by the Commission under Articles 8, 11, 12, 13 or
Amendment 495 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 35 – paragraph 2 Amendment 496 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 35 – paragraph 3 Amendment 497 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 36 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission shall publish a summary notice of the decisions adopted pursuant to Article 8(2)
Amendment 498 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 37 – paragraph 1 (1) Decisions adopted pursuant to Articles 8, 9, 15, 24(3), 25, 30(1), 32 and 3
Amendment 499 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 38 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission shall, before adopting a decision pursuant to Articles 9, 15, 24(3) point (c), 25, 30(2) or 32 give all the interested parties likely yo be affected by the result of the proceeding -such as the undertaking concerned- the opportunity to
Amendment 500 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 38 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission shall, before adopting a decision pursuant to Articles 9, 15, 24(3) point (c), 25, 30(2) or 32, give the undertaking concerned and the competent authorities of the Member State in which it is registered the opportunity to submit observations on the grounds on which the Commission intends to adopt its decision.
Amendment 501 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 40 – paragraph 7 (7) An investigation pursuant to this Regulation shall not be carried out and measures shall not be imposed or maintained where such investigation or measures would be contrary to the Union’s obligations emanating from any relevant international agreement it has entered into. In particular, no action shall be taken under this Regulation which would amount to a specific action against a subsidy within the meaning of Article 32.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
Amendment 502 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 40 – paragraph 7 (7) An investigation pursuant to this Regulation shall not be carried out and measures shall not be imposed or maintained where such investigation or measures would be contrary to the Union’s obligations emanating from any relevant international agreement it has entered into. In particular, no action shall be taken under this Regulation which would amount to a specific action against a subsidy within the meaning of Article 32.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, except where the country granting the subsidy is not a WTO Member or where the Commission has well-founded indications that the country granting the subsidy is in substantial non-compliance with notification obligations under the Agreement or under other international agreements, at least with regard to the sector concerned. Provided that, regardless of the sector involved, actions may always be taken under this Regulation in relation to foreign subsidies which cause distortions on the internal market in public procurement procedures or in relation to concentrations. This Regulation shall not prevent the Union from exercising its rights or fulfilling its obligations under international agreements.
Amendment 503 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 40 – paragraph 7 (7) An investigation pursuant to this Regulation shall not be carried out and measures shall not be imposed or maintained where such investigation or measures would be contrary to the Union’s obligations emanating from any relevant international agreement it has entered into. In particular, no action shall be taken under this Regulation which would amount to a specific action against a subsidy within the meaning of Article 32.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures except where the country granting the subsidy is not a WTO member or where the Commission has well-founded indications that the country granting the subsidy is in substantial non-compliance with notification obligations under the Agreement or under other international agreements. Provided that, regardless of the sector involved, actions may always be taken under this Regulation in relation to foreign subsidies which cause distortions on the internal market in public procurement procedures or in relation to concentrations. This Regulation shall not prevent the Union from exercising its rights or fulfilling its obligations under international agreements.
Amendment 504 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 40 – paragraph 7 (7) An investigation pursuant to this Regulation shall not be carried out and measures shall not be imposed or maintained where such investigation or measures would be contrary to the Union’s obligations emanating from any relevant international agreement it has entered into. In particular, no action shall be taken under this Regulation which would amount to a specific action against a subsidy within the meaning of Article 32.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, except where the Commission has well- founded indications that the country granting the subsidy is in substantial non- compliance with notification obligations under the Agreement or under other international agreements, at least with regard to the sector concerned. Regardless of the sector involved, actions may always be taken under this Regulation in relation to foreign subsidies which cause distortions on the internal market in public procurement procedures or in relation to concentrations. This Regulation shall not prevent the Union from exercising its rights or fulfilling its obligations under international agreements.
Amendment 505 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 40 – paragraph 7 (7) An investigation pursuant to this Regulation shall not be carried out and measures shall not be imposed or maintained where such investigation or measures would be contrary to the Union’s obligations emanating from any relevant international agreement it has entered into. In particular, no action shall be taken under this Regulation which would amount to a specific action against a subsidy within the meaning of Article 32.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and granted in a third country which is a member of the World Trade Organisation. This Regulation shall not prevent the Union from exercising its rights or fulfilling its obligations under international agreements.
Amendment 506 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 42 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) the form, content and procedural details of notifications of foreign
Amendment 507 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 42 – paragraph 1 – point f (f) detailed rules on the application of redressive measures under article 6 and the conditions and time limits for proposing commitments under Article 30;
Amendment 508 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 42 – paragraph 1 a (new) (1 a) The first such implementing act shall be adopted no later than one year after the entry into force of this Regulation.
Amendment 509 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 Amendment 510 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 Amendment 511 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 Amendment 512 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point -a (new) (-a) specifying the definition of financial contribution, the definition of economically equivalent support measure, as well as for establishing criteria for identifying actions that can be plausibly attributed to third countries as set out in Article 2;
Amendment 513 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point -a a (new) (-a a) supplementing the indicators set out for determining distortive subsidies in the single market as referred to in Article 3;
Amendment 514 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point -a b (new) (-a b) specifying the methodology underlying the balancing assessment and in particular for the determination of positive effects as well as criteria for outweighing effects referred to in Article 5;
Amendment 515 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point a Amendment 516 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) exempting certain categories of undertakings concerned from the obligation to notify pursuant to Articles 19 and 28, in light of the practice of the Commission in the first
Amendment 517 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point c Amendment 518 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 45 Amendment 519 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 45 Amendment 520 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 46 – paragraph 1 Within
Amendment 521 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 46 – paragraph 1 1. Within
Amendment 522 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 46 – paragraph 1 Within
Amendment 523 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 46 – paragraph 1 Within
Amendment 524 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 46 – paragraph 1 Within
Amendment 525 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 46 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a.Where the report recommends amendments to this Regulation and where the Commission considers it appropriate in light of its practice during the application of this Regulation and taking into account the effectiveness of application, the report may be accompanied by relevant legislative proposals, including: a) to amend the thresholds for notifications as set out in Articles 18 and 27; b) to exempt certain categories of undertakings concerned from the obligation to notify pursuant to Articles 19 and 28, especially where the practice of the Commission enables the identification of economic activities where foreign subsidies are unlikely to distort the internal market; c) to establish specific thresholds for notifications for certain economic sectors, especially where the practice of the Commission enables the identification of economic activities where foreign subsidies are more likely to distort the internal market; d) to amend the timelines for review and in-depth investigations as set out in Articles 24 and 29; e) to abrogate the present Regulation, if the Commission considers that multilateral rules to address distortive subsidies have rendered this Regulation fully redundant.
