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Activities of Wolf KLINZ related to 2012/0242(CNS)

Shadow reports (1)

REPORT on the proposal for a Council regulation conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions PDF (524 KB) DOC (551 KB)
2016/11/22
Committee: ECON
Dossiers: 2012/0242(CNS)
Documents: PDF(524 KB) DOC(551 KB)

Amendments (57)

Amendment 59 #
Draft legislative resolution
Citation 4 a (new)
- having regard to the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (C-83/230),
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 74 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1
(1) Over the past decades, the Union has made considerable progress in creating an internal market for banking services. Consequently, in many Member States, banking groups with their headquarters established in other Member States hold a significant market share, and credit institutions have geographically diversified their business, especially within the within both the Euro area and non-Euro area.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 83 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
(2) Maintaining and deepening the internal market for banking services is essential in order to foster economic recoverygrowth in the Union. However this proves increasingly challenging. Evidence shows that the integration of banking markets in the Union is coming to a halt and the re- nationalisation of banks is proceeding.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 95 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4 a (new)
(4 a) Leaving the competence for supervision of individual banks within large and interconnected banking groups at national level precludes the possibility for a smooth and sound overview over an entire banking group and its overall health. This can lead to different interpretations and contradictory decisions on the individual entity level.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 100 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5
(5) The solidity of credit institutions is in many instances still closely linked to the Member State in which they are established. Doubts about the sustainability of public debt, economic growth prospects, and the viability of credit institutions have been creating negative, mutually reinforcing market trends. This may lead to risks for the viability of some credit institutions as well as for the stability of the financial system, and may impose a heavy burden for already strained public finances of the Member States concerned. The problem poses specific risks within the eEuro area where the single currency increases the likelihood that negative developments in one Member State can create risks for economic development and the stability of the Euro area as a wholother Euro area Member States and consequently the Euro area as a whole, but also in non-Euro area Member States where significant activities of banks from the Euro area are in place.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 104 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
(6) The European Banking Authority (EBA), established in 2011 by Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), and the European System of Financial Supervision established by Article 2 of that Regulation and of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (EIOPA), and Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (ESMA) have significantly improvedimproved in some aspects cooperation between banking supervisors within the Union. EBA is making important contributions to the creation of a single rulebook for financial services in the Union, and has been crucial in implementing in a consistent way the recapitalisation of major Union credit institutions agreed by the European Council in October 2011. Nevertheless there is still a strong need for a consistent approach around the capital requirements demanded by EBA and currently being implemented in the Basel process concerning both definitions and timing.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 123 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
(9) A European banking union should therefore be set up, underpinned by a true single rulebook for financial services for the Single Market as a whole and composed of a single supervisory mechanism, and a common deposit insurance and resolution framework. resolution framework at a later stage and eventually a harmonized deposit insurance scheme. In view of the close links and interactions between Member States participating in the common currency, the banking union should apply at least to all Euro area Member States. With a view to maintaining and deepening the internal market, and to the extent that this is institutionally possible, the banking union should also be open to the participation of other Member States.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 136 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
(10) As a first step towards the banking union, a single supervisory mechanism should ensure that the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions is implemented in a coherent and effective way, that the single rulebook for financial services is applied equally to credit institutions in all Member States concerned, and that those credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations. A single supervisory mechanism is the basis for the next steps towards the banking union. This reflects the principle that any possible introduction of common intervention mechanisms in case of crises including a direct access to ESM should be preceded by common controls to reduce the likelihood that intervention mechanisms will have to be used.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 145 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
(11) As the Euro area's central bank with extensive expertise in macroeconomic and financial stability issues, the ECB is well placed to carry out supervisory tasksaccording to the Treaty and its Statue is well placed to carry out the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision with a focus on protecting the stability of Europe's financial system. Indeed in many Member States Central Banks are already responsible for banking supervision. The ECB should therefore be conferred specific tasks concerning policies relating to the supervision of credit institutions at least within the Euro area.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 160 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
