2013/2076(INI) | [ParlTrack]

Motion for a resolution
Citation 2

– having regard to ~~Article 284(3) of~~ the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 123, 282 and 284(3) thereof,

Amendment 10 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)

Da. whereas the consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem reached EUR 3 trillion at the end of 2012, representing an increase of approximately 12 % over the course of 2012;

Amendment 100 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Considers unnecessary~~Welcomes the full sterilisation of the liquidity injected by the OMTs~~, as inflation expectations remain extremely low in a context of weak economic activity~~;

Amendment 101 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Considers ~~unnecessary~~ the full sterilisation of the liquidity injected by the OMTs~~, as inflation expectations remain extremely low in a context of weak economic activity~~ to be necessary in order to maintain price stability in the eurozone in the medium and long term;

Amendment 102 #

Nils TORVALDS, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Considers unnecessary the~~Notes that the planned full sterilisation of the liquidity ~~injected by the OMTs, as~~that might be injected by any future activation of the OMT programme, aims at reducing the levels of excess reserves; point out that inflation expectations remain extremely low in a context of weak economic activity;

Amendment 103 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. ~~Considers unnecessary~~Welcomes the full sterilisation of the liquidity injected by the OMTs~~, as inflation expectations remain extremely low in a context of weak economic activity~~;

Amendment 104 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Understands the Bank of International Settlements' (BIS) warnings about too long a period of quantitative easing ('whatever it takes'); follows with interest the discussions in most major central banks on the best timetable to wind down their loose monetary policies; notes that amongst others the Federal Reserve Board intends to exit from the present policies as soon as this is possible; understands that the ECB will maintain an accommodative policy stands as long as the banking sector is not fully stabilised, and spill-overs into the public sector remain a threat, a policy which is made possible by the low inflation rates which are expected over the medium term;

Amendment 105 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Considers it necessary that the ECB programmes for liquidity provision also properly address inflationary concerns, for example by sterilisation;

Amendment 106 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)

8b. Considers, in the light of the recent developments in the US, that economic recovery and higher growth in the economy represent a sound and solid basis for a progressive phase-out of the quantitative easing policy measures;

Amendment 107 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 c (new)

8c. Recalls that the quantitative easing policy measures of the ECB were intended to be of transitory nature and should hence in no way be regarded by the banking sector as a permanent instrument;

Amendment 108 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 d (new)

8d. Encourages the ECB to send clear signals to the market with regard to the estimated period of activation of its quantitative easing policy measures and to start their phasing-out as soon as the tension in the banking sector is diminished and the link between the banks and the sovereign could be severed and the economic indicators related to growth and inflation justify this decision;

Amendment 109 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Considers that the monetary policy tools that the ECB has used since the beginning of the crisis, while providing a welcome relief in distressed financial markets, have revealed their limits as regards stimulating growth and improving the situation on the labour market; considers, therefore, that the ECB could investigate the possibilities of implementing new unconventional measures aimed at participating in a large, EU-wide pro-growth programme, including the use of the Emergency Liquidity Assistance facility to undertake an ‘overt money financing’ of government debt in order to finance tax cuts targeted on low-income households and/or new spending programmes focused on the Europe 2020 objectives;deleted

Amendment 11 #

Nils TORVALDS, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)

Ea. whereas non-marketable assets represented the largest component of assets put forward as collateral to the Eurosystem in the course of 2012, amounting to around 25% of the total; whereas non-marketable securities, together with asset-backed securities, represent more than 40 % of total assets put forward as collateral;

Amendment 110 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

Amendment 111 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Considers that the monetary policy tools that the ECB has used since the beginning of the crisis, while providing a welcome relief in distressed financial markets, have revealed their limits as regards stimulating growth and improving the situation on the labour market; considers, therefore, that the ECB could investigate the possibilities of implementing new unconventional measures aimed at participating in a large, EU-wide pro- growth programme, including the u, in response to the crisis, the ECB has widened its range of monetary policy tools and altered its market operations; urges the ECB to gradually return to a narrower set of t~~he Emergency Liquidity Assistance facility to undertak~~ools, as recommended by the Ban ~~‘overt money financing’ of government debt in order to finance tax cuts targeted on low-income households and/or new spending programmes focused on the Europe 2020 objectives~~k for International Settlements in its 83rd Annual Report 2012/2013;

Amendment 112 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Considers that the monetary policy tools that the ECB has used since the beginning of the crisis, while providing a welcome relief in distressed financial markets, have revealed their limits as regards stimulating growth and improving the situation on the labour market; considers, therefore, that the ECB could investigate the possibilities of implementing new unconventional measures aimed at participating in a large, EU-wide pro- growth programme, including the use of the Emergency Liquidity Assistance facility to undertake an ‘overt money financing’ of government debt in order to finance tax cuts targeted on low-income households and/or new spending programmes focused on the Europe 2020 objectivesnot allowed a proper transmission of its monetary policy and thus have not sufficiently contributed to stimulating growth and improving the situation on the labour market;

Amendment 113 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

Amendment 114 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

Amendment 115 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Considers that the monetary policy tools that the ECB has used since the beginning of the crisis, while providing a welcome relief in distressed financial markets, have revealed their limits as regards stimulating growth and improving the situation on the labour market; c~~onsider~~alls, therefore, ~~that~~on the ECB could investigate the possibilities of implementing new unconventional measures aimed at participating in a large, EU-wide pro-growth programme, including the use of the Emergency Liquidity Assistance facility to undertake an ‘overt money financing’ of government debt in order to finance tax cuts targeted on low-income households and/or new spending programmes focused on the Europe 2020 objectivto address the need for further structural reforms, in particular in the labour markets, with Member States;

Amendment 116 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Considers that the monetary policy tools that the ECB has used since the beginning of the crisis~~, whil~~ may have provid~~ing a~~ed welcome relief in distressed financial markets, have revealed their limits as regards stimulating growth and improving the situation on the labour market; considers, therefore, that the ECB could investigate the possibilities of implementing new unconventional measures aimed at participating in a large, EU-wide pro- growth programme, including the use of the Emergency Liquidity Assistance facility to undertake an ‘overt money in the short term, but the easy money policy has done nothing to bring about a lasting economic recovery; considers, therefore, that the only way to promote growth is through sustainable economic policy and purposeful structural reforms, that the ECB must concentrate primarily on the goal of price stability, and that ECB financing’ of government debt i~~n order to finance tax cuts targeted on low-income households and/or new spending programmes focused on the Europe 2020 objective~~s unlawful and must be prevented at all costs;

Amendment 117 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Considers that the monetary policy tools that the ECB has used since the beginning of the crisis, while providing a welcome relief in distressed financial markets, have revealed their limits as regard~~s stimulating growth and improving the situation on the labour market~~ing the real economy; considers, therefore, that the ECB could investigate the possibilities of implementing new unconventional measures ~~aimed at participating in a large, EU-wide pro-growth programme, including the use of the Emergency Liquidity Assistance facility to~~targeting inter alia better funding conditions for SMEs; understa~~ke an ‘overt money financing’ of government debt in order to finance tax cuts targeted on low-income households and/or new spending programmes focused on the Europe 2020 objective~~nds that the ECB is currently working with the EIB so as to create such a framework in the form of joint risk sharing arrangements; calls on the ECB and the EIB to speed up such process;

Amendment 118 #

Sergio Paolo Francesco SILVESTRIS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

Amendment 119 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Considers that the monetary policy tools that the ECB has used since the beginning of the crisis, while providing a welcome relief in distressed financial markets, have revealed their limits as regards stimulating growth and improving the situation on the labour market; considers, therefore, that the ECB could investigate the possibilities of implementing new unconventional measures aimed at participating in a large, EU-wide pro-growth programme, including soft loans aimed directly at small and medium-sized enterprises or the use of the Emergency Liquidity Assistance facility to undertake an ‘overt money financing’ of government debt in order to finance tax cuts targeted on low-income households and/or new spending programmes focused on the Europe 2020 objectives;

Amendment 12 #

Lorenzo FONTANA

Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)

Ea. whereas the European institutions ought to have acted to restore confidence – not just in the financial markets, but also in the real economy – and to encourage investment in business;

Amendment 120 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)