Amendment 526 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 46 – paragraph 1 a (new) The Commission, taking into account the work undertaken by the Parliament and the Council, shall evaluate the scope, functioning and effectiveness of this Regulation within three years after its entry into force. The Parliament may then ask a revision of this Regulation.
Amendment 527 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 47 – paragraph 1 Amendment 528 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 47 – paragraph 1 Amendment 529 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 47 – paragraph 1 (1) This Regulation shall apply to foreign subsidies granted in the
Amendment 530 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 47 – paragraph 1 (1) This Regulation shall apply to foreign subsidies granted in the
Amendment 531 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 47 – paragraph 2 (2) This Regulation shall apply to foreign
Amendment 532 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 47 – paragraph 2 (2) This Regulation shall apply to foreign
Amendment 533 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 48 – paragraph 2 It shall apply from [date:
Amendment 56 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 1 (1) A strong, open and competitive internal market enables both European and foreign undertakings to compete on merits. The Union benefits from a sophisticated and effective system of State aid control, aiming at ensuring fair conditions for all undertakings engaging in any economic activity in the internal market. This State aid control system prevents Member States from granting State aid that unduly distorts competition in the internal market.
Amendment 57 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2) At the same time, undertakings might receive subsidies from third countries
Amendment 58 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2) At the same time, undertakings might receive subsidies from third countries, that provide public funds which are then used, for instance, to finance economic activities in the internal market in any sector of the economy, such as participation in public procurement tenders, or acquisitions of undertakings, including those with strategic assets such as critical infrastructure and innovative technologies. Such subsidies are currently not subject to Union State aid rules and, in the last decades, different third countries have increased this practice of giving out subsidies both with the objective to strengthen their respective national trading interests all over the world, as well as their geopolitical purposes.
Amendment 59 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 3 (3)
Amendment 60 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 4 (4) No existing Union instruments a
Amendment 61 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 (5) It is therefore necessary to complement existing Union instruments with a new tool to effectively deal with distortions in the internal market caused by foreign subsidies and ensure a level playing field. In particular, the new tool complements Union State aid rules which
Amendment 62 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 (5) It is therefore necessary to complement existing Union instruments with a new tool to effectively deal with distortions in the internal market caused by foreign subsidies and ensure a level playing field and the Union's strategic autonomy. In particular, the new tool complements Union State aid rules which deal with distortions in the internal market caused by Member State subsidies.
Amendment 63 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 6 (6) Rules and procedures to investigate foreign subsidies that actually or potentially distort the internal market should be laid down and, where relevant, those distortions should be redressed. Foreign subsidies could distort the internal market if the undertaking benefitting from the foreign subsidy engages in an
Amendment 64 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 6 (6) Rules and procedures to investigate foreign subsidies that actually or potentially distort the internal market should be laid down and, where relevant, those distortions should be redressed. Foreign subsidies could distort the internal market if the undertaking benefitting from the foreign subsidy engages in any economic activity in the Union. This Regulation should therefore establish rules for all undertakings engaging in any economic activity in the Union. Given the significance of the economic activities pursued by SMEs, and their contribution to the fulfilment of the Union’s key policy goals, special attention is given to the impact of this Regulation on them.
Amendment 65 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 7 (7) To ensure a level playing field throughout the internal market and consistency in the application of this Regulation, the Commission should be the
Amendment 66 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 7 (7) To ensure a level playing field throughout the internal market and consistency in the application of this Regulation, the Commission should be the sole authority competent to apply this Regulation. The Commission should have the power to examine any foreign subsidy to the extent it is in the scope of this Regulation in any sector of the economy on its own initiative or at the request of the competent national authorities, and relying on information
Amendment 67 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 7 (7) To ensure a level playing field throughout the internal market and consistency in the application of this Regulation, the Commission should be the sole authority competent to apply this Regulation, in close cooperation with Member States. The Commission should have the power to examine any foreign subsidy to the extent it is in the scope of this Regulation in any sector of the economy on its own initiative relying on information from all available sources. To ensure effective control, in the specific case of large concentrations (mergers and acquisitions) and public procurement procedures above certain thresholds, the Commission should have the power to review foreign subsidies based on a prior notification by the undertaking to the Commission. The Commission shall consult and inform Member States and the Parliament in all stages of the process in due time.
Amendment 68 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 7 (7) To ensure a level playing field throughout the internal market and consistency in the application of this Regulation, the Commission should be the sole authority competent to apply this Regulation. The Commission should have the power to examine any foreign subsidy to the extent it is in the scope of this Regulation in any sector of the economy on its own initiative relying on information from all available sources, including Member States, Member States’ trade associations and EU-wide social partners. To ensure effective control, in the specific case of large concentrations (mergers and acquisitions) and public procurement procedures above certain thresholds, the Commission should have the power to review foreign subsidies based on a prior notification by the undertaking to the Commission.
Amendment 69 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 7 (7) To ensure a level playing field throughout the internal market and consistency in the application of this Regulation, the Commission should be the sole authority competent to apply this Regulation. The Commission should have the power to examine any foreign subsidy
Amendment 70 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 8 (8) Foreign subsidy in the context of this Regulation should be understood as an intervention that meets three cumulative conditions based on international rules laid down in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and EU rules on State aid.
Amendment 71 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) There should be a financial contribution provided, directly or indirectly, by
Amendment 72 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) There should be a financial contribution or any other advantage provided, directly or indirectly, by the public authorities of a third country. The financial contribution or advantage may be granted through public or private entities. Whether a public entity provides a financial contribution or advantage should be determined on a case-by-case basis with due regard to elements such as the characteristics of the relevant entity and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the economy. Financial contributions or advantage may also be granted through a private entity if its
Amendment 73 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) There should be a financial contribution or an economically equivalent support measure provided, directly or indirectly, by the public authorities of a third country. The financial contribution or an economically equivalent support measure provided may be granted through public or private entities. Whether a public entity provides a financial contribution or an economically equivalent support measure provided should be determined on a case-by-case basis with due regard to elements such as the characteristics of the relevant entity and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the economy. Financial contributions or economically equivalent support measures provided may also be granted through a private entity if its actions can be plausibly attributed to the third country.