(12) The ECB should be conferred those specific supervisory tasks which are crucial to ensure a coherent and effective implementation of the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, while other tasks should remain with national authorities. The ECB's tasks should include measures taken in pursuance of macro-prudential stability in cooperation with ESRB.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 168 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
(13) Safety and soundness of large banks is essential to ensure the stability of the financial system. However, recent experience shows that smaller banks can also pose a threat to financial stability due to their interconnectivity or bad management. Therefore, the ECB should be able to exercise supervisory tasks in relation to all banks of participating Member States without exception. Nevertheless the ECB should take into account principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 197 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15 a (new)
(15 a) Nevertheless in order to achieve a fully effective supervisory framework in the Union it is crucial to go beyond the current legal limitations of the mechanism set up around the ECB and include all Member States irrespective their currencies, and all credit institutions, financial conglomerates, investment firms and insurance companies operational throughout the Union in the future. Therefore it is necessary to start preparing an essential institutional framework including possible changes of the Treaty as soon as possible in order to create a Single Supervisory Authority in the co-decision procedure. A Single Supervisory Authority, once fully operational, shall take over supervisory tasks granted to the ECB according to this Regulation and play a central role in the ESFS. The work towards this goal should not start later than by 2015 together with the envisaged review of the EFSF and this Regulation.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 198 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15 b (new)
(15 b) Setting up of the single supervisory mechanism within the ECB can assure identical interpretation and implementation of the EBA single rulebook only in participating Member States. In order to ensure the proper interpretation and implementation of the single rulebook in the same way throughout the Union further steps in the future will be necessary within the new Single Supervisory Authority.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 199 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
(16) An assessment of the suitability of any new owner prior to the purchaseThe ECB should have the right to assess the acquisition and disposal of a significant stakeholdings in a credit institution is an indispensable tool to ensure the continuous suitability and financial soundness of credit institutions' ownerss in cooperation with DG Competition in the European Commission. The ECB as a Union institution is well- placed toshould carry out such an assessment without imposing undue restrictions to the internal market. The ECB should have the task to assess the acquisition and disposal of significant holdings in credit institutions.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 219 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
(18) Additional capital buffers, including a capital conservation buffer and a countercyclical capital buffer to ensure that credit institutions accumulate during periods of economic growth a sufficient capital base to absorb losses in stressed periods, are key prudential tools to ensure the availability of adequate loss absorbency. The ECB should have the task to impose such buffers and ensure credit institutions comply with them in the cases specifically set out in Union acts.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 223 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
(19) The safety and soundness of a credit institution depend also on the allocation of adequate internal capital, having regard to the risks to which it may be exposed, and on the availability of appropriate internal organisation structures and corporate governance arrangements. The ECB should therefore have the task to apply requirements foreseen in the Union's acts ensuring that credit institutions have in place robust governance arrangements, processes and mechanisms, including strategies and processes for assessing and maintaining the adequacy of their internal capital. In case of deficiencies it should also have the task to impose appropriate measures including specific additional own funds requirements, specific publication requirements, and specific liquidity requirements in the cases specifically set out in Union acts.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 261 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24
(24) The conferral of supervisory tasks on the ECB for some of the Member States should be consistent with the framework of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) set up in 2010 and its underlying objective to develop the single rulebook and enhance convergence of supervisory practices across the whole Union. Cooperation between the banking supervisors and the supervisors of insurance and securities markets is important to deal with issues of joint interest and to ensure proper supervision of credit institutions operating also in the insurance and securities sectors. The ECB should therefore be required to cooperate closely with the EBA, the European Securities and Markets Authority and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, within the framework of the EFSF.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 269 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25
(25) In order to ensure consistency between supervisory responsibilities conferred on the ECB and decision making within the EBA, the ECB should coordinate a common position amongst representatives of the national authorities of the participating Member States in relation to matters falling within its competence. The ECB must fully respect the role of EBA in establishing the single rulebook for Union's banking sector and for the role of EBA in monitoring the application of the rules across the Union as a whole.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 278 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 28