9a. Welcomes the Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements and its finding that an accommodative monetary policy has caused reform efforts in the eurozone to slacken and the dependence between banks and sovereigns has increased;

Amendment 121 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)

9a. Urges the ECB’s Governing Council to raise its inflation target in order to accommodate wage increases in eurozone economies in surplus and hence enable eurozone aggregate demand to be boosted while reducing country imbalances within the eurozone;

Amendment 122 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)

9a. Asks the ECB to publish, in its monthly report, figures for the amount of public debt of each Member State posted as collateral by financial institutions;

Amendment 123 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)

9b. Is concerned about the significantly high levels of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) lines provided by national central banks in the course of 2011 under the authorisation of the ECB and demands further disclosure of, and complementary information on, the precise extent of such lines and the underlying operations and on the conditions attached to them;

Amendment 124 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 c (new)

9c. Remarks that the ELA should only be used for banks that are still viable; is concerned about the use of ELA in Cyprus and believes that this program should be cautiously applied;

Amendment 125 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 d (new)

9d. Asks the ECB to lower collateral requirements and the stance on collateral rules for asset-backed securities (ABS), as these are deeply correlated with loans to households and SMEs;

Amendment 126 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 e (new)

9e. Believes that, on collateral rules, the same standards should apply for sovereign as for regional government bonds in those cases where regions have legislative and tax powers, as both types of bond have relevant influence on the good transmission of the ECB monetary policy;

Amendment 127 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 f (new)

9f. Acknowledges that, since the monetary transmission mechanism is not functioning properly, the ECB should seek ways to target SMEs more directly; points out that at present similar SMEs from across the Eurozone do not have similar access to loans despite having similar economic prospects and risks; invites the ECB to implement a policy to purchase high quality securitised SME loans directly, particularly from some Member States where the monetary transmission mechanism is broken; stresses that this policy should be limited in amount and time, fully sterilised and directed to avoid risks on the ECB balance sheet;

Amendment 128 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 g (new)

9g. Believes that the ECB should take very seriously into account the possibility of launching a specific program to help SMEs to access to credit in the lines of the funding for lending scheme of the Bank of England;

Amendment 129 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 h (new)

9h. Deems that the TARGET2 settlement system has played a crucial role for safeguarding the integrity of the Eurozone financial system; notes, however, that the significant TARGET2 imbalances reveal the worrying fragmentation of financial markets within the Eurozone, as well as the ongoing capital flight in Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability;

Amendment 13 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)

Ea. whereas the aggregate turnover for all instruments in the euro money market decreased by 14% in the second quarter of 2012 compared with the second quarter of the previous year;

Amendment 130 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 i (new)

9i. Underlines that interesting lessons may be drawn for the Eurozone from the study of the functioning of balance of payments systems in other federal monetary unions such as the United States;

Amendment 131 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Considers it necessary to review the Treaties and the ECB’s statutes in order to establish price stability together with full employment as the two objectives, on an equal footing, of monetary policy in the eurozone;deleted

Amendment 132 #

Nils TORVALDS, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Amendment 133 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Amendment 134 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Amendment 135 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Considers it necessary to review the Treaties and the ECB's statutes in order to establish price stability together with full employment as the two objectives, on an equal footing, of monetary policy in the eurozone; that any debate on a potential revision of the Treaties should also include the ECB's statutes in order to analyse the possibilities of reinforcing its contribution to the realisation of the objectives of the EU (including full employment) while preserving price stability as the primary mandate; believes that it should also be an opportunity to change the legal basis to have adequate supervision (bank, insurance, markets) at the euro area and EU levels; considers, furthermore, that any revision of the ECB's statutes should seek to completely integrate the national central banks into the ECB;

Amendment 136 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Considers it necessary to review the Treaties and the ECB's statutes in order to establish price stability together with full employment as the two objectives, on an equal footing, of monetary policy in the eurozUnderlines that the primary mandate of the ECB is to maintain price stability in the Euro area, and that the achievement of this mandate overrides subordinate objectives such as supporting economic growth and job creatione;

Amendment 137 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. ~~Considers it necessary to review~~Endorses the objective of maintaining price stability, which the ECB is called upon to pursue as a matter of priority, as is laid down in the Treaties and in the ECB’s statutes ~~in order to establish price stability together with full employment as the two objectives, on an equal footing, of monetary policy in the eurozone~~, and stresses that monetary policy cannot be a substitute for necessary structural reforms and sustainable economic policy;

Amendment 138 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Considers it necessary to review the Treaties and the ECB’s statutes in order to establish price stability together with ~~full employment~~support for the general economic policies of the Union as the two objectives, on an equal footing, of monetary policy in the eurozone;

Amendment 139 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)

10a. Remains worried by the significant levels of non-marketable assets and asset- backed securities put forward as collateral to the eurosystem in the framework of its refinancing operations; asks the ECB to provide information on which central banks have accepted such securities as well as to disclose valuation methods regarding such assets; underlines that such disclosure would be beneficial for the purpose of parliamentary scrutiny of supervisory tasks conferred to the ECB;

Amendment 14 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E b (new)

Eb. whereas Emergency Liquidity Assistance lines provided by National Central Banks as represented under the item 'other claims on euro area credit institutions denominated in euro' of the Eurosystem consolidated financial statement reached unprecedented levels over 2012 and amounted to EUR 206 billion at the end of 2012;

Amendment 140 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)

10a. Calls on the ECB to make public the legal decision concerning the OMT programme in order to be able to analyse more deeply its details and implications;

Amendment 141 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 b (new)

10b. Underlines that ELA lines are reported under the category 'other claims on Euro area credit institutions denominated in Euro' in the Eurosystem consolidated balance sheets without providing further disclosure and more granular information on such lines as well as on the underlying operations and conditions attached to them; asks the ECB to improve the reporting provided on ELAs developments on a country-by- country basis on its website;

Amendment 142 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 c (new)

10c. Is encouraged by the stabilization of the levels of TARGET II imbalances over the second half of 2012; underlines that the TARGET II settlement system has played a crucial role for safeguarding the integrity of the euro area financial system; remains, nevertheless, concerned by the ongoing fragmentation of financial markets within the Euro area;

Amendment 143 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 d (new)

10d. Stresses that stable inflation rates, in line with the medium term rate objective defined by the ECB, may be associated with unsustainable debt dynamics, underlying the importance to manage asset bubbles and the growth of credit even when price stability is guaranteed;

Amendment 144 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 e (new)

10e. Is concerned by the persistent inflation and yield curve differentials within the Euro area; recommends that the ECB follow a proactive macroprudential approach associated with its monetary policy instruments so as to deal with regional asset bubbles and imbalances; asks the ECB to explore whether regional fine-tuning regarding collateral, haircut and reserve requirements may be appropriate for coping with asymmetric shocks, thereby enhancing financial stability within the monetary union while preserving price stability;

Amendment 145 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 f (new)

10f. Looks forward to the announced ECB assessment of the 'Irish Promissory Notes' deal and its consistency with the Treaty provisions regarding monetary financing;

Amendment 146 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 g (new)

10g. Asks the ECB to disclose to the European Parliament the secret 'Agreements on Net Financial Assets' between the National central banks and the ECB regarding inter alia the amounts of different classes of assets, including government bonds that an Euro area central bank can hold in its balance sheet;

Amendment 147 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

~~11. Argues that the conduct of monetary policy should be democratic and should result from deliberation between different viewpoints and approaches;~~deleted

Amendment 148 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

~~11. Argues that the conduct of monetary policy should be democratic and should result from deliberation between different viewpoints and approaches;~~deleted

Amendment 149 #

Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

~~11. Argues that the conduct of monetary policy should be democratic and should result from deliberation between different viewpoints and approaches;~~deleted

Amendment 15 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital E c (new)

Ec. whereas the ECB's long-term refinancing operations of February 2012 provided EUR 529.5 billion to the Euro area based financial institutions in loans with a maturity of 3 years and an initial 1% interest rate;

Amendment 150 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

~~11. Argues that the conduct of monetary policy should be democratic and should result from deliberation between different viewpoints and approaches;~~deleted

