Activities of Helga TRÜPEL related to 2014/2005(INI)
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on negotiations on the MFF 2014-2020: lessons to be learned and the way forward PDF (307 KB) DOC (213 KB)
Amendments (22)
Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the agreement on the MFF 2014-2020 was thea conservative and backward-looking outcome of long and strenuous negotiations that lasted two and a half years; whereas the final political agreement could only be reached at the highest political level between the 3 Presidents (Parliament, the Council Presidency and the Commission) according to the article 324 of the TFEU, thus avoiding any consultation of political groups;
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the overall level of the next MFF (960bn EUR in commitments, 908bn EUR in payments at 2011 prices), as decided by the European Council and eventually endorsed by Parliament, represents a cut of 3.5 % in commitments and 3.7 % in payments compared to the 2007-2013 financial framework which corresponds to a cut of 8,8% in commitments and 10% in payments compared to the initial European Commission's proposal which was based on the freeze of the EU budget at the 2013 level, despite the growing EU competences following the Lisbon Treaty and the enlargement of the Union to 28 Member States; whereas this level falls short of EU political goals and commitments, in particular in relation to the Europe 2020 strategy;
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the EU annual budget will continue to representbe reduced to approximately 1 % of EU GNI in the coming years, corresponding to the level of the EU budget in the late 1980's and well below the own-resources ceiling of 1.29 % of EU GNI for commitments and 1.23% of EU GNI for payments, as decided in 1992;
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas, faced with the impossibility of by not using fully its legislative power, including not granting its consent, the European Parliament made it impossible for itself to changillenge the overall MFF figures decidimposed by the European Council, moreover the Parliament successfupartially negotiated the inclusion of several kenon-budgetary new provisions that will help to make the new financial framework and the new EU annual budget more operational, consistent, transparent and responsive to the needs of EU citizens and to allow the MFF ceilings to be almost fully used; whereas these provision concern, in particular, the new arrangements relating to the MFF revision, flexibility, own resources, and the unity and transparency of the EU budget;
Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas Parliament gave its consent to the new MFF Regulation and approved the new Interinstitutional Agreement on 19 November 2013, following the Council’s partial fulfilment of the conditions set out in Parliament’s resolution of 3 July 2013, including the adoption of an additional EUR 11.2 bn in payments for 2013; whereas the constituent meeting of the High Level Group on Own Resources has not been held so far while it should have been 'convened at the time of the formal adoption of the MFF Regulation with a mandate to examine all aspects of the reform of the own-resources system';
Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the Council failed to make any progress on a much needed reform of the current system for financing the EU budget, thus violating the spirit of the Lisbon treaty, despite the ambitious proposals put forward by the Commission aimed at overcoming the stalemate caused by the lack of a genuine own resources system;
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Strongly regrets the fact that both the procedure leading up to the agreement on the MFF 2014-2020 and the political debate surrounding these negotiations demonstrated a clear lack of shared vision as regards the EU budget and fell short of Parliament’s increased role and prerogatives, as set out in the Treaty of Lisbon; stresses that the Parliament was reluctant to fully use its legislative power including the possibility not to grant its consent as set out in the Treaty of Lisbon and adopted by an overwhelming majority both the MFF regulation and the IIA without renegotiating the points already concluded by the European Council; considers consequently that both the Council and the Parliament as co- legislators shall endorsed the responsibility of both the political and institutional consequences of the final agreement; considers it of the utmost importance, therefore, that this report draw the necessary political and institutional lessons, which can serve as a basis for the preparation of future negotiations, notably in relation to the post-electoral revision of the MFF, due to be launched by the Commission before the end of 2016;
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Acknowledges that the fiscal consolidation that Member States are currently facing did not facilitate a more ambitious agreementpositive and forward-looking debate on the MFF 2014- 2020 while it could have been an opportunity to pool scarce public resources at the right political level and increase efficiency of public spending; deeply regrets, however, the fact that, as a result of these negotiations, the role of the EU budget as an important and common policy instrument for overcoming the current economic and social crisis and coordinating and enhancing national efforts to regain growth and generate employment in the whole EU has been largely disregarded;