(28) National supervisors have important and long-established expertise in the supervision of credit institutions within their territory and their economic, organisational and cultural specificities. They have established a large body of dedicated and highly qualified staff for these purposes. Therefore, in order to ensure high quality European supervision national supervisors should assist the ECB in the preparation and implementation of any acts relating to the exercise of the ECB supervisory tasks. This should include in particular the ongoing day-to-day assessment of a bank's situation and related on site verifications. In order to secure a smooth cooperation between national supervisors and the ECB and a fast facilitation of the ECB supervisory expertise, at least 5% of the human resources of each national supervisor should be delegated to work within the ECB single supervisor in both ECB headquarters and participating Member States by 1 January 2015.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 294 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29
(29) As regards the supervision of cross- border banks active both inside and outside the Euro area the ECB should cooperate closely with the competent authorities of non participating Member States. As a competent authority the ECB should be subject to the related obligations to cooperate and exchange information under Union law and should participate fully in the colleges of supervisors. In addition, since the exercise of supervisory tasks by a European institution brings about clear benefits in terms of financial stability and sustainable market integration, Member States not participating in the common currency should therefore also have the possibility to participate in the new mechanism. However, it is a necessary pre- condition for an effective exercise of supervisory tasks, that supervisory decisions are implemented fully and without delay. Member States wishing to participate in the new mechanism should therefore undertake to ensure that their national competent authorities will abide by and adopt any measure in relation to credit institutions requested by the ECB. The ECB should be able to establish a close cooperation with the competent authorities of a Member State not participating in the common currency. It should be obliged to establish the cooperation where the conditions set out in this rRegulation are met. The conditions under which representatives of the competent authorities of the Member States which established a close co-operation take part to the activities of the Supervisory Board should allow the greatest possible involvement of those representatives taking into account the limits following from the Statute of ESCB and of the ECB, in particular as regards the integrity of its decision making procesequality in rights and duties of those representatives.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 305 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 31
(31) In order to carry out its tasks effectively, the ECB should be able to require all necessary information, and to conduct investigations and on-site inspections in cooperation with national supervisors. These powers should apply to supervised entities, persons involved in the activities of those entities and related third parties, third parties to whom those entities have outsourced operational functions or activities and persons otherwise closely and substantially related or connected to the activities of those entities, including the staff of a supervised entity who are not directly involved in its activities but who, due to their function within the entity, may hold important information on a specific matter and firms which have provided services to those entities. The ECB should be able to require information by simple request under which the addressee is not obliged to provide the information but, in the event that it does so voluntarily, the information provided should not be incorrect or misleading and should be made available without delay. The ECB should also be able to require information by decision.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 310 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 33
(33) In its decision-making procedures, the ECB should be bound by Union rules and general principles on due process and transparency. The right of the addressees of the ECB's decisions to be heardappeal according to the rules set out in this Regulation should be fully respected.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 331 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 35
(35) The ECB is responsible for carrying out monetary policy functions with a view to maintaining price stability in accordance with Article 127(1) TFEU. The exercise of supervisory tasks has the objective to protect the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. In order to avoid conflicts of interests and to ensure that each function is exercised in accordance with the applicable objectives, the ECB should ensure they are carried out in full separation. This also includes, in particular, the personnel and the tasks for which the personnel is responsible.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 340 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36
(36) In particular, a sSupervisory bBoard responsible for preparing decisions on supervisory matters should be set up with the ECB encompassing the specific expertise of national supervisors. The bBoard should therefore be chaired by a Chair and a Vice-Chair elected by the ECB Governing Council and composed, in addition, of representatives from the ECB and from national authoritieuropean Parliament. The Vice-Chair who should be the ECB representative who is not a member of the Governing Council. In addition to the Chair and the Vice-Chair, the board should be composed of five representatives from national authorities from participating Member States selected from both Euro area and non-Euro area Member States on a proportionate basis. In order to allow for an appropriate rotation while ensuring the full independence of the Chair and the Vice-Chair, their term should not exceed five years and should not be renewable. In order to ensure full coordination with the activities of the EBA and with the prudential policies of the Union, the EBA and the European Commission should be observers in the supervisory board. The performance of the supervisory tasks conferred upon the ECB requires the adoption of a large number of technically complex acts and decisions, including decisions on individual credit institutions. In order to effectively carry out those tasks in accordance with the principle of separation from tasks relating to monetary policy, the ECB Governing Council of the ECB should be able to delegate certain clearly defineddelegate supervisory tasks and related decisions defined in this Regulation to the sSupervisory bBoard, subject to the oversight and responsibility of the Governing Council, which can give instructions and directions to that body. The supervisory board may be supported by a steering committee with a more limited composition.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 356 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 38