Amendment 151 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Argues that the conduct of monetary policy should ~~be democratic and should result from deliberation between different viewpoints and approache~~respect the principle of independence and accountability; recalls in this respect the importance of the Monetary Dialogue and of the written questions submitted by MEPs;

Amendment 152 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. ~~Argues that~~Recalls the independence of the ECB in the conduct of its monetary policy ~~should be democratic and should result from deliberation between different viewpoints and approach~~, as enshrined in the Treaties;

Amendment 153 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Argues that ~~the conduct of monetary policy should be democratic and should result from deliberation between different viewpoints and approaches~~monetary policy, while still being conducted in an independent manner, should not be indifferent to the democratic opinions expressed by the European Parliament, the European Council or the Council;

Amendment 154 #

Nils TORVALDS, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Argues that the conduct of monetary policy should be democratic and should result from deliberation between different viewpoints and approaches; believes that the ongoing crisis has highlighted the need to increase theoretical diversity within central banks; requests the ECB to report in its next annual report on how it intends to proceed in order to diversify the analytical background of its staff;

Amendment 155 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Argues that the conduct of monetary policy should ~~be democratic and should~~ result from open deliberation between different viewpoints ~~and approaches~~in order to strengthen transparency and thereby democratic accountability;

Amendment 156 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Amendment 157 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Amendment 158 #

Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Amendment 159 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Amendment 16 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)

Fa. whereas the ECB's long-term refinancing operations of December 2011 and February 2012 granted over EUR 1 trillion - EUR 489 billion and EUR 529.5 billion respectively - to European banks in the form of low-interest loans with a term of 3 years and a 1% interest rate;

Amendment 160 #

Nils TORVALDS, Olle SCHMIDT

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Invites the ECB to ~~pay more attention to~~continue monitoring and to analyse the contractionary effects on GDP, employment and social welfare cre~~ated by austerity policies carried out by national governments in the framework of Economic Assistance Programmes involving~~sulting from a number of factors, such as the over indebtedness of several Member States, the loss of competitiveness resulting from belated structural reforms, a strong mismatch between modest productivity increases and generous wage increases and the contractive effects on the economy resulting from the adjustment programs which became inevitable when a number of Member States almost went bankrupt, a feat from which they were only saved by the intervention of the Troika in conjunction with the solidarity from other Member States through ad hoc funds like the ECBSM;

Amendment 161 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Amendment 162 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Invites the ~~ECB~~Troika to pay more attention to the contractionary effects on GDP, employment and social welfare created by austerity policies carried out by national governments in the framework of Economic Assistance Programmes involving the ECB; calls for a thorough assessment of the Troika modus operandi and the ECB involvement in such framework with a view to clarifying and redefining the scope of responsibilities and increasing the democratic accountability of the adoption and implementation of assistance programmes;

Amendment 163 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Invites the ECB to pay more attention to the contractionary effects on GDP, employment and social welfare created by austerity policies carried out by national governments in the framework of Economic Assistance Programmes involving the ECB; asks the ECB to ensure that its contribution to the assessment by the Troika of progress in implementing the fiscal alignment programmes helps strike an optimum balance between growth, fiscal alignment and reform;

Amendment 164 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Invites the ECB to ~~pay more attention to the contractionary effects on GDP, employment and social welfare created by~~thoroughly evaluate the austerity policies carried out by national governments in the framework of Economic Assistance Programmes involving the ECB and to address necessary improvements in structural and growth policies;

Amendment 165 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Invites the ECB to pay more attention to the contractionary effects on GDP, employment and social welfare created by ~~austerity~~corrective policies carried out by national governments in the framework of Economic Assistance Programmes involving the ECB;

Amendment 166 #

Jürgen KLUTE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Invites the ECB to ~~pay more attention to~~take seriously the contractionary effects on GDP, employment and social welfare created by austerity policies carried out by national governments in the framework of Economic Assistance Programmes involving the ECB and to learn the proper lessons from ill-conceived recommendations;

Amendment 167 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Invites the ECB ~~to pay more attention~~not to be indifferent to the contractionary effects on GDP, employment and social welfare created by ~~austerity~~budgetary discipline policies carried out by national governments in the framework of Economic Assistance Programmes involving the ECB;

Amendment 168 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Is concerned about possible side effects of a prolonged extraordinarily accommodative monetary policy, such as aggressive risk taking, the build-up of financial imbalances, distortions in financial market pricing and incentives to delay necessary balance sheet repair and reforms; encourages the ECB to strike the right balance between the risks of exiting its extraordinarily accommodative policy stance prematurely and the risks associated with further delaying the exit;

Amendment 169 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

~~13. Underlines that the ECB’s independence should not justify lack of democratic accountability;~~deleted

Amendment 17 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)

Fa. whereas the European Economic Forecast in Spring 2012 showed low levels of business and consumer sentiment, high unemployment limiting private consumption and declining export growth since 2010, which has led to a levelling off in GDP growth during 2011 and 2012;

Amendment 170 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. ~~Underlines that the ECB’s independence should not justify lack of democratic accountability~~As regards the performance of its monetary policy tasks, warns against calling the ECB’s independence into question;

Amendment 171 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Underlines that the ECB~~'s independence should not justify lack of democratic accountability~~ should be ready to comply with the highest standards of accountability when performing its monetary policy tasks and its supervisory tasks vis-à-vis the European Parliament;

Amendment 172 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Underlines that the ECB's independence sh~~ould~~all not justify lack of democratic accountability; recalls the ongoing call for more transparency in the ECB which would result in increased credibility and predictability and appreciates the improvements in this area that have already been implemented; recognises, in this respect, the difficulties relating to the publication of the minutes of the ECB Governing Council’s meetings, as differences in individual positions could be interpreted as representing national interests, leading to pressure from Member State governments on Governing Council members; calls on the ECB to publish its summary minutes;

Amendment 173 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Underlines that the ECB's independence should not justify lack of democratic accountability and recalls in this respect the importance of the Monetary Dialogue and of the written questions submitted by MEPs;

Amendment 174 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Underlines that the ECB’s independence should ~~not justify lack of~~be accompanied by adequate democratic accountability;

Amendment 175 #

Nils TORVALDS, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Underlines that the ECB's independence ~~should not justify lack of~~must be tied to democratic accountability;

Amendment 176 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Underlines th~~at the ECB's independence should not justify lack of democratic accountabi~~e need for democratic accountability with regard to the SSM and the ECB's involvement in the Troika, while stressing the ECB's independence in the field of monetary politcy;

Amendment 177 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. UStresses that, with a view to the ECB's becoming a single supervisory power, it must meet high standards of democratic accountability and underlines that the ECB's independence should not justify lack of ~~democratic~~this accountability;

Amendment 178 #

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 2

~~Exchange rate policy~~deleted

Amendment 179 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

~~14. Considers that the exchange rate is a crucial economic policy variable which impacts on the competiveness of the eurozone;~~deleted

Amendment 18 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F b (new)

Fb. whereas small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) remain the backbone of the Euro area economy, representing about 98% of all Euro area firms, employing around three quarters of the euro area's employees and generating around 60% of value added;

Amendment 180 #

Nils TORVALDS, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Considers that the exchange rate i~~s a crucial economic policy variable which impacts on the competiveness of th~~mpacts on the competiveness of the Eurozone; recalls, nevertheless, that the exchange rate policy is not an attribute of the ECB but of the Council which in 1997 chose to let the Euro float freely in order to neither impede the Treaty's monetary policy goal of a stable ecur~~ozone~~rency nor the independence of the ECB;

Amendment 181 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

~~15. Calls on the ECB to pay more attention to the euro exchange rate in order to avoid excessive euro appreciation, which could in turn damage the eurozone;~~deleted

Amendment 182 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. CRecalls ~~on the ECB to pay more attention to the euro exchange rate in order to avoid excessive euro appreciation, which could in turn damage~~that, in accordance with Article 219 of the TFEU, the exchange rate policy is the responsibility of the Council involving recommendation from the Commission, consultation or recommendation of the ECB, in an endeavour to reach a consensus consistent with the objective of price stability and also including consultation of the eEuro~~zone~~pean Parliament;