Amendment 74 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) There should be a financial contribution provided, directly or indirectly, by the public authorities of a third country. The financial contribution may be granted through public or private entities. Whether a public entity provides a financial contribution should be determined on a case-by-case basis with due regard to elements such as the characteristics of the relevant entity and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the economy. Financial contributions may also be granted through a private entity if its actions can be attributed to the third country. Special or exclusive rights that are not adequately remunerated, could also be considered as a financial contribution.
Amendment 75 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) There should be a financial contribution provided, directly or indirectly, by the public authorities of a third country. The financial contribution may be granted through public or private entities. Whether a public entity provides a financial contribution should be determined on a case-by-case basis with due regard to elements such as the characteristics of the relevant entity and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the economy. Financial contributions may also
Amendment 76 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) There should be a financial contribution or any other advantage provided, directly or indirectly, by the public authorities of a third country. The financial contribution or advantage may be granted through public or private entities. Whether a public entity provides a financial contribution or advantage should be determined on a case- by-case basis with due regard to elements such as the characteristics of the relevant entity and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the economy. Financial contributions or advantages may also be granted through a private entity if its actions can be attributed to the third country.
Amendment 77 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 a (new) (9 a) The Commission should also consider as a financial contribution any privileged access of an undertaking to its own domestic market, such as, but not only, exclusive rights of entry, or lower administrative barriers. The Commission should assess this type of financial contribution on a case-by-case basis.
Amendment 78 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 (10) Such a financial contribution or economically equivalent support measure should confer a benefit to an undertaking engaging in an economic activity in the internal market. A financial contribution or an economically equivalent support measure that benefits an entity engaging in non-
Amendment 79 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 (10) Such a financial contribution or advantage should confer a benefit to any undertaking engaging in an economic activity in the internal market. A financial contribution or advantage that benefits an entity engaging in non-
Amendment 80 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 (10) Such a financial contribution or advantage should confer a benefit to an undertaking engaging in an economic activity in the internal market. A financial contribution or advantage that benefits an entity engaging in non-
Amendment 81 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 (10)
Amendment 82 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 a (new) (11 a) A foreign subsidy is considered granted from the moment the beneficiary has an entitlement to receive the subsidy. The actual payment of the subsidy is not a necessary condition for bringing a subsidy within the scope of this Regulation.
Amendment 83 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 12 (12) Once the existence of a foreign subsidy is established, the Commission should assess whether the foreign subsidy distorts the internal market. Unlike State aid granted by a Member State, foreign subsidies are not generally prohibited. This asymmetry should incentivise the EU to revise its own rules to offer better support to companies through State aid and to help implement an industrial strategy capable of boosting EU creation of value and jobs. Subsidies in the form of export financing may be a cause of particular concern because of their distortive effects. This is not the case if such financing is provided in line with the OECD Arrangement on officially supported export credits. The Commission should assess on a case-by-
Amendment 84 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 12 (12) Once the existence of a foreign subsidy is established, the Commission should assess whether the foreign subsidy distorts the internal market. Unlike State aid granted by a Member State, foreign subsidies are not generally
Amendment 85 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 (14) When applying these indicators, the Commission could take into account different elements such as the size of the subsidy in absolute terms or in relation to the size of the market or to the value of the investment. For instance, a concentration, in the context of which a foreign subsidy covers a substantial part of the purchase price of the target, is likely to be distortive. Similarly, foreign subsidies covering a substantial part of the estimated value of a contract to be awarded in a public procurement procedure are likely to cause
Amendment 86 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 (14) When applying these indicators, the Commission could take into account different elements such as the size of the subsidy in absolute terms or in relation to the size of the market or to the value of the investment. For instance, a concentration, in the context of which a foreign subsidy covers a substantial part of the purchase price of the target, is likely to be distortive. Similarly, foreign subsidies covering a substantial part of the estimated value of a contract to be awarded in a public procurement procedure are likely to cause distortions. If a foreign subsidy is granted for operating costs, it seems more likely to cause distortions than if it is granted for investment costs. Foreign subsidies to small and medium-sized undertakings may be considered less likely to cause distortions than foreign subsidies to large undertakings. Furthermore, the characteristics of the market, and in particular the competitive conditions on the market, such as barriers to entry, should be
Amendment 87 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 (14) When applying these indicators, the Commission could take into account different elements such as the size of the subsidy in absolute terms or in relation to the size of the market or to the value of the investment. For instance, a concentration, in the context of which a foreign subsidy covers a substantial part of the purchase price of the target, is likely to be distortive. Similarly, foreign subsidies covering a substantial part of the estimated value of a contract to be awarded in a public
Amendment 88 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 (14) When applying these indicators, the Commission could take into account different elements such as the size of the subsidy in absolute terms or in relation to the size of the market or to the value of the investment. For instance, a concentration,
Amendment 89 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 a (new) (14 a) Furthermore, the Commission should also assess whether the undertaking that has received a financial contribution from its third country of origin has a history of other distortive practices, such as dumping, or a history of violations on human rights, especially when it refers to forced labour and child labour. This history should also be taken into account by the Commission as complementary indicators. The Parliament should flag it through its annual report on the implementation of the common commercial policy.
Amendment 90 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 (16)
Amendment 91 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 (16) The Commission should take into account the positive effects of the foreign subsidy on the development of the relevant subsidised economic activity. The Commission should weigh these positive effects against the negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market in order to determine, if applicable, the appropriate redressive measure or accept commitments. The positive effects of the foreign subsidy should effectively contribute to achieving the objectives of Union policies. The balancing may also lead to the conclusion that no redressive measures should be imposed. Categories of foreign subsidies that are deemed most likely to distort the internal market are less likely to have more positive than negative effects. The Commission should make available guidelines to clarify the criteria used for the application of the balancing test, including the positive effects in relation to the objectives of Union policies.
Amendment 92 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 (16) The Commission should take into
Amendment 93 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 (16) The Commission should
Amendment 94 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 (16) The Commission should take into account the positive effects of the foreign subsidy on the development of the relevant subsidised economic activity. The Commission should weigh these positive effects against the negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market in order to determine, if applicable, the appropriate redressive measure or accept commitments. The balancing may also lead to the conclusion that no redressive measures should be imposed. Categories of foreign subsidies that are deemed most likely to distort the internal market are less likely to have more positive than negative effects. The Commission shall, in close cooperation with Member States, develop and publish guidelines on the application of the balancing test.
Amendment 95 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 (16) The Commission should take into account the positive effects of the foreign subsidy on the development of the relevant subsidised economic activity. The Commission should weigh these positive effects against the negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market in order to determine, if applicable, the appropriate redressive measure or accept commitments. It is of utmost importance to ensure a level playing field to support the economic recovery of the European Union. The balancing may also lead to the conclusion that no redressive measures should be imposed. Categories of foreign subsidies that are deemed most likely to distort the internal market are less likely to have more positive than negative effects.