(38) In order to carry out its supervisory tasks effectively, the ECB should exercise the supervisory tasks conferred on it in full independence, in particular from undue political influence and from industry interference which would affect its operational independence. A cooling-off period of 1 year should be introduced for former members of the Supervisory Board.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 358 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 38 a (new)
(38a) In order to support supervisory tasks of the ECB, the European Parliament should have the right to require the Supervisory Board and its members to carry out specific inquiries or investigations against individual institutions and national supervisory authorities in participating Member States where appropriate
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 362 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 39
(39) In order to carry out its supervisory tasks effectively, the ECB should dispose of adequate resources. Those resources should be obtained in a way that ensures the ECB's independence from undue influences by national competent authorities and market participants, and separation between monetary policy and supervisory tasks. The costs of supervision should be primarifully borne by the entities subject to it. Therefore, the exercise of supervisory tasks by the ECB should be financed at least partly by fees charged to credit institutions. In view of the transfer of significant supervisory tasks from national authorities to the ECB it is expected that any supervisory fees due at national level can be reduced as appropriate.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 365 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 40
(40) Highly motivated, well-trained and impartial staff is indispensable to effective supervision. In order to create a truly integrated supervisory mechanism, appropriate exchange and secondment of staff with and among national supervisors and the ECB should be provided for. At least 5% of the human resources of each national supervisor should be delegated to work within the ECB single supervisor in both ECB headquarters and participating Member States by 01.01.2015. Where necessary to avoid conflicts of interest, particularly in the supervision of large banks, the ECB should be able to request that national supervisory teams involve also staff from competent authorities of other participating Member States.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 370 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 41
(41) Given the globalisation of banking services and the increased importance of international standards, the ECB should carry out ooperate witsh taskshe EBA in respect of international standards and in dialogue and close cooperation with supervisors outside the Union, without duplicating the international role of the EBA. It should be empowered to develop contacts and enter into administrative arrangements with the supervisory authorities and administrations of third countries and with international organisations, subject to coordination with the EBA and while fully respecting the existing roles and respective competences of the Member States and the Union institutions.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 379 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 44
(44) In order to ensure that credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations and that the negative mutually reinforcing impacts of market developments concerns banks and Member States is addressed in a timely and effective way, the ECB should start carrying out specific supervisory tasks as soon as possible. However, the transfer of supervisory tasks from national supervisors to the ECB requires a certain amount of preparation. Therefore, an appropriate phasing-in period should be provided for. The number of banks subject to the supervision of the ECB should increase progressively, taking into account the relevance of the supervision of those banks to ensure financial stability. As a first step the ECB should be able to apply its supervisory tasks to any banks, in particular to banks which have received or requested public financial assistance. As a second step, banks of European systemic importance as reflected in their total exposures and their cross-jurisdictional activities should be covered. Total exposures should be calculated in light of the methodologies defined in the Basel III accord of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervisors on the calculation of the leverage ratio and on the definition of common equity tier 1 capital all other banks from participating Member States should be covered. The phasing- in process should be completed within one year12 Months from the entry into force of this Regulation at the latest.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 464 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) To assess acquisitions and disposals of major holdings in credit institutions;
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 479 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point f
(f) To apply requirements specifically set out in Union acts for credit institutions to have in place robust governance arrangements, processes and mechanisms and effective internal capital adequacy assessment processes;
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 500 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point k
(k) To carry out supervisory tasks in relation to early intervention where a credit institution does not meet or is likely to breach the applicable prudential requirements, including recovery plans and intra group financial support arrangements, in coordination with the relevant resolution authorities; according to Union acts.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 577 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 3
3. The ECB together with national supervisory authorities shall organise the practical modalities of implementation of paragraph 2 by the national supervisory authorities in discharging its tasks. It shall clearly define the framework and conditions under which national competent authorities shall carry out those activities.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 664 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1
