BETA

19 Amendments of Wolf KLINZ related to 2013/2076(INI)

Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas, according to the Commission services' spring 2013 forecast, GDP in the eurozone fell by 0.6 % in 2012 , after a rise of 1.4 % in 2011 and will contract by 0.4 % in 2013 before rising by 1.2 % in 2014;
2013/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas, according to the same forecast, unemployment in the eurozone rose from 10.2 % at the end of 2011 to 11.4 % at the end of 2012 and risks further increasing to 12.2 % in 2013 before slightly decreasing again in 2014;
2013/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Is deeply concerned at the fact that persistently weak economic conditions are becoming the norm in Europe, creating overwhelmingcreate discontent among European citizens and therefore jeopardising the wholwith the European project;
2013/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Welcomes the decisions of July 2012 to reduce the key ECB interest rates in the context of very low inflation expectations and weak economic activity; recalls that, in the long term, very low interest rates may cause distortions in the business sector and harm private savings and pension plans;
2013/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Considers that the three-year LTRO settled on March 2012 contributed to stabilising the banking system, but that this should be a temporary measure; notes that, despite the liquidity injected into the banking system by the LTRO, the credit available to the real economy is still below pre-crisis levels; suggests that it would be appropriate for the ECB to reduce its deposit facility rate to negative values in order to encourage banking lending to the real economy;
2013/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Welcomes the setting-up of the OMTs, with no ex ante quantitative limits, in order to safeguard monetary policy transmission, but deplores the decision to link the activation of the OMT to strict conditionalities attached to an EFSF/ESM programme; calls on the ECB to activate OMTs independently from strict conditionality;
2013/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 103 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Considers unnecessaryWelcomes the full sterilisation of the liquidity injected by the OMTs, as inflation expectations remain extremely low in a context of weak economic activity;
2013/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 110 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Considers that the monetary policy tools that the ECB has used since the beginning of the crisis, while providing a welcome relief in distressed financial markets, have revealed their limits as regards stimulating growth and improving the situation on the labour market; considers, therefore, that the ECB could investigate the possibilities of implementing new unconventional measures aimed at participating in a large, EU-wide pro-growth programme, including the use of the Emergency Liquidity Assistance facility to undertake an ‘overt money financing’ of government debt in order to finance tax cuts targeted on low-income households and/or new spending programmes focused on the Europe 2020 objectives;deleted
2013/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 133 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Considers it necessary to review the Treaties and the ECB's statutes in order to establish price stability together with full employment as the two objectives, on an equal footing, of monetary policy in the eurozone;deleted
2013/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 149 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Argues that the conduct of monetary policy should be democratic and should result from deliberation between different viewpoints and approaches;deleted
2013/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 158 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Invites the ECB to pay more attention to the contractionary effects on GDP, employment and social welfare created by austerity policies carried out by national governments in the framework of Economic Assistance Programmes involving the ECB;deleted
2013/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 176 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Underlines that the ECB's independence should not justify lack of democratic accountabie need for democratic accountability with regard to the SSM and the ECB's involvement in the Troika, while stressing the ECB's independence in the field of monetary politcy;
2013/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 178 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 2
Exchange rate policydeleted
2013/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 179 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Considers that the exchange rate is a crucial economic policy variable which impacts on the competiveness of the eurozone;deleted
2013/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 181 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Calls on the ECB to pay more attention to the euro exchange rate in order to avoid excessive euro appreciation, which could in turn damage the eurozone;deleted
2013/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 186 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Underlines the importance of supporting the euro as an international currency, and stresses the need to pave the way for a new international monetary order taking into account the new multipolar world economy;deleted
2013/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 204 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Stresses the importance of a fruitful cooperation between the ECB and the competent national authorities within the framework of the SSM, in order to ensure an effective and smooth supervision, while guaranteeing full separation between monetary policy and supervision;
2013/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 222 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
23. Considers it urgent to approve the establishment of a European Resolution System in order to protect depositors and prevent fur, to reinforce the stability of ther banking crisessystem as well as to prevent the "too big to fail" syndrome ;
2013/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 225 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
25. Notes that in order to strengthen the stability of the banking system and avoid the development of the ‘too big to fail’ syndrome, consideration should be given to introducing a full separation between deposit and investment banks, on the lines of the ‘Volcker Rule’ in the US;deleted
2013/07/12
Committee: ECON