Amendment 96 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 17 (17) Where the Commission examines a foreign subsidy
Amendment 97 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 19 (19) The undertaking concerned could offer to repay the subsidy, together with appropriate interest. The Commission
Amendment 98 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 19 (19) The undertaking concerned could offer to repay the subsidy, together with appropriate interest. The Commission
Amendment 99 #
(21) The Commission should have the power, on its own initiative, to examine any information on foreign subsidies or any other non-financial benefit from a third country that results in the same effect as a subsidy, whether this involves standards or practices of a specific or general nature. To this end, it is necessary to establish a procedure consisting of two steps, namely a preliminary review and an in-depth investigation.
source: 719.564
2022/03/09
JURI
122 amendments...
Amendment 100 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 4 a (new) (4a) Any other non-financial measure with an effect equivalent to a subsidy for the beneficiary.
Amendment 101 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission shall, where warranted, balance the negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market with positive effects on the development of the relevant economic activity, including positive environmental and social externalities providing a contribution to EU policy objectives.
Amendment 102 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission shall, where warranted, balance the proven negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market with positive effects on the development of the relevant economic
Amendment 103 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission shall take into account the balancing between the proven negative and positive effects when deciding whether to impose redressive measures or to accept commitments, and the nature
Amendment 104 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission shall take into account the balancing between the proven negative and positive effects when deciding whether to impose redressive measures or to accept commitments, and the nature and level of those redressive measures or commitments.
Amendment 105 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) The balancing assessment referred to in paragraph 1 shall be disclosed on a dedicated webpage of the Commission. The Commission shall also provide for a justification on the same webpage whenever a balancing test is not carried out pursuant to paragraph 1 and shall carryout, where warranted, a consultation with Member States, Member States’ trade associations and EU-wide social partners.
Amendment 106 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 b (new) (2 b) The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated act for the purpose of specifying the methodology underlying the balancing assessment and in particular for the determination of positive effects referred to in paragraph 1 as well as criteria for outweighing effects.
Amendment 107 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 (1) To remedy the distortion on the
Amendment 108 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 (1) To remedy the distortion on the internal market actually or potentially caused by a foreign subsidy, the Commission may impose suitable and proportional redressive measures. The undertaking concerned may also offer commitments.
Amendment 109 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 2 (2) Commitments or redressive measures shall fully and effectively remedy the distortion actually or potentially caused by the foreign subsidy in the internal market.
Amendment 110 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 – introductory part (3) Commitments or redressive measures may inter alia consist of the following:
Amendment 111 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 4 (4) The Commission may impose reporting and transparency requirements and follow-up on them.
Amendment 112 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 6 (6) Where the undertaking concerned proposes to repay the foreign subsidy including an appropriate interest rate, the Commission shall accept such repayment as commitment
Amendment 113 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 7 – paragraph 1 1. The Commission may on its own initiative examine information from any source regarding alleged distortive foreign subsidies. 2.The Commission shall hand the ex officio procedure over to the competent authorities of the Member States if the company receiving the subsidy or other benefit with an equivalent effect has a turnover of under EUR 250 million. 3. The provisions of Articles 8, 9, 11 and 12 of this Regulation shall be devolved to the competent authorities of the Member States if the turnover of the companies receiving the subsidy or other benefit with an equivalent effect is under EUR 250 million.
Amendment 114 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 7 – paragraph 1 The Commission may on its own initiative examine information from any source regarding alleged distortive foreign subsidies. The Commission shall examine substantiated information submitted by Member States, Member States’ trade associations and EU-wide social partners.
Amendment 115 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 7 – paragraph 1 The Commission may on its own initiative examine information from any source, including Member States and undertakings or their professional associations, regarding alleged distortive foreign subsidies.
Amendment 116 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 7 – paragraph 1 a (new) Any Member State may require the Commission to initiate a review of a foreign subsidy;
Amendment 117 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 1 – introductory part (1) The Commission shall seek all the information it considers necessary to assess, on a preliminary basis, whether the financial contribution or the economically equivalent support measure under examination constitutes a foreign subsidy and whether it distorts the internal market. To that end, the Commission may in particular:
Amendment 118 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 2 – point b (b) inform the undertaking and Member States concerned; and
Amendment 119 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 3 (3) Where the Commission, after a preliminary assessment, concludes that there are no sufficient grounds to initiate the in-depth investigation, either because there is no foreign subsidy or because there are no indications of an actual or potential distortion on the internal market, it shall close the preliminary review
Amendment 120 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 3 (3) Where the Commission, after a preliminary assessment, concludes that there are no sufficient grounds to initiate the in-depth investigation, either because there is no foreign subsidy or because there are no indications of an actual or potential distortion on the internal market, it shall close the preliminary review and inform the undertaking and Member States concerned.
Amendment 121 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – introductory part The Commission or the Member State to which a referral is made by the Commission pursuant to Article 7(2) and (3) may take interim measures, where:
Amendment 122 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – introductory part The Commission may take temporary interim
Amendment 123 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point 1 (1) there are indications that a financial contribution or an economically equivalent support measure constitutes a foreign subsidy and distorts the internal market; and
Amendment 124 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point 1 (1) there are indications that a financial contribution constitutes a foreign subsidy and distorts the internal market;
Amendment 125 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point 2 a (new) Amendment 126 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point 2 b (new) (2 b) The Commission is empowered to adopt a delegated act for the purpose of supplementing paragraphs 1 and 2 with a methodology for determining that a serious risk of substantial and irreparable damage to competition arises on the internal market.
Amendment 127 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 1 (1) The Commission or the Member State to which a referral is made by the Commission pursuant to Article 7(2) and (3) may require an undertaking concerned to provide all necessary information.
Amendment 128 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 2 – point a (a) to enter any premises
Amendment 129 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 7 (7) Upon
Amendment 130 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 1 In order to carry out the duties assigned to it by this Regulation, the Commission may conduct inspections in the territory of a third country
Amendment 131 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 3 (3) Where an undertaking concerned, including a public undertaking which is directly or indirectly controlled by the State, fails to provide the necessary information to determine whether a financial contribution or an economically equivalent support measure confers a benefit to it, that undertaking may be deemed to have received such benefit.
Amendment 132 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 1 – introductory part (1) The Commission may impose by decision fines and periodic penalty payments where an undertaking
Amendment 133 #
(2) Fines imposed in the cases referred to in paragraph 1 shall not exceed 10 % of the aggregate turnover of the undertaking or association of undertakings concerned in the preceding business year.
Amendment 134 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 2 (2) Fines imposed in the cases referred to in paragraph 1 shall not exceed
Amendment 135 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 3 (3) Periodic penalty payments imposed in the cases referred to in paragraph 1 shall not exceed 15% of the average daily aggregate turnover of the undertaking or association of undertakings concerned in the preceding business year for each working day of delay, calculated from the date established in the decision, until it submits complete and correct information as requested by the Commission.
Amendment 136 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 3 (3) Periodic penalty payments imposed in the cases referred to in paragraph 1 shall not exceed
Amendment 137 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 5 – introductory part (5) Where an undertaking or association of undertakings concerned does not comply with a decision with commitments pursuant to Article 9(3), a decision ordering interim measures pursuant to Article 10 or a decision imposing redressive measures pursuant to Article 9(2), the Commission may impose by decision:
Amendment 138 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 5 – introductory part (5) Where an undertaking concerned does not comply with a decision with commitments pursuant to Article 9(3), a decision ordering interim measures pursuant to Article 10 or a decision imposing redressive measures pursuant to Article 9(2), the Commission may, after consulting the Council, impose by decision:
Amendment 139 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 5 – point a (a) fines not exceeding 10 % of the
Amendment 140 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 5 – point b (b) periodic penalty payments not exceeding 5% of the average daily
Amendment 141 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 16 – paragraph 1 – point 1 a (new) (1a) In accordance with point (1), the Commission shall duly justify the revocation of the decision and the suitability of adopting a new decision.
Amendment 142 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 – point b (b) the undertakings concerned received from third countries an aggregate financial contribution in the three calendar years prior to notification of more than EUR 25
Amendment 143 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 4 – point a (a) the joint venture itself or one of its parent undertakings is established in the Union and generates an aggregate turnover in the Union of at least EUR
Amendment 144 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 4 – point a a (new) (aa) the joint venture itself or one of its parent undertakings is established in the Union and generates an aggregate turnover in the Union of at least EUR 250 million; and
Amendment 145 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 4 – point b (b) the joint venture itself and its parent undertakings received from third countries an aggregate financial contribution in the three calendar years prior to notification of more than EUR 25
Amendment 146 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 4 (4) If the undertakings concerned fail to meet their obligation to notify, the Commission
Amendment 147 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 (2) For the purpose of Article 28, a notifiable foreign financial contribution in an EU public procurement procedure shall be deemed to arise where the estimated value of that public procurement is equal or greater than EUR
Amendment 148 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 (2) For the purpose of Article 28, a notifiable foreign financial contribution in an EU public procurement procedure shall
Amendment 149 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 2 (2) The obligation to notify foreign financial contributions under this paragraph shall extend to economic operators, groups of economic operators referred to in Article 26(2) of Directive 2014/23/EU, Article 19(2) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 37(2) of Directive 2014/25/EU, main subcontractors and main suppliers. A subcontractor or supplier shall be deemed to be main where their participation ensures key elements of the contract performance and in any case where the economic share of their contribution exceeds
Amendment 150 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 29 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission shall carry out a preliminary review no later than
Amendment 151 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 31 – paragraph 7 (7) The principles governing public procurement, including proportionality, non-discrimination, equal treatment,
Amendment 152 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 33 – paragraph 1 (1) A financial contribution notified in
Amendment 153 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 33 – paragraph 2 (2) A financial contribution notified in the context of a public procurement procedure under Article 28 may be relevant and assessed again under this Regulation in relation to another economic activity.
Amendment 154 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 34 – paragraph 1 (1) Where the information available substantiates a reasonable suspicion that foreign subsidies in a particular sector, for a particular type of economic activity or based on a particular subsidy instrument may distort the internal market, the Commission may conduct a market investigation into the particular sector, the particular type of economic activity or into the use of the subsidy instrument concerned. In the course of that market investigation, the Commission may request the undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned to supply the necessary information and may carry out
Amendment 155 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 34 – paragraph 2 (2)
Amendment 156 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 34 – paragraph 2 (2) The Commission
Amendment 157 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 Amendment 158 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point -a (new) (-a) specifying the definition of financial contribution, the definition of economically equivalent support measure, as well as for establishing criteria for identifying actions that can be attributed to third countries as set out in Article 2;
Amendment 159 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point -a a (new) (-a a) supplementing the indicators set out for determining distortive subsidies in the single market as referred to in Article 3;
Amendment 160 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point -a b (new) (-a b) specifying the methodology underlying the balancing assessment and in particular for the determination of positive effects as well as criteria for outweighing effects referred to in Article 5;
Amendment 161 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 44 – paragraph 1 – point -a c (new) (-a c) for the purpose of adopting interim measures, specifying a methodology for determining that a serious risk of substantial and irreparable damage to competition arises on the internal market as referred to in Article 10;
Amendment 40 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 1 (1) A strong, open, dynamic, durable and competitive internal market enables both European and foreign
Amendment 41 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2)
Amendment 42 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2) At the same time, undertakings might receive subsidies from third countries, that provide public funds which are then used, for instance, to finance economic activities in the internal market in any sector of the economy, such as participation in public procurement tenders, or acquisitions of undertakings, including those with strategic assets such as critical infrastructure and innovative technologies. Such subsidies, including monetary financing of an economy to artificially lower the production costs, are currently not subject to Union State aid rules.
Amendment 43 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2) At the same time, undertakings might receive subsidies from third countries,
Amendment 44 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 a (new) (2 a) Whereas the historical origin of competition policies lies in the need to ensure that foreign or domestic undertakings cannot affect national sovereignty or the democratic exercise of popular sovereignty.
Amendment 45 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 3 (3) Foreign subsidies can distort the internal market and undermine the level playing field for various economic activities in the Union and can represent a threat to the sovereignty of Member States. This could in particular occur in the context of concentrations entailing a change of control over
Amendment 46 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 3 (3) Foreign subsidies can distort the internal market, upset the functional balance thereof and undermine the level playing field for various economic activities in the Union. This could in particular occur in the context of concentrations entailing a change of control over Union undertakings, where such concentrations are fully or partially financed through foreign subsidies, or if undertakings benefiting from foreign subsidies are awarded public contracts in the Union.
Amendment 47 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 (5) The Member States have not adopted national legislation regarding foreign subsidies, although countries such as France, Germany, Poland, Italy or the Netherlands have highlighted the need for harmonised EU rules to address the issue. It is therefore necessary to complement existing Union instruments with a new tool to effectively deal with distortions in the internal market caused by foreign subsidies and ensure a level
Amendment 48 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 (5) It
Amendment 49 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 6 (6) Rules and procedures to investigate foreign subsidies that actually or potentially distort the internal market should be laid down and, where relevant, those distortions should be redressed. Foreign subsidies benefitting a certain economic activity of an undertaking, or an undertaking itself could distort the internal market if the undertaking benefitting from the foreign subsidy engages in an economic activity in the Union. This Regulation should therefore establish rules for all undertakings engaging in an economic activity in the Union. Given the significance of the economic activities pursued by SMEs, and their contribution to the fulfilment of the Union’s key policy goals, special attention is given to the impact of this Regulation on them.
Amendment 50 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 7 (7) To ensure a level playing field throughout the internal market and consistency in the application of this Regulation, the Commission should be the sole authority competent to apply this Regulation. The Commission should have the power to examine any foreign subsidy to the extent it is in the scope of this Regulation in any sector of the economy on its own initiative relying on information from all available sources. To ensure effective control, in the specific case of large concentrations (mergers and acquisitions) and public procurement procedures above certain thresholds, the Commission should have the power to review foreign subsidies based on a prior
Amendment 51 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 7 (7) To ensure a level playing field throughout the internal market and consistency in the application of this Regulation, the Commission should be the sole authority competent to apply this Regulation. The Commission should have the power to examine any foreign subsidy to the extent it is in the scope of this Regulation in any sector of the economy on its own initiative relying on information from all available sources, including Member States, Member States’ trade association and EU-wide social partners. To ensure effective control, in the specific case of large concentrations (mergers and acquisitions) and public procurement procedures above certain thresholds, the Commission should have the power to review foreign subsidies based on a prior notification by the undertaking to the Commission.
Amendment 52 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 7 (7) To ensure a level playing field throughout the internal market and consistency in the application of this Regulation, the Commission should
Amendment 53 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) There should be a financial contribution or an economically equivalent support measure provided, directly or indirectly, by the public authorities of a third country. The financial contribution or an economically equivalent support measure may be granted through public or private entities. Whether a public entity provides a financial contribution or an economically equivalent support measure should be determined on a case-by-case basis with due regard to elements such as the characteristics of the relevant entity and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the
Amendment 54 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) There should be a
Amendment 55 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 (10) Such a financial contribution or an economically equivalent support measure should confer a benefit to an undertaking engaging in an economic activity in the internal market. A financial contribution or an economically equivalent support measure that benefits an entity engaging in non-
Amendment 56 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 (10) Such a
Amendment 57 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 a (new) (11 a) Foreign subsidies to undertakings supplying energy to the Member States should be exempt from this regulation, especially where such energy products meet the EU Taxonomy criteria;
Amendment 58 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 12 (12) Once the existence of a foreign subsidy is established, the Commission should assess whether the foreign subsidy distorts the internal market. Unlike State aid granted by a Member State, foreign subsidies are not generally prohibited. This asymmetry should prompt the EU to revise its own rules to offer better support to companies through State aid and to help implement an industrial strategy capable of enhancing our economy's potential for job and value creation. Subsidies in the form of export financing may be a cause of particular concern because of their distortive effects. This is not the case if such financing is provided in
Amendment 59 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 12 (12) Once the existence of a foreign subsidy is established, the Commission should assess whether the foreign subsidy distorts the internal market, in close cooperation with the Member States where the distortion is identified. Unlike State aid granted by a Member State, foreign subsidies are not generally prohibited. Subsidies in the form of export financing may be a cause of particular concern because of their distortive effects. This is not the case if such financing is provided in line with the OECD Arrangement on officially supported export credits. The Commission should assess on a case-by-
Amendment 60 #
(16) The Commission should take into account the positive effects of the foreign subsidy on the development of the relevant subsidised economic activity, in particular as regards of its contribution to the Union’s objectives and the positive social and environmental externalities of such subsidised activities. The Commission should weigh these positive effects against the negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market in order to determine, if applicable, the appropriate redressive measure or accept commitments. The balancing may also lead to the conclusion that no redressive measures should be imposed. Categories of foreign subsidies that are deemed most likely to distort the internal market are less likely to have more positive than negative effects.
Amendment 61 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 (16) The Commission should take into account the positive effects of the foreign subsidy on the development of the relevant subsidised economic activity. The Commission should weigh these positive effects against the proven negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market in order to determine, if applicable, the appropriate and proportional redressive measure or accept commitments. The balancing may also lead to the conclusion that no redressive measures should be imposed. Categories of foreign subsidies
Amendment 62 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 (16) The Commission should take into account the positive effects of the foreign subsidy on the development of the relevant subsidised economic activity. The Commission should weigh these positive effects against the proven negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market in order to determine, if applicable, the appropriate redressive measure or accept commitments. The balancing may also lead to the conclusion that no redressive measures should be imposed. Categories of foreign subsidies that are deemed most likely to distort the internal market are less likely to have more positive than negative effects.
Amendment 63 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 (21) The Commission should have the power, on its own initiative, to examine any information on foreign subsidies. The Commission should be able to act on the basis of information received from all relevant sources, particularly Member States but also companies, professional associations, local authorities, unions and non-governmental organisations. To this end, it is necessary to establish a
Amendment 64 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 (21) The Commission should have the power, on its own initiative, to examine any information on foreign subsidies or any other non-financial benefit from a third country, whether this consists of standards or practices of a specific or general nature, that results in the same effect as a subsidy. To this end, it is necessary to establish a procedure consisting of two steps, namely a preliminary review and an in-depth investigation.
Amendment 65 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 (21) The Commission should have the power, on its own initiative, to examine any information on foreign subsidies. The Commission should be able to act upon information received from any relevant source, including Member States, Member States’ trade associations and EU-wide social partners. To
Amendment 66 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 23 (23) Furthermore, where necessary to restore competition in the internal market immediately and to prevent irreparable harm, the Commission should have the power to adopt temporary interim measures.
Amendment 67 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 24 (24) In all cases where, as a result of the preliminary review, the Commission has sufficient indications of the existence of a foreign subsidy distorting the internal market, the Commission should have the power to launch an in-depth investigation to gather additional relevant information to assess the foreign subsidy
Amendment 68 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 24 (24) In all cases where, as a result of the preliminary review, the Commission has sufficient indications of the existence of a foreign subsidy distorting the internal market, the Commission should have the power to launch an in-depth investigation to gather additional relevant information to assess the foreign subsidy and how it might distort the internal market, and to allow the interested parties to exercise their rights of defence.