Without prejudice to the respective competences of the Member States and the other Union institutions including the EBA, in relation to the tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation, the ECB may develop contacts and enter into administrative arrangements with supervisory authorities, international organisations and the administrations of third countries, subject to appropriate coordinationshall appropriately coordinate international arrangements with the EBA. Those arrangements shall not create legal obligations in respect of the Union and its Member States.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 672 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 2
2. For the purposes of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by Article 4(1) and (2), the ECB shall have the investigatory powers set out in Section I. The ECB shall cooperate with national supervisory authorities in this regard.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 693 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. In order to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, the ECB may conduct all necessary investigations of persons referred to in Article 9 (1) (a) to (g) in cooperation with national supervisory authorities. To that end, the ECB shall have the right to:
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 699 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 1
1. In order to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, the ECB in cooperation with national supervisory authorities may conduct all necessary on- site inspections at the business premises of the legal persons referred to in Article 9(1) (a) to (g), in accordance with Article 12. Where the proper conduct and efficiency of the inspection so require, the ECB may carry out the on-site inspection without prior announcement.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 743 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1
1. For the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, where credit institutions, financial holding companies, or mixed financial holding companies, intentionally or negligibly, breach a requirement under directly applicable Union acts in relation to which administrative pecuniary sanctions shall be available to competent authorities under Union law, the ECB may impose administrative pecuniary sanctions of up to twice the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided because of the breach where those can be determined, or up to 10% of the total annual turnover of a legal person in the preceding business yearin accordance with the specifically applicable Union act.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 749 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 2
2. Where the legal person is a subsidiary of a parent undertaking, the relevant total annual turnover referred to in the first subparagraph shall be the total annual turnover resulting from the consolidated account of the ultimate parent undertaking in the preceding business year.deleted
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 763 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 a (new)
Article 15a Board of Appeal 1. The ECB shall establish a Board of Appeal for the purposes of settling appeals against decisions by the ECB acting as a single supervisor under this Regulation. The Board of Appeal shall be composed of five individuals of high repute, with a proven record of relevant knowledge and professional experience, including supervisory experience, to a sufficiently high level in the fields of banking or other financial services, excluding current staff of the ECB, competent authorities or other national or Union institutions. The Board of Appeal shall have access to sufficient legal expertise to provide expert legal advice on the legality of the exercise of powers of the ECB under this Regulation. 2. Members of the Board of Appeal and two alternates shall be appointed by the ECB for a non renewable term of five years, following a public call for expressions of interest published in the Official Journal of the European Union, and after consultation of the Supervisory Board. The Board of Appeal shall establish and make public the modalities for decision making. They shall not be bound by any instructions. 3. The members of the Board of Appeal shall undertake to act independently and in the public interest. For that purpose, they shall make a declaration of commitments and a public declaration of interests indicating any direct or indirect interest which might be considered prejudicial to their independence. 4. Any natural or legal person, including competent authorities, may appeal against a decision of the ECB under this Regulation. The Board of Appeal shall decide upon the appeal within three weeks after the appeal has been lodged. An appeal lodged pursuant to paragraph 1 shall not have suspensive effect. However, the Board of Appeal may, if it considers that circumstances so require, suspend the application of the contested decision. The Board of Appeal may confirm the decision taken by the ECB, or remit the case to the ECB who shall comply with the decision or explain the reasons for not complying.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 794 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 3
3. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, the ECB shall adopt any necessary internal rules, including and rules regarding professional secrecy. This also includes the separation of the personnel and of the tasks the personnel is responsible for in view of carrying out monetary policy functions and supervisory functions by the ECB.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 797 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – title
Supervisory bBoard
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 809 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1
1. The planning and execution of the tasks conferred upon the ECB, shall be undertaken by an internal body composed of four representatives of the ECB appointed by the Executive Board of the ECB and onive representative of thes from national authorityies competent for the supervision of credit instituitions in eachfrom participating Member States, selected from both Euro area and non-Euro area Member States on a proportionate basis (hereinafter ‘sSupervisory bBoard’).