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Is deeply concerned at the fact that any budgetary debate in the Council has been for many years poisoned by the logic of ‘fair returns’ instead of the logic of the European added-value; stresses that this situation is largely due to the current system of EU financing, whereby some 85 % of revenues stem from national contributions instead of genuine own resources; considers that such a system places disproportionate emphasis on net balances between the Member States and has led to the progressive introduction of complex and opaque rebates and other correction mechanisms for the financing of the EU budget;
Amendment 33 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. BelievesIs convinced that this logic also prevailed in the way the MFF agreement was struck by the European Council on 8 February 2013; considers it regrettabledamaging for the European project that this was reflected in the fact that the national allocations, especially from agriculture and cohesion policy, were determined at that moment while the European Council has no legislative power as set out in the Lisbon treaty; deplores, in particularaddition, the list of special allocations and ‘gifts’ granted in the course of negotiations between Heads of State and Government, which are not based on objective and verifiable criteria, but rather reflect the bargaining power of Member States, trying to secure their national interests and maximise their net returns; denounces the lack of transparency in striking this agreement; points out however that the Parliament has never contested the 'gifts' during the negotiation process;
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Notes that the European Council took a top-down approach to deciding the overall size of the MFF 2014-2020, which in turn demonstrates a worrying discrepancy between EU political commitments which the European Council has been making and its reluctance to adequately finance them; believes, on the contrary, that this decision should be based on a bottom-up process, resulting from a thorough assessment of EU financial needs and political objectives as set out in EU multiannual programmes and policies defined by the co-legislators;
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Is convinced, moreover, that tangible progress can only be achieved following an in-depth reform of the financing of the EU budget that should respect the letter and the spirit of the Treaty, return to a system of genuine, clear, simple and fair, fair and rebate- free own resources system; stresses that this should lead to the introduction of one or several new own resources that will considerably reduce the share of GNI- based contributions to the EU budget and, accordingly, the burden on national treasuries; reiterates its strong commitment to any process leading to the reform of the current unfair, non- transparent and complex system of own resources; Stresses that the final agreement on the own resources system is even more complex, untransparent and unfair than the previous one and has introduced new rebates and exceptions.
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Recalls that Parliament was the first EU institution to present its vision on the MFF 2014-2020, including a call for 'at least a 5% increase of resources for the next MFF', some positive priorities, a minimum level of resources for the biggest budget posts and the need to reform the financing of the EU budget, with the report of its specialised SURE Committee, in June 2011; considers that this report provided effective guidance for the Commission in drafting its own proposals on the MFF and own resources and appreciates the regular political dialogue that was established between the two institutions at all stages of the preparation of this report; points to the obvious advantages for Parliament of an early preparation for any negotiations on the MFF;
Amendment 59 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Stresses that while the European Commission tabled its MFF proposal on June the 29th 2011 and amended its own proposal on the July 6th 2012, it did not communicate its proposal in an efficient and pro-active manner to the public letting the national governments and the European Parliament the responsibility to lead the debate; considers therefore that the European Commission is, with the European Council, the Council and the Parliament, also responsible for the way the debate on both the MFF regulation and the IIA was led; underlines that the European Commission should have played a more pro-active role in the last negotiating phase by playing correctly its 'honest broker' role;
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Recalls that, pursuant to Article 312 TFEU, the European Council may, unanimously, adopts a decision authorising the Council to act by a qualified majority when adopting the MFF regulation; regrets therefore that the European Parliament refused to challenge the European Council on the point; regrets that the European Council refused to use the passerelle clause and let the Council acting by unanimity the MFF Regulation after obtaining the consent of Parliament, while the three EU institutions ‘shall take any measure necessary to facilitate its adoption’; notes, therefore, that the Treaty does not set out any concrete procedure for the involvement of Parliament in the MFF negotiations and that these modalities were subsequently determined in practice through a number of ad hoc arrangements agreed at political level at Parliament’s initiative;