Amendment 69 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 26 (26) The Commission should have appropriate instruments to ensure the effectiveness of commitments and redressive measures, ensuring that they are suitable and proportional. If the undertaking concerned does not comply with a decision with commitments, a decision imposing redressive measures, or a decision ordering temporary interim measures, the Commission should have the power to impose fines and periodic penalty payments.
Amendment 70 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 26 (26) The Commission should have appropriate instruments to ensure the effectiveness of commitments and redressive measures. If the undertaking concerned does not comply with a decision with commitments, a decision imposing redressive measures, or a decision ordering interim measures, the Commission should have the power to impose fines and periodic penalty payments of a value high enough to put a stop to the potential or actual distortion of the internal market, so that they have a deterrent effect.
Amendment 71 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 27 (27) In order to ensure the correct and effective application of this Regulation, the Commission should have the power to revoke a decision and adopt a new one, where the decision was based on incomplete, incorrect or misleading information, or where an undertaking acts contrary to its commitments or the redressive measures imposed. The Commission should duly justify the revocation of a decision and the need to adopt a new decision.
Amendment 72 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 28 (28) Given the potentially significant impact of concentrations on the internal market, the Commission should have the power, upon notification, to examine information on foreign
Amendment 73 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 31 (31) Below the notification thresholds, the Commission
Amendment 74 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 33 (33) The need to address distortive foreign subsidies is especially salient in public procurement, given its economic significance in the internal market and the fact that it is financed by taxpayer funds. The Commission should have the power, upon notification prior to the award of a public contract or concession, to examine information on foreign
Amendment 75 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 (36) Foreign subsidies and all other non-financial measures with an equivalent effect that enable an undertaking to submit a tender which is unduly advantageous in relation to the works, supplies or services concerned should be deemed to actually or potentially create a distortion in a public procurement procedure. Those distortions should therefore be assessed on the basis of the non-exhaustive set of indicators described in recitals 13 and 14 as well as the notion of unduly advantageous tender. The indicators should allow to determine how the foreign subsidy distorts competition by improving the competitive position of an undertaking and enabling it to submit an unduly advantageous tender. The opportunity should be given to undertakings to justify that the tender is not unduly advantageous, including by adducing the elements referred to in Article 69(2) of Directive 2014/24/EU. The prohibition of the award should only apply
Amendment 76 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 39 (39) In the interest of transparency and legal certainty, it is appropriate to publish either in full or at least in a summary form all decisions adopted by the Commission and forward them as soon as possible to all concerned.
Amendment 77 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 39 (39) In the interest of transparency and legal certainty, it is appropriate to publish either in full or in a summary form all decisions adopted by the Commission, as well as in-depth investigations and balancing assessments.
Amendment 78 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 43 (43) The implementation of this Regulation by the Union should comply with Union law, be consistent with
Amendment 79 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 48 (48) In order to ensure a level playing field on the internal market also in the long term, with a view to ensuring adequate coverage of cases investigated both through notifications as well as ex officio, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty should be delegated to the Commission in respect of specifying economically equivalent support measure to a financial contribution, establishing criteria for identifying actions that can be attributed to third countries, specifying the methodology underlying the balancing assessment, adopting a methodology for determining that a serious risk of substantial and irreparable damage to competition arises on the internal market, amending the notification thresholds for concentrations and for public procurement procedures, exempting certain categories of undertakings from the notification obligations under this Regulation, as well as amending the time limits for the preliminary review and the in-depth investigations of notified concentrations or notified financial contributions or economically equivalent support measures in the
Amendment 80 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 (1) This Regulation lays down rules and procedures for investigating foreign subsidies that distort the internal market and for redressing such distortions with a view to ensuring a level playing field for the functioning of the internal market. Such distortions may arise with respect to any economic activity, and in particular in concentrations and public procurement procedures.
Amendment 81 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 a (new) (1 a) This Regulation shall also make it possible to control foreign subsidies in case of threat to national sovereignty of the Member States, as well as their impact on the good exercise of democracy, and pluralistic and independent media;
Amendment 82 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 2 (2) This Regulation addresses foreign subsidies
Amendment 83 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 (1) For the purpose of this Regulation, a foreign subsidy or any other measure with an equivalent effect shall be deemed to exist where a third country provides a financial or non-financial contribution which confers a benefit to an undertaking engaging in an economic activity in the internal market and which is limited, in law or in fact, to an individual undertaking or industry or to several undertakings or industries.
Amendment 84 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 (1) For the purpose of this Regulation,
Amendment 85 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point a – point i (i) the transfer of funds or liabilities, such as capital injections, grants, loans, loan guarantees, tailored lending conditions, fiscal incentives, setting off of operating losses, compensation for financial burdens imposed by public authorities, debt forgiveness, debt to equity swaps or rescheduling, corporate bond buying programmes by public authorities including central banks;
Amendment 86 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point a – point ii (ii) the foregoing of revenue that is otherwise due;
Amendment 87 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point a – point ii a (new) (iia) inadequately remunerated special or exclusive rights or alternatively:
Amendment 88 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point a – point ii a (new) (ii a) inadequately remunerated special or exclusive rights; or
Amendment 89 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point a a (new) Amendment 90 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point b – introductory part (b) the financial contribution or an economically equivalent support measure provided by the third country shall include the financial contribution or an economically equivalent support measure provided by:
Amendment 91 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 – point b – point ii (ii) foreign public entities, whose actions can be attributed to the third country, taking into account elements such as the characteristics of the entity, the legal and economic environment prevailing in the State in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the economy, such as central banks or public investment banks; or
Amendment 92 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) The Commission is empowered to adopt a delegated act for the purpose of specifying the definition of financial contribution, the definition of economically equivalent support measure, as well as for establishing criteria for identifying actions that can be attributed to third countries as referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article.
Amendment 93 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) Foreign subsidies to undertakings supplying energy to the Member States should be exempt from this regulation, especially where such energy products meet the EU Taxonomy criteria;
Amendment 94 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new) (c a) the sector concerned;
Amendment 95 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point d (d) the level and evolution of economic activity of the undertaking concerned on the internal market;
Amendment 96 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point d (d) the level and evolution of economic activity of the undertaking concerned on the internal market;
Amendment 97 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 a (new) Amendment 98 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 Amendment 99 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 2 a (new) (2 a) The Commission is empowered to adopt a delegated act for the purpose of supplementing the indicators referred to in paragraph 1.
source: 719.865
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Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
docs/0 |
|
docs/12 |
|
docs/13 |
|
docs/13 |
|
docs/13/date |
Old
2021-07-14T00:00:00New
2021-07-15T00:00:00 |
docs/14 |
|
docs/14 |
|
docs/14/date |
Old
2021-07-27T00:00:00New
2021-07-28T00:00:00 |
docs/15 |
|
docs/15/date |
Old
2021-12-15T00:00:00New
2021-12-16T00:00:00 |
events/0 |
|
events/6 |
|
events/7 |
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
events/7 |
|
events/7 |
|
events/7 |
|
events/7 |
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
events/7 |
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
events/7 |
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
events/7 |
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
events/7 |
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
events/7 |
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
events/7 |
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
events/7 |
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
docs/11/docs/0/url |
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/commissions/inta/lcag/2022/07-13/INTA_LA(2022)008224_EN.pdf
|
docs/0 |
|
docs/12 |
|
docs/12/date |
Old
2021-07-15T00:00:00New
2021-07-14T00:00:00 |
docs/13 |
|
docs/13 |
|
docs/13/date |
Old
2021-07-28T00:00:00New
2021-07-27T00:00:00 |
docs/14 |
|
docs/14 |
|
docs/14/date |
Old
2021-12-16T00:00:00New
2021-12-15T00:00:00 |
docs/15 |
|
events/0 |
|
events/6 |
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
docs/0 |
|
docs/11 |
|
docs/12 |
|
docs/12 |
|
docs/13 |
|
docs/13 |
|
docs/13/date |
Old
2021-07-14T00:00:00New
2021-07-15T00:00:00 |
docs/14 |
|
docs/14/date |
Old
2021-07-27T00:00:00New
2021-07-28T00:00:00 |
docs/15 |
|
docs/15/date |
Old
2021-12-15T00:00:00New
2021-12-16T00:00:00 |
events/0 |
|
events/6 |
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
procedure/Legislative priorities/0 |
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
docs/11/docs/0/url |
Old
http://www.connefof.europarl.europa.eu/connefof/app/exp/COM(2021)0223New
https://connectfolx.europarl.europa.eu/connefof/app/exp/COM(2021)0223 |
docs/12/docs/0/url |
Old
http://www.connefof.europarl.europa.eu/connefof/app/exp/COM(2021)0223New
https://connectfolx.europarl.europa.eu/connefof/app/exp/COM(2021)0223 |
docs/13/docs/0/url |
Old
http://www.connefof.europarl.europa.eu/connefof/app/exp/COM(2021)0223New
https://connectfolx.europarl.europa.eu/connefof/app/exp/COM(2021)0223 |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
docs/11 |
|
events/5/summary |
|
docs/3/docs/0/url |
https://dmsearch.eesc.europa.eu/search/public?k=(documenttype:AC)(documentnumber:3401)(documentyear:2021)(documentlanguage:EN)
|
docs/9/docs/0/url |
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/JURI-AD-704679_EN.html
|
docs/10/docs/0/url |
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2022-0135_EN.html
|
docs/11/docs/0/url |
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0143_EN.html
|
events/4/docs/0/url |
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2022-0135_EN.html
|
events/5/docs/0/url |
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0143_EN.html
|
procedure/Legislative priorities |
|
procedure/subject/2 |
Internal market, single market
|
procedure/subject/6.20.02 |
Export/import control, trade defence, trade barriers
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
docs/0 |
|
docs/8 |
|
docs/9 |
|
docs/10 |
|
docs/11 |
|
docs/11 |
|
docs/12/date |
Old
2021-07-15T00:00:00New
2021-07-14T00:00:00 |
docs/13/date |
Old
2021-07-28T00:00:00New
2021-07-27T00:00:00 |
docs/14/date |
Old
2021-12-16T00:00:00New
2021-12-15T00:00:00 |
events/0 |
|
events/3 |
|
events/4 |
|
events/5 |
|
events/6 |
|
forecasts |
|
procedure/Legislative priorities |
|
procedure/Other legal basis |
Rules of Procedure EP 159
|
procedure/stage_reached |
Old
Awaiting committee decisionNew
Awaiting Parliament's position in 1st reading |
procedure/subject/2 |
Internal market, single market
|
procedure/subject/6.20.02 |
Export/import control, trade defence, trade barriers
|
forecasts |
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
forecasts |
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
docs/11 |
|
docs/10/docs/0/url |
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/ECON-AD-700661_EN.html
|
docs/9/docs/0/url |
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/IMCO-AD-703070_EN.html
|
docs/10 |
|
docs/8/docs/0/url |
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/JURI-AD-704679_EN.html
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
docs/8 |
|
docs/9 |
|
docs/9/date |
Old
2022-03-29T00:00:00New
2022-03-30T00:00:00 |
docs/8 |
|
docs/9 |
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
committees/0 |
|
committees/0 |
|
forecasts |
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
docs/6/docs/0/url |
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/INTA-AM-719563_EN.html
|
docs/7/docs/0/url |
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/INTA-AM-719564_EN.html
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
docs/6 |
|
docs/7 |
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
docs/4 |
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
docs/7 |
|
docs/4/docs/0/url |
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/INTA-PR-703002_EN.html
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
docs/4 |
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
events/1 |
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
procedure/legal_basis/0 |
Rules of Procedure EP 57
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
committees/3/rapporteur |
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
committees/0/shadows |
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
committees/0/rapporteur |
|
committees/2/rapporteur |
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
docs/4 |
|
docs/5 |
|
docs/1/docs/0 |
|
committees/5/rapporteur |
|
commission/0/dg |
Old
Economic and Financial Affairs CompetitionNew
Competition Economic and Financial Affairs |
events/0 |
|
events/0 |
|
procedure/dossier_of_the_committee |
|
procedure/stage_reached |
Old
Preparatory phase in ParliamentNew
Awaiting committee decision |
commission/0/dg |
Old
Competition Economic and Financial AffairsNew
Economic and Financial Affairs Competition |
committees/1/opinion |
False
|
committees/3/opinion |
False
|
docs/0 |
|
otherinst |
|
procedure/other_consulted_institutions |
European Economic and Social Committee
|
commission |
|
docs/0 |
|
events/0/summary |
|
procedure/Legislative priorities |
|
committees/2 |
|
docs/0/docs/1 |
|
events/0/docs/1 |
|