Amendment 183 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Calls on the ECB to p~~ay more attention to the euro exchange rate in order to avoid excessive euro appreci~~ursue its prime goal – price stability – and prevent the euro from being sucked into competitive devaluation, w~~hich could in turn damage the eurozone~~ith other currencies;

Amendment 184 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Calls on the ECB to pay more attention to ~~the euro exchange rate in order to avoid excessive euro appreciation, which could in turn damage the eurozone~~global monetary policy spillovers, including the pressure on exchange rates resulting from persistently low interest rates in the major advanced economies;

Amendment 185 #

Jürgen KLUTE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Calls on the ECB to pay more attention to the euro exchange rate in order to avoid ~~excessive~~harmful euro appreciation~~, which could in turn damage the eurozone~~ damaging to the eurozone and in particular to the eurozone countries being hardest hit by the crisis;

Amendment 186 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Amendment 187 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Underlines th~~e importance of support~~at it is ing the ~~euro as an international currency, and stresses the need to pave the way for a new international monetary order taking into account the new multipolar world economy~~strategic long-term interest of the Eurozone and of its Member States to draw all possible benefits from issuing the Euro currency which has the potential of becoming a global reserve currency in the long term;

Amendment 188 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Underlines the importance of supporting the euro as an international currency~~, and stresses the need to pave the way for a new international monetary order taking into account the new multipolar world economy~~;

Amendment 189 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Underlines the importance of supporting the euro as an international currency, and stresses the need to pave the way for a new international monetary order taking into account the new multipolar world economReiterates its wish to see the euro becoming of increasing importance as a leading international currency beside the US dollar in the world economy; notes the ECB´s stands to refrain from actively promoting the Euro as an international currency;

Amendment 19 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F c (new)

Fc. whereas the creditworthiness and financial health of SMEs have deteriorated more sharply than those of large firms and the protracted period of weak economic conditions have exacerbated the asymmetric information challenges of SMEs;

Amendment 190 #

Lorenzo FONTANA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Underlines the importance of ~~support~~assessing twhe ~~euro as an international currency, and stresses the need to pave the way for a new international monetary order taking into account the new multipolar world econom~~ther it is still advisable to support the euro as an international currency;

Amendment 191 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16a. Calls on the ECB to study the possibility of using forward guidance as a non-conventional tool to enhance the correct transmission of monetary policy; remarks that forward guidance should be tied to positive changes in the economic growth of the Eurozone or to a increase in inflation in the medium term beyond 2%;

Amendment 192 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)

16a. Invites the ECB, in cooperation with the national central banks, to explain its policies in terms of currency swap deals designed to provide support for the bilateral economic and trade exchanges and to help maintain financial stability;

Amendment 193 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Notes that the European Banking Ssystem is still fragile and needs to be reformed in structural terms and consolidated through the development of a true banking union; is deeply concerned by the delays in setting up the building blocks of the banking union; is of the opinion that it is crucial to complement a genuine supervision of systemic and cross-border institutions at the supranational level with a meaningful supranational backstop and burden- sharing capacity commensurate with the requirements of a functional and effective monetary union;

Amendment 194 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Notes that the European Banking System is still fragile and needs to be reformed in structural terms and consolidated through the development of a true single banking ~~union~~supervisory mechanism;

Amendment 195 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Welcomes the progress achieved on the negotiations on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) regulation conferring on the ECB the power of supervision over eurozone credit institutions; ~~believes the setting-up of the SSM will contribute to severing the link between banks and sovereigns and will help develop a common European approach to crisis management;~~

Amendment 196 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Welcomes the progress achieved on the negotiations on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) regulation conferring on the ECB the power of supervision over eurozone credit institutions; believes the setting-up of the SSM will contribute to severing the link between banks and sovereigns and ~~will help develop a common European approach to crisis management~~this will represent a key step towards a genuine European Banking Union;

Amendment 197 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Welcomes the progress achieved oin the negotiations on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) regulation conferring on the ECB the power of supervision over eurozone credit institutions and those of the participating countries opting in; believes the setting-up of the SSM will contribute to severing the link between banks and sovereigns and will help develop a common European approach to crisis management in the banking sector;

Amendment 198 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Welcomes the progress achieved on the negotiations on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) regulation conferring on the ECB the power of supervision over eurozone credit institutions; believes the setting-up of the SSM will contribute to severing the link between banks and sovereigns and will help develop a common European approach to crisis management; regrets that the SSM was not chosen for the supervision of the European Investment Bank (EIB);

Amendment 199 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)

18a. Welcomes the fact that the ECB President has repeatedly emphasised that the SSM should be complemented by a single resolution mechanism (SRM); also welcomes the call by the ECB and the Commission to include in such a framework a common resolution fund for institutions under a future single resolution authority as an integral part of the SRM;

Amendment 2 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 3

– having regard to ~~Article 15 of~~ the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, in particular Articles 15 and 21 thereof,

Amendment 20 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital F d (new)

Fd. whereas according to the information provided by the Survey on Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE) SMEs' profits, liquidity, buffers and own capital have developed less favourably than those of large firms during the crisis;

Amendment 200 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)

18a. Considers that the establishment of the SSM should contribute to restoring confidence in the banking sector and to reviving interbank lending and cross- border credit flows through independent integrated supervision for all participating Member States;

Amendment 201 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 b (new)

18b. Invites the SSM to operate in a manner fully consistent with the principles underpinning the single market in financial services and in full adherence to the single rulebook for financial services;

Amendment 202 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 c (new)

18c. Considers that the ECB should welcome the possibility to involve non- Euro area Member states in the SSM to ensure a greater harmonization of supervisory practices within the EU;

Amendment 203 #

Nils TORVALDS, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Stresses the importance of a fruitful cooperation between the ECB and the competent national authorities within the framework of the SSM, in order to ensure an effective and smooth supervision and in order to avoid a doubling of requirements for institutions; underlines that the principle of proportionality and the diversity in national banking sectors have to be taken into account;

Amendment 204 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Stresses the importance of a fruitful cooperation between the ECB and the competent national authorities within the framework of the SSM, in order to ensure an effective and smooth supervision, while guaranteeing full separation between monetary policy and supervision;

Amendment 205 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Notes that the strengthening of the ECB resulting from the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism needs to be balanced by greater democratic accountability vis-à-vis national parliaments and the European Parliament; insists that the highest standards regarding accountability of supervisors in National Parliaments should be applied in the case of the SSM accountability to the European Parliament;

Amendment 206 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Considers that transparency in the field of banking supervision is essential and that the ECB should take all possible measures to improve its transparency such as, inter alia, the publication of the minutes of the Supervisory Board;deleted

Amendment 207 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Considers that transparency in the field of banking supervision is res~~sential and that the ECB should take all possible measures to improve its transparency such as, inter alia, the publication of the minutes of the Supervisory Board~~tricted to a certain extent because of possible negative market reactions, but that nevertheless political decision-makers in particular need a reliable overall picture of the banks’ real situation, and that therefore the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs should be given a comprehensive analysis;

Amendment 208 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Considers that reasoned transparency in the field of banking supervision is essential and that the ECB should take all possible measures to improve its transparency such as, inter alia, by publishing the publication of the minutes of the Supervisory Board on its website, while complying with confidentiality requirements as defined in Union law;

Amendment 209 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

Amendment 21 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas Article 282 TFEU states that the primary objective of the ECB is to maintain price ~~stability and that the ECB should support general economic policies of the Union without prejudice to price~~ stability; whereas the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) works under the auspices of the ECB in the area of financial stability;

Amendment 210 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Considers that transparency in the field of banking supervision is essential and that the ECB should take all possible measures to improve its transparency ~~such as, inter alia, the publication of the minutes of the Supervisory Board~~;

Amendment 211 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)

21a. Looks forward to the adoption of an interinstitutional arrangement with the ECB formalizing EP scrutiny of the ECB Supervisory Board; is of the opinion that such arrangement should include scrutiny powers on ELAs, LTRO and other monetary tools presenting a potential of conflict of interest between the ECB's role in determining the solvency of an institution and its obligation to lend only to solvent institutions; stresses the need to set up an appropriate mechanism for identifying and resolving potential conflicts of interest between monetary policy and supervisory powers;

Amendment 212 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)

21b. Points out that the concept of 'insolvency' underpinning the provision of central bank liquidity to institutions in the Euro area lacks a sufficient level of clarity as the concept refers both to a situation arising in a bank after a judicial determination of insolvency or alternatively as the situation where competent supervisory authorities determine that an institution does not comply with minimum requirements defined in the CRD/CRR framework; underlines that such a lack of clarity needs to be addressed so as to guarantee legal certainty and foster financial stability;

Amendment 213 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

22. Notes that the allocation of supervisory tasks to the ECB poses new challenges in terms of conflict of interest, and that the current ECB internal rules are not ~~appropriate~~comprehensive enough in regard to the new tasks conferred on by SSM regulation and therefore should be complemented, inter alia, with more accurate rules including, inter alia, provisions on cooling- off periods for Eurosystem senior management staff involved in banking supervision;

Amendment 214 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)

22a. Recalls that it is of paramount importance that the ECB ensure operational separation of the core units preparing the draft decisions in the field of monetary policy and supervisory policy; underlines the crucial need for the agreement negotiated between the ECB and the European Parliament regarding practical measures to ensure democratic accountability;

Amendment 215 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Considers it urgent to approve the establishment of a European Resolution System within which national resolution authorities should have at their disposal a minimum set of common resolution tools and powers in order to protect depositors and prevent further banking crises;

Amendment 216 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Considers it urgent to approve the establishment of a European Rframework for resolution Ssystems in order to protect taxpayers and depositors and prevent further banking crises;

Amendment 217 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Considers it urgent to approve the establishment of a European Resolution System in order to protect depositors ~~and prevent fur~~, to reinforce the stability of ther banking ~~crises;~~ system as well as to prevent the "too big to fail" syndrome;

Amendment 218 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Considers it urgent to approve the establishment of a European Resolution System for credit institutions and other financial establishments in order to protect depositors and prevent further banking crises; proposes that a European Resolution System should also be envisaged for insurance undertakings;

Amendment 219 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Considers it urgent to approve the establishment of a European Resolution System in ~~order~~cluding measures to protect depositors and prevent further banking crises, as well as creating a single banking area;

Amendment 22 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas Article 282 TFEU states that the primary objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability and that the ECB should support general economic policies of the Union without prejudice to price stability; whereas the E~~uropean Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) works under the auspices of the ECB in the area of~~CB is conferred specific tasks regarding the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in the area of macro-prudential policy and financial stability;

Amendment 220 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Considers it urgent to approve the establishment of a European Resolution ~~System in order to~~Mechanism as well as to enhance the EU standards on deposit guarantee schemes in order to reduce taxpayers involvement to the maximum extent possible, protect depositors and prevent further banking crises;

Amendment 221 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Considers it urgent to ~~approve~~decide on the establishment of an E~~uropean Resolution System~~U framework for resolution mechanisms in order to protect depositors and prevent further banking crises;

Amendment 222 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Considers it urgent to approve the establishment of a European Resolution System in order to protect depositors ~~and prevent fur~~, to reinforce the stability of ther banking ~~crises~~system as well as to prevent the "too big to fail" syndrome ;

Amendment 223 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Considers it urgent to approve the establishment of a European Resolution System and Authority in order to protect depositors and prevent further banking crises;

Amendment 224 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

25. Notes that in order to strengthen the stability of the banking system and avoid the development of the ‘too big to fail’ syndrome, consideration should be given to introducing a full separation between deposit and investment banks, on the lines of the ‘Volcker Rule’ in the US;deleted

Amendment 225 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

Amendment 226 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

25. Notes that, in order to strengthen the stability of the banking system and avoid the development of ~~the ‘too big to fail’ syndrome~~excessive systemic risk, consideration should be given to the costs and benefits of introducing a full separation between deposit and investment banks, o~~n the lines of the ‘Volcker Rule’ in the US~~r further strengthening supervision of financial conglomerates, especially those active worldwide;

Amendment 227 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

25. Notes that in order to strengthen the stability of the banking system and avoid the development of the ‘'too big to fail’' syndrome, consideration should be given to ~~introducing a full separation between deposit and investment banks, on the lines of the ‘Volcker Rule’ in the US~~a mandatory separation of banks' essential services to the real economy and other activities by means of a transparent and credible 'ring fence';

Amendment 228 #

Nils TORVALDS, Olle SCHMIDT

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

25. ~~Not~~Believes that in order to reduce risks and strengthen the stability of the banking system ~~and avoid the development of the ‘too big to fail’ syndrome~~, consideration shcould be given to introducing ~~a full~~ separation between deposit and investment banks, on the lines of the ‘Volcker Rule’ in the US;

Amendment 229 #

Jürgen KLUTE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

25. Notes that in order to strengthen the stability of the banking system and avoid the development of the ‘too big to fail’ syndrome, ~~consideration should be given to introducing~~limits should be imposed on the overall size of banks and a full separation between deposit and investment banks, introduced on the lines of the ‘Volcker Rule’ in the US;

Amendment 23 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas Article 282 TFEU states that the primary objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability and that ~~the ECB should~~, without prejudice to this, it shall also support the general economic policies ofin the Union ~~without prejudice to price stability~~in order to contribute to the achievement of the latter's objective; whereas the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) works under the auspices of the ECB in the area of financial stability;

Amendment 230 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

25. Notes that further regulatory action has to be taken in order to strengthen the stability of the banking system and avoid the ~~development~~continuance of the ‘too big to fail’ syndrome~~, consideration should be given to introducing a full separation between deposit and investment banks, on the lines of the ‘Volcker Rule’ in the US~~;

Amendment 231 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

25. Notes that ~~in order to strengthen~~ the stability of the banking system ~~and avoi~~should be strengthened and the development of the ‘'too big to fail’' syndrome~~, consideration should be given to introducing a full separation between deposit and investment banks, on the lines of the ‘Volcker Rule’ in the US~~ should be avoided. Calls on the Commission to conduct a thorough impact assessment on a potential separation of bank’s retail and investment activities;

Amendment 232 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 a (new)

25a. Believes that the "troika" should be replaced by a system where the Commission, accountable to the European Parliament, is put at the heart of the mechanism with Program Countries, while the Eurogroup is included in the decision-making process, the ECB provides expertise and the IMF would give advice where appropriate;

Amendment 233 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. Points out that the draft regulation on the Single Supervisory Mechanism provides for interinstitutional arrangements to be concluded between the European Parliament and the ECB on ~~Parliament's scrutiny and~~the democratic accountability emphasizing the role of the Parliament; urges the ECB to meet the new requirements, in particular in terms of democratic accountability and transparency in its supervisory activities;

Amendment 234 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 a (new)

26a. Calls on the ECB to subject every aspect of its activity to critical self- assessment, including the impact of the adjustment programmes that it has helped to shape and the ex post adequacy of the macroeconomic assumptions and scenarios underlying those programmes;

Amendment 235 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 a (new)

26a. Calls on the ECB to publish the summary minutes of the Governing Council meetings, including arguments and voting records;

Amendment 236 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. ~~Is deeply concerned at the contempt shown by the Council towards Parliament's resolution of 25 October 20123 on the appointment of a new Member of the executive board of the ECB, and n~~Notes that due consideration should be given to ~~both~~ the expertise ~~and the gender~~, the gender and the geographical balance of members in the appointment of ECB top management;

Amendment 237 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Is deeply concerned at the contempt shown by the Council towards Parliament’s resolution of 25 October 2012 on the appointment of a new Member of the executive board of the ECB, and notes that due consideration should be given to both the expertise and the gender of membeNotes that the expertise and the ability of members have to be the deciding factors in the appointment of ECB top management;

Amendment 238 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Is deeply concerned at the contempt shown by the Council towards Parliament's resolution of 25 October 20123 on the appointment of a new Member of the executive board of the ECB, and notes that ~~due~~is con~~sideration should be given to both the expertise and the gender of members in the appointment of ECB top management~~trary to the Commission's and Parliament's recommendations for improving gender parity in high-level decision boards in the economic sector;

Amendment 239 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Is deeply concerned at the contempt shown by the Council towards Parliament's resolution of 25 October 20123 on the appointment of a new Member of the executive board of the ECB, and notes that due consideration should be given to both the expertise and the gender balance of members in the appointment of ECB top management;

Amendment 24 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)

Ga. whereas the Bank for International Settlements has noted in its Annual Report that, as a result of the low interest rate policy in the eurozone, reform efforts in the Member States have considerably slackened;

Amendment 240 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. IRegrets and is deeply concerned at the ~~contempt~~indifference shown by the Council towards Parliament’s resolution of 25 October 2012 on the appointment of a new Member of the executive board of the ECB, and notes that due consideration should be given to both the expertise and the gender of members in the appointment of ECB top management;

Amendment 241 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 a (new)

27a. Recalls that, according to Article 10.4 of the Protocol No 4 on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, the proceedings of the meetings of the Governing Council shall be confidential but it may decide to make the outcome of its deliberations public; believes that, unless the Governing Council has taken such a decision, all its members are bound by confidentiality and loyalty;

Amendment 242 #

Olle SCHMIDT, Sylvie GOULARD, Sharon BOWLES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 a (new)

27a. Asks the ECB to provide a detailed reaction to the annual European Parliament's report on the ECB in its subsequent annual reports;

Amendment 243 #

Olle SCHMIDT, Sylvie GOULARD, Nils TORVALDS, Sharon BOWLES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 a (new)

27a. Takes the view that the EU institutions, including the ECB, should lead by example in the field of gender balance and that it is essential that the gender representation among leading positions within the ECB be improved in order to better represent European citizens;

Amendment 244 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 b (new)

27b. Deeply disapproves of the fact the Member States ignored the negative vote in the European Parliament, both in the ECON Committee and in the plenary, because of the lack of gender balance perspective during the appointment of Yves Mersch;

Amendment 245 #

Olle SCHMIDT, Sylvie GOULARD, Nils TORVALDS, Sharon BOWLES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 c (new)

27c. Urges the Member States to incorporate a gender-balance perspective with possibility for positive action on the basis of a balanced gender representation in regard to the appointment of members to the Executive Board; whenever a vacancy arises on the Executive Board, Euro Member States should be encouraged to nominate two candidates, one male and one female, for the vacant position;

Amendment 246 #

Olle SCHMIDT, Sylvie GOULARD, Nils TORVALDS, Sharon BOWLES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 d (new)

27d. Believes that the principles of gender balance in appointment to leading positions should also apply to the Steering Committee and Advisory Committee of the ESRB as well as the Boards of Supervisors of the ESAs;

Amendment 247 #

Olle SCHMIDT, Sylvie GOULARD, Nils TORVALDS, Sharon BOWLES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 e (new)

27e. Believes that Member States should also be encouraged to appoint women as governors of the National Central Banks (NCBs) in order to achieve a better gender balance on the Governing Council and the General Council of the ECB as well as on the General Board of the ESRB;

Amendment 25 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)

Ga. whereas Article 123 TFEU and Article 21 of Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank prohibit the monetary financing of governments;

Amendment 26 #

Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Olle SCHMIDT, Nils TORVALDS

Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)

Ga. whereas a low-inflation environment is the best contribution monetary policy can make to creating favourable conditions for economic growth, job creation, social cohesion and financial stability;

Amendment 27 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)

Ga. whereas the recommendations concerning transparency of voting and the publication of summary minutes put forward in previous Parliament resolutions on the ECB annual reports have not yet been taken into account;

Amendment 28 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G b (new)

Gb. whereas a low-inflation environment is the best contribution monetary policy can make to creating favourable conditions for economic growth, job creation, social cohesion and financial stability;

Amendment 29 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G b (new)

Gb. whereas actions of national macro- prudential authorities should take account of the responsibility of the European Systemic Risk Board for macro-prudential oversight of financial system within the EU;

Amendment 3 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)

- having regard to the 83rd Annual Report 2012/2013 of the Bank for International Settlements,

Amendment 30 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G b (new)

Gb. whereas maintaining a flow of credit to SMEs is particularly important as they employ 72 % of the eurozone's labour force and have significantly higher gross job creation (and destruction) rates than large enterprises;

Amendment 31 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G c (new)

Gc. whereas the recommendations put forward in previous European Parliament resolutions on the ECB annual reports concerning transparency of voting and publication of summary minutes have not yet been taken into account;

Amendment 32 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G c (new)

Gc. whereas the deposit facility held EUR 315.754 million on 28 September 2012;

Amendment 33 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G d (new)

Gd. whereas credit in the Eurozone is falling by 2% annually and in some countries as Spain the annual fall is at 8% only in 2012;

Amendment 34 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G e (new)

Ge. whereas SMEs have to pay much higher borrowing costs depending on the country of the Eurozone in which they are situated, creating distortions in the single market;

Amendment 35 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G f (new)

Gf. whereas the borrowing costs of SMEs are no longer related to their balance sheet and viability but to their origin inside the Eurozone;

Amendment 36 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital G g (new)

Gg. Believes that the credit crunch that is currently affecting SMEs in some parts of the Eurozone is one of the fundamental problems delaying the economic recovery;

Amendment 37 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 (new)

-1. Welcomes the bold measures taken by the ECB in 2012, which have contributed in a decisive manner to the stabilisation of the banking sector and helping to sever the link between the banks and the sovereign;

Amendment 38 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Is deeply concerned at the fact that persistently weak economic conditions are becoming the norm in Europe~~, creating overwhelming discontent among European citizens~~ in parts of the EU, creating instability for the Eurozone as a whole and there~~fore jeopardising the whol~~atening the support of the European project;

Amendment 39 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Is deeply concerned at the fact that ~~persistently~~ weak economic conditions ~~are becoming the norm~~persist in Europe, creating ~~overwhelming~~ discontent among European citizens and ~~therefore jeopardising the whole European project~~businesses;

Amendment 4 #

Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)

- having regard to the 83rd Annual Report of the Bank of International Settlements published on 23 June 2013,

Amendment 40 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Is deeply concerned ~~at the fact~~ that persistently weak economic conditions ~~are becoming the norm in Europe, creating overwhelming~~create discontent among European citizens ~~and therefore jeopardising the whol~~with the European project;

Amendment 41 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Is deeply concerned about the ~~fact that~~ persistently weak economic conditions ~~are becoming the norm in Europe,~~experienced across the EU which creat~~ing~~e overwhelming discontent among European citizens and therefore jeopardising the whole European project;

Amendment 42 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Is deeply concerned at the fact that persistently weak economic conditions are becoming the norm in Europe, creating overwhelming discontent among European citizens and uncertainty regarding investors, therefore jeopardising the whole European project;

Amendment 43 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Is deeply concerned at the fact that persistently ~~weak~~very difficult economic conditions are becoming the norm in many Member States in Europe, creating overwhelming discontent among European citizens and therefore jeopardising the whole European project;

Amendment 44 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Welcomes the readiness of the ECB to do whatever it takes to save the Euro; underlines and welcomes the fact that the ECB Governing Council considers that its mandate allows it to fight excessive borrowing costs for Euro area Member States;

Amendment 45 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Notes that the recourse to the main refinancing operations, the medium and long-term refinancing operations with full allotment at fixed rates, the recourse to the marginal lending facility, the ELAs and the deposit facility remained all at significantly high levels throughout 2012 signalling a severe impairment of the monetary transmission mechanism and the Eurozone interbank lending market, albeit a significant improvement in the situation signalled by the stabilization of spreads and TARGET II imbalances was observed over the second half of the year;

Amendment 46 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. WBel~~comes~~ieves that the positive effects of the decisions of July 2012 to reduce the key ECB interest rates ~~in the context of very low inflation expectations and weak economic activity~~are limited as in many parts of the Eurozone the monetary transmission channel is broken or deeply impaired;

Amendment 47 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Welcomes the decisions of July 2012 to reduce the key ECB interest rates in the context of very low inflation expectations and weak economic activity; recalls that, in the long term, very low interest rates may cause distortions in the business sector and harm private savings and pension plans;

Amendment 48 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. ~~Welcom~~Notes the decisions of July 2012 to reduce the key ECB interest rates in the context of very low inflation expectations and weak economic activity;

Amendment 49 #

Nils TORVALDS, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. ~~Welcom~~Notes the decisions of July 2012 to reduce the key ECB interest rates in the context of very low inflation expectations and weak economic activity;

Amendment 5 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas, according to the Commission services' spring 2013 forecast, GDP in the eurozone fell by 0.6 % in 2012 , after a rise of 1.4 % in 2011 and will contract by 0.4 % in 2013 before rising by 1.2 % in 2014;

Amendment 50 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Points out that, in addressing the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 8 July 2013, the ECB President announced that key ECB interest rates were expected to remain at current or lower levels for an extended period based on limited medium-term inflation estimates and the need to underpin the real economy;

Amendment 51 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Underlines that the overall price stability objective in the Euro area is not undermined by non conventional policies implemented by the ECB given that an expansion of reserves in excess of compulsory requirement does not give banks more resources to expand lending nor represent idle resources but merely changes the composition of liquid assets of the banking system;

Amendment 52 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Notes that the banking system’s demand for liquidity from the Eurosystem increased in 2012, thus strengthening the dependence of the banking system on the Eurosystem’s intervention, and warns of the risks of such dependence;deleted

Amendment 53 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Notes with concern that the banking system's demand for liquidity from the Eurosystem increased in 2012, thus strengthening the dependence of the banking system on the Eurosystem's intervention, and warns of the risks of such dependence;

Amendment 54 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Considers that the three-year LTRO settled on March 2012 contributed to stabilising the banking system, but that this is~~hould be~~ a temporary measure; notes that, despite the ~~liquidity injected in~~unprecedented level of support and implicit subsidies provided by the Eurosystem to the banking system ~~by the LTRO~~, the credit available to the real economy is still well below pre-crisis levels; ~~suggests that it would b~~underlines the fact that ECB Governing Council has expressed its readiness to use, where appropriate, f~~or the ECB to reduce its deposit facilit~~urther measures to restore the monetary tra~~te to negative values in order to encourage banking lending to the real economy~~nsmission mechanism such as a further reduction of interest rates, including a reduction of its deposit facility rate to negative values;

Amendment 55 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Considers that the three-year LTRO settled on March 2012 contributed to stabilising the banking system, but that this should be a temporary measure; notes that, despite the liquidity injected into the banking system by the LTRO, the credit available to the real economy is still below pre-crisis levels; ~~suggests that it would be appropriate for the ECB to reduce~~understands that the demand for credits by business its ~~deposit facility rate to negative values in order to encourage banking lending to the real economy~~presently at a very low level, making it difficult for banks to lend;

Amendment 56 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Considers that the three-year LTRO settled on March 2012 contributed to stabilising the banking system, but that this should be a temporary measure; notes that, despite the liquidity injected into the banking system by the LTRO, the credit available to the real economy is still below pre-crisis levels; ~~suggests that it would be appropriate for the ECB to reduce its deposit facility rate to negative values in order to encourage banking lending to the real economy;~~

Amendment 57 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Considers that the three-year LTRO settled on March 2012 contributed to stabilising the banking system, but that this should be a temporary measure; notes that, despite the liquidity injected into the banking system by the LTRO, the credit available to the real economy is still below pre-crisis levels; ~~suggests that it would be appropriate for the ECB to reduce its deposit facility rate to negative values in order to encourage banking lending to the real economy;~~

Amendment 58 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Considers that the three-year LTRO settled on March 2012 contributed to stabilising the banking system, but that this should be a temporary measure; notes that, despite the liquidity injected into the banking system by the LTRO, the credit available to the real economy is still below pre-crisis levels; ~~suggests that it would be appropriate for the ECB to reduce its deposit facility rate to negative values in order to encourage banking lending to the real economy;~~

Amendment 59 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Considers that the three-year LTRO ~~settled on March~~s announced on 8 December 20121 contributed to stabilising the banking system, but that this should be a temporary measure; notes that, despite the liquidity injected into the banking system by the LTRO, the credit available to the real economy is still below pre-crisis levels; suggests that it would be appropriate for the ECB to ~~reduce its deposit facility rate to negative values in order to~~ encourage banking lending to the real economy if necessary by conditioning its support;

Amendment 6 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas, according to the same forecast, unemployment in the eurozone rose from 10.2 % at the end of 2011 to 11.4 % at the end of 2012, with major differences being observed between eurozone countries where the unemployment figures vary between 4.3% and 25%, the percentages being even higher in respect of youth unemployment;

Amendment 60 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Considers that the three-year LTRO settled on March 2012 contributed to stabilising the banking system, but that this should be a temporary measure; notes that, despite the liquidity injected into the banking system by the LTRO, the credit available to the real economy is still below pre-crisis levels; suggests that it would be appropriate for the ECB to reduce its deposit facility rate to ~~negative values in order to encourage banking lending to the real economy~~the maximum extent possible;

Amendment 61 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Considers that the three-year LTRO settled on March 2012 contributed to stabilising the banking system, but that this should be a temporary measure; notes that, despite the liquidity injected into the banking system by the LTRO, the credit available to the real economy is still below pre-crisis levels; ~~suggests that it would be appropriate for the ECB to reduce its deposit facility rate to negative values in order to encourage banking lending to the real economy;~~

Amendment 62 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Is deeply concerned about the transfer of risks from struggling banks and governments onto the ECB's balance sheet as a result of the ECB's decision to buy 'unlimited' amounts of short-term government debt; stresses that the LTROs do not provide a fundamental solution to the crisis;

Amendment 63 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Remarks that the LTROs were used by the banks to buy sovereign debt and refinance their bonds but credit to SMEs has not grown as a result of it;

Amendment 64 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 b (new)

4b. Regrets that two enterprises from the automotive sector used the LTRO to finance themselves though their banking branch; asks the ECB not to permit this situation in the future;

Amendment 65 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Stresses that the availability of the ECB to provide further support to the financial and banking system must be properly subject to conditionality, in particular the commitment by institutions benefiting from such support to increase levels of credit to small and medium-sized enterprises and to households, without which such efforts would prove to be ineffective;deleted

Amendment 66 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

Amendment 67 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. ~~Stresses that the availability of the ECB to provide further support to the financial and banking system must be properly subject to conditionality, in particular~~Underlines that institutions which have benefited from extraordinary central bank liquidity support should be subject to conditionality, in particular by establishing, in the same vein as the 'funding for lending' scheme implemented in the UK, loan targets to the real economy and requiring the commitment by institutions benefiting from such support to increase levels of credit to ~~small and medium-sized enterprises and to households~~the real economy, without which such efforts would prove to be ineffective;

Amendment 68 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. ~~Stresses that the availability of the ECB to provide fur~~Asks the ECB to take into account the possibility that in the future, ther support to the financial and banking system ~~must be properly~~ to be subject to conditionality, in particular the commitment by institutions benefiting from such support to increase levels of credit or decreasing borrowing interest rates to small and medium-sized enterprises and to households, without which such efforts would prove to be ineffective;

Amendment 69 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Stresses that the availability of the ECB to provide further support to the financial and banking system must be properly subject to conditionality, in particular the commitment by institutions benefiting from such support to increase levels of credit to the real economy, to small and medium-sized enterprises and to households, without which such efforts would prove to be ineffective;

Amendment 7 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas, according to the same forecast, unemployment in the eurozone rose from 10.2 % at the end of 2011 to 11.4 % at the end of 2012 and youth unemployment increased significantly over the same period;

Amendment 70 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Stresses that the availability of the ECB to provide further support to the financial and banking system must be properly subject to strong conditionality, in particular the commitment by institutions benefiting from such support to increase levels of credit to small and medium-sized enterprises and to households, without which such efforts would prove to be ineffective;

Amendment 71 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Recalls its position on the CRD IV negotiation process to impose additional conditions to institutions having benefited from ECB liquidity support; underlines that such conditionality should be directly linked to the economic benefits provided to banks by means of the non- conventional monetary policy measures, among which the three and one years maturity funding (LTRO), the decrease in the levels of compulsory reserves, the full allotment at fixed rates for its refinancing operations and the enlargement of the spectrum of eligible collateral;

Amendment 72 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Considers that the ECB bond-buying programmes violate at least the intent, if not the letter, of Article 123 TFEU; urges the ECB to refrain from assuming a political role and monetary financing government deficits;

Amendment 73 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Considers that a national central bank's functions must be performed in a matter that is fully compatible with the functional, institutional and financial independence to safeguard the proper performance of its tasks under the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the ECB;

Amendment 74 #

Anni PODIMATA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Notes that the transmission of monetary policy is not effective throughout the Eurozone since interest rates in countries facing economic difficulties are disproportionately high; underlines that higher interest rates in these countries are not only hampering the financing of the economy and its recovery but they also distort competition in the Internal Market; calls, therefore, on the ECB to introduce as soon as possible new instruments to address the ineffective transmission of monetary policy;

Amendment 75 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Underlines that insufficient growth in the European business sector is not mainly due to the insufficient availability of credit offered by the banking sector;

Amendment 76 #

Anni PODIMATA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)

5b. Considers that the use of Emergency Liquidity Assistance facility should not in cases of resolution result to an excessive burden for sovereigns or banks inheriting assets of a resolved bank; invites the ECB, also in its capacity as a member of the troikas where applicable, to support favourable terms of repayment of ELA in all such cases;

Amendment 77 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)

5b. Is concerned about the fact that credit tightening appears to be very severe for the SMEs, because they are perceived by banks to have a higher probability of default than larger firms and also because SMEs are often unable to switch from bank credit to other sources of external finance;

Amendment 78 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 c (new)

5c. Stresses its concern regarding the considerable fragmentation of lending conditions for SMEs across Euro area countries;

Amendment 79 #

Nils TORVALDS, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

~~6. Underlines the important role played by the SMP in addressing the malfunctioning of certain eurozone sovereign debt securities market segments;~~deleted

Amendment 8 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas, according to the same forecast, unemployment in the eurozone rose from 10.2 % at the end of 2011 to 11.4 % at the end of 2012 and risks further increasing to 12.2 % in 2013 before slightly decreasing again in 2014;

Amendment 80 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Underlines the ~~important~~ role played by the SMPecurities Markets Programme (SMP) in ~~add~~decresasing ~~the malfunctioning of certain eurozone sovereign debt securities market segments~~unsustainably high financing costs for some eurozone Member States; welcomes the winding-down of the SMP;

Amendment 81 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Underlines the important role played by the SMP until September 2012 in addressing the malfunctioning of certain eurozone sovereign debt securities market segments;

Amendment 82 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Underlines the important, albeit, limited role played by the SMP in addressing the malfunctioning of certain eurozone sovereign debt securities market segments;

Amendment 83 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. ~~Underlines the important role played by~~Notes the role of the SMP in addressing the malfunctioning of certain eurozone sovereign debt securities market segments;

Amendment 84 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. ~~Underlines the important role played by the SMP in addressing the malfunctioning of certain eurozone sovereign debt securities market segment~~Notes the positive effects played by the SMP on the sovereign debt; warns that this should not be considered by the banking sector or governments to be a permanent fixture, as the role of a central bank is neither the recapitalisation of governments, nor the attempt to influence the interest rates of sovereign bonds;

Amendment 85 #

Nils TORVALDS, Olle SCHMIDT, Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS, Wolf KLINZ

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Welcomes the ~~setting-up of the OMTs, with no ex ante quantitative limits, in order to safeguard monetary policy transmission, but deplores the~~ decision to link the activation of the OMT to strict conditionalities attached to an EFSF/ESM programme; ~~calls on the ECB to activate OMTs independently from strict conditionality;~~

Amendment 86 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Welcomes the setting-up of the OMTs~~, with no ex ante quantitative limits,~~ in order to safeguard monetary policy transmission~~, but deplores the decision to link the activation of the OMT to strict conditionalities attached to an EFSF/ESM programme; calls on the ECB to activate OMTs independently from strict conditionality~~;

Amendment 87 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. ~~Welcom~~Notes the setting-up of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs), with no ex ante quantitative limits, ~~in order to safeguard~~aimed at safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission, b~~ut deplor~~y providing a liquidity backstop for sovereign debt markets; welcomes the decision to link the activation of the OMTs to strict and effective conditionalit~~ies~~y attached to an E~~FSF/ESM~~uropean Financial Stability Facility/European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM) programme; ~~call~~is con ~~the ECB to activate OMTs independently from strict conditionality~~cerned about the compliance of OMTs with the prohibition on monetary financing laid down in Article 123 TFEU;

Amendment 88 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Welcomes the setting-up of the OMTs, with no ex ante quantitative limits, in order to safeguard monetary policy transmission~~, but deplores the decision to link the activation of the OMT to strict conditionalities attached to an EFSF/ESM programme; calls on the ECB to activate OMTs independently from strict conditionality~~;

Amendment 89 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Welcomes the setting-up of the OMTs, with no ex ante quantitative limits, in order to safeguard monetary policy transmission, ~~but deplores~~takes note of the decision to link the activation of the OMT to strict conditionalities attached to an ~~EFSF/~~ESM programme; ~~calls on the ECB to activate OMTs independently from strict conditionality~~takes note of the ECB President's commitment that the OMT legal documentation will be disclosed whenever there is an application to the programme; underlines that new mechanisms should be created so as to increase the democratic accountability of ESM programmes; stresses the need to avoid designing assistance programmes under overoptimistic assumptions and scenarios which may result in self- defeating and pro-cyclical effects;

Amendment 9 #

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas in 2012 the ECB reduced interest rates once, in July (25 basis point), reducing them further to a historic low of 0.50% in May 2013;

Amendment 90 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Welcomes the setting-up of the OMTs, with no ex ante quantitative limits, in order to safeguard monetary policy transmission, ~~but deplor~~and welcomes the decision to link the activation of the OMT to strict conditionalities attached to an EFSF/ESM programme; ~~calls on the ECB to activate OMTs independently from strict conditionality;~~

Amendment 91 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. ~~Welcomes~~Points out that the setting-up of the OMTs, with no ex ante quantitative limits, in order to safeguard monetary policy transmission, ~~but deplores the decision to link~~might facilitate the financing of Member States in difficulty and send a clear signal to the markets that the ECB were firmly and totally committed to an accommodative monetary policy if that decision were not linked to the activation of the OMT ton the basis of strict conditionalities attached to an EFSF/ESM programme; calls on the ECB to activate OMTs independently from strict conditionality;

Amendment 92 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Welcomes the setting-up of the OMTs, with no ex ante quantitative limits, in order to safeguard monetary policy transmission, but deplores the decision to link the activation of the OMT to strict conditionalities attached to ~~an EFSF/ESM programme; calls on the ECB to activate OMTs independently from strict conditionality~~the European Financial Stability Fund / European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM) programme;

Amendment 93 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. ~~Welcomes~~Takes note of the setting-up of the OMTs, with no ex ante quantitative limits, in order to safeguard monetary policy transmission, ~~but depl~~and supporets the decision to link the activation of the OMT to strict conditionalities attached to an EFSF/ESM programme; ~~calls on the ECB to activate OMTs independently from strict conditionality;~~

Amendment 94 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Welcomes the setting-up of the OMTs, with no ex ante quantitative limits, in order to safeguard monetary policy transmission, ~~but deplor~~welcomes the decision to link the activation of the OMT to strict conditionalities attached to an EFSF/ESM programme; ~~calls on the ECB to activate OMTs independently from strict conditionality;~~

Amendment 95 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Believes that the punitive financing conditions enforced by the ECB under the adjustment programmes being applied to several Member States are adding to the difficulties that those countries are facing as regards their government accounts, thus exacerbating the snowball effect from which they were already suffering;

Amendment 96 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)

7b. Considers that the role which the ECB has assumed in relation to Member States, in recommending – not to say imposing – fiscal and tax policies, changes to the labour market, the privatisation of public services, and other measures, clearly goes beyond even a sweeping interpretation of its task, which is to conduct monetary policy in the eurozone;

Amendment 97 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

~~8. Considers unnecessary the full sterilisation of the liquidity injected by the OMTs, as inflation expectations remain extremely low in a context of weak economic activity;~~deleted

Amendment 98 #

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

~~8. Considers unnecessary the full sterilisation of the liquidity injected by the OMTs, as inflation expectations remain extremely low in a context of weak economic activity;~~deleted

Amendment 99 #