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Points out that the conclusions of the European Council are to be seen as negotiating instructions for the Council and that they in no case constitute red lines which cannot beConsiders it dangerous and against the treaty provision, as set out on the article 15 of the TEU which states that the European Council shall not exercise legislative functions, that the European Council uses the EU summit to impose to the Council its views and red lines creating de facto a legislative power; Considers therefore that by refusing to negotiated with Parliament; calls for a standard formula recalling the provisions of Article 15(1) TFEU to be included in the conclusions of the European Councilthe EP the European Council's red lines the Council refused to exercise its legislative power; Stresses however that by granting its consent the European Parliament democratically legitimizes both the European Council and Council behaviours;
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Notes that the MFF figures (overall level and distribution per heading), as decided by the European Council, were not challenged in the end by Parliament, which acknowledged the particularly difficult economic and financial context at the time of this decision in its Resolution adopted in March 13th 2013, particularly because of the difficult economic and financial context at the time of this decision; regrets that finally the European Parliament fully endorses the MFF figures by giving its the formal consent; stresses, however, that this should by no means be perceived as a precedent and reiterates its position that the MFF figures, and every other part of the European Council’s relevant political agreement, are subject to negotiations with Parliament;
Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Stresses the need to significantly improve the modalities of any future MFF negotiations, in order to avoid deadlocks and save valuable time and resources in the course of negotiations; considers that these modalities should be formalised in an agreement at the highest political level, which should take account of the shortcomings of the recent negotiations and fully safeguard Parliament’s role and prerogatives, as set out in the EU Treaty including the possibility not to grant its consent; considers that this procedure should eventually be enshrined in the IIA itself, as is the case for the budgetary procedure;
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Is convinced that the unanimity rule in the Council means that the agreement represents the lowest common denominator, based on the need to avoid the veto of a single Member State; stresses that a shift towards qualified majority voting for the MFF Regulation would be in line not only with the ordinary legislative procedure, used for the adoption of virtually all EU multiannual programmes, but also with the annual procedure for adopting the EU budget; considers that this can be achieved by using the ‘passerelle’ clause under Article 312 and that this issue should be further considesecured on the occasion of any future Treaty revision;
Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Declares its intention to ensure that all new provisions that were successfully incorporated into the MFF Regulation and IIA are utilised in full in the annual budgetary procedure; expects that the Council will not attempt to impose restricted interpretations of these provisions, especially on the nature and scope of all special instruments; reminds therefore that the MFF ceilings has been set far below the own resources ceilings;
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Recalls that the next Commission, which will come into office after the 2014 European elections, is due to launch a compulsory review and revision of the MFF 2014-2020 by the end of 2016 which opens up the possibility of an increase of the MFF ceilings; underlines the fact that thisa legally binding post-electoral MFF review/revision clause by Qualified Majority Vote was one of Parliament’s key demands in the MFF negotiations, based on the need to allow the next Commission and Parliament to reassess the EU’s political priorities, hence endowing the MFF with renewed democratic legitimacy; stresses the need for the next Parliament to identify in good time political priorities, for which more investments will be deemed necessary in the second half of the next MFF;
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Strongly believes that the High Level Group on Own Resources represents a uniquone opportunity to overcome the deadlock that has arisen over the reform of the current own-resources system; expects that it will contribute significantly to understanding the shortcomings of the current system and the benefits that can derive from an in- depth, comprehensive reform and, the introduction of new and genuine own resources which can significantly reduce the share of GNI contributions to the EU budgeand the phasing out of the rebates and corrections systems in order to significantly reduce the share of GNI contributions to the EU budget as proposed initially by the European Commission and supported by the European Parliament;