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 826 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 2
2. In addition, the supervisory board shall include a Chair elected by the members of the Governing Council from the members, with the exception of the President, of the Executive Board, and a Vice-Chair elected by and from the members of the Governing Council of the ECBand a Vice-Chair, elected by the European Parliament from the participating Member States.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 838 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 3
3. The Governing Council of the ECB mayshall delegate clearly defined supervisory tasks and related decisions regarding individual or a set of identifiable credit institucredit institutions defined in this Regulations, financial holding companies or mixed financial holding companies to the sSupervisory bBoard, subject to the oversight and responsibilitythe right of the Governing Council to revoke decisions of the Supervisory Board with qualified majority.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 845 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 4
4. The supervisory board may appoint from among its members a steering committee with a more limited composition which supports its activities, including preparing the meetings.deleted
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 853 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 5
5. The representatives of the competent authority of the Member States which established a close cooperation in accordance with Article 6 shall take part to thein all activities of the sSupervisory bBoard in accordance with the conditions set out in the decision adopted in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 6, in compliance with the Statute of ESCB and of the ECB.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 854 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 6
6. The Chair of the European Banking Authority and a member of the European Commission may participate as observers in the meetings of the supervisory board.deleted
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 872 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. A cooling-off period of 1 year shall be introduced for the former members of the Supervisory Board.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 891 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 3
3. The Chair of the supervisory board may, at the request of the European Parliament, be heard on the execution of its supervisory tasks by the competent committees of the European Parliament. Voting rights are limited to the Members of the European Parliament from participating Member States.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 903 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. The European Parliament shall have the right to require the Chair and the Supervisory Board to carry out specific inquiries or investigations against individual institutions and national supervisory authorities in participating Member States where appropriate. This decision shall be taken by the majority of the Members of the European Parliament from the participating Member States.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 910 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 1
1. The ECB's expenditure for carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation shall be entered into a separate section ofbudget other than the budget of the ECB.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 927 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. By 1 January 2015 no less than 5% of the human resources of each national supervisor should be seconded to work within the ECB single supervisor.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 942 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the functioning of the ECB within the European System of Financial Sas a single supervisionor;
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 961 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 1
1. From the 1st of July 2013, the ECB shall carry out the supervisory tasks conferred on it also in relation to the most significant credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies of European systemic importance at the highest level of consolidation, based on their size as reflected in, the sum of exposure values of all assets and off-balance sheet liabilities not deducted when determining the common equity tier 1 capital for regulatory purposes, and their cross- border activity as reflected in cross- jurisdictional claims such as deposits and other assets in respect of customers or other financial operators located in another country and cross-jurisdictional liabilities such as loans and notes in respect of customers or other financial operators located in another country, which together cover at least half of the banking sector in the Euro area as a whole, on 1 January 2013. The ECB shall adopt and make public the list of those institutions before 1 March 2013.deleted
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 978 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 3
3. Before 1 January 2014 the ECB may, by a decision addressed to the credit institution, financial holding company or mixed financial holding company and the national competent authority of the participating Member States concerned, start carrying out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation, in particular where a credit institution, financial holding company or mixed financial holding company has received or requested public financial assistance involving the ESM.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON